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Abstract:
Since the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programmes in West
Africa, the role of the national governments has changed considerably. Prices
are no longer controlled by the state and governments do no longer intervene
as major marketing agents. It remains to be seen whether the free market
system leads indeed to an efficient food allocation, especially in remote and
less endowed regions. In this report a quantitative analysis is made of arbitrage
in time and space. We pursue two objectives. First, a model is developed to
simulate the interaction between the various agents on the market: producers,
traders and consumers. Particular attention is given to 1) differences between
perfect and monopolistic markets; 2) farmers’ supply behaviour in various
seasons, and 3) optimal traders’ strategies. A stochastic, spatial equilibrium
model is set up to analyse price formation and optimal supply, demand,
transport and storage strategies by the market actors.
Secondly, the model is used to analyse the direct impact of transport and
storage costs on the distribution of cereals in space and time in Burkina Faso,
in West Africa. In particular, it is analysed how changes in these costs
influence cereal prices, consumption, sales, transport and storage in all regions
of the country and during all periods of the year. An important question is to
what extent the most vulnerable regions are affected by these changes. In the
literature on the functioning of food markets in West Africa transport costs are
often perceived as a major constraint for food marketing and rural
development in general. The results, however, indicate that the direct impact
of these costs on prices and cereal distribution is only marginal. This is mainly
due to the inability of farmers to increase production, and the inability of
consumers to increase purchases. The paper concludes with a discussion on
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11 Introduction
This report deals with trade on cereal markets in semi-arid West Africa, and the
distribution of cereals in particular. A quantitative analysis will be made of arbitrage
in space and time. In many West African countries trade costs, i.e. transport, storage
and transaction costs, are said to be high, induced by an inefficient market system. In
the literature on the functioning of food markets in West Africa, these costs are often
perceived as a major constraint for food trade and rural development in general. Since
the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes in Africa the role of national
governments in the food market has been reduced considerably. Prices are no longer
controlled by the state but have been liberalized, and governments do no longer
intervene as major marketing agents, because markets have been privatized. A lively
debate is taking place on the effects of these programmes on poverty alleviation (see
e.g. Sahn et al., 1997, Thorbecke, 2000). Despite some improvements, it is still an
open question whether the free market system leads indeed to a greater food security
in West Africa due to a more efficient market system, especially in remote and less
endowed regions. In this report this question is addressed.1
We pursue two objectives. First, an instrument will be developed to analyse the
interaction between the various actors on the market: producers, traders and
consumers. Spatial equilibrium models (see e.g. Samuelson, 1952; Takayama and
Judge, 1971; Judge and Takayama, 1973; Martin, 1981; Florian and Los, 1982; Labys
et al., 1989; Guvenen et al., 1990; Roehner, 1995; Van den Berg et al., 1995) are used
as instruments of analysis. They describe arbitrage in space and time. In the first part
of this paper the theory of these models is discussed. In three respects the spatial
                                                      
1
 This research is a component of a joint research programme on food security in West Africa, in which
researchers of the University of Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, of the Institute of the Environment and
Agricultural Research (INERA) in Burkina Faso and of the Centre for Development Studies of the
University of Groningen participate. Some of the research deals with modelling the behaviour of various
agents on cereal markets and of interregional cereal flows between markets (see e.g. Yonli, 1997, SirpJ,
2000, Bassolet, 2000, Maatman, 1996, 2000, Lutz and Bassolet, 1999).
2equilibrium models as developed in this paper differ from standard theory. First,
equilibrium models are set up for both perfectly competitive and monopolistic
models. Secondly, the farmers’ supply of cereals in various periods of the year
depends on supply decisions in previous periods and on uncertain prices in later
periods. Thirdly, the traders’ optimal strategies of buying from the producers and
selling to the consumers are explicitly taken into account.
The second objective is the application of these models to the cereal market in
Burkina Faso. It will in particular be analysed what the direct impact is of transport
and storage costs on the distribution of cereals in space and time in Burkina Faso. It is
analysed how changes in these costs influence cereal prices, consumption, sales,
transport and storage in all regions of the country and during all periods of the year.
An important question is to what extent the most vulnerable regions and trade are
affected by these changes during the lean season. Marketed cereal flows between
surplus and shortage regions in the various periods of the year are calculated as
functions of farmers’ supply, consumers’ demand and traders’ strategies of
purchasing, selling, storage and transport. Key parameters in the models will be
estimated on the basis of an extensive exploration of many resources. 2
First, in Chapter 2, some characteristics of food markets in developing countries are
reviewed. Some persistent imperfections of the food market in many developing
countries are discussed. These imperfections determine to a large extent the
functioning of the food market, and are used as a background to the model .
The Chapters 3 and 4 are also of an introductory nature. A review is given of some
basic elements of optimization theory, stochastic programming and of
micro-economics, which will be used in later chapters. In Chapter 3, some elements
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 See for example studies of the University of Michigan and the University of Wisconsin (McCorkle,
1987; Szarleta, 1987; Sherman et al., 1987), of CILSS (Pieroni, 1990), of ICRISAT (Reardon et al.,
1987, 1988a, 1988b, 1989, 1992), of Yonli (1997), of Broekhuyse (1988, 1998), of INSD (1995a, 1995b,
1996a, 1996b, 1998), of the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resource (1984-1996), and data
provided by SIM/SONAGESS.
3of non-linear programming will be discussed, in particular necessary conditions
(Lagrange and Kuhn-Tucker conditions) for optimality. These conditions play a key
role in the interpretation of results of applying spatial equilibrium models. The review
of the non-linear programming is set up step by step; we start with simple non-linear
programming problems with only non-negativity constraints and finish with
complicated problems with general non-linear equality and inequality constraints.
Furthermore, the theory of stochastic programming is briefly discussed in Section 3.5,
in order to analyse in Chapter 7 decision making under uncertainty. Chapter 4 reviews
some basic concepts from micro-economics. Attention is focused on supply and
demand functions and their properties and some basic concepts of equilibrium. These
introductory chapters are included, because the present paper is intended to be used as
well as teaching material for university students in developing countries, who not
always have easily access to the proper literature. Readers who are already familiar
with the contents, may skip these chapters.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 deal with the theory of spatial equilibrium models. All models
deal with only one commodity, cereals. In the Chapters 5 and 6 a distinction is made
between equilibrium models for a perfect market system where a large number of
competitive producers, traders and consumers operate who are all price takers and for
a monopolistic market system where the traders can set the prices to some extent. The
spatial equilibrium models of Chapter 5 deal with n markets and one period of time.
No storage is involved. In Chapter 6 multi-period spatial equilibrium models are
discussed. Here storage is a key factor. For the model of Chapter 6, future prices are
assumed to be known. In Chapter 7 multi-period spatial equilibrium models are
discussed for a situation with uncertain future prices. Supply, demand and storage
decisions are based on what is observed on the market, and on what is expected to
happen in the future. In the Chapters 5, 6 and 7 much attention is given to the
interpretation of results and properties of the solutions, and to the optimality of the
individual strategies of the agents: producers, traders and consumers.
4In Chapter 8 empirical evidence of the market behaviour of the different actors is
discussed for the case of Burkina Faso. On the basis of a large number of surveys
performed in the past, supply and demand behaviour of cereal producers and
consumers is discussed, as well as the costs involved in cereal trade. In Chapter 9
supply and demand functions, key elements of the stochastic, multi-period, spatial
equilibrium models, are presented for Burkina Faso. On the basis of the evidence
presented in Chapter 8 cereal demand is estimated per period as a function of cereal
prices. Furthermore, the distribution of cereal supply over the year as a function of
cereal production and cereal prices is estimated. In Section 9.3, the stochastic, multi-
period, spatial equilibrium model discussed in Chapter 7 is shortly summarized.
In Chapter 10, results of the stochastic, multi-period, spatial equilibrium model
presented in Chapter 7 are discussed. It is a case study of regional transport of cereals
in Burkina Faso. The paper concludes with some reflections on the results and on the
use of these models.
52 Food allocation by the market: an overview of persistent
imperfections
The functioning of food markets is a major policy issue in many developing
countries. The reason of its importance is twofold. Firstly, availability of food is a
precondition for survival and socio-economic stability and, secondly, many regions
regularly face climatic hazards (supply shocks). Food markets play an important role
in food distribution. Their performance is the result of a complex set of institutions
(rules) which regulates exchange and initiatives undertaken by individuals (traders,
farmers) and governmental and non-governmental organizations (cereal banks, co-
operatives).
In the commonly used neo-classical perfect market theory strong assumptions are
made to simplify this complex set of institutions:
• Farmers and traders are price takers, because their large numbers preclude any
influence on prices.
• No uncertainty or risk exists, as information on market conditions is perfect.
• No entry or exit barriers constrain the behaviour of potential competitors.
• The commodity is homogeneous: quality and variety do not influence prices.
Rural food markets in Africa differ from this ideal market type. This section presents
some of these features, which do not correspond with the ‘perfect conditions’.
In the debates on the food policy in the semi-arid tropics policy-makers and
researchers have tended to view sedentary rural households as dependent almost
exclusively on their own cereal production to ensure household food security.3 Rural
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 Indeed, farmers have taken new and promising initiatives to master the food situation. These activities
include among others:
- activities on the farm-household level: improvement of strategies to reduce risks of low yields by
careful choice of different varieties and of intercropping and rotation patterns, and by timely
land-preparation and sowing; adoption of low external input methods to restore soil fertility and water
management methods to improve hydrological capacities of soils; use of animal draught power for land
6markets were seen as primary markets that should simply drain surpluses to urban
deficit markets. Various recent research results have undermined this view and show
that many farm households are net buyers of substantial food quantities (see Reardon
et al., 1989 and 1992). Revenues from livestock and nonfarm activities provide an
important part of the necessary food entitlements for the rural population. This
implies that trade flows within a country are much more complex than the simple
‘model’ of rural areas that provision urban centres. The rural economies are
increasingly monetized and nowadays food markets play a crucial role in food
distribution. Petty trade and processing activities are an important income source for
many of the poor.
Properly functioning markets will serve both the producers at the one end of the
marketing chain and the consumers at the other end; market failures will affect
opportunities for producers, as well as food availability for consumers. Views on the
performance of  food markets in developing countries have shifted in the course of
time. During the 1960s the debate stressed the existence of market failures. For
example:
• Due to a lack of competition traders were alleged to abuse their market power.
• A lack of capital and credit constituted an entry barrier for small traders.
• Due to a lack of information, market integration was deficient.
                                                                                                                                             
preparation and weeding; agroforestry and the integration of animal husbandry and crop production;
investments in non-farming activities (trade, processing);
- ’collective activities’ by farmers’ groups: village cooperatives working together on the construction of
small water-reservoirs, anti-erosive measures and horticulture; exchange of information between farmer
groups; education and information activities; establishment of cereal banks with the aim of building up
reserve stocks to strengthen food security in the village and to improve the local distribution and
marketing system.
They have taken up the twofold challenge: survival in the lean season and the transformation towards a
more sustainable agrarian system. Some of these initiatives are almost entirely based on strategies of
‘self-reliance’ in food production. However, others do rely directly or indirectly on market-exchanges.
These initiatives can be individual or collective; the latter, often structured by ‘new’ forms of agrarian
institutions, aim to improve access to product- and factor-markets (in particular food, finance and inputs)
for some group of relatively ‘isolated’ farmers.
7In line with the desire of the newly independent African states to plan economic
development, interventionist policies were developed to correct for these failures.
However, the 1970s have shown that many of the so-called ‘market failures’ were
only replaced by ‘government failures’. Ellis (1992) summarises the government
failures as follows:
• Information failures. It appeared almost always wrong to assume that state
officials have any clearer idea, of the supply and demand conditions in the market
than private sector operators. This resulted in serious misallocation and the
coexistence of a network of formal and informal parallel markets.
• Complex side effects. Interventions have secondary effects in an economy, e.g.
policies striving for low consumer prices may lower farm-gate prices or increase
government budget-deficits.
• Implementation and motivation failures. Most of the developing countries are
‘soft states’ with ‘soft bureaucracies’, making the implementation of  market
policies all over the country's territory a difficult task. Moreover, low salaries
affect the motivation of the civil servants in charge.
• Rent-seeking. Under the above-mentioned conditions state action may easily lead
to bribery and malpractice.
As a result of the experiences in the 1970s, structural adjustment policies in the 1980s
and 1990s advocated market liberalization. These have put to an end the
interventionist policies of many governments. The new market policies foster the
functioning of the market. Despite the liberalization, several market imperfections
(market failures) persist.
2.1 Seasonal and spatial arbitrage with imperfect information
Food production is not synchrone with food consumption. For example, in the
semi-arid areas of West Africa, producers have only one harvest a year, while
consumption is continuous. Moreover, harvests are regularly threatened by climatic
hazards: yields are volatile and the start of the harvest (end of the lean season) differs
8between the years. This seasonal aspect may cause substantial price fluctuations, as
storage costs (due to storage losses and capital needs to finance the cereals) are
important and information on local supply and demand conditions is imperfect.
Indeed, prices in the cereal market can be volatile: during the harvest the value of old
stocks depreciates quickly (30 to 50% in a few weeks) and, on the contrary, prices
may be sky-high at the end of the lean season as traders are hesitant to run the price
risk and keep only minimum amounts of cereals in stock. Under these conditions
traders may realize high speculative profits or losses, dependent on the accurateness
of their market price expectations. Moreover, the lack of access to credit seriously
hampers the functioning of seasonal arbitrage. Most traders operate with very small
funds and most farmers have little withholding capacity (they need money to settle
debts and household expenses), while credit, insurance or futures markets are
imperfect or missing.
In the same vein, we observe that the place of food production usually does not
correspond to the place of food consumption. In particular, after a bad year arbitrage
over long distances may be necessary to provision consumers. The food chain is
complex as many food producers are constrained by variable seasonal agro-ecological
conditions and appear to be net food buyers: local supply and demand conditions vary
between years and within years. This implies that adequate information on local
market conditions (prices, quantities, local market rules) is a prerequisite for
successful traders. In most of the African countries this information is difficult to
obtain as the telecommunication infrastructure is imperfect and market rules are
non-transparent. In many cases information depends on personal networks of
individual traders.
On a perfect market, prices convey information from households to firms concerning
what consumers want, and from firms to households about the production costs (see
Stiglitz, 1994:8). However, one of the major constraints, which hamper the
functioning of the rural markets, is imperfect information on the potential market
opportunities. In order to safeguard their existing trade relations, traders are reluctant
9to share their information with competitors. Some information simply does not exist
for instance information on uncertainty in the production process. Other sources of
information may exist but are not always accessible for all traders and farmers.
Moreover, in many countries official regulations are not transparent and their
implementation arbitrary. The existence of oligopolistic markets often seems to be
based on the possibility for certain wholesalers to detain specific information. In
practice we observe that traders stick to their individual marketing networks which
are nested in particular geographical regions. This restricts competition, as a lack of
information constitutes an entry barrier.
2.2 Thin markets
Most producers are peasants who are to a high degree self-sufficient with regard to
cereals and are incidentally buying/selling their deficit/surplus in the market. The
grain stock is perceived as a liquid source that may be used for urgently needed
household necessities. The problem for the market is that most of these transactions
concern small and highly variable quantities, scattered all over the country’s territory.
This fragmented structure inflates transaction costs: the assembly and distribution of
cereals becomes a labour-intensive and costly activity. An example may explain this
argument. In Benin, the average retailers’ turnover per market day is often less than
100 kg. If we assume an average price of 50 Fcfa per kg and a normal average income
per day of 500 Fcfa, then a net margin of at least 10% is necessary to remunerate the
retailer’s labour time, who is only one of the intermediaries in the market chain. If the
turnover doubles the margin for labour remuneration can be lowered significantly.
Despite the somewhat higher turnover of wholesalers, the same argument applies for
their activities.
The development of a personal network of trade agents and clients (farmers and
consumers) may provide traders the necessary information on supply and demand.
These networks may reduce the number of intermediairies in the market chain, as
well as the transaction costs. However, the elaboration of such a network presupposes
the availability of sufficient working capital (the agent has to be pre-financed) and
10
takes time. This constitutes an entry barrier for potential competitors. Moreover,
small marketable surpluses also restrict competition among traders (in particular
wholesalers), as only a limited number of traders are sufficient to drain the surplus.
Thin markets increase market imperfections (e.g. lack of competition) and high
transaction costs make markets even thinner or may result in missing markets. In
order to evade the high transaction costs, farmers may increase the number of
non-market transactions. Cereals can be exchanged within the family and some
services and goods can be paid in kind. Matthews (1986) formulated this issue as
follows: ‘Family production tends to make for high production costs because it
restricts exploitation of scale economies and may create mismatches between talents
and occupation. On the other hand it tends to reduce transaction costs, because if
instead you have a lot of dealing with strangers you have to devote more resources to
checking up on their personal characteristics and safeguarding yourself against
opportunism’. If transaction costs are high, it will decrease the competitiveness of
farmers and, consequently, they may decide to withdraw from the market (see de
Janvry et al., 1991). However, the disadvantage of this strategy is that food security of
farmers, who have no other food entitlements, will be at stake if production falls
short. Market exchange makes it possible to specialize, or to exploit comparative
advantages and to spread production risks (production of cash and food crops,
insurance against crop failures). If the transaction costs are high, these markets may
be missing (or imperfect) and, consequently, these opportunities will not be available
(or not interesting).
2.3 Missing or Incomplete markets
In most developing countries, the set of commodity and service markets is highly
incomplete. Imperfections in three related markets, providing essential services for
cereal trade, hamper the functioning of the food market and increase the transaction
costs:
• Transport services are only available to a limited extent. A small group of
large-scale wholesalers have their own transport facilities, but the majority of
11
small-scale traders depend on public transport facilities, which are mainly
oriented toward the urban centres. During rainy seasons large rural areas may
even become inaccessible. Consequently, the transport of commodities is less
flexible than required for optimal trade flows.
• Credit facilities constrain the commercial activities of traders and farmers, in
particular the storage function. The formal financial sector does not provide credit
for trade activities and even if credit facilities do exist, most traders and farmers
lack the necessary collateral (see Zeller et al., 1997).
• Finally, an insurance (harvest failures) and futures (hedging) market, accessible to
individual traders and farmers, does not exist. Hedging against price fluctuations
is impossible. Only recently some experiences are noted (see below). However,
the institutional structure necessary to guarantee the enforcement of these
contracts between individuals is weak, often resulting in the non-existence of this
market.
2.4 Markets and Famines
Agricultural production in developing countries is highly dependent on climatic
circumstances. Climatic hazards may provoke serious supply shocks, leading to food
deficits. Various authors have studied food insecurity and hunger situations and
particularly discussed the relationship between famines and markets (Ravallion, 1987;
DrPze and Sen, 1989). They have documented situations where market failures, thin
markets and missing food markets have made hunger and famines more severe.
Markets work badly during famines when panic buying and excess hoarding
exacerbates scarcities. The food insecurity is aggravated by the seasonality of food
production, which makes that food demand is highest during the lean season, whereas
the availability of food stocks is at its lowest level. Consequently, governments
should be alert and guarantee sufficient supply in drought prone areas. Adequate
policies are necessary to attenuate the problem of transitory food-insecurity.
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2.5 Alternative institutions to improve the food situation
Cereal Banks
Cereal banks are a type of organisation that may challenge the existing market
structure (Saul, 1987; Yonli, 1997). They concern a communal village organisation
that co-ordinates the marketing and storage of cereals. In general, cereals are bought
in harvest time and sold during the lean season to members of the community. The
idea behind this structure is that farmers in the rural areas are obliged to sell a part of
their production just after the harvest in order to settle debts and other financial
obligations. The same farmers have to buy during the lean season to supplement the
cereal deficit. Put differently, they sell low and buy high. The difference between
these prices may be considerable in a situation of remote semi-arid regions. In such
regions cereals may have to be imported over large distances. Rural population
density is low, meaning that the market is thin. Large-scale traders are not interested
in provisioning these regions, and supply may even be lacking. Under these
circumstances a farmers’ organisation (cereal bank) may be useful; there are
opportunities to beat the market.
Cereal banks substitute to a certain extent for market-exchanges, but at the same time
they may play a key-role in improving access of farmers to rural markets. The cereal
bank may provide farmers’ access to rural group credit schemes to finance cereal
stocks. The organization can also be helpful to develop new market strategies: buying
directly in surplus markets (rural centres), or selling directly in deficit markets (urban
centres). However, it should be noted that many cereal banks, established during the
last decade, failed. Often, the objectives were too ambitious and organisational
problems were frequent.
Cereal auction market (futures market)
A more recent initiative in Burkina Faso is quite interesting: the development of a
cereal auction market. In 1991 the auction started as an experiment, with the aim to
facilitate the exchange between farmers’ organisations, in particular cereal banks.
Nowadays also private traders are participating in this market. Yonli (1997) indicates
13
that the auction facilitates the functioning of cereal banks as it may provide the
structure to link directly surplus and deficit cereal banks and, consequently, limit
transaction costs. Moreover, the auction may introduce a futures cereal market as
contracts can be concluded for delivery at a certain time, which may result in an
effective instrument to protect farmers against price changes.
2.6 Final remarks
The presentation of persistent market failures is not meant to be a plea for
government intervention. Market institutions are complex and experiences with
interventions in the past have shown that also governments can fail. Nevertheless, the
challenge for market policies is still to foster improvements in market institutions that
decrease transaction costs and improve food-security.
The objective of this introduction was to enumerate some important imperfections
that characterize the functioning of food markets in developing countries. The models
presented in the following chapters are based on severe restrictions and do not take
into account all these imperfections. Mainly the problems of non-synchrone food
production and consumption (Section 2.1), and of thin markets (low supply and
demand by rural households; Section 2.2), are dealt with in the next chapters. The
models discussed in the Chapters 4, 5 and 6 pre-suppose perfect markets: atomistic
supply and demand, perfect information, perfect mobility (no entry or exit barriers),
homogeneity of commodities and, last but not least, the existence of a set of related
markets, such as transport, credit and insurance/futures markets. In Chapter 7 also the
problem of imperfect price information is discussed. In practice many of the perfect
market conditions are not fulfilled. This should be kept in mind when the results of
simplified models are interpreted.
14
3 Non-linear programming revisited
In the models to be described in the next chapters the behaviour of various agents -
producers, consumers and traders - is formulated in such a way that their decisions on
quantities to be produced, consumed or traded are the ‘best ones’. Of course, it will
not be easy to give a proper definition of the ‘best decisions’, in particular in a
situation where interests of producers, consumers and traders can be different, even
conflicting. This definition will be a key issue in the next chapters. The structure of
models describing the behaviour of the various agents is as follows: the maximum
value of a certain ‘objective function’ is to be found, where the decision variables
(e.g. quantities to be produced, consumed or traded) are determined in such a way that
certain conditions are to be satisfied (e.g. equilibrium conditions). Such models
belong to the class of optimization models, known as non-linear programming
models. In this chapter some basic elements of such models are reviewed.
Furthermore, in Section 3.5 the theory of stochastic programming is briefly discussed.
Let x be a n-dimensional vector with elements xj, j = 1,2,...,n. Here the problem of
determining the global or a local maximum of a non-linear function F(x) is dealt with.
The variables x may have to satisfy non-linear equality and inequality constraints. The
review is presented as follows. Stepwise, four maximization problems, (i) - (iv), will
be discussed. First in problem (i) the maximum of F(x) has to be found, where some
of the variables x have to satisfy (only) non-negativity constraints. Then, in problem
(ii), x has to satisfy only one (non-)linear equality constraint, in (iii) one (non-)linear
inequality constraint. Finally, in problem (iv) more (non-)linear equality and
inequality constraints are included. In this chapter a persistent distinction is made
between non-linear equality and inequality constraints on one hand and
non-negativity constraints on the other hand. The number n1 with n1 ≤ n refers to the
number of non-negativity constraints to be taken into account. The number m1 refers
to the number of (non-)linear equality constraints and m to the total number of
(non-)linear constraints - both equality and inequality constraints with the exception
of non-negativity constraints. Let g(x) and gi(x), i = 1, 2, …, m be (non-)linear
15
functions of x. In the next four sections the following maximization problems will be
discussed:
(i) max {F(x)  | x j  ≥  0 , j = 1,2,…,n 1}
(ii) max { F(x)  | g(x)  = 0 }
(iii) max { F(x)  | g(x)  ≥ 0 }
(iv) max {F(x)  | g i(x)  = 0, i=1,2,…,m1; gi(x)  ≥ 0, i = m 1+1, m 1+2,…,m;
x j ≥ 0, j = 1,2,…,n 1}
In this paper all functions F(x) ,  g(x)  and g i (x) , i = 1, 2, ..., m are assumed to be
differentiable. A function F(x)  is called concave, if for all x* and x and the scalar λ
with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 holds F(λx + (1-λ)x*)  ≥  λF(x) + (1-λ)F(x* ) ; strictly concave if
in this expression ≥ may be replaced by >. The function F(x)  is (strictly) convex, if
-F(x)  is (strictly) concave. A linear function is both concave and convex. A
differentiable function is concave if and only if for all x* and x holds





* *3 8 1 6 3 8 1 6− ≤ −
=
∑ ∂∂1
If F(x) is twice differentiable, then F(x) is (strictly) concave if and only if the n × n
Hessian matrix consisting of the elements ∂∂ ∂
2F
x xi j
, i = 1, 2, .., n; j = 1, 2, ..., n is negative
(semi-)definite (see e.g. Bazaraa et al., 1993: p. 91).
3.1 Non-negativity constraints



















, j = n1 +1, n1 +2, ..., n.
For a function in one variable x the conditions (3.2) and (3.3) are illustrated in Figure
3.1.
If F(x)  is concave, the conditions (3.2) - (3.4) imply that the function F(x)  is in the
point x the global maximum. This can be shown as follows. Consider any point x* ≠ x
satisfying *jx  ≥ 0, j=1,2,...,n1. Then it may be written - by making use of property
(3.1) and the conditions (3.2) - (3.4) - that F(x* )  ≤  F(x) . So F(x)  is the global




Figure 3.1: Illustration of the conditions (2) and (3) for a function F(x) in one variable
x. In situation (a) a maximum exists for x=0, in situation (b) for x>0.
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3.2 Equality constraint
The derivation of necessary optimality conditions for optimization problems where
equality constraints have to be satisfied is greatly due to Lagrange (1736 - 1813).
Assume that from g(x)  = 0 one of the variables, say x 1, can be expressed in terms of
the other variables x2,...,xn and we can write
(3.5) x 1 = ϕ ( x 2, x 3,..., xn ).
The function ϕ is assumed to be differentiable with respect to x 2 ,  x 3 , . . . ,  xn . The
maximization problem (ii) is equivalent to:
      Max { F(x 1, x 2, . . . ,xn ) | x 1 = ϕ (x 2, . . . ,xn) },
which is a maximization problem in the n-1 variables x 2 ,  x 3 , . . . ,  xn. Substituting x 1










+  = 0,  j = 2, ...,n.
If ϕ is known, then (3.6) is a set of n-1 equations, from which the values of the n-1
variables x 2 ,  . . . ,  xn  have to be determined. If ϕ is not known, then we can proceed as
follows. Since
  g (ϕ  (x2, x 3,..., xn ), x2,…,xn ) = 0










+  = 0,  j = 2, ...,n.
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Assume that in the solution of the maximization problem (ii) ∂∂gx1  ≠ 0 (otherwise in the
solution would hold, see (3.7), that all ∂∂ gx j = 0). So, it follows that




























 = 0, j = 2,…,n.
All terms in (3.8) are functions of the n variables x 1 ,  . . . ,  xn . The solution of (ii) can





















+  = 0, j = 1,2,..., n and
(3.11) g(x) = 0
Solving (x 1 ,  x2 ,  . . . ,  xn )  from (3.8) and (3.11) is equivalent to solving (x 1 ,  x 2 ,  . . . ,
xn )  and λ from (3.10) and (3.11). Lagrange has shown that the conditions (3.10) and
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(3.11) can also be written in a different way. He introduced a function, which became
later know as the Lagrangean function defined by:
(3.12) L(x,λ) = F(x) + λg(x).
Note that the function L(x,λ)  is a function of both the variables  x = x 1 ,  x 2 , . . . ,  xn
and λ.













So the conditions for optimality of the solution of (ii) are the same, if in (ii) the
function F(x)  is replaced by the ‘Lagrangean’ function given by (3.12) and the new
optimization problem is considered as a problem in the variables x 1 ,  x 2 ,  . . . ,  xn  and
λ. The coefficient λ is called the multiplier of Lagrange.
For all feasible points x (i.e. satisfying g(x)=0) the value of the Lagrangean function
(3.12) equals the value of F(x) .
If in the maximization problem (ii) the function F(x)  is concave, then the conditions
(3.10) and (3.11) or (3.13) and (3.14) do not necessarily imply that a global maximum
is found. This can be illustrated by an example. Let 22
2
1)( xxxF −−=  be maximized
given the equality constraint g (x)  = -20x2 - (5x1 - 6)2 + 36 = 0 . The function F(x)
is concave. The point (2 ,1) satisfies the conditions (3.10) and (3.11) as easily can be
verified. However, the global maximum is found for the point (0 ,0). Note that
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concavity or convexity of the constraint function g(x)  does not matter. Let F(x)  be
concave and g(x)  a linear function, so g (x) = a 0 + a xj jj
n *
=
∑ 1 . In a point x satisfying
(3.10) and (3.11) F(x)  takes a global maximum. This follows from the following
reasoning. Let x* be any point satisfying g (x*) = a 0 + a xj jj
n *
=
˚ 1 . Due to property
(3.1) and conditions (3.10) and (3.11) it may be written F(x*) – F(x) ≤
- -
=
˚λ x x aj j jj
n *3 81 . So F(x)  is a global maximum indeed. If F(x)  is strictly concave
and g(x)  is linear, then x satisfying (3.10) and (3.11) is the only point where F(x)
takes its global maximum.
3.3 Inequality constraints
We pass now to maximization problem (iii). By introducing a slack variable s, the
maximization problem (iii) is equivalent to:
(3.15) max: { F(x) | g(x) – s = 0, s ≥ 0 }
It will again be assumed that x 1  can be expressed in terms of x 2 , . . . ,x n  and s, so
(3.16) ),,...,(~ 21 sxxx nϕ=




















−  = 0
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Defining ),...,),,,...,(~(),,...,,(~ 2232 nnn xxsxxFsxxxF ϕ=  we may replace (3.15) by
(3.19) max { ),,...,,(~ 32 sxxxF n | s  ≥  0  }













































(3.23) s ≥ 0
Making use of (3.17) and (3.18) and assuming that ∂∂gx1  ≠ 0 these conditions may be
written as:






















,   j = 2,…,n
























     s ≥ 0.









+  = 0,    j = 1,2,…,n
(3.25) g(x)λ = 0
(3.26) λ ≥ 0
(3.27) g(x) ≥ 0

















These conditions are usually referred to as the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
These conditions correspond to the necessary conditions of optimality of the
Lagrangean function as function of both x and λ. In the optimal solution of (iii) the
value of the Lagrangean function equals the maximal value of F(x) , due to (3.25). It









is the decrease of the value of the objective function, if s increases with one unit. So λ
corresponds to the opportunity costs and -λ to the shadow price. If s=g(x)>0 then λ
= 0 due to (3.25).
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If F(x)  is concave and g(x)  is concave, then the conditions (3.24) - (3.27) imply that
the function F(x) takes in x its global maximum value. Consider any x* satisfying

























So in point x satisfying (3.24) - (3.27) F(x) takes its global maximum. If F(x)  and
g(x)  are strictly concave the solution x is unique.
3.4 Equality and inequality constraints
For the optimal solution of the general non-linear programming problem (iv):
(iv) max {F(x)  | g i(x)  = 0, i = 1,2,…,m 1; gi(x)  ≥ 0, i = m 1+1,m 1+2,…,m;
x j ≥ 0, j = 1,2,…,n 1}
the necessary conditions can be formulated as follows. Introduce the vector λ
consisting of m multipliers of Lagrange, λ1 ,  λ2 ,  . . . ,  λm . The function of Lagrange
L(x,λ)  is defined as:
(3.33) L(x,λ) = F x g xi i
i
m




Referring to the previous sections and to many handbooks of non-linear
programming, see e.g. Hazell and Norton, 1986, Bazaraa et al, 1993, the necessary








, i =1, 2, ...,m1
(3.35) λ ∂∂λi i
L
 = 0,  i = m1+1,  m1+2, ...,m



















, j = 1,2,…,n1






, j = n1+1, n1+2,…,n
In the optimal solution of (iv) the value of the Lagrangean function equals the value
of F due to (3.34) and (3.35). For the inequality constraints λ i  refers to the
opportunity costs of constraint i.
Next to the non-negativity constraint x j ≥ 0, in the next chapters also the constraints x j
≤ a j will play an important role. These constraints can be taken into account as new
inequality constraints. In that case g j(x j) ≥ 0 in (iv) is written as g j(x j) = a j - x j ≥ 0. A
Lagrange multiplier λ j  can be introduced for this constraint, and the optimal solution
has to satisfy the necessary conditions (3.35) - (3.37). It is, however, simpler not to
introduce a new inequality constraint and a Lagrange multiplier λ j , but to deal with
the lower and upper bounds: 0 ≤ x j ≤ a j, by replacing (3.38) - (3.40) by:
(3.42) if 0 < x j < a j then ∂∂
L
x j
= 0, j = 1,2,…,n1
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(3.43) if x j = 0 then ∂∂
L
x j
≤ 0, j = 1,2,…,n1
(3.44) if x j = a j then ∂∂
L
x j
≥ 0, j = 1,2,…,n1
Without the upper bound x j ≤ a j, (3.42) and (3.43) follow from (3.38) - (3.40). With x j
≤ a j, (3.42) and (3.44) follow from (3.38) - (3.40), by writing ξ j = a j – x j and
replacing in (3.38) - (3.40) x j by ξ j.
We return to (iv). Let F(x) be concave, g i (x) , i=1,2 , . .. ,m 1 , linear functions and
gi(x) ,  i  = m1 +1,m1 +2,. . . ,m  concave functions. If a point x=x 1 ,x 2 , . . . ,xn  and λ
satisfy the conditions (3.34) - (3.41) then the function F(x)  takes in point x its global
maximum. This follows in a similar way as derived in the previous sections from the
following reasoning. Let x and λ satisfy (3.34) - (3.41). Consider any feasible point x*
≠ x with g i(x *)=0, i=1,2 , . . . ,m1 ;  gi (x *)≥0, i=m 1 +1,m 1 +2, . . . ,m ;  *jx ≥0,
j=1,2, . . . ,n1 . Making use of property (3.1) and of (3.33) it may be written:



























Due to (3.38) and (3.41), to the linearity of the g i (x) ,  i=1,2 , . . . ,m 1  and to the
concavity of the functions g i(x) ,  i=m1 +1,m 1 +2,. .. ,m , see also (3.1), it follows that
     F x F x x L
x











Due to *jx  ≥ 0, j=1,2, . . . ,n1 , (3.39) and (3.41), (3.35), (3.36) and g i (x*)≥0,
i=m1 +1,m1 +2,.. . ,m , it follows that  F(x* )  -  F(x)  ≤  0 .
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So the function F(x)  takes its global maximum in the point x satisfying (3.34) -
(3.41). If g i(x i), i = 1,2,…,m 1, are linear functions, F(x) is strictly concave, and g i (x),
i=m1 +1,m1 +2,.. . ,m  are concave, the point x, where F(x) takes its global maximum,
is unique.
3.5 Stochastic programming
In Chapter 7 we will set up some stochastic programming models, in which market
actors decide sequentially on their optimal strategies, taking into account the
uncertain character of future prices. The sequential decision process is modelled using
so-called recourse models. In these recourse models the objective functions contain
the expected costs and revenues of future decisions which depend on random future
prices. Furthermore, the right hand side values of the constraints depend on
realisations of the random future prices. Probability distributions of random future
prices are assumed to be known. In this section the structure of these models is briefly
discussed.
Consider a time horizon of T periods, and introduce for the periods t ∈ {1,…,T} the
following vectors:
(3.45) x t vector of decision variables, corresponding to the decisions taken in
period t
(3.46) Pt vector of random variables, corresponding to the uncertain prices in
period t
The vector x 0 contains as parameters the initial values of the decision variables. In
each period t ∈ {1,…,T}, optimal values of x t are determined. They depend on the
decisions x t-1 taken in the previous period,4 on the observed realisations of Pt, written
                                                      
4
 Without loss of generality, in this introductory section it is assumed that x t does only depend on x t-1
rather than on x 0, x 1,…,x t-1. In many recourse models – as in Chapter 7 – x t depends on a ‘state variable’
which is a function of x 0, x 1,…, x t-1. A stock level is a typical example of such a state variable.
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as p t, and on the expected future revenues which depend on the distribution of the
random future prices Pt+1,…, PT. Simultaneously, for each possible realisation of
Pt+1, P t+2,…,PT, optimal values of x t+1, x t+2,…,xT are determined as well. Write this
as x t+1(Pt+1), x t+2(Pt+2),…,xT(PT). These decisions on future strategies, which are
expected to be optimal, are of a preliminary nature. They can be revised in period t+1,
when the realisations of Pt+1, i.e. p t+1, are observed, and new information comes
available on the probability distribution of Pt+2. The decision structure and the
deterministic and stochastic elements for the decision on x 1 are illustrated in Figure
3.2.
xt−1 xt x Pt t+ +1 11 6
pt P pt t+11 6 P p Pt t t+ +2 1,1 6
Figure 3.2: Recourse model: illustration of decisions taken in period 1: x 1 depending
on x 0 and observed price p 1, preliminary decisions on x 2,…,xT on random prices
P2,…,PT.
It is assumed that the random variables of Pt, for t ∈ {1,…,T}, have a finite discrete
probability distribution. Assume without loss of generality that P1, P2,..., PT, are
independent random variables. In Chapter 9, the stochastic programming models will
be reformulated for conditional probability distributions. Introduce for all t ∈
{1,…,T} the set K t, containing the number of possible realisations of Pt. Define for t
∈ {1,…,T} the vector ptk , as the vector of possible outcomes of Pt for a k ∈ Kt.
Define for each t ∈ {1,…,T}:
(3.47) Pr P p ft tk tk= =2 7 , k ∈ K t.
with probabilities ftk  satisfying ftk  ≥ 0 and f tkk Kt∈∑ = 1.
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For each period t, the values of the decision variables x t and the preliminary decision
variables x t+1(Pt+1), x t+2(Pt+2),…,xT(PT) are based on the maximization of an
objective function, which consists of the net revenues in period t and the expected net
revenues in future periods. The value of the objective function depends on the
decisions taken in the previous period, x t-1, and the observed value of p t. In the theory
of recourse models, the value of the objective function as a function of p t and x t-1 is
called the value function. Define z t(xt-1,p t) the value function of the decision problem
of period t. The decision problems discussed in Chapter 7 can in short be written as,
for period t ∈ {1,…,T}:
(3.48) z x p Max c p x Ez x P W x T x h p xt t t
x
t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t
− + + −= + + = ≥1 1 1 1 0, , , ,1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6> C
where Ez t+1(⋅) refers to the expectation of z t+1(⋅) with respect to Pt+1, and z t+1(⋅) is the
value function of the decision problem for period t+1.5 We assume that zT+1(⋅) = 0. Wt
and Tt are matrices, h t(p t) is a vector depending on p t, and c t(p t,xt) is the net revenue
in period t. It is assumed that c t(p t,x t) is a function in x t, some parameters in the
function depend on p t. The vector x t contains the necessary slack variables, so that the
constraints can be written as equalities. Define xt
k
+1 the vector of preliminary decision
variables in period t+1 for a price realisation ptk+1  of Pt+1, for k ∈ K t+1. For period t, a
given value of decision variable x t, and realisations ptk+1, k ∈ K t+1, it may be written:
Ez x P f z x p
f Max c p x Ez x P
W x T x h p x
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5
 z t+1(⋅) refers to the corresponding expression z t+1(x t, P t+1). (⋅) is introduced to simplify the notation,
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In (3.49) Ez t+2(⋅) refers to the expectation of z t+2(⋅) with respect to Pt+2, and z t+2(⋅) is
the value function of the decision problem for period t+2. It follows that the recourse
problem (3.48) - (3.49) is equivalent to the following model:
(3.50) 
z x p Max c p x f c p x Ez x P
W x T x h p W x T x h p x x
t t t
x x
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For realisations pt
l
+2  of Pt+2, for l ∈ K t+2, and period t+1 decision xtk+1 , Ez t+2(xtk+1 ,
Pt+2) can be written analogous to model (3.49).
As an illustration of the structure of the decision problems if a short time horizon of
three periods is considered, i.e. T = 3, we write the three decision problems for the
periods 3, 2, and 1:
(3.51) z x p Max c p x W x T x h p x
x
3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3
3
0, , ,1 6 1 6 1 6> C= + = ≥
(3.52)  
z x p Max c p x f c p x
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W x T x h p x x x k K l K
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l Kk K
k k
lk k l k lk
k lk1 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
1 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2




, , , ,
, ,
, , , , ,
, ,
1 6 1 6 2 7 2 7










+ = + =
+ =  ³ ³
³³
˚˚
In (3.53) xlk3  represents the preliminary decision variable x 3 in period 3 for price
realizations pk2  and p
l
3  in period 2 and 3.
If, for t = 1,2,3, x t is a n-dimensional vector, Wt and Tt m×n-dimensional matrices,
ht(p t) an m-dimensional vector depending on p t, and the set K t contains k t elements,
then model (3.53) is a model with n(1+k 2(1+k 3)) decision variables and
m(1+k 2(1+k 3)) constraints. These models are in fact large scale mathematical
programming models of the form:
(3.54) Max c y Wy h y
y
1 6< A= ≥, 0
with y a vector of decision variables, c(y) a function in y, W a matrix, and h a vector.
Optimal solutions of the recourse models
To derive some properties of the optimal solution of these models, the same methods
can be used as discussed in the previous sections. As an illustration, we discuss the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions for model (3.52). For the other models, the approach is
similar. Introduce the vectors λ1, λ 2k , for k ∈ K 2, consisting of the Lagrange
multipliers of the constraints of model (3.52). Define L x x k Kk k1 2 1 2 2, , ,λ λ ∈3 8  the
Lagrange function of (3.52) as a function of x xk k1 2 1 2, , ,λ λ  for all k ∈ K 2:
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(3.55) 
L x x k K c p x f c p x
W x T x h p W x T x h p
k k k k k
k K
T k T k k
k K
1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
2
2
, , , , ,λ λ
λ λ
∈ = + +





3 8 1 6 3 8
1 6 3 8
Recall that, for t ∈ {1,2} and k ∈ K 2, x xk1 2,  are n-dimensional vectors, the matrices
Wt and Tt are of dimension m×n, and h t are m-dimensional vectors. The multipliers λ1
and λ 2k  are m-dimensional. Define x j1 the jth element of the vector x 1, for j ∈
{1,…,n}. x jk2  and λ λi i
k
1 2, , for i ∈ {1,…,m}, j ∈ {1,…,n} are defined analogously.
Wij1 is defined as the element on the ith row and jth column of the matrix W1, for i ∈
{1,…,m}, j ∈ {1,…,n}. Wij2, Tij1, and T ij2 are defined analogously. Furthermore,
define Wj1 as the jth column of the matrix W1, for j ∈ {1,…,n}. Wj1 is a m-
dimensional vector. Wj2, T j1, and T j2 are defined analogously. Referring to (3.38) −
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In the models discussed in Section 7.1, the function c t(p t,x t) is a linear function
c t(p t,x t) = d t(p t)⋅x t, with d t(p t) a vector which is, without loss of generality, linear in
p t. In the models discussed in Section 7.2, the function c t(p t,x t) is a non-linear
function. The functions c t(pt,x t) and matrices Wt and Tt will be such that λ 2k ,
following from (3.59), can easily be substituted in (3.58). This results in a number of
elegant properties indicating the influence of the expected future prices on the current
optimal strategies (see Section 7.2).
33
4 Supply functions, demand functions and equilibrium
One of the objectives of building a spatial equilibrium model is to analyse the
functioning of the agricultural market system and the rationale for government
intervention on agricultural markets. The standard analysis of agricultural markets is
based on the microeconomic analysis of the behaviour of agricultural producers and
consumers. Producers are supposed to maximize profits and consumers to maximize
utility. From these assumptions demand and supply can be derived as a function of
prices. If markets are perfectly competitive, supply and demand will be in equilibrium
and equilibrium prices and quantities can be generated using supply and demand
functions. In standard economic theory it is usually assumed that producers sell all
production. In developing countries, however, many farmers consume on-farm a large
part of their own production. Therefore, production and consumption decisions are
interrelated, and can not always be analysed separately. Household models can be
applied to determine simultaneously production, consumption, sales and purchases of
agricultural households.
This chapter deals in particular with supply and demand functions. Their derivation
and properties will be shortly reviewed. Furthermore, the need to analyse
simultaneously supply and demand decisions will be shortly discussed. Finally, some
basic concepts of a market equilibrium will be discussed. For further reading on these
subjects see e.g. Varian (1992) and Nicholson (1995).
4.1 Supply functions
In standard economic theory it is supposed that goods are produced by firms which
maximize net profits, i.e. the difference between revenues received from selling the
produce and production costs incurred. Consider a firm producing one good. Let p be
the given price per unit, x the quantity to be produced and sold by the firm and c(x)
the costs of producing x. The question how much the firm should supply corresponds
to determining x by solving:
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(4.1) W(p) = Max px c x x
x
− ≥1 6< A0
W(p)  gives the firm’s optimal profit as a function of prices, and is called the profit
function. Usually, it is assumed that c(x)  is twice differentiable, and that it costs
more to produce more, so c ′(x)  > 0, and that the costs to produce one unit extra are
higher the more is produced, so
(4.2) c″(x)  > 0
This last condition excludes economies of scale, so costs per unit can not be reduced
if more is produced. If the cost function is differentiable and satifies c ′(x)  > 0 and
c″(x)  > 0, then the assumption of profit maximization induces that the profit function,
W(p) , is non-decreasing, convex and continuous in output prices. Let x be the
optimal production level. Given prices p, the firm can easily derive the optimal





x1 6  = 0,  dF
dx
x1 6  ≤ 0
So,
(4.3) if x = 0, then F ′(0) = p –  c ′(0) ≤ 0
(4.4) if x > 0, then F ′(x)  = p –  c ′(x)  = 0
The solution x = 0, i.e. zero production, may be excluded by postulating, see (4.3):
(4.5) p > c ′(0)
So the (interior) solution x satisfies, see (4.4):
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(4.6) p – c′(x) = 0
This shows that in the optimum, marginal revenues equal marginal costs. Stated
otherwise, profit is optimal if the revenues provided by the last unit sold, equal the
costs of the last unit produced. The marginal revenues equal the product price. The
optimization problem (4.1) gives for each price p a different optimal supply, x. x as a
function of p can now be interpreted as the supply function. This function gives the
firm’s most profitable production plan x as a function of price p. Writing the supply
function as x(p), it follows from (4.6) that
p - c′(x(p)) = 0
Since c(x)  is differentiable, x(p)  is differentiable in p. It then follows from
differentiating to p that:
1 0− ′′ =c x dx
dp
1 6






1 01 6 , due to (4.2)
In economic analysis one often uses a measure for the responsiveness of supply to
price changes. The price elasticity of supply measures the percentage change in
supplied quantity as a result of a percentage change in the goods’ price:







Due to (4.7), spε  > 0. Property (4.7) is not at all evident. Farmers in developing
countries who consume a large part of their production on-farm, are often obliged to
sell a part of their harvest in order to repay debts or to pay for daily important
expenses, even if they are in a food shortage situation. If a farmer needs a certain
amount of money m, he may sell a quantity x  = m/p , so dxdp < 0, and 
s
pε  < 0 . This
result differs from (4.7), since the objective function of such a farm household is
different from the profit maximizing objective of the firm discussed in this section.
Their objectives will be more concerned with satisfying household food security or
maximizing household utility. In section 4.3 some short notes will be made on
modeling household behaviour.
Example: Consider a quadratic cost function: c(x)  = ax  + ½bx 2 , with a>0, b>0. If
(4.5) is satisfied, p>a . For given price, p, profit can be written as: F(x)  = px − ax
½bx2 , and the supply function can be derived by (4.6): x  = -a/b  + p/b .
4.2 Demand functions
In a similar way the demand function of an individual consumer consuming a number
of goods is determined. In the analysis of consumer behaviour, it is studied how a
consumer chooses what to consume if (s)he can choose between various goods with
different prices and if (s)he is confronted with a limited income. Consumers have
preferences on the consumption of different goods. Consider a situation with k
different goods. Introduce the vector of consumed goods, y = (y 1 . . .y k) , with y i  the
consumption of good i, i=1,. . . ,k . To the consumption of each bundle of goods, y, a
level of satisfaction is associated, called utility. A continuous utility function, u(y) ,
can be defined, which orders the consumers’ preferences. For each possible bundle of
goods, y, consumers get a certain level of utility u(y) . In micro-economics it is
usually supposed that a consumer always chooses the most preferred bundle of goods
from the set of afordable alternatives. These alternatives depend on the available
budget. Expenses to the purchase of bundle y, may not exceed the available budget m.
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Let pi  be the vector of prices the consumer has to pay when he purchases the goods on
the market. This is given for the consumer. Now the consumer problem of preference
maximization can be defined as:
(4.8) v(pi,m)  = Max u y y m y
y
0 5< Api  , 0
where v(pi ,m)  is the indirect utility function. This function gives the maximum utility
as a function of price pi and income m. Usually it is assumed that u ′(y)  > 0 and u″(y)
< 0. This means that utility increases if more is consumed, and that the increase of
utility by consuming one extra unit decreases if consumption increases. The
Lagrangian for the consumer problem can be written:
(4.9) L = u(y)  + λ (m - piy),
with λ the Lagrange multiplier. Write the price of good i as pi i , i = 1, ..., k. Let yi be
the optimal demand of good i, i = 1,…,k, and y = (y 1,…,yk) be the vector of optimal
demanded goods. If the utility function is differentiable, then the optimal solution of













1 6 ≤ 0 , y i ≥ 0,  i = 1,…,k
λ ∂∂λ
L y1 6 = 0 , ∂∂λ





 = ′u yi 1 6 . Then the above optimality conditions imply,







(4.11) if y i = 0, then necessarily ′ − ≤ui i0 01 6 λpi , i=1,2 ,…,k
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(4.12) if y i > 0, then necessarily ′ − =u yi i1 6 λpi 0 , i=1,2 ,…,k
Assume that in the optimum of (4.8) y > 0 and pi  y  = m, so that (4.10) and (4.12) have
to be satisfied. Multiply (4.12) with y i, sum over the number of goods, and fill in pi⋅y
= m to get the inverse demand function (i.e. the price as a function of demand and
income):


















































A type of utility function that is often used in applied economics is the quasilinear
utility function. With this utility function, simple demand functions can be derived. A
utility function, is quasilinear if it is linear in one of the goods, i.e. if it can be written
as:
     ),...,(),...,,(~ 2121 kk yyuyyyyu +=
Consider for simplicity a situation with 2 goods, y 0  and y, where the variable y 0  is the
amount of ‘money’, and the variable y is the amount of cereals consumed. Suppose pi
is the (given) price for cereals. Note that y and pi are not vectors in this example.
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Suppose that the ‘price’ for money is 1, pi0  = 1. The consumer problem (4.8) can now
be written as:
(4.15) Max y u y y y m y y
y y0
0 0 00 0
,
, ,+ + ≤ ≥ ≥1 6< Api
In the optimum, all income will be spent on cereals and money, piy  + y 0  = m . If
income is large, the consumer will consume good y until marginal utility of
consuming y is smaller then marginal utility of consuming y 0 , i.e. until u ′(y)  < 1. The
remainder of income will be spent on consuming y0. In this case the constraint may be
substituted in the objective function. The problem may now be reduced to the
maximisation problem:
(4.16) Max u y y y
y
1 6< A− ≥pi 0
In that case, the solution will be independent of m. If the problem is written in this
way, it can be given a special interpretation which resembles the producer problem in
section 3.1. Utility u(y)  may be interpreted as the ‘revenues of consuming y’ and pi⋅y
as the ‘costs of consumption’. So, (4.16) conveys a situation in which ‘revenues’
minus ‘costs’ are maximized. Analogous to section 2.1, we find two classes of
solutions, depending on whether the optimal demand y > 0 or y = 0. The solution of
(4.15) has a convenient form, if we find an interior solution, y > 0:
(4.17)   u′(y) = pi
which simply says that the marginal utility of consumption is equal to the price of the
good. This utility function, thus, results in a simple demand structure, and simplifies
the analysis of market equilibrium. Note, however, that this only holds for large
enough levels of income. If income is too low such that all income will be spent on
consuming y, and y 0  is zero, (4.17) is not valid. Another feature of the quasilinear
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utility function is that the indirect utility function (4.8) can be written as (Varian,
1992: 154):
(4.18) v(pi ,m) = v(pi) + m
This is a special case of the so-called Gorman form. In section 4.4 this will be further










Example: Linear expenditure system
As an example of how demand functions can be derived, consider the often used
utility function of the form:







where y i  > γ i . In this utility function k goods are considered and γ i  is the minimum
consumption requirement of good i. The utility maximisation problem is:
v(pi ,m) = Max  u(y) s.t. pi y = m.
Solving this problem, see Section 3.2, gives the following demand function:













(see Varian 1992, p. 212). This demand system is often used in applied economics. A
drawback is, however, that it implies a linear relation between demand and income
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(linear Engel functions) and that it can at best be true over a short range of variation
(Sadoulet and De Janvry, 1995). ~
Next to a measure for the price responsiveness of supply, economists also use a
measure for the responsiveness of demand to price or income changes. Analogous to
the price elasticity of supply, the price elasticity of demand for a good i measures the











Demand of a good i depends not only on its own price, but also on the price of the
other goods j. So, the demand function has to be written as: y i = y i(pi1,…,pi i,…,pi k), if
k goods are considered. The cross-price elasticity of demand, dijε , measures the
responsiveness of demand of good i after a price change of good j. Also the income
elasticity, η i , is often calculated. This measures the responsiveness of demand of



















Goods can be categorized according to the signs and magnitudes of the elasticities. A
good is a normal good if the goods’ price elasticity of demand is negative. Demand is
said to be elastic if diε < -1 . This means that demand decreases more then
proportionally if the price increases. If demand decreases less then proportionally
after a price increase, i.e. if -1 < diε < 0, then demand is said to be inelastic. Most
food crops have inelastic demand. If demand for a good decreases if its price
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decreases, i.e. diε  > 0, we call the good a Giffen good. An example are potatoes in the
Netherlands, or any other staple food crop which serves as base ingredient in daily
meals. If the price of the basic food decreases, people have to spend less money on
their basic expenditures, and consequently their purchasing power increases.
Accordingly, they shift their consumption pattern to the consumption of less basic and
more luxury foods, which are more appreciated (see Heijman et al., 1991). Two goods
i and j are gross complements if demand of good i decreases if the price of good j
increases, i.e. if dijε  < 0 . An example are tobacco and cigarette paper. Goods are
gross substitutes of each other if demand of a good increases if the price of the other
good increases, i.e. if dijε  > 0. An example of two substitutes are maize and rice in
West Africa. If the price of maize increases, maize consumption will be substituted by
rice consumption. Furthermore, goods are called normal goods if the income
elasticity, ηi is positive. The good is a necessary normal good if 0 < η i  < 1, and a
luxury normal good if η i  > 1. A good is an inferior good if η i  < 0. Examples of
inferior goods are basic food crops such as potatoes in the Netherlands and millet and
sorghum in some regions in West Africa. If income increases, people will shift their
consumption to more luxury goods (Varian, 1992).
4.3 Seperability of supply and demand decisions
In the previous discussion it was supposed that producers sell all their produce, and
consumers have to purchase all goods they consume. In developing countries, farmers
often save a part of their harvest, to be consumed on-farm, and only a small part of
production is sold. They integrate in the household decisions regarding production
and consumption. For that reason, we can not allways estimate supply and demand
functions the way we did above, but they have to be determined on an integrated way
in a household model.
Such an integrated analysis is not necessary if consumer prices and producer prices
are the same, and the markets function well. Then production and consumption
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decisions can be analysed separately. In that case households are indifferent between
consuming their own produce or selling it to rebuy what they need for their own
consumption. The value of the consumed goods will in both cases be the same. In the
first case, if households consume their own produce, they still have to sell a part of
the harvest to pay for the production costs. Suppose the household produces a
quantity x* of a consumption good, which costs c(x* ) . Let the price be p. To cover
the production costs, the household has to sell a quantity c(x* )/p , and they can
consume a quantity x*  −  c(x* )/p . In the second case, if the household sells all
produce and rebuys the consumption, the income from agriculture will be m  = px*
−  c(x* ) . Suppose no income is earned from other sources, then a quantity m/p  = x*
−  c(x* ) /p  can be purchased. This shows that consumption will be the same in both
cases. In this case, a supply function, x* (p ) , can be derived analogous to section 4.1.
Using this supply function income can be calculated, m(p)  = px* (p) −  c(x* (p)) ,
which is an input in the consumer problem to determine demand.
However, if some markets fail, or if transaction costs exist, production, supply and
consumption decisions are no longer separable. Define p and pi to be producer and
consumer prices of a good, respectively, with p < pi. If producers consume, in this
case, a part of their produce on farm, they can consume a quantity x*  −  c(x* )/p . On
the other hand, if producers would sell all produce and rebuy their consumption, they
could only consume m /pi  = px* /pi  −  c(x* )/pi . So, in order to reflect reality,
production, supply, demand and consumption decisions have to be analysed
simultaneously, which can be done in a household model. In such models it is
supposed that a household optimizes utility. Consumed quantities may be partly
purchased and partly self produced. Decisions are constrained by a money income
constraint, labour time constraints and a production function that calculates
production as a function of inputs (see e.g. Ellis, 1993; Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995).
The household allocates labour time of the members of the household between home
production, wage work, and leisure. The money income constraint is determined by
the time allocated to wage work, and revenues from own production. Many household
models have been built. Maatman et al. (1996) recently built one for a representative
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household on the Central Plateau in Burkina Faso. Their linear programming model
evaluated production, consumption, trade and storage decisions of one houshold.
They analyzed, in a very detailed manner, the different production possibilities of a
household, and included the household’s consumption patterns. The model clearly
showed the interdependance between production and consumption decisions for
subsistence farmers in West Africa.
In spite of this, we suppose in the next chapters that supply and demand decisions can
be taken seperately. This is defensible since: 1) Subsistence households in many
developing countries safeguard a part of their harvest for own consumption; only a
small part may be sold on the market (see also Section 8.1.3); 2) In many developing
countries, supply and demand decisions in an extended family are taken by different
persons, with each their own, sometimes conflicting, objectives (see e.g. Maatman et
al., 1996).
4.4 Equilibrium
In section 4.1 and 4.2 supply and demand functions for a single good have been
derived, that represent the producer’s and consumer’s reaction on prices. Individual
consumers and producers have no influence on prices, but the total supply and
demand of all consumers and producers together certainly influence prices. Consider
a situation with k consumers and n producers. Suppose that markets are perfectly
competitive, and that supply and demand decisions can be analyzed separately. The
functions x i(p) and y j(pi,mj)  render the optimal supply and demand of for example
cereals, for a producer i and consumer j, for a certain producer price p, consumer
price pi, and income level mj , for i = 1, ..., n, j = 1, ..., k. Total supply on the market is
the sum of all supplies. Define the market supply function x(p) = x pii
n 0 5
=
∑ 1 .6 Since
each producer chooses a production level such that marginal costs equal the price (see
                                                      
6
 Note the different denotation of the variables x, x i, y, and y j in this section and the Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
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(4.6)), each producer must have the same marginal costs at price p, pxc ii =′ )( * . The




∑ 1 . In general
this demand function does not have properties like (4.14). It can be proven that the
aggregate demand function has the same properties as the individual demand
functions, if the indirect utlity function is of the Gorman form. This means that it can





∑ 1  + b(pi)m j, with m = mjjk=∑ 1 . The quasilinear utility function is a special
case of the Gorman form, for which b (pi)=1 (see (4.18)).
Producers and consumers can sell and purchase all supply and demand only if the
market is in equilibrium. A market equilibrium in a closed economy can be defined as
follows: prices, p and pi, and levels of supply and demand, x and y, exist for which
market demand equals market supply, so x(p )  = y(pi) , such that no producer or
consumer does have the tendency to change his decisions. This implies that the
producer will supply x i(p) and the consumer will demand y j(pi,mj). One condition for
such an equilibrium to exist is that exit from or entrance to the market are free.
We consider two situations:
(i) Producers and consumers sell and buy on one market. There is one market
price, so p = pi. This postulate together with the equilibrium condition
determines the market price p, which follows from x(p) = y(p). Note that no
trader is explicitly introduced, and that no trading costs are involved.
(ii) A trader buys from the producers at a producer price p, and sells to the
consumers at the consumer price pi. What he buys is also sold. The consumer
price is assumed to be an amount γ  higher than the producer price, so pi  = p  +
γ . The equilibrium condition reads x(p) = y(pi). Both conditions together
determine prices and produced and consumed quantities: x(p) = y(p+γ).
Both conditions are illustrated in figure 4.1.
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In stead of postulating p = pi in situation (i), we can also rewrite the consumer and
producer problem. Suppose that producer i can produce a quantity of cereals xi with
costs c i (xi ) , i = 1, ..., n. Consumer j can choose between consuming a quantity y 0j of
good 0 (money) and a quantity of cereals y j , j = 1, ..., k. Preferences for consumer j
are ordered by a quasilinear utility function (see (4.15)):
     jjj yyu 0)( + ,   j = 1,…,k
In stead of postulating market equilibrium to determine output, we maximize a
welfare function which measures total consumer utility, subject to a money balance





p=B p,B B=p+( p,Bp





Figure 4.1: Illustration of equilibrium prices and produced and consumed quantities



















































































If λ is the lagrange multiplier on the constraint, the optimal solution x i, y j of (4.24)
has to satisfy, see also (3.12) and (3.13):
(4.25) ′ = = ′ ∀u y c x i jj j i i3 8 1 6λ , ,
In section 4.1 and 4.2 we have seen that producers supply a quantity such that
marginal costs equal the producer price, ′c xi i1 6  = p, and consumers demand a quantity
such that marginal utility equals the consumer price, ′u yj j3 8  = pi. So, (4.25) shows
that welfare is optimal if p  = pi .
It is possible to rewrite the welfare function in (4.24) in a form which is common in
economics. First we rewrite the first term in (4.24), the summation of individual
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utility. (4.17) showed that ′u yj j3 8  = pi. Because the utility function is differentiable,
we can introduce the inverse demand function for consumer j, pi j(y j) . Suppose u j(0)
= 0, then:







By making use of pi = pi(y j)  and of partial integration, the last term may be written as:






j jd y d y y d
j j
1 6 1 6 1 6
0 0
I I I= − ′ = + ∞
Total utility from consuming cereals can be written as:
(4.27) 
u y d y y d
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Furthermore, rewrite the last term in the objective function of (4.24), the summation
of production costs. Suppose c i (0)=0, and introduce the inverse supply function for
producer i, p i(xi ). Given that ′c xi i1 6  = p - see (4.6) - for all i=1,2 ,…,n , we can
write:





Since x(p) = x pii
n 0 5
=
∑ 1  we can write total production costs:
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(4.29) 
c x p d px p x d
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Because the summation of individual income, mjj
m
=
∑ 1 , has no influence on the
solution of (4.24) it may be skipped from the formulation. Using (4.27) and (4.29),
problem (4.24) can be rewritten as:
(4.30) 
Max u y c x y x y x
Max d p d y x y x
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This gives the well known problem of maximising consumer plus producer surplus.
Consumer surplus is defined as:




In fact, consumer surplus measures the difference between the optimal benefits from
consuming y and the expenditures to purchase it. Producer surplus is defined as:
       px p d
x
− I ζ ζ1 6
0
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This surplus reflects, in fact, the optimal profits from producing x. Since in the
optimum y = x and p = pi , the terms pi⋅y  and p ⋅x  are the same, and the sum of
consumer and producer surplus gives exactly (4.30). If producer plus consumer
surplus is optimized, the solution is the same as the solution of problem (4.23).
Samuelson (1952) was the first who showed that the surplus concept was relevant in
converting the market equilibrium problem into an optimization problem (Van den
Bergh et al., 1995b). The objective function of this problem is also called a
semi-welfare function.
Note that this derivation only holds for a quasilinear utility function and when all mj
are large. If welfare is defined as aggregate utility, consumer plus producer surplus
gives an exact measure of welfare only if the utility function is quasilinear. In other
cases, it will not be an exact measure. However, it often gives a reasonable
approximation to more precise but also more complicated measures. In the next
chapters the semi-welfare function will play an important role.
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5 Spatial equilibrium on n markets; one period model
In Chapter 4, we discussed one of the basic concepts of equilibrium models. That is,
the market clears at a certain market price, which means that producer supply and
consumer demand are in equilibrium. This price, and the corresponding supply and
demand levels, are called equilibrium price and equilibrium quantities. In Section 4.4
we saw that a market equilibrium problem can be solved by writing it as an
optimization problem, in which consumer plus producer surplus are maximised. This
surplus is interpreted as ‘semi-welfare’. In the Chapters 5 and 6, this method is
extended, to be able to take into account several regions (Chapter 5) and several
periods (Chapter 6). The equilibrium models for competitive markets presented in the
Chapters 5 and 6, correspond with the methods first formulated by Samuelson (1952),
and discussed extensively and extended by Takayama and Judge (1971). Ever since,
these methods have been applied frequently, especially for agricultural, energy and
mineral resources problems (see e.g. Takayama and Judge, 1971; Judge and
Takayama, 1973; Labys et al., 1989; Guvenen et al., 1990; Roehner, 1995; Van den
Berg et al., 1995). In multi-region and multi-period-models, the concept of (price)
equilibrium requires special attention.
Dealing with equilibrium on spatially seperated, competitive markets, Takayama and
Judge use the term ‘Spatial Price Equilibrium’ (SPE) for a situation where prices and
quantities satisfy the following properties: 1) in each region, there is only one market
producer and one market consumer prices (p and pi, see Chapter 4; i.e in any region
prices are homogeneous and unique); 2) there is no excess demand or supply in any of
the regions; and 3) commodities purchased in one region will only be transported to
another region, to be sold there, if the difference between the consumer price in the
importing region and the producer price in the exporting region is at least equal to
transport costs (Van den Bergh et al., 1985, p.50, see also Takayama and Judge, 1971,
p.34). An intertemporal SPE for multi-period equilibrium models, satisfies as well the
following property (see Takayama and Judge, 1971, p. 378): 4) commodities
purchased in a certain region, will only be stored, to be sold later in the same region,
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if the difference between the consumer price in the selling period and the producer
price in the purchase period is at least equal to storage costs. For the multi-period
situation, excess supply is possible in every period. The surplus will be stored, and
sold in later periods. If a finite time horizon is considered, it is usually assumed that
excess demand and supply are zero in the last period. This means that no stock
remains after the last period. Takayama and Judge optimize in their equilibrium
models ‘semi-welfare’, subject to supply-demand equilibrium on the market. The
welfare optimal prices and quantities, satisfy the properties of a SPE. Takayama and
Judge conclude from this that the models are suitable for analysing price formation on
competitive markets. Why price formation on a competitive market can be decribed
accurately by a SPE, usually receives little attention. Takayama and Judge only
consider the behaviour of producers and consumers. Other market actors playing a
role in market price formation, like traders, are not taken into account explicitly. The
way prices are established on a market with traders, can, however, not be fully
understood if only producers and consumers are considered. The process of price
formation can be made more transparent, if traders are taken into account explicitly.
Traders purchase goods from producers and sell to consumers. A market will clear,
i.e. will be in equilibrium, because traders do only purchase from the producers the
quantities they can sell to the consumers or store for sales in later periods.
Furthermore, traders do only purchase from the producers, transport between the
regions, store, and sell to the consumers, if prices are such that they make no losses.
In the next chapters, we will show that the economic foundations of the SPE and the
equilibrium models of Takayama and Judge can be better comprehended, if also the
behaviour of traders is considered explicitly. We will show that the results of the
equilibrium models satisfy the profit maximizing behaviour of traders. The approach
to deal explicitly with traders’ behaviour will in particular be useful in Chapter 7, in
which the uncertain character of future prices is taken into account. In a situation of
uncertain prices, the definition of price equilibrium as presented by Takayama and
Judge is difficult to apply. By taking into account explicitly the behaviour of traders,
we are able to analyse such situations.
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In this chapter we discuss an extension of the method of Takayama and Judge (1971),
to analyse cereal price formation and trade flows in a country where cereals are sold
by producers, distributed by traders over a number of regions, and purchased by
consumers. The quantities supplied, demanded and transported by individual
producers, consumers and traders are a function of producer and consumer prices. In
Section 5.1 we discuss the optimal strategies of the agents operating on the cereal
market, if producer and consumer prices are known. In Section 5.2 we set up a spatial
equilibrium model, which results in welfare optimal supply, demand and transport
plans. We will show that the welfare optimal quantites are equal to the aggregate
optimal sales, purchases and transport flows of the individual market agents, at
market equilibrium prices. In Section 5.3, a different market situation is considered,
in which a monopolistic trader determines market prices. A model is discussed to
analyse this situation.
5.1 Strategies of producers, consumers and traders
Consider a situation in which an area of land (e.g. a country) is divided into n regions,
which are numbered i = 1, 2, .., n. In each region is one market, numbered i = 1, 2, ...,
n as well. If a farmer produces cereals, part of it may be stored for home
consumption, the rest is sold on the market. Farmers of region i sell only to traders at
market i, not at other market places and not directly to consumers. At marketplace i,
farmers get a kg-price p i , called the producer price of region i. The total quantity of
cereals sold by the producers of region i is called the producer supply (of cereals) in
region i. Consumers in region i buy from traders at market i. They have to pay a
kg-price pi i , called the consumer price. The quantity bought by the consumers of
region i is called the consumer demand in region i. Traders in region i purchase the
producer supply in this region, may transport cereals to regions j = 1,...,n, j ≠ i, where
they sell the consumer demand to the consumers.
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Strategies of producers and consumers:
We define for i = 1,...,n:
x i  producer supply in region  i
(5.1) y i consumer demand in region i
p i producer price in region i
pi i consumer price in region i
In analogy with Chapter 4 it is assumed that producer and consumer strategies are
reflected by (aggregate) market supply and demand functions, which are given by
x i(p i) and yi(pi i). These functions give the producers’ profit maximizing cereal supply
at price p i, and the consumers’ utility optimizing demand at price pi i. We prefer to use
here the inverse supply and demand functions p i(x i ) and pi i(y i ) rather than x i(p i ) and
y i(pi ). For each region supply and demand functions are assumed to be known. It is
recalled that - see (4.26) and (4.28):
(5.2) u y di i i
yi
1 6 1 6= Ipi ξ ξ
0
,   i=1,2,…,n
(5.3) c x p di i i
xi
1 6 1 6= I ζ ζ
0




chapter 4 it is assumed that pi i(y i) > 0 and p i(xi) > 0, due to the assumptions that
′u yi i1 6 > 0 and ′c xi i1 6 > 0, that the derivatives of pi i(y i) and p i(xi) exist and that:
(5.5) 
0)( that  assumption  the todue   0)(







ui(yi ) utility of consumption of y i  by the consumers of region i
c i(xi) costs of producing x i  by the producers of region i
55
Some characteristics of traders’ strategies
In the sections 5.1 and 5.2 it is assumed that the traders operate on a competitive
market. They are all price followers who can not influence prices. The traders
together are called here the aggregated trader, who operates on all n markets.
Introduce the following variables for i,j=1,...,n, i ≠ j:
q i total quantity of produce purchased by the aggregated trader from the
producers in region i
(5.6) r i total quantity of produce sold by the aggregated trader to the
consumers in region i
q ij total amount of produce transported by the aggregated trader from
region i to region j.
Assume that the (aggregated) trader does not want to have a stock left over, but that
he wants to sell the entire purchase. This means that the quantity he purchases on a
market i plus the quantity transported to this market, has to be equal to the quantity he
sells on market i plus the quantity transported to other markets to be sold there. We
call this the traders’ equilibrium condition for region i:















Knowing producer and consumer price levels, p i and pi i, also producer supply and
consumer demand levels are known, x i = x i(p i) and y i = y i(pi i). The quantities the
trader can purchase and sell on the market are bound by these supply and demand
levels, q i ≤ x i and r i ≤ y i. We define the parameter:
(5.8) τ ij costs of transfer of one kg from market i to market j, i,j=1,...,n, i ≠ j.
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The costs of transfer, which obviously satisfy τ ij > 0, refer to transaction costs
including transport costs, costs of insurance, contracts, taxes, information collection
etc.. We define:
(5.9) 
jiij market   tomarket  from weight ofunit  one ing transportof costs         






(5.10) τ ij = τ * + *ijτ
In (5.9) τ* is assumed not to depend on i or j. Without loss of generality it is assumed
here that τ*=0. So τ ij refer to transportation costs only. The value of τ ij depends on the
mode of transport, for road transport on the size of trucks, on the distance between
market i and j, conditions of roads, etc.. Estimates of τ ij for a practical situation will
be discussed in Chapter 8.2. The definition of τ ij deserves further specification. τ ij is
often defined as the costs for the shortest route between market i and j. Here a
different definition is adopted. τ ij is defined as the minimum costs of transport
between market i and market j, i.e. if the cheapest way of transport is chosen. In
transport models, especially in industrialized countries, it is often assumed that
transport costs τ ij =c ⋅d ij where d ij is the distance between towns i and j and c the costs
per km. Then the cheapest τ ij corresponds to the shortest distance between town i and
j. In developing countries the situation can be different. Taking the road with the
shortest distance between markets i and j is not necessarily the cheapest way of
transport, for instance if the direct road between market i and j is a dirt road in bad
condition and costs can be reduced by taking a longer tarmac road. In this chapter the
definition of τ ij as costs of transport for the cheapest way of transport will play an
important role. It follows from this definition that for any three different markets, i, j
and s - see Figure 5.1 - minimum costs of transport of one unit of weight between
market i and market j can never exceed the costs of transport if the route is taken from
market i via market s to market j. So it may be written: τ ij ≤  τ is + τ sj, i ≠ j, i ≠ s, j ≠ s.
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If for the regions i,j and s, i ≠ j, i ≠ s, j ≠ s, τ ij = τ is + τ sj, a trader is indifferent
between transporting directly from region i to j, or to transport first from region i to s
and later from region s to j. The costs will for both possibilities be the same. In order
to avoid this situation and to simplify the mathematical reasoning and proofs later in
this chapter, it will be assumed that the ≤ in the triangle equation above may be
replaced by <, so:
(5.11) τ ij < τ is + τ sj,     i ≠ j, i ≠ s, j ≠ s.
The trader’s objective is to maximize profits from cereal purchases, transport and
sales. We are interested in the optimal levels of ri, qi, and qij, if p i, pi i, x i and y i, are
known. To show how a trader’s decisions depend on producer and consumer prices,
consider the following decision problem, in which he maximizes his profits subject to
equilibrium conditions and upper bounds:
(5.12) 
Max r p q q q q r q
q x r y q i j n j i
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Figure 5.1: Schematic representation of three markets i, j and s with the
corresponding costs of transportation. Two situations are illustrated: direct
transportation from market i to market j and transport via market s.
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Introduce λi the Lagrange multiplier of the equilibrium condition (5.7) in model
(5.12) – see also (3.33). The optimal quantities qi, r i, and q ij, have to satisfy
equilibrium condition (5.7) and the following conditions– see also (3.42) - (3.44):
if q i = 0 then λ i ≤ p i; if 0 < q i < x i then λ i = p i; if q i = x i then λ i ≥ p i;
(5.13) if r i = 0 then λ i ≥ pi i; if 0 < r i < y i then λ i = pi i; if r i = y i then λ i ≤ pi i;
if q ij = 0 then λ j ≤ λ i + τ ij; if q ij > 0 then λ j = λ i + τ ij
From this, we can derive the following properties, which show the influence of the
difference between producer and consumer price levels, on purchased, sold and
transported quantities.
Trader property 5.1:  For each region i ∈ {1,...,n}:
a) If pi i < p i, then any optimal solution of (5.12) satisfies: q i = 0 or r i = 0.
b) If pi i ≥ p i, then an optimal solution of (5.12) exists which satisfies the condition q i
= x i or r i = y i. Nota bene: for pi i > p i, any optimal solution of (5.12) has to satisfy this
condition; for pi i = p i, other optimal solutions may exist not satisfying this condition.
Proof: see Appendix 1.
Trader property 5.1 can be well understood. If pi i < p i, the trader will certainly not
purchase and sell in the same region, since he would only make losses out of this
transaction. If pi i > p i, it is obviously profitable for the trader to buy and sell in region
i. In that case he will buy the maximum possible quantity, x i, or sell the maximum
possible quantity, y i, in region i. We can not say that he will buy as much as possible
from the producers in region i to sell to the consumers in the same region. This
depends on producer and consumer prices in the other regions. It may be more
profitable to sell in another region j. We come back to this issue after Trader property
5.3 below. If pi i = p i, the only thing we can say, is that the trader would not loose if he
would buy and sell in the same region.
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Trader property 5.2: Let q i, r j, q ij, j ≠ i, i,j = 1,…,n, be an optimal solution of (5.12).
Let a trader transport from a region i to a region  j, so q ij > 0, for i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j,
then:
a) no goods are transported from a region s = 1,…,n, s ≠ i, to region i, q si = 0
b) no goods are transported from region j to a region s = 1,…,n, s ≠ j, q js = 0.
c) purchases in region i are positive, q i > 0
d) sales in region j are positive, r j > 0.
Proof: see Appendix 1.
q ij was defined – see (5.6) – as the amount transported from region i to region j.
Trader property 5.2 implies that the quantity q ij is purchased in region i and sold in
region j.
Trader property 5.3: For the regions i and j, i,j ∈ {1,...,n}, i ≠ j:
a) If pi j < p i + τ ij, then any optimal solution of (5.12) satisfies q ij = 0.
b) If pi j ≥ p i + τ ij and q ij > 0, then an optimal solution of (5.12) exists satisfying q i = x i
or r j = y j; for pi j = p i + τ ij and q ij > 0 an optimal solution of (5.12) is not necessarily
unique.
Proof: see Appendix 1.
Also Trader property 5.3 can be well understood. If pi j < p i + τ ij, the trader can only
make losses from transporting between region i and j. If pi j = p i + τ ij, he would make
neither losses nor profits if he would transport between region i and j. If pi j > p i + τ ij,
transport between i and j will be profitable. As a consequence, he will buy as much as
possible in region i, x i ,  or sell as much as possible in region j, y j. Note that it is
possible that qij = 0 if pi j > p i + τ ij. If for example, pi i - p i > pi j - p i - τ ij > 0, selling in
region i will be more profitable than selling in region j.
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These three Trader properties will play an important role in the next section:
solutions of the equilibrium models to be developed should not violate these
properties, otherwise the found solutions would not be acceptable for the traders.
5.2 Maximization of welfare; perfect competition between traders
In this section we extend equilibrium model (4.30), to take into account transport
between the different regions. We first discuss the set-up and results of the spatial
equilibrium model, in which semi-welfare is optimized for all agents together. In this
spatial equilibrium model optimal values of the following variables are determined
for all regions i = 1,…,n: producer and consumer prices (p i and pi i), producer supply
(x i, total quantity sold by the producers), consumer demand (y i, total quantity
purchased by consumers) and total transported quantities to the various regions. We
define for j = 1,…,n and i ≠ j:
(5.14)  x ij total amount of produce transported from region i to region j.
This optimum is called the market equilibrium solution. Secondly, we show that this
solution is sustained by the individual market agents. This means that the market
equilibrium supplied, demanded and transported quantities, are equal to, respectively,
the aggregate optimal sales of the individual producers, the aggregate optimal
purchases of the individual consumers and the aggregate optimal transport flows of
the traders, at the market equilibrium prices. These individual strategies have been
discussed in the previous section.
In analogy with (4.30), in this section we maximize the sum of total utility minus all
costs made, which has been defined as semi-welfare. The following maximization
problem is solved:
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(5.15) Max u y c x x
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Total utility Total producer costs
Total transportation costs
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where the variables x i ,  yi ,  x ij, i,j = 1,2, ..., n; j ≠ i have to satisfy the market
equilibrium conditions -see also (5.7):















 , for i = 1,...,n
(5.17) x i ≥ 0, y i ≥ 0, x ij ≥ 0,        i, j = 1,2, ...,n; j ≠ i.
The utility and cost functions u i(y i)  and c i (xi ) are given in (5.2) and (5.3). In
principle, semi-welfare can also be defined as the sum of the ‘net revenues’ of the
consumers, producer, and traders, with ‘net consumer revenues’ defined as the utility
from consuming y i (i.e. u i(y i)) minus the costs from purchasing y i (i.e. pi i⋅y i). This
definition of semi-welfare seems to be more appropriate than the definition in (5.15).
In other words, semi-welfare is:
(5.18) u y y p x c x y p x xi i i i
i
n
i i i i
i
n















∑ ∑ ∑∑pi pi τ
1 1 11
Net consumer revenues Net producer revenues
Net trader revenues
1 244 3444 1 244 344
1 24444 344444
(5.18) is equal to (5.15). Because of the properties of utility and production costs, the
objective function (5.15) can be replaced by the integral of the inverse demand
function minus the integral of the inverse supply function minus transport costs – see
(5.2) and (5.3). We arrive at the following maximization problem to be solved:
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(5.19) 
Max d p d x
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Since the objective function in (5.15) is a linear combination with positive
coefficients of concave functions - see (5.5) - the objective function is concave.
Referring to the discussion at the end of section 3.4 it can easily be shown that a
global maximum is found and that the optimal values of x i ,  p i (xi ) ,  y i  and pi i (y i ) in
the solution are unique. The values of x ij are not necessarily unique. Introduce λi, for i
∈ {1,2, ...,n}, the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints (5.16). The Lagrangean
function may be written as, see (3.33):
(5.20) 
L x y x i j n j i
d p d x x x y x
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L(x i ,yi ,xi j ,λ i | i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, j ≠ i) signifies the Lagrangian function as a function of
x i, y i, x ij, and λ i, for all i, j ∈ {1,2, ...,n}, j ≠ i. Let x i, y i, x ij, i, j ∈ {1,2, ...,n}, j ≠ i, be
a solution of (5.19). From the Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions, see (3.33) and
(3.38) - (3.40), follows that:
(5.21) if x i > 0 then ∂∂
L
xi
 =  −p i (xi )  + λ i  = 0
(5.22) if x i = 0 then ∂∂
L
xi
 = −p i (0) + λ i  ≤ 0
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(5.23) if y i > 0 then ∂∂
L
yi
 = pi i (y i )  − λ i  = 0
(5.24) if y i = 0 then ∂∂
L
yi
 = pi i (0) − λ i  ≤ 0
(5.25) if x ij > 0 then ∂∂
L
xij
 = −τ ij + λ j  − λ i  = 0
(5.26) if x ij = 0 then ∂∂
L
xij
 = −τ ij + λ j  − λ i  ≤ 0
Using these conditions we can derive some properties of a solution of (5.19).
Equilibrium property 5.1:  For region i ∈ {1,…,n}:
a) In the optimal solution of (5.19), pi i ( y i ) ≤ p i (xi ) .
b) If in the optimal solution of (5.19), pi i(y i) < p i(x i), then x i = 0 or y i = 0.
c) If in the optimal solution of (5.19), supply and demand in region i are both positive,
so x i > 0 and y i > 0, then necessarily p i(x i) = pi i(y i).
Proof: see Appendix 1.
Equilibrium property 5.2: In the optimal solution of (5.19), let transport take place
from market i to market j, i.e. x ij > 0, with i, j ∈ {1,2, ...,n}, j ≠ i,, then:
a) no cereals are transferred from other regions into market i, i.e. xsi = 0, for all s ≠ i
b) no cereals are transported from market j to other regions, i.e. x js = 0, for all s ≠ j
c) the producer supply x i in region i satisfies x i > 0,
d) the consumer demand y j in region j satisfies y j > 0,
Proof: see Appendix 1.
Equilibrium property 5.3: For region i and j, i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j:
a) In the optimal solution of (5.19), pi j(y j) ≤ p i(x i) + τ ij.
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b) If in the optimal solution of (5.19), pi j(y j) < p i(x i) + τ ij, then x ij = 0.
c) If in the optimal solution of (5.19), transport between region i and j is positive, x ij >
0, then the optimal prices satisfy necessarily pi j(y j) = p i(x i) + τ ij.
Proof: see Appendix 1.
For a situation in which the optimal solution results in supply and demand in a certain
region i, so that x i > 0 and y i > 0, the producer price and consumer price are the same,
pi i(y i) = p i(x i). If transport takes place between region i and j, so that x ij > 0, i ≠ j, then
pi j(y j) = p i(x i) + τ ij. If no commodities are supplied or demanded in region i, so x i = 0
or y i = 0, then pi i(y i) ≤ p i(x i). Likewise, if no commodities are transported from region
i to region j, so x ij = 0, i ≠ j, then pi j(y j) ≤ p i(x i) + τ ij. One may wonder whether traders
are interested to buy x i from the producers, transport x ij, and sell y j to the consumers.
This follows from the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1:
Let x i, y i, x ij, i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, be an optimal solution of the equilibrium model
(5.19). Let pi i = pi i(y i) , p i = p i(x i). The solution:
(5.27) q i = x i ;  r i = y i  ;  q ij = x ij for i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j
is an optimal solution of trader decision problem (5.12). The value of the objective
function is equal to 0, meaning that the trader makes no profits or losses.
Proof: see Appendix 1.
It follows from Theorem 5.1, that it is optimal for the traders to buy, sell, and
transport the equilibrium quantities. They will make no losses from these transactions.
The result that pi i(y i) = p i(x i) on a competitive market on which y i > 0 and x i > 0, is a
well known result. The reasoning is as follows. Suppose that in region i, pi i(y i) >
p i(x i). Then a trader could acquire all supply in region i, still make profits, and price
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all his competitors out of the market, by offering a price just above the producer price
p i(x i). In that case x i would increase, due to (5.5). In order to sell this extra quantity
he would have to decrease the consumer price pi i(y i), see (5.5). Other traders would
do the same, in this way increasing the producer price and lowering the consumer
price, until pi i(y i) = p i(x i). Similarly, it is not possible on a competitive market that
pi j(y j) > p i(x i) + τ ij.
Takayama and Judge (1971, p112) conclude that the optimal quantities of equilibrium
model (5.19) will indeed be transacted on a competitive market, because the “solution
satsifies the conditions for a spatial price equilibrium (SPE)” – see the introduction of
Chapter 5 for the definition of a SPE. We come to the same conclusion, but based on
other arguments. The optimal quantities of equilibrium model (5.19) will be
transacted on a competitive market, because they are equal to the aggregate quantities
which are optimal for each individual producer, consumer and trader. This implies
that each agent reaches optimal profits or utility if the equilibrium quantities are
transacted, and that the traders’ purchases and sales are in equilibrium. This argument
is more convincing than the argument that the solution satisfies a (debatable)
definition.
The result that price differences equal transport costs – see Equilibrium property 5.3 -
is usually argued by assuming perfect competition between traders. As was discussed
in Chapter 2, this mechanism of perfect competition is often not satisfied on food
markets in developing countries. In the next section the behaviour of a monopolistic
trader will be investigated.
5.3 Monopolistic behaviour of traders
In this section the trader is not a price taker, but a monopolist who can set prices. To
what extent do price formation on the market and the flows between the various
regions change, if not the semi-welfare function (5.15) or (5.19) would be maximized,
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but the traders’ net profits? The model is based on the following assumptions, for i,j =
1,…,n, i ≠ j:
• The producers of region i sell an amount x i = xi(pi) to the monopolistic trader -
see (5.1) - at a producer price p i.
• If the monopolist buys from a producer from region i, he may sell (part of) the
purchases to the consumers of region i at price pi i or transport it to an other
market j to be sold to the consumers there at a price pi j.
• If an amount x ij is transported between market i and market j, the transport costs
are τ ij⋅x ij.
• Consumers of region i buy a quantity y i = yi(pii), at consumer price pi i at market i
from the trader.
Using the inverse supply and demand functions, the monopolists profit maximization
problem may be written as – compare (5.12):
(5.28) 
Max y y p x x x
x x y x x y x i j n
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The corresponding Lagrangean function is given by, see (3.33) and (5.20):
(5.29) 
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The corresponding conditions (5.21) - (5.26) result into:
(5.30) if x i > 0 then ∂∂
L
xi
 = − − ′ +p x x p xi i i i i i( ) ( ) λ  = 0
(5.31) if x i = 0 then ∂∂
L
xi
 = − − ′ +p x x p xi i i i i i( ) ( ) λ  ≤ 0
(5.32) if y i > 0 then ∂∂
L
yi
 = pi pi λi i i i i iy y y1 6 1 6+ ′ −  = 0
(5.33) if y i = 0 then ∂∂
L
yi
 = pi pi λi i i i i iy y y1 6 1 6+ ′ −  ≤ 0
(5.34) if x ij > 0 then ∂∂
L
xij
 = -τ ij + λ j  -  λ i  = 0
(5.35) if x ij = 0 then ∂∂
L
xij
 = -τ ij + λ j  -  λ i  ≤ 0
The following properties can easily be derived from (5.30) - (5.35)
Monopoly property 5.1: If x i > 0 and y i > 0, then: p x p x y yi i i i i i i i+ ′ = + ′( ) ( )pi pi .
This condition follows immediately from (5.30) and (5.32), and says that if a
monopolist purchases and sells in the same region, his marginal revenue equals his
marginal cost. It follows due to (5.5) that in that case: pi i( y i)  - p i(xi)  ≥ 0.
Monopoly property 5.2: In the solution, let transport take place from market i to
market j, i.e. x ij > 0, with i, j ∈ {1,2, ...,n}, j ≠ i, then (compare Equilibrium property
5.2):
a) no cereals are transferred from other regions into market i, i.e. xsi = 0, for all s ≠ i
b) no cereals are transported from market j to other regions, i.e. x js = 0, for all s ≠ j
c) the producer supply x i in region i satisfies x i > 0
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d) the consumer demand y j in region j satisfies y j > 0.
Monopoly property 5.3: If x ij > 0, then necessarily - see (5.30) - (5.35):
τ ij = y j ′pi j jy( )  + pi j − x p xi i i′( )  − p i,.
It follows, due to (5.5), that: pi τ pi τj i ij j j j i i i ijp y y x p x− = − ′ + ′ ≥( ) ( )
Monopoly properties 5.1 and 5.3 differ from the Equilibrium properties 5.1 and 5.3,
in which it is not possible that in the solution pii(yi) - pi(xi) > 0 or pij(yj) - pi(xi) > τ ij.
This shows that on a monopolistic market, traders will make positive profits, whereas
traders play even on a competitive market. Note that we can not say on beforehand,
that producers and consumer are worse off on a monopolistic market. For example,
assume producer prices on a monopolistic market are lower than producer prices on a
competitive market. In that case, producer supply on the monopolistic market is lower
than on the competitive market. Consequently, due to (5.5), the costs a producer has
to make on a monopolistic market are lower than his costs on a competitive market.
In total, the producers’ net revenues may still be higher on the monopolistic market
than on the competitive market.
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6 Spatial equilibrium on n markets; multi-period model
In this chapter the market situation of Chapter 5 is extended. A year, for instance from
one harvest to the next harvest, is divided in T periods of time, which we number t =
1,2, ...,T. 7 Now, cereals can not only be distributed over all n regions of a country, but
can also be stored for one or more periods. In Section 6.1 we discuss the strategies of
the agents operating on the market, if the producer and consumer prices are known. In
Section 6.2 and 6.3 we discuss methods to analyse cereal price formation and trade
flows for a competitive and a monopolistic market, respectively. The two models of
Chapter 5 - one for perfect competition between traders, one for monopolistic
behaviour of traders - are extended to multi-period models. Again, in Section 6.2 we
will show that the optimal quantities of the equilibrium model are equal to the
aggregate optimal sold, purchased, transported and stored quantities of the individual
market agents, at market equilibrium prices.
6.1 Strategies of producers, consumers and traders
Strategies of producers and consumers:
In analogy to (5.1) we define, for i = 1,...,n, t = 1,...,T:
x it producer supply in region i during period t
(6.1) y it consumer demand in region i during period t
p it producer price in region i during period t
pi it consumer price in region i during period t
Suppose again that consumer demand and producer supply strategies are reflected by
demand and supply functions. Suppose, furthermore, that demand and supply in
period t depend only on current prices, and not on prices in the other periods, so y it =
y it(pi it ) and  x it = x it(p it) . In the next chapter we will consider a situation in which
                                                      
7
  In the semi-arid countries of West Africa, there is only one growing season.
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pi it ity1 6 < 0,   i = 1,...,n; t = 1,...,T
p xit it1 6  > 0,   i = 1,...,n; t = 1,...,T
supply depends also on prices in other periods. In analogy with (5.2) and (5.3) it is
assumed that:
(6.2) u y dit it it
yit
1 6 1 6= Ipi ξ ξ
0
,        i = 1,2,…,n, t = 1,...,T
(6.3) c x p dit it
xit
1 6 1 6= I ζ ζ
0
,        i = 1,2,…,n, t = 1,...,T
with:
(6.4) u it (y it )  utility of consumption of y it by consumer i during period t
c it (x it)  costs of producing x it by producer i during period t.
Again, see (5.5) it is assumed that:
(6.5) 
Some characteristics of traders’ strategies:
To describe the optimal strategies of the traders operating on a competitive market,
we introduce in analogy with (5.6) the following variables for the aggregated trader,
for i,j=1,...,n, j≠ i, t=1,...,T:
r it quantity sold by the (aggregated) trader to the consumers in region i
in period t
q it quantity purchased by the trader from the producers in region i in
period t
(6.6) q ijt total quantity of produce transported by the trader from region i to
region j in period t
v it the quantity of produce in store by the trader in region i at the end of
period t.
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We suppose that traders have perfect foresight, i.e. that they know in advance, or can
predict with certainty, the producer and consumer prices for all T periods, p it and pi it.
Knowing prices, also producer supply, x it = x it(p it), and consumer demand, y it =
y it(pi it), are known to the trader. Traders can not buy more than the producers supply
(q it ≤ x it), and they can not sell more than the consumers demand (r it ≤ y it). Introduce
the following parameters for i,j=1,...,n, i ≠ j, t=1,...,T.
v i0 initial stock of the trader in region i
(6.7) τ ijt costs of transfer of one unit of weight from market i to market j
during period t
k it costs of storage of one unit of weight in region i during period t
Analogous to property (5.11), we assume that:
(6.8) τ ijt < τ ist + τ sjt,     i ≠ j, i ≠ s, j ≠ s, t = 1,…,T.
Storage costs k it are the costs which will be paid in period t, to store one unit of
weight from the moment of storage in period t, until the moment when they will be
taken from the stock in period t+1. If no storage losses are taken into account, the
quantity in stock at the end of period t in region i, can be written as































, t = 1,…,T.
The traders’ objective is to maximize profits, i.e. the revenues from sales minus the
costs from purchases, transports and storage. To show how the (aggregated) trader’s
decisions depend on consumer and producer prices, we analyse the following decision
problem – compare (5.12):
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(6.10) 
Max r p q q k v
q q v r q v q x
r y q v i j n j i t T
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Introduce the Lagrangian multipliers of the equilibrium constraints, λit, for i ∈
{1,…,n}, t ∈ {1,…,T}. The optimal solution of model (6.10), q it, y it, q ijt, v it for i,j =
1,…,n, j ≠ i, t = 1,…,T, has to satisfy the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions – see also
(3.42) - (3.44):
if q it = 0 then λ it ≤ p it if r it = 0 then λ it ≥ pi it
if 0 < q it < x it then λ it = p it if 0 < r it < y it then λ it = pi it
(6.11) if q it = x it then λ it ≥ p it if r it = y it then λ it ≤ pi it
if q ijt = 0 then λ jt ≤ λ it + τ ijt if v it = 0 then λ i,t+1 ≤ λ it + k it,  t = 1,…,T-1
if q ijt > 0 then λ jt = λ it + τ ijt if v it > 0 then λ i,t+1 = λ it + k it ,  t = 1,…,T-1
It follows immediately that v iT = 0.8 From (6.11), we can derive some properties
which show the influence of the difference between producer and consumer price
levels, on the traders’ optimal purchases, sales, transports and storage:
                                                      
8
 For period T, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (3.38) - (3.40) show that v iT⋅ (-k iT − λ iT) = 0, v iT ≥ 0, and -k iT
− λ iT ≤ 0. If v iT > 0, then λ iT = −k iT < 0, which is impossible due to (6.11), from which follows that λ iT ≥
0. Consequently, v iT = 0.
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Trader property 6.1:  For region i ∈ {1,…,n}, and period t ∈ {1,…,T}:
a) If pi it < p it, then any optimal solution of (6.11) satisfies q it = 0 or r it = 0
b) If pi it ≥ p it, then an optimal solution of (6.11) exists satisfying the condition q it = x it
or r it = y it; for pi it = p it, other optimal solutions of (6.11) may exist, not satisfying this
condition.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Trader property 6.2: Let q it, r jt, q ijt, v it, j ≠ i, i,j = 1,…,n, t = 1,…,T, be an optimal
solution of (6.11). Let a trader transport in a period t from a region i to a region j, so
q ijt > 0, for i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, j ≠ i, t ∈ {1,…,T}, then:
a) in period t no goods are transported from region s = 1,…,n, s ≠ i, to region i, q sit = 0
b) in period t no goods are transported from region j to region s = 1,…,n, s≠ j, q jst = 0.
c) in period t, purchases in region i are positive, q it > 0, or the stock remaining from
the previous period is positive, v i,t-1 > 0.
d) in period t, sales in region j are positive, r jt > 0, or the stock at the end of period t in
region j is positive, vjt > 0.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Trader property 6.3: For region i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, j ≠ i, and period t ∈ {1,…,T}:
a) If pi jt < p it + τ ijt, then any optimal solution of (6.11) has to satisfy q it = 0 or q ijt = 0
or r jt = 0.
b) If pi jt ≥ p it + τ ijt, and q it > 0, q ijt > 0 and r jt > 0, then an optimal solution of (6.11)
exists satisfying q it = x it or r jt = y jt; for pi jt = p it + τ ijt, an optimal solution of (6.11) is
not unique.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
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Define the costs of storage of one unit of weight in region i, from the moment of
storage in period t to the moment when it will be taken from the stock in period τ , for







−∑1  , 
Trader property 6.4: For region i ∈ {1,…,n}, j ≠ i, period t ∈ {1,…,T-1}:
a) If pi i,t+1 < p it + k it, then any optimal solution of (6.11) has to satisfy q it = 0 or v it = 0
or r i,t+1 = 0.
b) Analogously for τ ∈ {t+1,…,T}: if pi iτ < p it + κ itτ, then any optimal solution of
(6.11) has to satisfy q it = 0 or v it = 0, or …, or v i,τ − 1  = 0, or r iτ = 0.
c) If pi i,t+1 ≥ p it + k it, and q it > 0, v it > 0 and r i,t+1 > 0, then an optimal solution of (6.11)
exists which satisfies the condition q it = x it or r i,t+1 = y i,t+1. Nota bene: for pi i,t+1 > p it +
k it, any optimal solution of (6.11) has to satisfy this condition; for pi i,t+1 = p it + k it, an
optimal solution is not unique.
d) Analogously for τ ∈ {t+1,…,T}: if pi iτ ≥ p it + κ itτ, and q it > 0, v it > 0,…, v i,τ−1 > 0
and r iτ > 0, then an optimal solution of (6.11) exists satisfying the condition q it = x it or
r iτ = y iτ. For pi iτ = p it + κ itτ, an optimal solution of (6.11) is not unique.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
The interpretation of the first and second property is the same as the interpretation of
Trader property 5.1 and 5.2 in Section 5.1. Trader property 6.3 describes for which
price levels a trader will purchase from producers in region i, and transport to region
j, where he sells to consumers. This property is almost similar to Trader property 5.3.
The difference is that it is possible that goods are transported from region i to j, even
if pi jt < p it + τ ijt. In that case, it is not possible that a trader sells in region j the
commodities he purchased in region i in the same period. But the goods transported to
region j have to be taken from the stock from the previous period v i,t-1, or they have to
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be put in stock in region j, v jt. Trader property 6.4 describes the possibility of the
trader to purchase in period t, store till period τ, and sell to the consumers in period τ,
for τ = t+1,…,T. A trader will not sell in period τ the goods purchased in period t, if
he would make a loss out of it, i.e. if pi iτ < p it + κ itτ . For pi iτ = p it + κ itτ , storage will
give losses nor profits. Finally, for pi iτ > p it + κ itτ , selling in τ the commodities
purchased in t, will be profitable. The trader will purchase the maximum possible
quantity, x it, in period t, or sell the maximum possible quantity, yiτ, in period τ.
Note that it is possible that goods are transported from region i to j, even if pi jt < p it +
τ ijt, or that goods are stored in period t, even if pi i,t+1 < p it + k it, as show the following
examples:
• If pi jt < p it + τ ijt but pi jt > p i,t-1 + ki,t-1 + τ ijt, it will be profitable to purchase
commodities in region i in period t-1, store it until period t, and then transport it
to region j, where it is sold to the consumers. In that case it is possible that q i,t-1 >
0, v i,t-1 > 0, q it = 0, q ijt > 0 and r jt > 0.
• If pi i,t+1 < p it + k it, but pi i,t+2 > p it + k it + k i,t+1, then it will be profitable to purchase
in period t, store until period t+2, when it is sold the the consumers. So, possibly
q it > 0, v it > 0, r it = 0, v i,t+1 > 0, r i,t+1 = 0 and r i,t+2 > 0.
• If pi i,t+1 < p it + k it, but pi i,t+1 > p jt + τ jit + k it, it will be profitable to purchase in
period t in region j, transport it to region i, then store it until period t+1,
whereupon it is sold to the consumers. For those prices, it is possible that q jt > 0,
q it = 0, q jit > 0, v it > 0 and r i,t+1 > 0.
The above properties will be used in the next section to verify whether the optimal
solutions of the market equilibrium model to be developed, will satisfy the properties
of the traders’ optimal behaviour. The equilibrium solutions will only be acceptable
for the traders if they are also optimal for them individually.
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6.2 Maximization of welfare; perfect competition between traders
In this section we extend equilibrium model (5.19), to take storage into account. We
set up a multi-period, spatial equilibrium model in which the optimal values of the
following variables are determined for all regions i = 1,…,n, and all periods t =
1,…,T: producer and consumer prices (p it and pi it), producer supply (x it), consumer
demand (y it), total transported quantities to the various regions, and the quantity put in
store in period t. We define for i,j = 1,…,n, i ≠ j, t = 1,..,T:
(6.13) 
Without loss of generality it may be assumed that no goods are in stock at the
beginning of period 1, s i0 = 0. In analogy with Section 5.2, we first discuss the set-up
and results of the multi-period spatial, equilibrium model. Secondly, we show that the
welfare optimizing supplies, demand, transported and stored quantities, are equal to,
respectively, the aggregate optimal sales of the individual producers, the aggregate
optimal purchases of the individual consumers, the aggregate optimal transport flows
of the traders, and the aggregate optimal stock levels of the traders, at the market
equilibrium prices.
Semi-welfare in the multi-period, spatial equilibrium model may be written as total
consumer utility minus all costs made, which include producer, transport and storage
costs – see (4.30) and (5.15). As we may write consumer plus producer surplus as the
integral of the inverse demand function minus the integral of the inverse supply
funtion – see (6.2) and (6.3), semi-welfare can be written as:
(6.14) Max d p d x k s
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x ijt total produce transported from region i to region j in period t
s it the quantity of produce in stock in region i at the end of period t.
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where pi it( y it)  and p it(x it)  are given demand and supply functions satisfying (6.5), the
parameters τ ijt and k it have been defined in (6.7), and the variables x it, y it, s it and x ijt
have to satisfy the equilibrium conditions and non-negativity conditions



















(6.16) x it ≥ 0, y it ≥ 0, s it ≥ 0, x ijt ≥ 0,    i,j = 1, 2, ..., n; j ≠ i;  t = 1,...,T.
Let x it, y it, s it and x ijt, i,j = 1, 2, ..., n; j ≠ i;  t = 1,...,T, be the optimal solution of
(6.14) - (6.16). The Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions show that – see (3.33) and
(3.38) - (3.40), see also (5.21) - (5.26):
(6.17) if x it > 0 then -p it( x it)  + λ it = 0
(6.18) if x it = 0 then -p it(0)  + λ it ≤ 0
(6.19) if y it > 0 then pi it(y it)  -  λ it = 0
(6.20) if y it = 0 then pi it(0)  - λ it ≤ 0
(6.21) if x ijt > 0 then -τ ijt - λ it + λ jt = 0
(6.22) if x ijt = 0 then -τ ijt - λ it + λ jt ≤ 0
(6.23) if s it > 0 then -k it -  λ it + λ i,t+1 = 0 for t = 1,…,T-1
(6.24) if s it = 0 then -k it -  λ it + λ i,t+1 ≤ 0 for t = 1,…,T-1
Analogous to the argumentation in footnote 8, and using (6.19) and (6.20), it follows
immediately that s iT = 0. From these conditions we derive the following properties –
compare Equilibrium properties 5.1 to 5.3 in Section 5.2.
Equilibrium property 6.1:  For region i ∈ {1,…,n}, and period t ∈ {1,…,T}:
a) In the optimal solution of (6.14) - (6.16) pi it( y it) ≤ p it(xit) .
b) If in the optimal solution of (6.14) - (6.16) pi it(y it) < p it(x it), then x it = 0 or y it = 0.
c) If in the optimal solution of (6.14) - (6.16), supply and demand are both positive,
x it > 0 and y it > 0, then the prices necessarily satisfy p it(x it)  = pi it(y it).
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Proof: See Appendix 1.
Equilibrium property 6.2: Let in the optimal solution of (6.14) - (6.16) transport in
period t take place from a market i to a market j, so x ijt > 0, with i,j ∈ {1,2, ...,n}, j ≠ i,
t ∈ {1,…,T}, then:
a) in period t, no cereals are transferred from other regions into market i, i.e. xsit = 0,
for all s ≠ i
b) in period t, no cereals are transported from market j to other regions, i.e. x jst = 0,
for all s ≠ j
c) in period t, the producer supply in region i in period t satisfies, x it > 0, or the stock
remaining from the previous period is positive, s i,t-1 > 0.
d) in period t, the consumer demand in region j in period t satisfies y jt > 0, or the
quantity put in stock in region j is positive, sjt > 0.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Equilibrium property 6.3: For region i and j, i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, and period t ∈
{1,…,T}:
a) In the solution of (6.14) - (6.16) pi jt(y jt) ≤ p it(x it) + τ ijt.
b) If in the optimal solution of (6.14) - (6.16) pi jt(y jt) < p it(x it) + τ ijt, then x it = 0 or x ijt
= 0 or y jt = 0.
c) If in the optimal solution of (6.14) - (6.16) supplies in region i, transport between
region i and j, and demand in region j are positive, x it > 0 and x ijt > 0 and y jt > 0, then
the optimal prices necessarily satisfy pi jt(y jt) = p it(x it) + τ ijt.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Equilibrium property 6.4: For region i ∈ {1,…,n}, and period t ∈ {1,…,T-1}:
a) In the optimal solution of (6.14) - (6.16) pi i,t+1(y i,t+1) ≤ p it(x it) + k it. Analogously, for
τ ∈ {t+1,…,T}: pi iτ(y iτ) ≤ p it(x it) + κ itτ.
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b) If in the optimal solution of (6.14) - (6.16) pi i,t+1(y i,t+1) < p it(x it) + k it, then x it = 0 or
s it = 0 or y i,t+1 = 0. Analogously, for τ ∈ {t+1,…,T} – see also (6.12): if pi iτ < p it + κ itτ,
then any optimal solution of (6.14) - (6.16) has to satisfy x it = 0 or s it = 0 or s i,t+1 = 0
… or s i,τ-1 = 0 or y iτ = 0.
c) If in the optimal solution of (6.14) - (6.16) supplies in period t, stock levels at the
end of period t, and demand in period t+1 are positive, x it > 0 and s it > 0 and y i,t+1 > 0,
then the optimal prices necessarily satisfy pi i,t+1(y i,t+1) = p it(x it) + k it.
d) If in the optimal solution of (6.14) - (6.16), supplies in period t, storage from
period t to the end of period τ-1, and demand in period τ are positive, x it > 0, s it > 0,
s i,t+1 > 0,…, s i,τ-1 > 0 and y iτ > 0, then the optimal prices satisfy pi iτ(y iτ) = p it(x it) + κ itτ,
for τ ∈ {t+1,…,T}.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
The results of equilibrium model (6.14) - (6.16) are more or less similar to those of
model (5.16) - (5.19) in Section 5.2. Summarizing:
• For a situation in which the optimal solution results in supply and demand in
region i in period t, so x it > 0 and y it > 0 for i ∈ {1,…,n} and t ∈ {1,…,T}, the
producer price and consumer price are the same, pi it(y it) = p it(x it).
• If in period t, commodities are supplied in region i, transported between region i
and j, and demanded in region j, so x it > 0, x ijt > 0 and y jt > 0 for i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i
≠ j and t ∈ {1,…,T}, then pi jt(y jt) = p it(x it) + τ ijt.
• If in region i, commodities are supplied in period t, stored from period t to the end
of period τ-1 and demanded in period τ, so x it > 0, s it > 0,…,s i,τ-1 > 0, and y iτ > 0
for i ∈ {1,…,n}, t ∈ {1,…,T-1} and τ ∈ {t+1,…,T}, then pi iτ(y  iτ) = p it(x it) + κ itτ.
One may wonder whether traders are interested to buy x it from the producers,
transport x ijt, store s it, and sell y it to the consumers i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j and t ∈
{1,…,T}. This follows from the following theorem.
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Theorem 6.1:
Let x it, y it, x ijt, s it, i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, t ∈ {1,…,T}, be an optimal solution of the
equilibrium model (6.14) - (6.16). Let pi it = pi it(y it) , p it = p it(x it). The solution:
(6.25) q it = x it ;  r it = y it  ;  q ijt = x ijt  ;  v it = s it for i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, t ∈
{1,…,T}
is an optimal solution of trader decision problem (6.10). The value of the objective
function is equal to 0, meaning that the trader makes no profits or losses.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
From Theorem 6.1 it follows that it is optimal for the traders to buy, sell, transport,
and store the equilibrium quantities. They will make no losses from these
transactions. The equilibrium model can be used to analyse the optimal sales,
purchase, transport and storage behaviour of producers, consumers and traders on a
competitive market. For a monopolistic market situation, the results will be different.
This will be discussed in the next section.
6.3 Monopolistic behaviour of traders
If the market is not competitive, but the trader is a monopolist, the trader strategies
change. In Section 5.3 we described the market equilibrium solution for a
monopolistic trader. In this section we will extend this approach for a situation in
which the trader may store commodities. The multi-period model describing the
monopolist's objectives to maximize profits may be written as - compare (5.28):
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(6.26) 
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Formulating the Lagrangean function and taking the Kuhn-Tucker conditions,
analogous to the analysis in Section 5.3, we can derive some properties to which the
optimal solution of the monopolistic trader model will apply. Analogous to model
(6.14) - (6.16), it follows immediately that s iT = 0. Instead of Equilibrium properties
6.1 - 6.4, we can write the following properties:
Monopoly property 6.1: If x it > 0 and y it > 0, then: p x p x y yit it it it it it it it+ ¼  = + ¼ ( ) ( )pi pi .
This condition says that if a monopolist purchases and sells in the same region, his
marginal revenue equals his marginal cost. It follows due to (6.5) that in that case:
pi it – p it = ′ − ′p x yit it it itpi  ≥ 0
Monopoly property 6.2: In the solution, let transport in period t take place from a
market i to a market j, i.e. let x ijt > 0, with i,j ∈ {1,2, ...,n}, j ≠ i, t ∈ {1,…,T}, then
(compare Equilibrium property 6.2):
a) in period t, no cereals are transferred from other regions into market i, i.e. xsit = 0,
for all s ≠ i
b) in period t, no cereals are transported from market j to other regions, i.e. x jst = 0,
for all s ≠ j
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c) in period t, the producer supply in region i in period t satisfies, x it > 0, or the stock
remaining from the previous period is positive, s i,t-1 > 0.
d) in period t, the consumer demand in region j in period t satisfies y jt > 0, or the
quantity put in stock in region j is positive, sjt > 0.
Monopoly property 6.3: If x it > 0, y jt > 0 and x ijt > 0, then necessarily:
τ ijt = y jt pi jt jty( ) + pi jt − x it p xit it( )  − p it
It follows, due to (6.5), that:
pi jt − p it = τ ijt − y jt pi jt jty( ) + x it p xit it( )  ≥ τ ijt
Monopoly property 6.4: If x it > 0, y i,t+1 > 0 and s it > 0, then necessarily:
k it = y i,t+1  + +pi i t i ty, ,( )1 1  + pi i,t+1 − x it p xit it( )  − p it
It follows, due to (6.5), that:
pi i,t+1 − p it = k it − y i,t+1  + +pi i t i ty, ,( )1 1  + x it p xit it( )  ≥ k it
As can be seen from the Equilibrium properties 6.1 to 6.4, in the competitive case
discussed in Section 6.2, it was not possible that in the optimal solution piit - pit > 0 or
pijt - pit > τ ijt or pii,t+1 - pit > k it. Like in Section 5.3, traders will make positive profits on
a monopolistic market, whereas traders play even on a competitive market.
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7 Spatial equilibrium on n markets in T periods: stochastic future
prices.
In the previous chapter we discussed the set-up of an equilibrium model for n regions
and T periods, for a situation in which the level of future prices was not an uncertain
factor for traders, producers and consumers. They were supposed to know future
prices, on which they based their storage, supply and demand decisions. In reality,
however, producers, consumers and traders do not have full knowledge on what will
happen in the future. In fact, their decisions are based on their observations of the
market, and on their expectations for the future. In this chapter we will analyse the
market situation in which future prices are stochastic.
In Section 7.1 we will first deal with the optimal strategies of the individual market
agents. In a period t ∈ {1,…,T}, the optimal strategies of the consumers are assumed
to depend only on the observed consumer price in period t. In this period, the optimal
strategy of the producers depends on the observed producer price in period t, and the
uncertain producer prices in the periods t+1 to T. Finally, the optimal trader strategies
in period t, depend on both observed producer and consumer prices in period t, and on
uncertain producer and consumer prices in the periods t+1 to T. In Section 7.2 we
discuss a stochastic, multi-region, multi-period, equilibrium model to analyse cereal
price formation in a situation in which future prices are stochastic. For each period t
∈ {1,…,T}, a model will be set up in which producer prices, consumer prices,
supplies by the producers, demands by the consumers, and quantities transported and
stored by the traders are computed for all regions i = 1,…,n. Furthermore, also future
supplies, demands and quantities transported and stored which are expected to be
optimal for future periods are derived. The objective function of this model is set up
in such a way, that the optimal equilibrium quantities for the period t correspond to
the optimal strategies of the individual agents in this period. This means that for p it
and pi it the computed equilibrium producer and consumer price in the region i, the
optimal supplies of all individual producers together, optimal demand of all
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individual consumers together, and optimal strategies of all individual traders
together, are equal to the computed equilibrium quantities.
7.1 Strategies of producers, consumers and traders
Consumer strategies
Again, we deal with a situation in which a country is divided in n regions, and a year
is divided in T periods, from one harvest to the other. Consumer demand strategies
are reflected by demand functions. Anticipating on the empirical implementation of
the model for cereal trade in Burkina Faso, we will assume that demand in period t
only depends on current prices, and not on prices in previous or expected prices in
future periods, so y it = y it(pi it ) . In analogy with (6.1) and (6.2) it is assumed that:
(7.1) u y dit it it
yit
1 6 1 6= Ipi ξ ξ
0
        i = 1,2,…,n, t = 1,…,T.
Producer strategies
To describe producer supply strategies, we follow a different approach than in the
Chapters 5 and 6. We make use of the variables and parameters introduced in (6.1),
and of the parameters:
(7.2) w i0 available produce at the beginning of period 1 in region i
and of the variables
(7.3)  wit the quantity in stock at the end of period t by the producers of region i
for i ∈ {1,…,n} and t ∈ {1,…,T}. We assume that the producers in region i can
supply during the T periods, from one harvest to the other, at most a quantity w i0,
which is known at the beginning of the first period. w i0 may contain the harvest and
the commodities still in store from the previous year. In the previous chapter, prices
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p it for all periods t = 1,...,T, were assumed to be known at the beginning of period 1.
In this section, we assume that in a certain period t ∈ {1,...,T}, prices are known for
the periods 1,...,t, but future prices for the periods t+1,...,T are random variables, of
which the probability distributions are assumed to be known. Introduce, for i = 1,...,n,
t = 1,...,T:
(7.4) Pit random future producer price for period t in region i.
We will first assume that Pi1,..., P iT are independent random variables, and that Pit,
for t ∈ {1,…,T} has a discrete distribution, with possible price realizations pitk , for k
= 1,…,K. Define:
(7.5) Pr P p fit itk itk= =3 8 , for t ∈ {1,…,T}, k ∈ {1,…,K}, i ∈ {1,...,n}
with probabilities fitk  satisfying 0 1≤ ≤f itk  and fitkk
K
=1∑ = 1. EPit = f pitk itkkK=1∑  is
the expected price in region i and period t, for t ∈ {1,…,T}, i ∈ {1,...,n}.
Different from the approach followed in the previous chapters, we assume that at the
beginning of the first period, producers do not make final decisions on the optimal
supplies for all periods. Based on w i0, the observed price pi1, and random future
prices, Pi2,...,PiT, at t = 1, producers decide on the optimal supplied quantity x i1 in the
first period. In each period t ∈ {2,...,T}, producers decide on the optimal supplies x it
for the period t. These decisions depend on the quantity remaining from the previous
period, w i,t-1, the observed price p it, and the distribution of the random future prices
Pi,t+1,...,PiT. Supplies in period t are constrained by the produce which is in stock at
the end of the previous period. If storage losses are not taken into account, w it can be
written as:
(7.6)  w it = w i,t-1 – x it = w i0 − x i1 −…−x it, for t=1,…,T, i = 1,...,n
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The condition w it ≥ 0, for t = 1,…,T, implies that:
(7.7) x it ≤ w i,t-1, for t = 1,…,T, i = 1,...,n.
To choose between selling now or later, the producer balances net revenues from
current sales and expected net revenues from selling later. He maximizes in each
period t his revenues for that period, p it⋅x it, minus the costs made to sell x it, called
c it(x it), plus the expected net revenues for future periods. We will assume here that the
cost function can be written as :
(7.8) c it(x it) = c itx it, for i = 1,…,n, t = 1,…,T.
with c it > 0 a constant. The parameter c it may contain among other things, production
costs per unit, transport costs to the market place, and costs to store the goods until
period t. Consequently ′c xit it1 6> 0 and ′′c xit it1 6  = 0, for i = 1,…,n, t = 1,…,T, see also
Section 4.1. It will be discussed below why we assume that c it(x it) is a linear function.
In each period t ∈ {1,…,T}, a producer optimizes his revenues for the period t, plus
his expected revenues for the future periods t+1 to T, knowing the current price p it
and available stock w i,t-1. Define for i ∈ {1,…,n} and t ∈ {1,…,T}:
(7.9)  z w pitpr i t it, ,−12 7  the optimal current plus expected future net revenues
of the producer in region i for period t.
Optimal producer supply in period T
The sequential decision process can be modelled using a so called recourse model.
The model structure is the same as in model (3.48) in Section 3.5. Consider first the
producer’s supply in the last period t = T. In the last period the producer knows the
level of the stocks remaining from the previous period, w i,T-1, and also p iT is assumed
to be known. The producer in region i maximizes his net revenues for that period.
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Produce remaining at the end of period T, x iT - w i,T-1, is assumed not to yield any
future revenues. The decision problem for period T may then be written as:
(7.10) 
z w p Max p x c x x w
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Optimal producer supply for the periods T-1 to 1
In the producers’ decision problems for the periods t = T-1, T-2,…,1, producers in
region i are assumed to know the level of the stock remaining from the previous
period, wi,t-1 – see (7.6), the producer price p it, and the probability distribution of
future prices – see (7.5). In a period t ∈ {1,…,T−1}, a producer optimizes his profits
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Ez w Pi t
pr
it i t, ,,+ +1 12 7  refers to the expectation of zi tpr, +1  with respect to the random price
Pi,t+1, i.e. the expectation of the optimal revenues for period t+1 plus expected future
revenues for the periods t+2 to T. Define xi t
k
, +1  and wi t
k
, +1  for k = 1,…,K, the supply in
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period t+1 and the stock at the end of period t+1, if the producer price in period t+1
takes the value pi t
k
, +1 . Analogous to (3.49), Ez w Pi tpr it i t, ,,+ +1 12 7  in (7.12) is:
(7.13) 
Ez w P Max f p c x Ez w P
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Since we assumed above that remaining stocks at the end of period T will not yield
future revenues, Ezi Tpr, + ⋅11 6  = 0. The supply problem (7.12) for period t, t = T-1,…,1,
can be written as, with wi t
k
, +1  = w xit i t
k
− +, 1 , see (3.50):
(7.14) 
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Optimal producer supply for period T-1
Consider the optimal supply for period T-1, x i,T-1. For each region i = 1,…,n, the set of
possible realizations {1,…,K} in period T can be divided in two subsets – see (7.11):
(7.15) 
K k K p c

















Due to (7.11), it follows that the optimal solution xiTk  in (7.14) may be written as xiTk




 = w i,T-1 = w i,T-2 – x i,T-1 for k ∈ KiT
2
. For the k for which piT
k
 =
x iT the solution is not unique. Let (a )+ = max(a ;0), the positive point of a. Define for
each region i = 1,…,n:
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For t = T-1, (7.14) is:
(7.17) 
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i T i T
x w











iT i T i T
k K
i T i T i T i T i T
x w
i T i T
i T i T
iT iT




















+ - + - -







1 2 1 1 1 1
2 1







2 7 2 7
2 7 2 72 7
- - -
- - - - -
- +
  = -
1 1 2
1 2 1 2 10
Ψ ΨiT i T iT i T
i T i T i T i T i T
x w




, , , , ,
,
ΨiT can be interpreted as the expected net revenues of selling one kg in period T or
not selling it at all. ΨiT is a constant. The solution of model (7.17) depends on the
difference between the current net revenues, p i,T-1 – c i,T-1, and the expected net
revenues for the next period Ψ iT:
(7.18) 
if then 
if  then 
if then any solution  between 0 and  is optimal
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Optimal producer supply for period T-2
To determine an optimal solution of model (7.14) for the period T-2, analogous to the
derivation of optimal supplies for period T-1, the set {1,…,K} can be subdivided in




 = l K p ci Tl i T iT∈ < +− −1 1 1,..., , ,; @> CΨ
Ki T, −1
2
 =  l K p ci Tl i T iT∈ ≥ +− −1 1 1,..., , ,; @> CΨ
The optimal solution for period T-1 may be written as, xi T
l
, −1  = w i,T-2 = w i,T-3 – xi,T-2,
for l ∈ Ki T, −1
2
.  In that case nothing will be supplied in period T. For the l for which
pi T
l
, −1  − c i,T-1 = Ψ iT, the solution is not unique. Finally, nothing will be supplied in
period T-1, xi T
l
, −1  = 0, if l ∈ Ki T, −1
1
. In that case, supplies in period T will be equal to
xiT
k




 = w i,T-2 = w i,T-3 – xi,T-2 for k ∈ KiT
2
 – see (7.15). Filling in
model (7.14) for period T-2, the optimal supplies for the periods T-1 and T – see
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with – see (7.16):
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Ψi,T-1 are the expected net revenues of selling one kg not in period T-2 but in one of
the later periods or not selling it at all.
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Optimal producer supply for the periods 1 to T
The optimal supplies for the periods T-3 to 1 can be determined in a similar way. In
Appendix 2 the optimal supplied quantities are derived step by step for a slightly
different supply decision problem for cereal producers in Burkina Faso, in which a
year is divided in four periods, so T = 4. Define Ψit, t ∈ {1,…,T}, the expected net
revenues of selling one kg not in period t-1, but in one of the later periods or not
selling it at all. Analogous to (7.16), Ψit can be written for t ∈ {1,…,T}, as – see
Appendix 2:
(7.20) Ψ Ψ Ψit i t itk itk it i t
k
K






with Ψ i,T+1 = 0. Since both terms on the right hand side are positive, it follows that Ψ it
≥ Ψ i,t+1, t ∈ {1,…,T}. In other words, expected net revenues from selling in one of the
periods t to T exceed expected net revenues from selling in one of the periods t+1 to
T. Analogous to (7.17), the producer supply model (7.14) for period t ∈ {1,…,T}  is:
(7.21) 
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The optimum supply levels x it, for the periods t = 1,…,T, satisfy – see Appendix 2:
(7.22) 
if then 
if  then 
if then any solution  between 0 and  is optimal
p c x
p c x w
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These results indicate that the producer will sell his entire stock w i,t-1, if the net
revenues from sales in period t exceed the expected net revenues from sales in a later
period. Else he will sell nothing. This result will be used in the next section to
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develop multi-period, spatial equilibrium models in which future prices are stochastic
variables.
If we did not suppose in (7.8) that ′′c xit it1 6  = 0, but that ′′c xit it1 6  ≥ 0, then ΨiT should be
written as:
Ψ iT i T iTk iTk iT i Tk Kx f p c xi, ,− −∈= − ′∑1 122 7 2 74 8
with K i2(x i,T-1) = k K p c xiTk iT i T∈ ≥ ′ −, 12 7J L . In that case K i2 would be a dynamic set
depending on x i,T-1, complicating the analysis considerably. Although it is possible to
derive the optimal producer supply in a similar way as above, this will not be done in
this paper.
Some characteristics of trader strategies:
To show how the behaviour of the traders depends on uncertain future prices, we
make use of the variables and parameters introduced in (6.6) and (6.7). The aggregate
trader operates on a competitive market, and can not influence producer and
consumer prices. We assume that in period t, he does know the prices p it and pi it, but
that future prices are random variables of which the probability distributions are
known. As for the producers, the basic characteristic of the trader’s strategy to cope
with uncertain prices, and uncertain supply and demand, is the sequential nature of
the decision process. The trader’s decision problem has many similarities with the
producer’s supply problem discussed above. The structure of the models to analyse
their decision problem is similar to the structure of the producer model discussed
above and of model (3.48) in Section 3.5. In period t ∈ {1,...,T} he decides on the
optimal strategies for this period, taking into account the strategies which he expects
to be optimal in future periods. His decisions in period t are based on the observed
current market prices, p it and pi it, and the probability distribution of possible prices for
the future periods τ = t+1,…,T. Introduce, for i ∈ {1,…,n}, t ∈ {1,…,T}:
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random future producer price for period  in region 
random future consumer price for period  in region Π
We assume for the moment that random producer prices Pi1,…,PiT are mutually
independent, and that also random consumer prices Π i1,…,Π iT are mutually
independent. Random producer prices in a period t are not necessarily mutually
independent from the random consumer prices in period t. Assume that future prices
have a discrete empirical probability distribution, which are written as, for t ∈
{1,…,T}, k ∈ {1,…,K}:
(7.24) Pr( ; ;....; ; ;....; ; )Π Π Π1 1 1 1t tk t tk it itk it itk nt ntk nt ntk tkP p P p P p g= = = = = = =pi pi pi
with possible price realizations pit
k
 and pi it
k



















, t ∈ {1 ,…,T}, i ∈ {1,…,n}.
Given current producer and consumer prices, p it and pi it, the probability distributions
of random future prices, Piτ and Π iτ, τ = t+1,...,T, and the stock level at the end of
period t-1, the trader decides in period t on the quantity of goods q it he purchases
from the producers, the quantity q ijt he transfers to other regions, the quantity r it he
sells to the consumers, and the level of the stock v it at the end of period t to be sold
later – see (6.6).
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In each period t ∈ {1,…,T} the trader optimizes his current revenues for period t, plus
the expected future revenues for the periods t+1 to T, knowing the current producer
and consumer prices, p it and pi it, and the trader’s stock v i,t-1 in the region i = 1,…,n.
Define for t ∈ {1,…,T}:
(7.26) z p v i nttr it it i tpi , , ,...,, − ∈1 1; @3 8 the optimal current plus expected future
revenues of the trader in period t. 10
Like the producer supply problem, the trader’s sequential decision process can be
modelled using a recourse model. For period t the problem can be written as – see
also (6.10) and (3.48):
(7.27) 
z p v i n
Max r p q q k v Ez P v i n
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The quantities v i,t-1 are the known stocks remaining from the previous period. In
analogy with (6.10), in (7.27) the producer supply x it and consumer demand y it, i =
1,...,n, are given upperbounds on the traders’ purchases from the producers and sales
to the consumers, with x it the optimal solution of model (7.10) for period T and of
                                                      
10
 z p v i nt
tr
it it i tpi , , , ... ,, − ∈{ }1 11 6 is a short notation for z p p v vttr t nt t nt t n tpi pi1 1 1 1 1,..., , ,..., , , ... ,, ,− −1 6 .
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¼10 5 , with pi i,t+1 and p i,t+1 replaced by the random prices Π i,t+1 and
Pi,t+1, see (3.49). We assume that EzTtr+ ⋅11 6  = 0, i.e. stocks remaining at the end of
period T are assumed not to yield any future revenues. Define








, , , ,
, ,+ + + +1 1 1 1 and  as the purchased, sold, transported and stored quantities,




, ,+ +1 1 and  the upperbounds on the traders’ purchases and sales, if producer
and consumer prices in period t+1 and region i would be pi t
k
, +1  and pi i t
k
, +1 . Analogous
to (3.49), Ezttr+ ⋅11 6  can be rewritten as – see also (7.13):
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in which pi i t
l
, +2  and  pi t
l
, +2  are the possible price realizations in period t+2, for l ∈
{1,….,K}. Purchased, sold, transported and stored quantities in period t+2, if producer
and consumer prices in period t+1 and t+2 are equal to, respectively, pi t
k
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+ + + +2 2 2 2 and , for k  = 1,…,K, l =
1,…,K.
Introduce λ it the Lagrange multipliers of the equilibrium constraints of model (7.27),
λ i tk, +1  the Lagrange multipliers of the equilibrium constraints in Ezttr+ ⋅11 6 , and λ i tk l,, +2
the Lagrange multipliers of the equilibrium constraints in Ezt
tr
+ ⋅2 1 6 , for t= 1,…,T-1, k,l
= 1,…,K. A part of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of model (7.27) read – see (3.38) -
(3.40) and (3.42) - (3.44):
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To derive condition (7.32) for vi tk, +1 , write out Ezttr+ ⋅2 1 6 , in which vi tk, +1  occurs only in
the equilibrium constraint, with Lagrange multiplier λ i tk l,, +2 , for l ∈ {1,…,K}. The
Kuhn-Tucker conditions show that the results of model (7.27) satisfy a number of
properties. Like in Section 6.1, these properties show the influence of the producer
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and consumer price levels, on the traders’ optimal purchased, sold, transported and
stored quantities. The interpretation of the properties is equal to the interpretation of
the Trader properties 6.1 to 6.4 in Section 6.1.
Trader property 7.1:  For region i ∈ {1,…,n}, and period t ∈ {1,…,T}:
a) If pi it < p it, then any optimal solution of (7.27) satisfies q it = 0 or r it = 0.
b) If pi it ≥ p it, then an optimal solution of (7.27) exists, satisfying the condition q it = x it
or r it = y it. For pi it = p it, other optimal solutions of (7.27) may exist, not satisfying this
condition.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Trader property 7.2: Let q it, r jt, q ijt, v it, j ≠ i, i,j = 1,…,n, t = 1,…,T, be an optimal
solution of (7.27). Let a trader transport in a period t from region i to j, so q ijt > 0, i,j
∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, t ∈ {1,…,T}, then:
a) no goods are transported from a region s = 1,…,n,s ≠ i,  to region i, q sit = 0
b) no goods are transported from region j to a region s = 1,…,n, ,s ≠ j, q jst = 0.
c) purchases in region i are positive, q it > 0, or the stock remaining from the previous
period is positive, v i,t-1 > 0.
d) sales in region j are positive, r jt > 0, or the quantity put in stock in region j is
positive, vjt > 0.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Trader property 7.3: For region i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, and period t ∈ {1,…,T}:
a) If pi jt < p it + τ ijt, then any optimal solution of (7.27) has to satisfy q it = 0 or q ijt = 0
or r jt = 0.
b) If pi jt ≥ p it + τ ijt, and q it > 0, q ijt > 0 and r jt > 0, then an optimal solution of (7.27)
exists satisfying q it = x it or r jt = y it. For pi jt = p it + τ ijt, an optimal solution of (7.27) is
not unique.
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Proof: See Appendix 1.
We recall that storing from period t to the end of period τ-1 costs κitτ per unit – see
(6.12). Analogous to the results of (6.10), it follows that v iT = 0.
Trader property 7.4: For region i ∈ {1,…,n}, and period t ∈ {1,…,T-1}:
a) If Epi i,t+1 < p it + k it, then any optimal solution of (7.27) has to satisfy q it = 0 or v it =
0 or ri t
k
, +1  = 0 for at least one k ∈ {1,...,K}.
b) Analogously, if Epi i,t+2 < p it + κ it,t+2, see also (6.12), then any optimal solution of
(7.27) has to satisfy q it = 0 or v it = 0 or vi tk, +1 = 0 or ri tk l, ,+2  = 0 for at least one k, l ∈
{1,...,K}. Analogous properties can be derived for storage until the periods τ =
t+3,...,T if Epi iτ < p it + κ itτ.
c) If Epi i,t+1 ≥ p it + k it and q it > 0 and s it > 0 and ri tk, +1  > 0 for all k = 1,…,K, then an
optimal solution of (7.27) exists satisfying q it = x it or ri tk, +1 = yi tk, +1  for at least one k ∈
{1,...,K}. For Epi i,t+1 = p it + k it, an optimal solution of (7.27) is not unique.
d) Analogously: if Epi i,t+2 ≥ p it + κ it,t+2 and q it > 0 and v it > 0, vi tk, +1 > 0 and ri tk l, ,+2  > 0,





+2 , for at least one k, l ∈ {1,...,K}, is an optimal solution. For Epi i,t+2 = p it + κ it,t+2,
an optimal solution of (7.27) is not unique. Analogous properties can be derived for
storage until the periods τ = t+3,...,T if Epi iτ ≥ p it + κ itτ.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
In this problem, in which decisions are taken on the basis of expectations on future
prices, it is possible that a trader makes a loss out of a transaction. If the price in
period t is lower than the price for period t he expected in earlier periods (p it < EPit),
then it is possible that he makes a loss out of the sales from his stock v i,t-1. In the
previous chapter, this was not possible. In that situation he knew with certainty future
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prices, giving him the possibility to know in advance the profits he could get from
storage.
These conditions will be used in the next section to verify whether the results of the
stochastic equilibrium model to be developed satisfy the optimal strategies of the
market agents.
7.2 Maximizing welfare; stochastic future prices
In this section we extend equilibrium model (6.14) - (6.16), to take into account
stochastic future prices. In the multi-period, spatial equilibrium model of Section 6.2,
optimal quantities and prices are determined for all T periods at once. In the model set
up in this section, the optimal strategies of producers and traders in a period t ∈
{1,...,T} depend on known past strategies, on observed current prices in period t, and
on stochastic future prices. Therefore, in a period t ∈ {1,...,T}, we can only determine
strategies which are optimal for the current period t, and provisional strategies which
are expected to be optimal for future periods. We set up an equilibrium model for
each period t = 1,...,T, in which the optimal values of the following variables are
determined for i = 1,...,n: producer prices p it and consumer prices pi it for period t,
producer supply x it for period t, consumer demand y it for period t, total transported
quantities xijt to the various regions, and stock levels s it at the end of period t – see
(6.13). These quantities depend on known stock levels at the end of period t-1, s i,t-1,
on the available producer stock w i,t-1, see (7.6), and on uncertain future prices. In the
equilibrium model also future transacted quantities are determined, which are
expected to be optimal at the stochastic future prices. The structure of this model is
comparable to the structure of model (3.48) in Section 3.5
In analogy with the Sections 5.2 and 6.2, we will discuss the set-up and results of the
stochastic, multi-period, spatial equilibrium model, and show that the equilibrium
quantities are in line with the optimal strategies of the individual producers,
consumers and traders at the equilibrium producer and consumer prices.
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Stochastic, multi-period, spatial equilibrium model
In the stochastic, multi-period, spatial equilibrium model for period t, we optimize
current semi-welfare for period t plus expected future semi-welfare for the periods t+1
to T. In principle, we are interested in current semi-welfare. After all, expected future
strategies can be adapted in later periods. However, since the strategies of the
producers and traders in a period t depend on what they expect to be optimal in the
future periods, expected future semi-welfare must be considered as well. In Section
5.2 semi-welfare was defined as the sum of consumer, plus producer, plus trader ‘net
revenues’, with consumer ‘revenues’ defined as utility from consuming y it minus the
costs to purchase y it: pi it y it – see (5.18). Likewise, in this section, current semi-welfare
for period t can be defined as consumer, plus producer, plus trader revenues in period
t. Current net revenues in period t can be written as:
• Current consumer net revenues: utility from consuming y it  minus costs to
purchase y it:







• Current producer net revenues: revenues minus costs from supplying x it – see
(7.8):
(7.34) p x c x p x c xit it it it
i
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• Current trader net revenues: revenues from selling y it, minus costs to purchase x it,
minus costs to transport x ijt, minus costs to store a quantity s it, see (6.7):



















Due to the properties of integrability of the utility and cost function and the properties
of producer and consumer theory discussed in Chapter 4, utility from consuming yit
was equal to the integral of the inverse demand function (see (7.1)), and the costs of
supplying x it to the integral of the inverse supply function (see (6.3)). The properties
of the supply problem discussed in Section 7.1 are, however, different from those in
the Chapters  4 to 6. For that reason, the cost function in the objective of the
stochastic equilibrium model can not be replaced by the integral of the inverse supply
function. Consequently, current semi-welfare (7.33) + (7.34) + (7.35) can be written
as:
(7.36) pi ξ ξ τit
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where the variables, y it, x it, x ijt, and s it have to satisfy the constraint and non-
negativity conditions:



















(7.38) 0 ≤ x it ≤ w i,t-1, y it ≥ 0, s it ≥ 0, x ijt ≥ 0,    i,j = 1, 2, ..., n; j ≠ i.
for given stocks s i,t-1 and w i,t-1.
Expected future semi-welfare for the periods t+1 to T are the sum of expected
consumer, expected producer, and expected trader revenues, with regard to random
future producer prices Piτ and consumer prices Π iτ, for τ = t+1 to T. The perception of
probability distributions of future prices may differ between producers, consumers
and traders, depending on the information they have. Assume that producers have a
price probability distribution function which is defined as in (7.5), and that the price
probability distribution of the traders is defined as in (7.24). For consumers in region
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i, we assume that the random prices Π i1,...,Π iT are mutually independent stochastic
variables. The random price Π it for period t is assumed to have a discrete, empirical
distribution with possible realisations pi it
k
, for k = 1,...,K, with:
(7.39) Pr Π it itk itkh= =pi3 8
with probabilities hit
k
. Expected future revenues for the consumers, producers, and
traders can be written as:
• Expected future consumer revenues: since consumer demand satisfies the demand
function y it = y it(pi it)  in all periods t ∈ {1,…,T}, see also (7.1), it follows that a
consumer will demand in a period τ, τ = t+1,...,T, a quantity yikτ  = yi i
k
τ τpi2 7  if the
consumer price is pi τi
k
, for k = 1,...,K. Demand in a period τ is assumed not to
depend on demanded quantities or prices in other periods. Optimal expected
future revenues for the periods t+1 to T, Ezi tc i t, ,+ +1 1Π2 7 , can be defined as:
(7.40) 
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, + ⋅11 6  = 0.These revenues are a constant, since all elements are
constants.
• Expected future producer revenues have already been discussed in Section 7.1. If
a quantity x it is supplied in period t, a quantity w i,t-1 - x it can be supplied in the
remaining periods. In (7.13) we defined revenues expected to be earned in the
future by the producers as:
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(7.41) 
Ez w x P Max f p c x
Ez w x x P x w x
i t
pr












i t it i t
k




k, , , , , , ,




+ - + + + + +
=
+ - + + + -
- = - +
%&’
- -   -
+
˚1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
2 1 1 2 1 1
1
0
2 7 2 7
2 7 L
• Expected future trader revenues have already been discussed in Section 7.1 – see
(7.28). If the stock remaining from the period t is s it, then traders expect to earn in
the future revenues equal to (see also footnote 10):
(7.42) 
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Note that the upperbound on supply xi t
k
, +1 is a fixed bound, which is not
necessarily equal to optimal future producer supply xi t
k
, +1 at price pi t
k
, +1 . Below it
will be explained why for these upper bounds not the variables xi t
k
, +1 should be
taken, see Footnote 12 on page 108.
As will be proved later (see Theorem 7.2) welfare optimizing prices p it and pi it in
period t are formed in such a way, that it is optimal for the traders to purchase exactly
the quantity the producers supply at producer price p it, q it = x it, and to sell exactly the
quantity consumers demand at consumer price pi it, r it = y it(pi it). In period t, producers
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plan for each possible future producer price pikτ , k = 1,…,K, τ ∈ {t+1,...,T}, to supply
a quantity xi
k
τ  which is optimal for them individually. Similarly, in period t,
consumers plan for each possible consumer price pi τik  to demand in period τ ∈
{t+1,...,T} a quantity y yik i ikτ τ τpi= 2 7  which is optimal for them individually. It is,
however, not evident that it is also optimal for the traders to purchase the producer
supply and to sell the consumer demand. It may be optimal for them to purchase or
sell another quantity. Future strategies of the individual market agents are expected to
be optimal for them individually, but this does not mean that they are also optimal for
the other market agents. For that reason it is not possible to impose for each period
t+1 to T and for each possible price realization a market equilibrium as defined in
(7.37) for period t.
Define for each period t ∈ {1,…,T} the optimal current plus expected future semi-
welfare, knowing the producer and trader stocks available at the beginning of period t,
wi,t-1 and s i,t-1:
(7.43) z t(s i,t-1,wi,t-1 | i ∈ {1,…,n}) optimal current plus expected future semi-
welfare in period t.
Optimizing the sum of current semi-welfare for period t plus expected future semi-
welfare, subject to the market equilibrium condition (7.37) and non-negativity
conditions (7.38) for period t, and the supply upperbound x it ≤ w i,t-1, results in the
following stochastic, multi-period, spatial equilibrium model for period t ∈ {1,...,T-1}
as – see (7.36) - (7.38) and (7.40) - (7.42), see also (6.15), (6.16), and (3.48):
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(7.44) 
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In period t, the initial stocks s i,t-1 and w i,t-1  are known parameters. s i,t-1 is the quantity
in stock at the end of period t-1, w i,t-1 is the stocks of the producers − see (7.6). The
model for period T is similar to (7.44), but without the terms for the expected future
revenues. Note that s i0 = 0.
We will prove that the  optimal supplied, demanded, transported and stored quantities
resulting from model (7.44), are equal to, respectively, the optimal producer supply,
consumer demand, trader transport flows, and trader stock levels, at the market
equilibrium prices, as discussed in Section 7.1.
Optimal equilibrium prices and quantities for period T
Consider first the model for period T. Let x iT, y iT, x ijT, and s iT, i,j = 1,…,n, i ≠ j, be
the optimal solution of model (7.44) for period T. Let λ iT be the value of the Lagrange
multiplier for the corresponding equilibrium condition. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions
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Analogous to the argumentation in footnote 6, it follows that s iT = 0. The equilibrium
model for period T results in optimal values for supplies, demand, transport and
storage, from which optimal consumer price levels, pi iT(y iT), follow. Due to the
peculiar form of producer supply, see (7.11), (7.18), and (7.19), the model can not not
determine a unique optimal value of the producer price, p iT(x iT). One may wonder for
which producer price, producers are interested in supplying the equilibrium supply
x iT. This follows from the following theorem.
Theorem 7.1a:
Let in the optimal solution of the equilibrium model (7.44) for period T, $xiT  be the
optimal supply level and λ iT be the corresponding optimal value of the Lagrange
multiplier, for i = 1,…,n. If the producer price in period T in region i is equal to:
(7.48) p iT = λ iT
then x iT = $xiT  is an optimal solution of model (7.10), the producer supply model for
period T. In other words, the optimal equilibrium supply level is a supply level which
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gives the producers optimal profits in period T. Since the value of λ iT, depends on the
value of the equilibrium supply level, we write p iT(x iT) = λ iT.11
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Like in Theorem 6.1, we can also prove that in period T traders are interested in
buying x iT from the producers, transporting x ijT, and selling y iT to the consumers. This
is proved in the following theorem.
Theorem 7.2a:
Let x iT, y iT, x ijT, i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, be an optimal solution of equilibrium model
(7.44) for period T. Let pi iT = pi iT(y iT) , p iT = p iT(x iT) = λ iT. The solution:
(7.49) q iT = x iT  ;  r iT = y iT  ;  q ijT = x ijT for i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j
is an optimal solution of the trader decision problem (7.27) for period T.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Theorem 7.1a and 7.2a prove that the welfare optimal quantities for period T are in
line with the optimal strategies of the individual agents.
Optimal equilibrium prices and quantities for period T-1
Consider now the equilibrium model for period T-1. Rewriting the expected future
semi-welfare in (7.44), results in the following equilibrium model, with the variables










                                                      
11
 λ iT > 0 due to the assumption that pi iT(0) > 0.
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(7.50) 
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The terms between square brackets are the Lagrange multipliers. We will again prove
that the  optimal supplied, demanded, transported and stored quantities resulting from
model (7.50), are equal to, respectively, the optimal producer supply, consumer
demand, trader transport flows, and trader stock levels, discussed in Section 7.1. Let










, i,j = 1,…,n, i ≠ j, be the optimal
solution of model (7.50). Analogous to (3.56) - (3.60) in Section 3.5, the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions of model (7.50) can be derived. They are presented in Appendix 1.
With L(⋅) the Lagrange function and χ one of the variables of model (7.50), the Kuhn-




















Using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, it follows that viT
k
 = 0 for all i ∈ {1,…,n} and k ∈
{1,…,K}. Furthermore, similar to Theorem 7.1a and 7.2a, the following two theorem
can be proved:
Theorem 7.1b:
Let in the optimal solution of the equilibrium model (7.50), $
,
xi T −1  and $xiT
k
 be the
optimal supply levels for period T-1 and T, respectively, and let λ i,T-1, λ iTk  and γ ik  be
the corresponding optimal values of the Lagrange multipliers, for i = 1,…,n and k =
1,…,K. If the producer price in period T-1 in region i is equal to:
(7.52) p i,T-1 = λ i,T-1




= $  are optimal solutions of model (7.14), the producer
supply model for period T-1.12 In other words, the optimal equilibrium supply levels
give the producers optimal profits in period T-1. Since the value of λ i,T-1, depends on
the value of the equilibrium supply level, we write p i,T-1(x i,T-1) = λ i,T-1.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
                                                      
12
 Note that the upperbound on trader purchases in period T, xiT
k
, has to be an exogenous upperbound,
and may not be the variable xiT
k
. If the upperbound would be the variable xiT
k
, the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions would change, in that way not well reflecting producer strategies.
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Like in Theorem 7.2a, we can also prove that in period T-1 traders are interested in
buying x i,T-1 from the producers, transporting x ij,T-1, storing s i,T-1, and selling y i,T-1 to
the consumers. This is proved in the following theorem.
Theorem 7.2b:




, and $qijTk , i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, be an optimal
solution of model (7.50). Let pi i,T-1 = pi i,T-1(y i,T-1) , p i,T-1 = p i,T-1(x i,T-1) = λ i,T-1. The
solution:













for k ∈ {1,…,K}, i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, is an optimal solution of the trader decision
problem (7.27) for period T-1.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Theorem 7.1b and 7.2b prove that the welfare optimal quantities for period T-1 are in
line with the optimal strategies of the individual agents.
Optimal equilibrium prices and quantities for period t ∈ {1,…,T-2}
Consider now the equilibrium model for period t ∈ {1,…,T-2}. In this period optimal
values of x it, y it, x ijt, and s it are determined, as well as optimal values of future
consumer demand, producer supply, and trader purchases, sales transports and
storage, for all possible future price realisations. We define:
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, for k 1 = 1,…,K.
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k 2,…,k τ = 1,…,K, τ = 2,…,T-t.
Rewriting the expected future semi-welfare in (7.44) results in the following
equilibrium model, with the variables y it, x it, x ijt, s it, x r q q vi tk i tk i tk ij tk i tk, , , , ,, , , ,+ + + + +1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 ,
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, τ = 2,…,T-t:
(7.54) 
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The terms between square brackets are the Lagrange multipliers. Analogous to the
models for the periods T and T-1, by writing out the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (see
Appendix 1), we can prove that optimal supplied, demanded, transported and stored
quantities resulting from model (7.54), are equal to, respectively, optimal producer
supply, consumer demand, trader transport flows, and trader stock levels, discussed in
Section 7.1. Similar to Theorem 7.1a and b, and Theorem 7.2a and b we can
formulate the following theorem.
Theorem 7.1c:
Let in the optimal solution of the equilibrium model (7.54) for period t, t = 1,…,T-2,
$ , $ , $ ,








k kT t1 −
 be the optimal supply levels and λ it be the corresponding
optimal value of the Lagrange multiplier of the equilibrium condition for period t, for
i = 1,…,n, k 1,…,kT-t = 1,…,K. If the producer price in period t in region i is equal to:
(7.55) p it = λ it
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$ ,..., $
,..., ,...,
, for k 1,…,kT-t = 1,…,K, is an optimal
solution of model (7.14). In other words, the optimal equilibrium supply levels give
the producers optimal profits. Since the value of λ it, depends on the value of the
equilibrium supply level, we write p it(x it) = λ it.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Theorem 7.2c:
Let $ , $ , $ , $ , $ , $ , $ , $ , $ , $ , $ , $
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, τ = 2,…,T-t, i,j
∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, be an optimal solution of equilibrium model (7.54). Let pi it = pi it( $yit )
, p it = p it( $xit ) = λ it. The solution:
(7.56) 
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for i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, is an optimal solution of the trader decision problem (7.27).
Proof: See Appendix 1.
We conclude that it is optimal for the individual agents to transact the equilibrium
quantities. The stochastic, multi-period, multi-region equilibrium model can be used
to analyse the optimal strategies of the market agents and price formation on a
competitive market under uncertainty of future prices.
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Some Equilibrium properties
From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of model (7.44) we can derive the following
properties – compare the Equilibrium properties 6.1 – 6.4 and the Trader properties
7.1 – 7.4:
Equilibrium property 7.1:  For region i ∈ {1,…,n}, and period t ∈ {1,…,T}:
a) In the optimal solution of (7.44) pi it(y it) ≤ p it(x it).
b) If in the optimal solution of (7.44) pi it(y it) < p it(x it), then y it = 0.
c) If in the optimal solution of (7.44), supply and demand are both positive, x it > 0
and y it > 0, then the prices satisfy necessarily pi it(y it) = p it(x it).
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Equilibrium property 7.2: In the optimal solution of (7.44), let transport take place
from market i to market j in period t, i.e. x ijt > 0, with i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, j ≠ i, t ∈
{1,…,n}, then:
a) no goods are transported from a region s = 1,…,n, to region i, x sit = 0, for s ≠ i.
b) no goods are transported from region j to a region s = 1,…,n, x jst = 0, for s ≠ j.
c) the producer supply in region i satisfies, x it > 0, or the stock remaining from the
previous period is positive, s i,t-1 > 0.
d) the consumer demand in region j satisfies, y jt > 0, or the quantity in stock at the end
of period t in region j is positive, sjt > 0 (this is equal to the statement that the quantity
in stock at the end of period t, to be sold in period τ, is positive for at least one period
τ, &s jtτ > 0 , τ ∈ {t+1,…,T}).
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Equilibrium property 7.3: For region i and j,  i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, j ≠ i, and period t ∈
{1,…,n}:
a) In the solution of (7.44) pi jt(y jt) ≤ p it(x it) + τ ijt.
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b) If in the optimal solution of (7.44) pi jt(y jt) < p it(x it) + τ ijt, then x ijt = 0 or y jt = 0
c) If in the optimal solution of (7.44) supplies in region i, transport between region i
and j, and demand in region j are positive, x it > 0, x ijt > 0 and y jt > 0, then the optimal
prices satisfy necessarily pi it(y it) = p it(x it) + τ ijt.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Equilibrium property 7.4: For region i ∈ {1,…,n}, and period t ∈ {1,…,n}, we can
derive that:
a) If in the optimal solution of (7.44) EΠ i,t+1 < p it(x it) + k it, then s it = 0 or ri tk, +1  = 0 for
at least one k ∈ {1,…,K}.
b) If in the optimal solution of (7.44) Epi i,t+1 ≥ p it + k it, storage in period t, and




 > 0 for all k 1 ∈ {1,…,K},
then an optimal solution exists satisfying q it = x it or ri t
k
, +1 = yi t
k
, +1  for at least one k ∈
{1,...,K}. For Epi i,t+1 = p it + k it, an optimal solution is not unique.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
In Section 6.2, a trader would not make profits from storage, pi i,t+1 ≤ p it + k it. In this
section it is possible that a trader expects to make profits from storage. From
Equilibrium property 7.4 follows that a trader will store if Epi i,t+1 ≥ p it + k it. On a
competitive market, it is expected that traders will continue purchasing commodities
in period t (so that p it will increase), until Epi i,t+1 = p it + k it. However, due to the
(exogenous) upperbound on the trader’s future sales (r i,t+1 ≤ yi tk, +1  − see (7.54)) it is
possible that a trader will not continue purchasing in period t until Epi i,t+1 = p it + k it.
The results of (7.44) are more or less similar to the results of the Equilibrium model
in Section 6.2. However, the difference between the consumer and producer price pi it
and pit does, in this case, not influence the supply level, x it. Supply only depends on
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the difference between the producer price p it and the term c it + Ψ i,t+1. Differences
between the situations discussed in the Sections 6.2 and 7.2 can be illustrated by
considering the case in which pi it < p it:
• In Section 6.2, it was possible that y it > 0 for pi it < p it. In that case x it = 0, and
demand in region i originated from transports to region i, or from stocks
remaining from previous periods.
• If in the present situation pi it < p it, then y it = 0. It follows that, it is not possible to
take goods from the stock in region i or to transport goods to region i, not even if
pi it = p jt + τ jit. In the present situation, necessarily pi it = p it if y it > 0, see
Equilibrium Property 7.1.
So, in both sections, goods will not be purchased and sold in the same region for pi it <
p it. In Section 6.2, goods demanded may originate from stocks or transports to region
i, whereas in Section 7.2 no goods will be demanded for these prices. If in Section 7.2
demand in region i is positive, then necessarily pi it = p it.
In the next chapter we discuss the cereal market situation in Burkina Faso. Using this
information, we will discuss in the Chapters 9 and 10 a stochastic, temporal, spatial
equilibrium model for cereal trade in Burkina Faso. Using this model, we can analyse
the influence of for example storage and transport costs on cereal supply, demand,
transport and storage in Burkina Faso.
7.3 Monopolistic behaviour of traders
If the market is not competitive, but the trader is a monopolist, trader strategies
change. In that case the trader can set prices in each period t = 1,…,T. Consequently,
if he knows consumer and producer strategies as a function of market prices, future
prices are not stochastic for him. The trader decision problem is comparable to the
method discussed in Section 6.3. The difference is the price dependence of cereal
supply by the producers. It has been argued in Section 7.1, that producers supply
nothing in period t if p it < c it + Ψ i,t+1 – see (7.22). They supply the entire stock w i,t-1, if
p it > c it + Ψ i,t+1. If the price is equal to p it = c it + Ψ i,t+1, then any supply x it between 0
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and w i,t-1 is optimal for the producer. Since the monopolistic trader will pay the least
possible for his purchases to the producer, he will offer a price p it = c it + Ψ i,t+1 to the
producer. Consequently, cereal purchases cost him: (c it + Ψ i,t+1)⋅x it.  The model
describing the monopolist’s decision problem may be written as – compare (6.26),
(7.27) and (7.44):
(7.57) 
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in which c it⋅xit = c it(x it) as in (7.8), and Ψ i,t+1 is defined in (7.20). For the period t = T,
the parameter Ψ i,T+1 = 0. Let x it, y it, x ijt and s it, i,j = 1,…,n, i ≠ j, t = 1,...,T, be the
optimal solution of model (7.57). Formulating the Lagrangean function and taking the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we can write:
(7.58) If x it = 0  then –c it − Ψ i,t+1 + λ it ≤  0
(7.59) If 0 < x it < w i,t-1  then –c it − Ψ i,t+1 + λ it = 0
(7.60) If x it = w i,t-1  then –c it − Ψ i,t+1 + λ it ≥ 0
(7.61) If yit > 0 then pi pi λit it it it it ity y x( ) ( )+ ′ −  = 0
(7.62) If yit = 0 then pi pi λit it it it it ity y x( ) ( )+ ′ −  ≤  0
(7.63) If x ijt > 0 then -τ ijt + λ jt -  λ it = 0
(7.64) If x ijt = 0 then -τ ijt + λ jt -  λ it ≤  0
(7.65) If s it > 0 then –k it − λ it + λ i,t+1 = 0
(7.66) If s it = 0 then –k it − λ it + λ i,t+1 ≤  0
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Analogous to model (6.26), s iT = 0. Like in Theorem 7.1, the optimal supply level x it
of model (7.57) will also be an optimal level for the producers in region i, if:
(7.67)  p it = λ it.
Instead of Equilibrium properties 6.1 - 6.4, we can write the following properties:
Monopoly property 7.1: If y it > 0, then  − see (7.61) and (7.67):
p y yit it it it it= + ′pi pi ( ) .
According to this condition, marginal revenues from selling in region i equal marginal
costs of purchasing in region i. It follows due to (6.5) that in that case: pi it – p it =
− ′pi it it ity y1 6  ≥ 0
Monopoly property 7.2: Let in the solution transport in period t take place from a
market i to a market j, i.e. let x ijt > 0, with i,j ∈ {1,2, ...,n}, j ≠ i, t ∈ {1,…,T}, then
(compare Equilibrium property 7.2):
a) in period t, no cereals are transferred from other regions into market i, i.e. xsit = 0,
for all s ≠ i
b) in period t, no cereals are transported from market j to other regions, i.e. x jst = 0,
for all s ≠ j
c) in period t, the producer supply in region i in period t satisfies, x it > 0, or the stock
remaining from the previous period is positive, s i,t-1 > 0.
d) in period t, the consumer demand in region j in period t satisfies y jt > 0, or the
quantity put in stock in region j is positive, sjt > 0.
Monopoly property 7.3: If y jt > 0 and x ijt > 0, then necessarily − see (7.61), (7.63) and
(7.67):
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τ ijt = y jt pi jt jty( ) + pi jt − p it.
It follows, due to (6.5), that: pi jt – p it = τ ijt − y jt ′pi jt jty3 8  ≥ τ ijt
Monopoly property 7.4: If y i,t+1 > 0 and s it > 0, then necessarily − see (7.61), (7.65)
and (7.67):
k it = pii,t+1 + y yi t i t i t, , ,( )+ + +′1 1 1pi  − p it.
It follows, due to (6.5), that: pii,t+1 − p it = k it − y yi t i t i t, , ,( )+ + +′1 1 1pi  ≥ k it.
As can be seen from the Equilibrium properties 7.1 to 7.4, in the competitive case
discussed in Section 7.2, it was not possible that in the solution piit - pit > 0, pijt - pit >
τ ijt, or pii,t+1 − p it ≥ k it. Like in Section 5.3 and 6.3, traders will make positive profits
on a monopolistic market, whereas traders play even on a competitive market.
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8 Cereal markets in Burkina Faso
Before we can analyse the inter-regional cereal flows in Burkina Faso, first the
parameters of the models discussed in the previous section must be estimated. We
have to estimate cereal supply and demand functions, storage costs and losses per
stored unit per unit of time, transport costs per transported unit of  cereals between the
various markets, and the trading costs per unit of cereals sold. Estimation of these
elements demands a careful review of the existing literature on these issues. In
Section 8.1 a survey is given of empirical evidence of cereal supply and demand, both
in terms of quantities and timing. It focuses on the major factors determining supply
and demand, as well as on regional differences. This survey is based on the review in
Appendix 3 of many studies focussing on cereal trade, production and consumption,
which have been performed in Burkina Faso in the past. In the next chapter the cereal
supply and demand functions are estimated using the data presented in this chapter. In
Section 8.2 and Appendix 4 we discuss some studies which analyse the costs involved
in cereal trade. We estimate the values of transport, storage and trading parameters of
the equilibrium model.
8.1 Empirical evidence of supply and demand
For our analysis a planning period of one year is considered. The planning year is
divided in four periods of three months each, starting at harvest time in October.
During the planning year producers sell, traders purchase and sell, and consumers
purchase the cereals harvested, as a function of the cereal prices in all four seasons.
Farmers are both producers and consumers. For each period producer supply
functions and consumer demand functions have to be estimated. In Figure 8.1 the
planning year is presented. Supply and demand functions, discussed in Chapter 7,
refer to aggregate regional supply and demand. The regions distinguished in this
study are the 12 BurkinabJ “agricultural extension” regions (the CRPA: Centre
Regional de Promotion Agricole). Figure 8.2 shows a map of Burkina Faso with the
provinces and CRPA’s of the country. As planning year the reference year October
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2000 to September 2001 will be chosen. Quarterly supply and demand functions will
be estimated for this reference year.
A distinction is made between production and marketable supply functions. Production
functions refer to the level of cereal production as a function of among other things
rainfall, inputs and prices. Cereal supply functions, on the other hand, give the
quantity of cereals which is supplied on the market as a function of e.g. production
levels and market prices. For cash crops and industrial production, production and
supply functions are often similar: the quantity produced is also sold. In Sahelian
subsistence agriculture, however, both functions differ. In many households, certainly
in the shortage regions, the largest part of the production is consumed on farm, while
only a small part is sold. Production functions are not taken into account in this study.
Cereal harvest levels are supposed to be known before farm households make their
supply decisions. Supply decisions depend on cereal prices,  harvest levels, and
various other factors. For instance, distress sales often force households to sell a part
of their production early in the season, even if prices are low (see e.g. Yonli, 1997).
Furthermore, in some regions, merchants purchase from farmers only during some
months of the year. During the rainy season villages may be inaccessible,
consequently farmers will not be able to sell their supply. These examples show that
supply functions must be set-up carefully, taking into account the particular
characteristics and timing of BurkinabJ agriculture and trade. The set-up of demand
functions is also not straightforward. Urban households purchase all or the largest part
of their consumption on the market. Rural households, on the other hand, only
Oct. 1 Sept. 30Jan. 1 Apr. 1 July. 1
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
Agricultural season: clearing, fertilisation,




Figure 8.1 Schematic presentation of the planning year.
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purchase a small quantity of cereals on the market. Therefore, a distinction should be
made between rural and urban demand.
It is recalled that in the equilibrium models of the previous chapters the supply and
demand functions for each region i were written as a function of prices. In fact, as
was seen above, these functions depend as well on other characteristics, which may
differ from one region to the other. Population size, demographic growth and levels of
production are obvious examples of such characteristics. In the Sections 8.1.1 and
8.1.2 first these characteristics will be discussed. In Section 8.1.1 and Appendix A3.1,



















































































Figure 8.2 Map of Burkina Faso, showing the provinces and CRPA’s
Notes: 1) In 1996, some of the 30 provinces were split in two or more new provinces,
resulting in a total of 45 provinces. In this report, the ‘old’ provinces are still used, because
most data refer to the old provinces; 2) The Sahelian rainfall zone is the climatic region
with an average annual rainfall less then 600 mm, the Sudan-Sahelian rainfall zone is the
region which receives on the average between 600 mm and 900 mm of rain per year, the
Sudanian rainfall zone has an average annual rainfall exceeding 900 mm (see for example
LaclavPre, 1993).
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will be estimated. These data will later be used in the process of estimating aggregate
regional supply functions and rural and urban demand functions. In Section 8.1.2 and
Appendix A3.2, for each region harvest levels are estimated. By making use of
demographic data and regional cereal production data during a series of years (1984-
1998), production per inhabitant and per rural inhabitant can be estimated. These data
are compared with data on required cereal consumption per person in order to
evaluate whether a region may be considered to be a shortage, a surplus or an
‘equilibrium’ region. Special attention will be put on the estimation of expected
harvest levels in the reference year 2000, taking into account possible trends in
production, yields and/or cultivated areas.
In Section 8.1.3 and Appendix A3.3 a review is given of empirical evidence at
household level of cereal sales and their timing. It is discussed to which extent in a
number of village level studies various characteristics have influenced cereal supply
on the market. A distinction will be made between the annual supply on the market
and the timing of the supply. Section 8.1.4 and Appendix A3.4 deal with cereal
purchases by rural and by urban consumers. Special points of interest are the relation
between cereal production levels and purchases. Both demand and supply of cereals
depend on the household’s ability to earn an income from other sources. In Section
8.1.5 and Appendix A3.5 a review is given of data on household’s incomes and
expenditures. For various regions average levels of household income are estimated.
Finally, Section 8.1.6 and appendix A3.6 deal with cereal prices on markets in
Burkina Faso. Especially seasonal price patterns are investigated. This information is
used to estimate price probability distribution functions, and serves as a reference for
validation of the calculation of (endogenous) prices in Chapter 10. A careful review
of all possible sources, thus allows for the estimation of regional, quarterly cereal
supply and demand functions in Chapter 9. Though not conform rigorous
econometrical rules, data limitations do not enable another estimation procedure. It is
recalled that in this paper cereals comprise millet, red sorghum, white sorghum and
maize. Rice and fonio have not been taken into account.
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8.1.1 Rural and urban population
The size of the urban and rural population in Burkina Faso in the reference year 2000
can be estimated using census data for 1996 and 1985 (INSD, 1995a,b, 1998). INSD
data allow for the estimation of growth rates of the rural and urban population per
CRPA. The total, rural and urban population can be estimated for each region for the
year 2000, if it is supposed that
the yearly urban and rural
population growth between
1996 and 2000 is the same as
between 1985 and 1996 (see
Table 8.1 and Appendix A3.1).
The population estimates are
used in Section 8.1.2 to
estimate the cereal production
per person and the cereal
production per head of the rural
population, and in the Sections
9.1 and 9.2 to estimate the
aggregate regional cereal
demand and supply functions.
8.1.2 Cereal Production
Using the rural population estimates and production data which are published yearly
by the Ministry of Agriculture, the expected cereal production for the year 2000 and
the expected cereal production per head of the rural population can be estimated for
each region. The estimated level of cereal production per rural inhabitant is used in
Section 9.2 to estimate the annual cereal sales.
Table A3.2 in Appendix A3.2 shows production, cultivated area and yield data for the
years 1984-‘98. For each CRPA it can be indicated whether in most years cereal
Table 8.1: Estimated urban and rural population
             in the reference year Oct 2000-Sept 2001.
CRPA Total urban rural
Centre 1,787,175 843,454 943,721
Centre Nord 1,016,292 66,820 949,473
Centre Ouest 1,060,889 118,377 942,512
Centre Sud 518,920 18,343 50,0577
Sahel 792,889 31,499 761,390
Mouhoun 1,241,941 101,918 1,140,022
Est 1,049,317 55,799 993,518
Centre Est 836,249 103,372 732,877
Nord 1,039,819 104,111 935,708
Sud Ouest 543,289 19,221 524,068
Hauts Bassins 1,109,265 371,416 737,849
Comoe 359,652 76,996 282,655
Total 11,355,699 1,911,328 9,444,371
Estimates are based on 1985 and 1996 census data (INSD
1995a,b, 1998) data, see Table A4.1 in Appendix 4.
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production exceeds or is lower than the minimally required cereal consumption of
190 kg per person.13 In this paper we adopt the definition that a region is in shortage if
in most years average cereal production per person is lower than 170 kg (taken into
account 15% grain losses). A region is a surplus region if average production exceeds
210 kg per head for most years. The other regions (with production levels between
170 and 210 kg per person or having alternately a surplus or shortage production) are
called here equilibrium zones. In column (a) in Table 8.2 is indicated which CRPA
are shortage, surplus or equilibrium regions. The entire country is on average just in
equilibrium (between 1984 and 1998 the country had surplus in nine years, a shortage
in three years, and was in equilibrium in three years). The northern CRPA Sahel and
Nord, and the CRPA Centre (with the capital Ouagadougou) are in most years in a
shortage situation. The cotton areas Mouhoun, Hauts Bassins (with Bobo-Dioulasso),
ComoJ and Sud-Ouest and the CRPA Centre Ouest, Centre Sud, and Est have in
general a surplus. The other CRPA are in general in equilibrium.
Regression analyses executed on the data presented in Appendix A3.2 have
demonstrated that although the production data feature a significant linear trend, it is
risky to suppose that the cereal production for each CRPA in the reference year can
be estimated by extrapolating the data. Regression results showed that yield levels,
production and area cultivated are dependent upon rainfall (see Appendix A3.2 and
Figure A3.3). Yield levels show a jump after 1991. Part of this jump can be explained
by the good rainfall in 1991, 1994, 1995, 1997 and 1998. Yield levels were also high
during the average rainfall years 1992 and 1993, but the period is too short to be able
to draw conclusions upon the yield levels in the coming years. Furthermore,
                                                              
13
 The norms for required minimal consumption per adult equivalent differ per source and depend on
suppositions on the share of the different cereals in total consumption, and nutrient losses during food
preparation. Estimated norms per person per year vary (see Bakker and KonatJ, 1988) between 180 kg
used by FAO, 220 kg calculated by Bakker and KonatJ (taken into account the large losses due to meal
preparation) and even 270 kg estimated by CILSS. We use here the average norm of 190 kg per person,
applied by the ministry of agriculture to calculate the yearly consumption balances. It is noted that this
norm is not a strict norm, and that therefore the bounds between surplus and shortage households are not
strict.
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regression analysis for the cultivated area showed a significant, positive, linear time
trend for the cultivated area at a national level. For most CRPA’s, however, this trend
was not significant. In order to forecast for each CRPA the expected production levels
in the reference year 2000-2001, average 1984-‘98 yield levels are multiplied with
forecasted cultivated area for each CRPA. This area is estimated as follows. The
national cultivated area for the reference year is estimated, and for each CRPA the
average 1984-‘98 share in total cultivated land is calculated. Cultivated area per
CRPA for the year 2000 is forecasted by multiplying these two (see Table 7.2).
Yearly production is corrected for grains lost or used as seeds for the next season,
which are supposed to be 15%.
The last two columns of Table 8.2 show the forecasted mean production per head of
the total and per head of the rural population. If the norm for minimally required
yearly consumption of 190 kg cereals is applied it is shown that in only 3 regions
(Center, Sahel and Nord) farmers are expected to produce much less than their own
consumption requirements. In the other regions, the farmers are expected to succeed
fairly well in producing enough cereals for their own consumption. In five regions
farmers are expected to produce a quantity of at least 50 kg of cereals above the norm.
Farmers in these regions, which are all in the south-western part of the country, have
the opportunity to sell a large quantity of their cereal production. It has to be noted
that these farmers, usually also produce cotton. So, despite their cotton production
activities, they also succeed in producing more cereals than needed. The data show
that the northern regions are not self-sufficient and need to be provisioned by the
surplus areas. The CRPA Centre, in which Ouagadougou is situated, is also in deficit.
The low production per head of the total population in Hauts Bassins is caused by the
large number of urban households in the city of Bobo-Dioulasso. Column (g) in Table
8.2 shows that for the reference year the CRPA Sahel, Nord, Centre, Centre Nord and
Centre Est are expected to have a shortage production. The CRPA Mouhoun, Centre







































Centre D 650 7% 222878 144926 123187 69 131
Centre Nord E 597 10% 306996 183210 155728 153 164
Centre Ouest S 668 11% 337521 225630 191786 181 203
Centre Sud S 759 7% 210916 160008 136006 262 272
Sahel D/E 483 9% 278245 134257 114118 144 150
Mouhoun S 812 15% 467667 379850 322873 260 283
Est S 808 10% 311393 251481 213759 204 215
Centre Est E/S 771 7% 203259 156614 133122 159 182
Nord D 584 9% 264955 154775 131559 127 141
Sud Ouest S 814 7% 206583 168071 142860 263 273
Hauts Bassins S 1211 7% 203726 246802 209782 189 284
Comoe S 1171 2% 74872 87671 74520 207 264
Burkina Faso S 740 100% 3089011 2293294 1949300 172 206
Notes: (a) According to the definition in the text, S = Surplus region, D = Deficit region, E = Equilibrium region; (b) Based on Table
A3.2; (c) Average share of cultivated land of each CRPA in total cultivated area for the years 1984-98, see Table A3.2; (d) Total
forecasted cultivated area is estimated on the basis of extrapolation of the national cultivated area between 1984-1995; see Appendix 3;
(d) = Forecasted area Burkina Faso * (c); (e) = (b)*(d); (f) = 0.85*(e); (g) = (f)/forecasted total population per CRPA in 2000, see Table
8.1; (h) = (f)/forecasted rural population 2000, see Table 8.1.
128
Sud, and Sud Ouest are expected to be surplus zones. The other CRPA are expected
to be more or less self-sufficient and are equilibrium zones. This does not say
anything about the food security level of individual households, but shows whether in
principle much has to be transported to these areas or not. The cereal balances differ
from the official balances calculated by the government, since the last ones include
rice and fonio.
8.1.3 Cereal sales
Many farm households, certainly those with a shortage, prefer not to sell cereals, but
to earn an income by selling other crops, like groundnuts, cowpeas or cotton.
However, as discussed above they sometimes have to sell cereals because of urgent
cash needs. McCorkle (1987) speaks about a ‘code of honour’, which influences
cereal sales. Referring to her research in Dankuie, a village in the province of
Mouhoun, she reports that cereal sales to alleviate cash needs are usually
disapproved, except in special cases (extraordinary surplus, sales to village
cooperatives, sales in the lean period, just before the new harvest). Although the
people in Dankuie usually produce a large surplus, harvests in the survey year were
low. McCorkle uses a ‘commercial preference scale’ in order to classify the order in
which products would be sold if people had them, in case of cash needs. Millet and
sorghum occupy respectively the 17th and 18th place. Households prefer to sell cash
crops (cotton is the most prefered commercial good in case of cash needs) or
livestock (poultry is on the second place) or to borrow from parents (10th), farmer
cooperatives (11th) or traders (16th). Despite this code of honour, cereal sales can be
significant, especially when other ways to get an income are not conceivable.
In the past several marketing studies have been performed in Burkina Faso by for
example the University of Michigan and the University of Wisconsin (McCorkle,
1987; Szarleta, 1987; Sherman et al., 1987), by CILSS (Pieroni, 1990), by ICRISAT
(Reardon et al., 1987), by Yonli (1997) and by Broekhuyse (1988, 1998); see
Appendix A3.3. A comparison of sales patterns reported by these studies, reveals that
differences between years and regions as well as differences within regions are very
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large. The quantity of cereals sold depends to a large extent on production levels. In a
good rainfall year, with a good harvest, more cereals can be sold. In bad rainfall
years, households will not be inclined to sell many cereals, but they sometimes have
to. For example, Szarleta reports a sale of 600 kg of cereals per household in the
province of Houet in the bad rainfall season 1983-84, while Pieroni (1990) reports a
household sale of 1806 kg in the same province in the abundant rainfall season 1986-
87. Furthermore, households in surplus zones usually sell more than households in
shortage areas (see for example Table A3.6). They sell both a larger quantity and a
larger part of their production. Not only total cereal supplies, but also the type of
crops offered differs per region. Szarleta (1987) shows that in the survey villages in
the CRPA’s Mouhoun and Hauts Bassins, large amounts of red sorghum but hardly
any maize are offered.
The influence of prices on annual sales is weak. Szarleta (1987) concludes from a
regression analysis among 5 villages scattered over Burkina Faso that, indeed,
production is the most important determinant of annual cereal sales. Cereal prices, on
the other hand, do not significantly influence cereal sales. In the long run production,
and consequently also sales, may be influenced by prices. In the short run (for a
period of only a few years), however, farmers will probably not immediately alter
their production plans if cereal prices turned out to be different than expected. So, in
the short run the dependence of supplies on prices can not be demonstrated.
McCorkle (1987) argues that for some households prices do not influence sales
decisions. For other households, however, prices are of influence, but not decisive.
Using data collected between April 1983 and March 1984, Lang (1985) finds for the 4
surplus villages surveyed by SAFGRAD (see also Appendix A3.3) a relationship
between prices and annual sales, which is negative for some and positive for other
cereals, though it is not significant. Regression analysis per village shows that
production is the most important determinant of annual sales. Prices do not
significantly influence annual sales. Pardy also points at the importance of the
household size. The larger the number of consumers, the lower the sales. Pieroni
(1990) agrees with the strong link between production and sales (see Table A3.8 in
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Appendix A3.3), but argues, based on his village studies in the surplus zones of
Burkina Faso, that it is not a law. The production of a large surplus does, for some
households, not correspond to large sales. Cereal sales depend not only on the surplus
produced, but also on the need for capital, social relations, and market demand
(Pieroni, 1990; p. 44, 45). Cash needs may also be satified by earnings from other
activities (cash crop sales or non-cropping activities).14 Market development and
infrastructural conditions determine for a part the opportunity for such activities.
Households closer to main roads or to busy markets, have more possibilities to sell
handicrafts or processed food. Therefore, they also have the incentive to initiate
activities, which can replace their cereal sales. Such activities attract new traders, and
therefore enhance market competition and reduce marketing costs. Pieroni shows that
households selling large quantities are those with more land, more modern
techniques, less young children, and those closer to well functioning markets. This
argument is in favour of improving market functioning in Burkina Faso. Developing
other capital generating activities is, however, not only tied to the presence of roads
and markets. Reardon et al. (1988a) show that households in the shortage Sahelian
regions earn more income from non-cropping activities than households in the
Sudanian equilibrium regions in the centre of the country (see Figure 8.2). Sahelian
households provided most of their non-cropping income from livestock and
temporary migration. Activities related to crop production (product processing)
provided the largest part of the non-cropping income for most of the Sudanian
households. Due to the dependence of these activities on crop production, earnings
from these activities were low in years with bad harvest.
The ability to earn an income from other sources also influences the timing of sales. It
is often said that West African farmers sell usually in the post-harvest, low-price
season and buy in the pre-harvest, high-price season. Reasons for this are cash needs
                                                              
14
 Non-cropping activities refer to all activities other than crop cultivation activities, like livestock
raising, processing agricultural crops (dolo preparation, making millet porridge bouillie), handicrafts,
trade, off-farm employment, temporary migration, etc..
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for celebrations, urgent daily expenses, wage payments, debt repayments, etc. Various
authors (see Appendix A3.3) observed that in general, most sales are effectuated
during the post-harvest season. It appears that the number of households selling
during the post-harvest season is higher than the number of households selling during
the rainy season, when prices are higher. However, the quantity of cereals sold per
selling household is smaller during the post-harvest season than during the rainy
season. The results seem to indicate that households which do not have to sell cheap,
prefer to wait until prices increase. Poorer households, who do not have other income
generating sources have to sell (small quantities) during more periods. Sales of
households posessing a large number of livestock seem to be dependent not only on
the cereal market, but also on the livestock market (Pardy, 1987). These households
may have the ability to postpone sales until prices increase. These patterns might
support the hypothesis that sales during the harvest and post-harvest season are a
function of cash needs (with a negative price elasticity of supply), whereas sales later
in the year are a function of prices (with a positive price elasticity of supply).
To summarize, the different surveys indicate that cereal production levels are the
most important determinant of annual cereal sales. Cereal prices do often not
influence annual cereal sales significantly. Some juxtaposed effects reduce the total
price effect which is overwhelmed by the effect of total production. Next to the
surplus produced, also the need for capital, social relations, and the possibility to
develop other income generating activities influences annual cereal sales. This also
influences the timing of sales. A general recognized pattern is that most farmers sell
during the post-harvest, low-price season. Some authors, however, observed that it are
especially the poorer households who sell small quantities during all periods of the
year. The wealthier households prefer to sell a larger quantity during the higher priced
seasons.
The levels of cereal sales observed in the different surveys, are used to estimate in
Section 9.2 the levels of annual cereal sales in each region. The information on sales
patterns is used to estimate average levels of revenues from cereal sales in each
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period of the reference year which will be necessary to estimate the supply functions.
Furthermore, the results from the equilibrium models can be validated using the
information on cereal supply discussed here.
8.1.4 Cereal purchases
As only a part of the households sells cereals, most households purchase cereals on
the market. A comparison of the same studies as mentioned above, learns us
something about the purchase pattern of BurkinabJ households (see also Appendix
A3.4). Here a clear distinction must be made between urban and rural purchases.
About 18% of the population lives in urban areas, who have to purchase almost all
cereals consumed on the market. Urban households consume much more rice than
rural households, and more often they purchase prepared food (millet porridge
bouillie, bread, prepared meals).
Some studies only concentrated on urban consumption and demand. For example,
Sherman et al. (1987) executed in 1983-84 a survey among 125 households in
Ouagadougou and 108 households in Bobo-Dioulasso, and among 75 sellers of
prepared food in Ouagadougou and 75 in Bobo-Dioulasso. They report that cereals,
including rice, are the major staple of urban diets. White sorghum and millet are still
consumed in largest quantities, but rice is increasingly consumed by urban
households. Reardon et al. (1988b) report that rich households consume relatively
more rice (32% of total cereal consumption) than poor households (19% of total
cereal consumption). According to Sherman et al. (1987), red sorghum is not
regularly eaten, but only as a grain of last resort. Households purchase the largest part
from medium and small traders or from vendeuses (petty women traders) and to a
lesser extent from large traders. Large traders usually do not sell in quantities less
than 100 kg. The purchasing of 100 kg bags is typically reserved to civil servants and
private sector employees who receive salaries periodically. Since purchases per bag
are relatively cheaper than purchases in retail, the richer households can profit more
from lower prices than poorer households. Only few households purchase directly
from producers. Most prepared food sellers are women, who purchase and sell in
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small quantities. Apart from some of the dolo brewers, they purchase in the morning
the cereals they need for preparing the food which is sold the same day. Purchases are
often on credit. Dolo brewers usually purchase red sorghum in larger quantities,
because it is not profitable to brew only small quantities.
The data presented in Table A3.18 in Appendix A3.4 show that almost all rural
households purchase cereals on the market. Many rural households have to purchase
large quantities in order to satisfy consumption requirements, certainly in the shortage
areas.15 As with sales patterns, purchases by rural households are dependent on
production levels. The data clearly show that purchases are less in the higher
production regions. So, on average, rural households in the surplus areas purchase
less than those in the shortage areas. However, as Reardon et al. (1987) show, even in
surplus zones there are many households who have to purchase large volumes of
cereals to satisfy consumption needs. It regularly happens that the same type of
cereals sold is rebought later in the season. This phenomenon is well known in Africa
and sometimes called overcommercialization (see also Yonli, 1997). This is also the
case for red sorghum, a part of which is consumed as dolo (see Table A3.19 in
Appendix A3.4). Seasonal data confirm that most purchases take place during the
lean, high price season. The data suggest, however, that richer farmers purchase
earlier, when prices are still lower (in the surplus village of BarJ most purchases were
made between January and March, Ellsworth and Shapiro (1989)).
The observation that high production levels in surplus regions lead to lower
purchases, may imply that purchases will be lower during the favourable rainfall
years. The only source which reports on differences in purchases between production
seasons is Reardon et al. (1987), who gives purchase data for 6 villages in three
provinces in Burkina Faso. We will try to use Reardon’s data to analyse the influence
                                                              
15
 Most households, both in urban and in rural areas, receive cereal gifts. These gifts are not taken into
account here, though they may be substantial (Szarleta, 1987; Broekhuyse, 1998; Appendix A3.5). It is
supposed here that the quantity received is more or less equal to the quantity given to others. Therefore,
they are not taken into consideration in this study.
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of rainfall on purchases. The purchase data will be compared with rainfall data. For
we do not have data on cereal production for these villages, and local cereal
production levels may not be well represented by aggregate production data, we
compare purchases with rainfall data from the rainfall stations closest to the survey
villages. The data are obtained from the National Meteorological Institute of Burkina
Faso. For the province of Soum, rainfall data from the rainfall station in Djibo (1981
458 mm, 1982 304 mm, 1983 322 mm, 1984 227 mm) show that only 1981 rainfall
was above the 1970-93 average (of 333 mm). Table A3.23 in Appendix A3.4 shows
that for the province of Soum purchases are higher if rainfall is low, although
purchases in the 1983-84 season are rather low compared to the other low rainfall
years. Purchases of the province of PassorJ do not differ very much over the years,
although the slightly increasing purchases correspond to the slightly decreasing
rainfall in Kaya (1981 603 mm, 1982 583 mm, 1983 574 mm, 1984 533 mm; 1970-
’93 average 615 mm). Finally, rainfall in the rainfall station in DJdougou in the
province of Mouhoun are all below the 1970-‘96 average (1981 no observation, 1982
521 mm, 1983 621 mm, 1984 627 mm; 1970-’96 average 717 mm). The pattern of
decreasing purchases from 1982 to 1984 corresponds to the pattern of increasing
rainfall in this period. Although too few data are available to make conclusive
statements, the data are not in contradiction with the hypothesis that purchases are
inversely proportional to rainfall, and therefore also to production (in Appendix A3.2
it was shown that a positive, significant relation exists between rainfall and
production).
To analyse the influence of income or prices on cereal demand, income elasticities of
demand and price elasticities of demand are useful measures, see also Chapter 4. The
price elasticity of demand measures the percentage change in demand if the price
changes with 1%. Estimating elasticities is difficult since no time series data are
available for a large number of respondents, and since many other factors influence
demand behaviour as well. Because of the weakness of the available data in
developing countries, many studies apply elasticities reported by different authors for
similar situations in different countries. It is noted that elasticities also depend on the
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degree of commodity aggregation. The demand for cereals is expected to be less price
elastic than the demand for white sorghum. If the price of white sorghum increases,
other cereals can serve as substitute. If, however, the prices of all cereals increase,
other types of food which can serve as a substitute, must be sought for. Some studies
estimating price elasticities of demand and income elasticities of demand are
discussed in Appendix A3.4.
The information on the timing of purchases is used in Section 9.1 to estimate the
share of total purchases in each period. Furthermore, the purchase data discussed
above are used to check the validity of the results from the equilibrium models. In
Section 9.1 estimates are also made of the income elasticity of cereal demand in the
different CRPA in Burkina Faso. These are necessary to estimate the share of the
revenues spent on cereal purchases.
8.1.5 Revenues and expenditures
Cereal supply and demand decisions depend on the total household revenues and
expenditures. If a household produces cash crops or has other sources of income,
probably not many cereals will have to be sold. If household expenditures are high in
a certain period, and if revenues (other than revenues from cereal sales) are not
sufficient, cereals must probably be sold. If total revenues are low, not many cereals
can be purchased for own consumption. In other words, household revenues and
expenditures are decisive factors in view of the quantities of cereals that can or have
to be sold or purchased.
Measurement of household revenues and expenses in developing countries is a
notorious difficult task. For interviewers it may be difficult to get reliable answers to
sensitive questions related to money. People are not always prepared to answer
questions on for example their expenditure pattern during the last 12 or 6 months,
people often forget many expenditures or (non-monetary) revenues, or give too low
figures because they do not want other people to know their wealth. Reliable results
can only be obtained if a relation of trust exists between the interviewer and the
people interviewed, and if they are interviewed on a regular basis. The unreliability of
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the data clearly comes forward if revenue and expenditure data of different surveys
are compared. Various surveys have been carried out in Burkina Faso. The most
recent is a national poverty study by the national statistical and demographic institute
(INSD, 1996a, 1996b). Other studies were performed by Broekhuyse (1988) in the
province of Sanmatenga, Thiombano et al. (1988), Reardon et al. (1988a) and Lang et
al. (1983) who performed village studies in different villages spread over the country.
In Appendix A3.5 results of these studies are discussed. These studies will be used in
Section 9.1 to estimate average expenditures on cereals and average income levels per
capita per CRPA. The income per person turns out to be one of the major
determinants of cereal purchases.
8.1.6 Agricultural prices
It has already been mentioned that many households sell cheap during the post-
harvest season and purchase dear during the lean season. Cereal prices in Burkina
Faso, as in many West African countries show a clear seasonal fluctuation. Prices are
low immediately after the harvest, and increase considerably during the year, to start
decreasing again just before the new harvest. Seasonal price increases are caused by
demand and supply differences (supply is large during the post-harvest season,
whereas demand is highest during the lean season) and storage costs which are
charged in the prices. Prices in the lean season may be up to the double of post-
harvest prices. In Burkina Faso price data are gathered by SIM/SONAGESS (SystPme
d’Information sur les MarchJs/SociJtJ Nationale de Gestion des Stocks de SJcuritJ).
Since 1992 prices for all cereals are gathered on 37 markets scattered over the
country. A distinction is made between producer and consumer prices. Producer
prices ensue from transactions between producers and traders, consumer prices ensue
from transactions between consumers and traders or between consumers and
producers. For the analysis, we used prices for the crops white sorghum, millet and
white maize. Data for red sorghum and yellow maize have been omitted because only
very few data were available. In Appendix A3.6 the price data for the period 1992-
1999 are analysed and some other studies discussing these price data are briefly
discussed (Bassolet, 2000, Hoftijzer, 1998).
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Four main conclusions can be drawn from the price analysis in Appendix A3.6:
1. Producer prices are lowest in the high production, surplus regions of the country,
the CRPA Mouhoun and Hauts Bassins. Consumer prices are highest in the
shortage regions Centre (with the capital Ouagadougou) and Sahel, See Table
A3.36 and A3.37. Producer prices in the CRPA Nord are lower than expected.
However, for this CRPA only data for Ouahigouya are available. This is a transit
market, through which large amounts of cereals pass from Bobo Dioulasso
towards the northern regions, and where supply from producers to traders is low.
Producer prices in the regions Centre Est, Centre Ouest and Est and consumer
prices in the regions Centre Sud and Centre Est are also high. This may be caused
by demand from traders from the neighbouring countries Ivory Coast, Ghana and
Togo. However, this can not be supported with data on cross-border trade.
Consumer prices in these regions may also be high due to low cereal demand
from the mainly rural population who usually can sell small surpluses – see
Section 8.1.2.
2. Producer and consumer prices increased a lot after the devaluation of the Franc
CFA in January 1994. This increase was not caused by lower cereal production in
these years – see Section 8.1.2. On average producer and consumer prices in the
period 1996 to 1999 were, respectively, 91% and 99% above the average prices
between 1992 and 1994, see Table A3.39. Prices in the cotton producing areas
have increased more than prices in the non-cotton areas, probably due to reforms
in the cotton sector. It looks as if prices stabilized after October 1996.
3. Retail trade margins (the difference between the consumer and producer price in a
region) increased significantly after the devaluation, see Table A3.39. Trade
margins from transport from the surplus zones to Ouagadougou did not change a
lot, whereas margins from transport to the other regions increased a lot. It looks
as if competition on the wholesale markets in Ouagadougou has become more
competitive, whereas traders make high profits from trade towards the retail
markets in the shortage regions. A more detailed inquiry of trade costs and
competition in Burkina Faso is needed to explain this.
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4. In most years, consumer and producer prices reach their maximum in July and
August. Minimum prices are reached in November or December. It can be
concluded cautiously, that prices reach their minimum earlier if the harvest is bad,
see Table A3.36 and Figure A3.5. Prices in the period July-September exceed
prices between October and December on average with 17% and 18% for
producer and consumer prices, respectively, see Table A3.36. Differences
between CRPA are, however, large. It looks as if this did not change a lot after
the devaluation.
To estimate the parameters for the supply and demand functions in Section 8.2 and
8.3, average producer and consumer prices for each quarter are used. Due to the huge
price increase after the devaluation of the Franc CFA in 1994, we do not use ‘92-’99
averages, but average prices for the period October 1996 – September 1999. Although
these averages are based on only a short time period, this is more realistic than using
the prices for the entire period. Average cereal price levels for the period Oct ’96 –
Sept ‘99 are presented in Table 8.3.
8.2 Trading costs
Price differences between regions and between periods, are, as discussed in Chapter 5
to 7, caused by differences in supply and demand, and by the costs made by the
trading agents. In Chapter 5 to 7, a distinction has been made between transport and
storage costs. We distinguish also ‘other trading costs’, which include the costs which
are made when the cereals are sold or purchased on the market. These costs include
among other things costs to purchase bags, market taxes, and personnel costs. These
costs are not included in the theory discussed in the Chapters 4 to 7, but are discussed
here because they may amount to a significant part of the trading costs. In Appendix 4
the main conclusions and data of some studies on trading costs are discussed.
Table 8.3 Average seasonal cereal prices for the period Oct ’96 – Sept ‘99 in FCFA per kg.
Producer Cereal price Consumer Cereal priceOct ’96 –
 Sept ‘99 Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sept Oct-Dec
Year
Average Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sept Oct-Dec
Year
average
Centre 128 136 140 133 134
Centre Nord 104 104 116 100 103 120 129 137 119 126
Centre Ouest 115 125 125 102 115 121 131 134 114 125
Centre Sud 122 131 133 116 123 126 139 126 122 128
Sahel 105 103 93 96 100 133 144 149 131 139
Mouhoun 89 101 103 83 94 103 114 120 96 108
Est 106 113 116 102 109 112 125 133 108 120
Centre Est 111 118 126 117 117 125 132 133 119 127
Nord1) 99 111 114 124 128 110 119
Sud Ouest1) 83 83 134 143 152 129 139
Hauts Bassins 86 89 95 86 89 108 117 118 108 113
Comoe 105 116 114 122 113 119 134 140 123 129
Burkina Faso 103 109 110 99 104 119 129 133 116 125
Note: 1) Not enough data were available for these CRPA to estimate the average prices for all periods.
Source: Data from SIM/SONAGESS
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8.2.1 Transport costs
In Burkina Faso the costs for transporting cereals between the place of production and
the place of consumption, cause for a large part of the price differences between
regions. Transport costs taken into account in this study only include the transport
costs between markets, made by traders. Costs made by the producers to bring the
produce from the field to the compound and from the compound to the market, as
well as the costs made by the final consumers to transport their purchases from the
market to their houses are not taken into account.
Transport costs are much influenced by the road conditions, which may be poor. In
Burkina Faso, only a small portion of the road network is asphalted. Only the roads
leading from Ouagadougou to Bobo-Dioulasso, to Ouahigouya, to Kaya and to
Koudougou, and from Ouagadougou or Bobo-Dioulasso to the main border crossings
with Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Niger and Mali are asphalted. The other roads
are unpaved roads. Some of the unpaved roads may be rather good, but others are
only small trails (in our analysis we call them ‘dirt roads’) which are almost
inaccesible for cars, not to mention trucks. Some roads, especially the dirt roads,
which are passable during the dry season turn into mud trails during the rainy season
inaccesible for cars. Some of the ‘good’ unpaved roads may also be closed for a few
hours or days during the rainy season if the lower parts of the roads (which are
sometimes constructed on purpose to prevent parts of the road to be washed away
during showers by the swirling water running to lower places) are flooded.
Because of these bad road conditions, travelling time may be long and maintenance
costs for trucks high. It regularly happens that trucks get stuck along the road because
of breakdowns, which may delay the journey considerably. These problems cause
transport costs to be high. If two villages are located along an asphalted road,
transport costs between these villages may be cheap. However, sending a truck to a
remote village in the Sahel during the rainy season may be a costly and risky
undertaking.
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Most traders (certainly the small and medium) do not own their own transport means,
but have to rent a truck (if the traded quantities are large enough) or pay a certain
transport price for each bag transported by a truck owner (which is often a merchant).
DJjou (1987) reports that cereal transporters sometimes have monopolistic power.
Merchants owning a truck may force other traders who are dependent upon this
merchant for their transport, to respect mutual price agreements. However, according
to DJjou (1987), transport is in general not the limiting factor for most regions.
Competition is in most cases satisfactory. Transport costs between a number of
markets are given in Appendix A4.1. It can be expected that transport became
considerably more expensive after the devaluation of the Franc CFA in January 1994.
However, a comparison of Table A4.3 and Table A4.4 in Appendix A4.1 does not
give any evidence for such an increase. For some routes, the transport prices paid by
the cereal traders to the carriers even decreased. This corresponds with the
observation in Section 8.1.6 that the difference between the consumer price in
Ouagadougou and the producer price in the surplus zones hardly increased. It is,
however, in contradiction with observations that the difference between consumer
prices in the northern shortage regions and producer prices in the south-western
surplus zones increased considerably after the devaluation – see Section 8.1.6 and
Appendix A3.1. It also corresponds to observations in other recent reports (Egg et al.,
1997; Danida, 1999; UE, 1999), who also concluded on the basis of the
SIM/SONAGESS price data, that trade margins from trade between the surplus zones
and Ouagadougou, remained relatively stable after the devaluation, despite a
substantial increase of cereal prices and prices of fuel and spare parts. The stability of
margins for transport to Ouagadougou may be due to an increased competition on the
cereal market. However, it causes difficulties for transporters who can not face the
competition, and who may have difficulties of purchasing new vehicles in the near
future (Danida, 1999, p. 13).
Transport prices also depend on the means of transport used. SirpJ (2000) makes a
distinction between small pick-up trucks, 10-tonne trucks, and large 32-tonne trucks.
Pick-ups are most often used to transport goods over short distances; for example,
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between villages, or from villages to the nearest city. The large, 32-tonne trucks are
mainly used for international transport. Transport between the main commercial
centres, and between the different provinces, mainly involves 10-tonne trucks. SirpJ
makes a persistent distinction between the transport costs carriers make (i.e. costs for
fuel, maintenance, personnel, depreciation), and transport prices to be paid to carriers
by traders who rent transport services from them. SirpJ evaluates average transport
costs per kilometer for each type of truck – see Appendix A4.1. The load rate (the
part of the loading capacity of the truck which is filled) plays an important role in the
costs. In this paper we only consider the distribution network between the main
centres of each CRPA. It is assumed that only 10-tonne trucks are involved.
Furthermore, the location of the carriers, an issue brought forward by Vogelzang
(1996), may play a role in transport prices. Transporting cereals between two remote
villages alongside tarmac roads in which no carriers are located will probably be
relatively more expensive than between Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. For
example, if a carrier located in a city C has to transport goods from a village A to a
village B, not only the costs to travel between A and B, but also the costs to go from C
to A and to return from B to C have to be paid for. Furthermore, carriers transporting
towards remote cities have less possibilities to find a freight for the return journey
than carriers transporting between, for example, Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso.
For that reason, transport between the more frequented markets will probably be
cheaper than between more remote markets.
In this report we do not consider the transport costs made by the carriers. We only
look at the transport costs cereal traders have to make (which are the transport prices
charged by the carriers in the notation of SirpJ, see above). Using the studies
discussed in Appendix 4, transport costs have been estimated. A difference has been
made between 1) transport along the busy trade routes over asphalted roads (from
Ouagadougou to Bobo Dioulasso, to Pouytenga, and to Koudougou and from Bobo-
Dioulasso to Koudougou); 2) transport over less frequented trade routes over
asphalted roads; 3) transport over (all-weather) unpaved roads, and 4) transport over
(bad) dirt roads. Although most transport is done over asphalted and unpaved roads,
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some of the cities are connected by dirt roads (for example, the route Bobo-Dioulasso
- Diebougou and  a part of the route between Ouahigouya and Kaya). Transport along
busy trade routes is cheaper than transport along less frequented routes, since the
chance to have a return freight is larger for these routes. Transport over unpaved
roads is more expensive than over asphalted roads. Transport over dirt roads is even
more expensive. Furthermore, during the rainy season (July to September) transport
over unpaved roads and dirt roads is more expensive than during the dry season
(October to June). In this paper only transport between the main commercial centres
is considered. For each CRPA one or two centres have been chosen, for which
transport costs to other regions are estimated. The distance between each pair of cities
has been estimated using the road map of Burkina Faso (see Table A4.5 in Appendix
A4.1). For each road connection it has been estimated what part of the route is over
busy asphalted roads, less frequented asphalted roads, unpaved roads or dirt roads.
Next, transport costs per km per road type are estimated using the data in Appendix
A4.1. By multiplying the costs per km with the distance, the costs to transport goods
between two cities or two CRPA is estimated.
It is difficult to make balanced estimates of the transport costs. Most transport costs
presented in the transport surveys do not make a distinction in costs per road type,
although it is admitted that they differ a lot. Furthermore, the data of the different
studies do not always correspond. For example, transporting 100 kg of cereals
between Ouagadougou and Gorom-Gorom costs 2000 FCFA according to DJjou
(1987), and 950 FCFA according to Bassolet (2000). SirpJ (2000) argues that
transport costs depend on a lot of factors, of which the loading rate plays a major role.
By comparing the different studies, we can make the following observations:
• Transporting along the busy trade routes, between the most animated markets (i.e.
from Ouagadougou to Bobo-Dioulasso, to Pouytenga and to Koudougou and
from Bobo-Dioulasso to Koudougou), costs the traders, according to DJjou
(1987) and Bassolet (1997), less than 20 FCFA per kilometer per tonne
(observations range between 11 and 21 FCFA). These costs are considerably
lower than between the other markets. Reasons for these lower costs are that most
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carriers are located on these markets, and that they have more possibilities to find
return freights.
• Transport costs between the other market depend on road type. Divide these trade
routes, presented in Table A4.3 and Table A4.4 in Appendix A4.1, in routes over
asphalted roads, routes which are both over asphalted and unpaved roads, and
routes which are only over unpaved roads and dirt roads.16 It can be observed that
transport costs between markets connected by asphalted roads are on average 40
FCFA per tonne per km (observations range between 20 and 52 FCFA; standard
deviation 15 FCFA). If it is also partly over unpaved roads, only a minor increase
is observed (on average 41 FCFA, observations range between 20 and 76 FCFA,
standard deviation 15 FCFA). If it is only over an unpaved road or if also dirt
roads must be passed, costs per tonne per km increase on average to 52 FCFA
(observations range between 24 and 82 FCFA, standard deviation 14 FCFA).
• It is striking that transport costs over unpaved roads and dirt roads paid by the
cereal traders, increase less than the rise of transport costs made by the carrier
reported in Table A4.2 in Appendix A4.1. Either the increases reported in the
table are too high, or the transport price charged by the carriers is too low to cover
their costs.
• The transport price charged by carriers of 112 FCFA, reported by SirpJ (2000)
seems to be very high. It is not clear why his estimates are more than twice the
averages observed by DJjou (1987) and Bassolet (1999).
• During the rainy season, the costs for transport over unpaved roads increases on
average with 17%.
These considerations bring us to make the following estimations for the transport
costs:
                                                              
16
 For these calculations the more lively transport routes (Bobo-Dioulasso, Koudougou, Ouagadougou,
Pouytenga) with lower transport costs and the short routes (less than 80 km) with higher transport costs
are not taken into consideration.
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1. Transporting cereals over the less frequented asphalted roads is estimated to cost
during the dry and rainy season 40 FCFA per tonne per km.
2. For the busy routes between the CRPA Hauts-Bassins and Centre (Bobo-
Dioulasso to Ouagadougou), Centre–Est and Centre (from Pouytenga to
Ouagadougou) and between Koudougou and the CRPA Centre or Hauts Bassins
costs per tonne are estimated at 25 FCFA per kilometer. For these routes it is
supposed that transporters have return freights more often, so that transport costs
can be lower. Although the market of Ouahigouya is one of the most important
distribution centres of the country, transporting towards this market is not
reported to be cheaper.
3. Average transport costs from Hauts Bassins and Centre towards the CRPA Centre
Ouest, in which Koudougou is situated, exceeds 25 FCFA. To estimate the
average transport costs to the CRPA Centre Ouest, the average is taken of
transporting to Koudougou and to Leo. Since Leo is a less busy market than the
market of Koudougou, transport costs from Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso
towards Leo will exceed those for Koudougou.
4. Transport over unpaved roads is 20% more expensive than transport over the less
frequented asphalted roads during the dry season, and 40% more expensive
during the rainy season.
5. Transport over dirt roads is 40% more expensive than transport over the less
frequented asphalted roads during the dry season, and 140% more expensive
during the rainy season. Transporting over dirt roads during the rainy season is a
risky undertaking. If the truck gets stuck, it may take a few days before the
destination is reached.
Estimated transport costs between each CRPA are presented in Table 8.4.
Table 8.4 Estimation of the transport costs during the dry (October – June) and rainy season (July – September) in
FCFA per 100 kg bag.













Centre 0 392 517 408 1084 840 695 343 724 1366 890 1230
Centre Nord 392 0 909 800 773 1294 1070 718 918 1758 1282 1622
Centre Ouest 517 909 0 875 1601 924 1212 860 1118 934 1120 1460
Centre Sud 408 800 875 0 1492 1248 940 588 1132 1769 1298 1638
Sahel 1084 773 1601 995 0 1652 1473 1473 1062 2450 1974 2314
Mouhoun 840 1294 924 1248 1652 0 1535 1183 686 1838 1094 1434
Est 695 1070 1212 940 1473 1535 0 352 1419 2061 1585 1925
Centre Est 343 718 860 588 1473 1183 352 0 1067 1709 1233 1573
Nord 724 918 1118 1132 1062 686 1419 1067 0 2090 1614 1954
Sud Ouest 1366 1758 934 1769 2450 1838 2061 1709 2090 0 744 1084
Hauts Bassins 890 1282 1120 1298 1974 1094 1585 1233 1614 744 0 340
Comoe 1230 1622 1460 1638 2314 1434 1925 1573 1954 1084 340 0
Table 8.4 (continuation)













Centre 0 392 583 428 1232 940 695 343 724 1702 890 1230
Centre Nord 392 0 975 820 986 1652 1454 1102 1574 2094 1282 1622
Centre Ouest 583 975 0 1099 1815 1078 1278 926 1213 1100 1493 1833
Centre Sud 428 820 1099 0 1660 1368 1008 656 1152 2462 1318 1658
Sahel 1232 986 1815 1107 0 2152 1660 1660 1573 2934 2122 2462
Mouhoun 940 1652 1078 1368 2152 0 1634 1282 801 2501 1277 1617
Est 695 1454 1278 1008 1660 1634 0 352 1419 2397 1585 1925
Centre Est 343 1102 926 656 1660 1282 352 0 1067 2045 1233 1573
Nord 724 1574 1213 1152 1573 801 1419 1067 0 2426 1614 1954
Sud Ouest 1702 2094 1100 2462 2934 2501 2397 2045 2426 0 1224 1564
Hauts Bassins 890 1282 1493 1318 2122 1277 1585 1233 1614 1224 0 340
Comoe 1230 1622 1833 1658 2462 1617 1925 1573 1954 1564 340 0
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8.2.2 Storage and other trading costs
Price differences between periods are, for an important part, caused by storage costs.
A trader will only store cereals if he expects to recover at least the storage costs.
Market equilibrium theory shows that the price difference between two periods on a
competitive market is expected to be equal to the storage costs if the traders store
cereals (see Chapter 6). An evaluation of some studies on strategies of cereal traders
(see Appendix A4.2, A4.3 and A4.4) showed that storage costs may include costs of
the storehouses (rent or maintenance), costs for pesticides and insecticides,
surveillance costs, and capital costs. Also storage losses must be considered. Many of
these costs are difficult to estimate. Many cereals are not stored by the traders for a
long time, but shipped quickly. Many of the storage costs are difficult to evaluate per
bag, but have to be paid independent of the number of bags stored. Moreover,
differences between traders are considerable.
The influence of capital costs on traders’ storage decisions demands some extra
explanation. In stead of capital costs, many authors take into account ‘opportunity
costs’. These are no ‘real’ costs to the traders. They reflect the foregone revenues if
the trader would have invested the money value of his cereal stock in other activities,
for instance put the money on the bank raising interest. In stead of calculating
‘opportunity costs’, which are rather difficult to determine, we prefer to estimate
‘capital costs’. 17 Capital costs correspond to the interest payments a cereal trader
should pay if he borrowed money from a bank to finance his cereal purchases. In each
period he should pay interest costs, which are a certain percentage of the money
                                                              
17
 In order to calculate opportunity costs, the traders’ capital balance and activity portfolio should be
considered. In that case, a comparison could be made between the possible investment opportunities and
credit needs. For the moment we do not introduce this capital balance. Although we acknowledge that
the development of credit facilities for cereal traders and farmers may be an important policy measure to
improve the functioning of the market, it goes too far for this paper to evaluate the importance of credit
costs in the strategies of cereal traders.
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invested in the stock (i.e. of the quantity stored multiplied with producer price plus
transport costs plus storage costs).
Other costs involved in trading may constitute an important part of the trading costs.
These costs include personnel costs, costs to buy cereal bags, and taxes. Personnel
costs are the salaries paid to intermediaries of merchants, who may be resident buyers
and sellers or regional coordinators. They may receive a monthly salary or a
commission. Personnel costs also include truck loading and unloading costs. Taxes
include both trade and market taxes. The first category are the taxes which have to be
paid to be allowed to operate as a trader. The second category are the taxes which
have to be paid daily, weekly or monthly to be allowed to use the market
infrastructure of a certain market place. The level of these taxes depends on the
business size of the traders.
To calculate the equilibrium model discussed above, we also need estimates of
storage and other trading costs per bag. No precise estimates can be made because of
data limitations. For some of the services the costs per 100 kg bag are easy to estimate
(personnel who are paid on a commission basis, costs for bags, loading and unloading
costs), for others this turns out to be difficult. For example, personnel costs can be
estimated per month, but costs per bag will differ considerably between months and
traders. To estimate these costs per bag, not only the monthly costs, but also the
number of bags traded must be known. These data are missing in some of the surveys
available. Also costs for storehouses are difficult to estimate per kg. Monthly costs of
a storehouse can be estimated, but to estimate the costs per bag, it should be kept up
how long each bag is stored. Costs per bag are best described in Sherman et al. (1987)
– see Appendix A4.4. Based on their estimates, and using the studies of Bassolet
(2000) and DJjou (1987) as reference literature, we made estimates which are
presented in Table 8.5. Because of the weakness of the data we do not make seperate
estimates for the different CRPA. It is noted that the sensitivity of the model to the
estimates must be analysed carefully. The costs estimated are:
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1. Storage costs, including renting costs, surveillance and insecticides: Sherman
does not present storage costs seperately, but places it under ‘sundry costs’, see
Table A4.9 column (c) in Appendix A4.4, which are renting costs for warehouses,
taxes, bribes and other costs. Sundry costs are on average 200 FCFA per bag. We
suppose that half of these costs, so 100 FCFA per bag, are renting costs for
warehouses and insecticides. Salaries paid to personnel engaged in storage is part
of the personnel costs mentioned in column (b) in Table A4.9 in Appendix A4.4.
The salary of a warehouseman per bag sold by the trader is estimated by Sherman
between 40 FCFA and 200 FCFA per bag, with an average of 100 FCFA per bag.
Suppose that also one of the apprentices of the trader (Sherman supposed that two
apprentices are working for the trader) is half of his time occupied with
controllling storage. Therefore, personnel costs for storage are 150 FCFA per bag.
Total storage costs are 250 FCFA per bag
2. Storage losses: Bassolet observes storage losses of 8% per year, and DJjou of 15
to 20% per year. We take an average of 12% per year, so 3% per quarter, see
Appendix A4.2.
3. Capital costs: the ongoing bank interest rate is 14% per year (3.5% per period) -
see Appendix A4.3. Capital costs per quarter are estimated at 3.5% of the
producer price of a bag of cereals. For the producer price we take the average
producer prices, which are given in Table 8.3.18 Producer prices for the CRPA
Centre and missing producer prices for the regions Nord and Sud Ouest are
supposed to be the average producer prices for Burkina Faso. The discount rate is
assumed to be equal to 1/(1+r), with r the interest rate of 3.5% per period.
Rounded off, the discount rate is 0.97.
4. Costs for bags: We adopt the estimate given by Sherman in Table A4.9 in
Appendix A4.4, who gives an average cost of 200 FCFA per bag. This is a little
                                                              
18
 We multiply the percentage capital costs with a predetermined, average value of the producer price,
and not with the variable p it. This last option would complicate the model considerably because it would
result in an extra non-linear term ( p it⋅s it) in the objective function.
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lower than the observations of Bassolet and DJjou in Appendix A4.3.
Considering multiple uses of these bags 200 FCFA might still be high.
5. Annual and market taxes plus other trade costs: Bassolet and DJjou give trade
taxes as percentage of profits and market taxes per day. The average amount of
taxes paid per bag estimated by Bassolet in Table A4.10 and Table A4.11 in
Appendix A4.4 is very low. We suppose that taxes plus other trade costs are half
the ‘sundry costs’ given in column (c) in Table A4.9, so 100 FCFA per bag – see
also under 1).
6. Personnel costs: Again, the personnel costs estimated by Bassolet are very low.
Personnel costs and the payments to personnel paid on a commission basis are
estimated by Sherman in the columns (a) and (b) in Table A4.9. His estimates are
much higher than the estimates made by Bassolet, because Sherman includes the
‘salary’ of the trader. We also have to include this salary because the trade costs
considered in our model have to account for the total difference between cereal
consumer and producer prices. This difference includes the margin earned by the
trader (i.e. his salary). Total personnel costs reported by Sherman vary between
400 and 1250 FCFA per bag. Part of these personnel costs are storage costs – see
under 1). Other personnel costs ( which are part of the trade costs) are estimated
at 700 FCFA per bag.
7. Loading and unloading costs: Observations range between 50 FCFA per bag by
DJjou, 250 FCFA per bag by Bassolet and 100 FCFA per bag by Sherman. We
suppose it costs100 FCFA per bag to load or unload a truck. So, total loading and
unloading costs are 200 FCFA per bag. We do not consider them to be trade
costs, but treat them as transport costs.
Table 8.5 Trading costs in FCFA per 100 kg bag or in %.
1) Storage costs per quarter, including renting costs, surveillance and instecticides: 250 FCFA per bag
2) Storage losses: 3% per quarter
3) Capital costs: itp~*%5.3 , in FCFA per 100 kg bag,  with itp~  the average producer price of a 100 kg bag in
region i in period t - see Table 8.3 for the producer prices per kg.
Discount rate: 0.97.
CRPA Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sep CRPA Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sep
Centre 3.47 3.59 3.81 3.86 Est 3.58 3.73 3.97 4.05
Centre Nord 3.50 3.64 3.64 4.05 Centre Est 4.10 3.88 4.14 4.39
Centre Ouest 3.59 4.03 4.37 4.39 Nord 3.47 3.59 3.81 3.86
Centre Sud 4.07 4.28 4.58 4.66 Sud Ouest 3.47 3.59 3.81 3.86
Sahel 3.36 3.69 3.60 3.25 Hauts Bassins 3.00 3.02 3.13 3.32
Mouhoun 2.89 3.10 3.52 3.60 Comoe 4.28 3.68 4.04 4.00
4) Costs for bags: 200 FCFA per bag
5) Taxes plus other costs: 100 FCFA per bag
6) Personnel costs: 700 FCFA per bag
7) Loading and unloading costs: 200 FCFA per bag
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9 Estimation of cereal demand and supply functions for the case of
Burkina Faso
For the analysis of the inter-regional cereal flows in Burkina Faso, use is made of the
multi-period model (7.64) for a situation of a competitive market. The exogenous
elements of the models are the storage costs and losses per stored unit per unit of
time, the transport costs per transported unit of cereals between the various markets,
the trading costs per unit of cereals sold, and the cereal supply and demand
functions.19 Storage, transport and trade costs have already been estimated in Section
8.2. Supply and demand functions are not readily available. In Section 9.1 regional
demand functions will be estimated for each period, by choosing a functional form
and then estimating the parameters with the aid of data and information discussed in
Section 8.1. For the estimation of quarterly, regional producer supply in Section 9.2,
the method discussed in Section 7.1 is extended. Annual supply is estimated, based on
data on sales and production levels for each region discussed in Section 8.1. Annual
supply depend on production levels and other factors, rather than on prices. As
discussed in Section 8.1.3 the dependence of yearly supply on prices is weak. The
distribution of the annual cereal supply over the year does depend on prices. The
supply in each period is for a part influenced by cash needs, and for another part by
the expected price development within a year.
9.1 Cereal demand functions
In the preceding chapter we discussed the cereal purchase behaviour of househols. In
this section we will estimate cereal demand functions as a function of cereal prices for
an ‘average’ consumer for each CRPA. Regional demand functions per CRPA are
determined by aggregating the individual demand functions. First, in Section 9.1.1 a
functional form for the demand functions is chosen. In Section 9.1.2 differences
between the annual cereal demand functions for rural and for urban households are
                                                              
19
 The supply and demand functions are exogenous elements of the model, supply and demand itself are
endogenous elements.
154
discussed and the parameters for the annual cereal demand functions are estimated.
Finally, in Section 9.1.3 the cereal demand functions per period are defined and the
aggregate, regional demand functions are estimated.
9.1.1 Linear Expenditure System
The demand function adopted in this paper is derived from the widely applied Linear
Expenditure System (LES) (see e.g. Roth (1986) for a discussion and application of
the LES, see also Theil (1980) and Section 4.2). The LES is derived from the Stone-
Geary utility function. It is widely applied because it is simple and has convenient
properties. Although more elaborate demand systems exist (see for example Deaton
and Muellbauer, 1980), data limitations prevent us from using them. To illustrate the
principles of the LES, consider the case where a consumer can consume different
commodities. The quantity consumed is purchased entirely on the market at consumer
prices (so that consumption equals market demand). Define K the set of goods the
consumers can purchase. Each consumer demands at least a minimally required, fixed
quantity of each commodity (it is supposed that they can afford to buy this minimum
quantity). This minimally required quantity may either be a minimum subsistence
level of consumption or a minimum preferred quantity. The income remaining after
purchasing all minimally required quantities, is divided in fixed shares over the
commodities from the set K. This remaining income is also called ‘supernumerary
income’, i.e. income after initial purchases. Introduce, for each commodity k 0 K the
elements:
U The utility level a consumer obtains from consuming the K
commodities,
C k Consumption level of commodity k,
γ k The minimally required purchase level of commodity k,20
                                                              
20
 This minimally required purchase level should not be compared with the minimally required quantity
of nutrients which is necessary to remain healthy.
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b k Weighing coefficients corresponding to the preferences of
consumption of commodity k.
then the Stone-Geary utility function can be written as:























Manipulation of the first order conditions from utility maximization subject to an
income constraint, gives the Linear Expenditure System. First introduce:
I Income level of a consumer which can be spent on buying the
commodities from K
pi k Consumer price level of commodity k.
The Linear Expenditure System can now be written as:












with I ≥ pi γi ii K∈∑  and 0 < b k < 1, and bkk K∈∑  = 1.
The expression I − pi γi ii K∈∑ is the discretionary or supernumerary income which
remains after due allowance for the minimum requirements. This income is allocated
among the different goods in shares b k/pi k . It follows that the parameter b k  is the
share of supernumerary income spent on purchases of commodity k. It can also be




, “which tells how expenditures on
each commodity change as income changes” (Sadoulet et al., 1995). Expression (9.2)
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shows that expenditures on each good (C kpi k) are linear in prices and income. Tastes,
preferences, and subsistence requirements are implicitly included in the values of the
parameters b k  and γ k . The own-price, cross-price and income elasticity of demand of













































= = − + − = = −
= =
1 11 6, ,
.
From expression (9.3) it follows that -1 < ε kk < 0 (since C k  > γ k , see (9.1)). So,
demand decreases if consumer prices increase, but less than proportionally. A
consequence is that no inferior goods (for which ε k k  > 0) can be considered. This also
follows from the expression of the income elasticity, which is always positive.
Now suppose that cereals (comprising  red sorghum, white sorghum, millet and
maize) is one of the commodities from the set K. The other commodities may contain
among other things rice. Since we do not intend to analyse the role of prices of the
other commodities on cereal distribution in Burkina Faso, it is not necessary to
specify all commodities of set K. Only the budget share b cer, the minimum cereal
purchase level γ cer, and the minimum expenses on the other commodities,




∑ , need to be estimated.21 The cereal demand function as a function of
income I and cereal prices pi cer, can now be written as - see equation (9.2):
(9.4) C b I b b Icer cer cer
cer
cer cer cer cer
cer
cer
= + − − = − + −γ
pi
pi γ ξ γ
pi
ξ1 6 1 6 1 61
                                                              
21
 If the influence of the price of rice on cereal distribution is to be analysed, then also the minimum rice
demand, γri, and the minimum expenses on all commodities aside from cereals and rice,






, have to be estimated.
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∑ , and in which γ cer,  b cer and ξ are exogenously given parameters.
9.1.2 Estimating cereal demand functions for Burkina Faso
To analyse cereal demand in Burkina Faso demand functions have to be estimated
seperately for rural and urban consumers. Introduce the following set and variable:
H = {u, r} set of urban (u) and rural (r) consumers
yh the level of cereal demand by a consumer of type h, for h ∈ H
For the sake of readibility, we do not present here cereal demand in region i as, yi
h
like we did in Chapter 5 and 6. The region index i has been skipped, and the variable
yh  refers now to cereal demand of an individual consumer. Redefine also the
parameters and variables introduced above, to indicate the type of consumer. For h ∈
H:
Ch Cereal consumption level by a consumer of type h
γ h The minimally required cereal purchase level by a consumer of type h
bh Share of supernumerary income spent on cereal purchases by a
consumer of type h
Ih Income level of a consumer of type h
ξ h Minimally required expenses on all commodities except cereals by a
consumer of type h
pi Cereal consumer price level.
For urban consumers it is supposed that they demand their entire consumption on the
market. Their annual market demand is represented by (9.4), and can also be written
as:
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(9.5) y C b b Iu u u u
u
u u
= = − + −γ
pi
ξ13 8 3 8
For the urban consumers budget shares b u , minimum cereal purchase levels γ u , and
supernumerary income levels Iu  -  ξu  have to be estimated. For rural households,
account has to be taken of the on-farm consumption of self produced cereals. For
them, consumption differs from demand on the market. Cereal consumption is the
sum of purchased cereals and on-farm consumption of self produced cereals. We
assume that their cereal production level is more than the minimally required cereal
purchase level. Then it is not necessary to purchase this required quantity on the
market, but it is taken from own stocks. So, the quantity purchased on the market
depends not on the minimally required level, γ r , but only on consumer price and
income levels. So, for rural households the parameter γ r is zero. Annual cereal
demand of rural households, y r , is- see (9.4):






Annual cereal consumption of rural households is, if OC r  is the on-farm consumption
of self-produced cereals:
(9.7) C r = OC r + yr
A consequence of this definition is that for rural households the income elasticity of
cereal demand is equal to I r / ( I r -ξ r)  > 1 (see equation (9.3)).
We estimate average values of γ r  and b r . However, they depend for rural households
in principle on rainfall. After a good rainfall season with a higher cereal production,
on-farm consumption of self produced cereals will be higher and b r  lower, than after
a bad rainfall season. The influence of rainfall on demand, and consequently market
price levels, can be analysed with a sensitivity analysis.
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To make the different estimates of the parameters, the data presented in Section 8.1
and in Appendix A3.5 are used. Differences between the various studies are
enormous. For example, Reardon et al. (1988a) estimated household income in the
Sudanian rainfall zone (see Figure 8.2) at 38,820 FCFA per year; Broekhuyse (1988)
observed an average household income of 65,831 FCFA per year in the province of
Sanmatenga; and INSD (1996a,b) came to an average monetary income in the Centre-
Nord region (including the province of Sanmatenga) of 128,598 FCFA. Often
samples are small, only one or two villages in a region are chosen, or income is
estimated for only one year, so it is not strange that observed differences are large.
Despite these problems, we will estimate the different parameters of the demand
functions.
a) Average income per consumer, Ih .
To estimate the average income per consumer, I h , the results of the 1994 INSD
poverty surveys (INSD, 1996a,b, see Appendix A3.5) are used. The other studies
discussed in Appendix A3.5 give income levels which are probably too low. If it is
evaluated how many cereals can approximately be purchased with the income
reported by Broekhuyse (1988) and Reardon et al. (1988a), it is seen that these
possible purchases do not correspond with the purchases presented in Appendix A3.4.
In the INSD studies, revenues and expenditures include both monetary and non-
monetary revenues and expenses. The non-monetary terms include on-farm
consumption of own production and gifts and payments in kind. It has been supposed
here that the level of household revenues equals the level of expenditures. Average
monetary revenues per person, Ih , are estimated as (see Table A3.31 for the values):
     I h =
¼(total household expenses) (monetary revenues as a percentage of total revenues)
(average household size)
These estimates do not fully correspond with what could reasonably be expected. A
closer look to these estimates, shows that the income for the CRPA Sud Ouest (in the
INSD Area ‘Sud and Sud-Est’) is lower than what could be expected from the
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production per capita given in Table 8.1 and the situation of this CRPA (see
Appendix A3). For that reason, the same estimate is chosen as for the CRPA
Mouhoun and Hauts Bassins, which are in a more or less similar situation. For the
CRPA Est a somewhat lower estimate is chosen, since there is no reason to believe
that their income is much higher than for the other CRPA in the same rainfall zone.
The resulting estimate, gives income per person for the year 1994. Income in the
reference year 2000 will be considerably higher, partly due to the devaluation of the
Franc CFA in 1994, which caused cereal prices to double (see Section 8.1.6).
Household income also increased, but no information is available on the percentage
increase. It is known that salaries of civil servants did increase, but they did not
double. Furthermore, also incomes of people working in private enterprises or in the
informal sector, or from farmers earning an income from off-farm labour, increased
but is is not known how much. For the moment we suppose that income in the year
2000, increased with 75% compared to income in 1994. The influence of income on
market prices and demand and supply must be evaluated using a sensitivity analysis.
The estimates of Ih  are presented in Table 9.1, with estimates for rural inhabitants in
column (a) and for urban inhabitants in column (b).
Table 9.1 Estimates of annual monetary income per person for each CRPA in
FCFA.














Centre 24500 262500 Est 24500 152250
Centre Nord 25375 152250 Centre Est 24500 152250
Centre Ouest 24500 152250 Nord 25375 152250
Centre Sud 24500 152250 Sud Ouest 52500 152250
Sahel 38500 152250 Hauts Bassins 52500 262500
Mouhoun 52500 152250 Comoe 52500 152250
Source: Estimates are based on INSD (1996a,b) data and some additional assumptions, see above.
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b) The share of supernumerary income spent on cereal purchases, b h .
The parameter b h  can be estimated using the income elasticity of demand for a









To estimate this, introduce the share of total income spent on cereals by a consumer
of type h, s h . Note that the share parameter b h  differs from the share of total income
spent on cereals, s h . Cereal demand yh  can also be written as the income spent on
cereal purchases (Ih ⋅sh ) divided by the cereal consumer price pi:




Filling in (9.9) in expression (9.8) results in:
(9.10) bh  = hcerIε  sh
To estimate the income elasticities of cereal demand hcerIε  we use the estimates made
by Roth (1986), which are presented in Table A3.28, see also Section 8.1.4. Roth
presents income elasticities for all cereal types seperately. For our purpose we need
estimates of income elasticities of demand for rural and urban households for the
commodity cereals (comprising red sorghum, white sorghum, millet and maize).
Elasticities for the rural households are supposed to be the same in all CRPA. Roth
gives elasticities for maize demand which are lower than for the other cereal types.
Since maize consumption is only a small part of cereal consumption, we suppose that
                                                              
22
 The share parameter bh
 
can not be estimated with equation (9.6), because we can not estimate average
values of y h  and I h - ξ h
162
the income elasticity of cereal demand is equal to the income elasticities Roth gives
for sorghum and millet demand. For urban households not living in Ouagadougou or
Bobo-Dioulasso we suppose that the income elasticity is a little higher than the
elasticity for Ouagadougou. Estimates are given in Table 9.2.







Income elasticity of demand 0.95 0.7 0.75
Source: Estimates are based on Roth (1986) and some additional suppositions, see above.
The parameter S h  can be estimated using the INSD data of  Table A3.31. We estimate
the parameter s h  as:
s
h
 = (monetary cereal expenses) / (monetary income),
with:
Monetary cereal expenses = (total cereal expenses) * (monetary cereal
expenses as a percentage of total cereal expenses); (see Table A3.31 for the
values).
Monetary income = (total expenses) * (monetary revenues as a percentage of
total revenues); (see Table A3.31 for the values).
Estimates of s h  and bh  are presented in Table 9.3.
The parameters b h  are lower than the cereal budget shares mentioned in Roth (1986;
see Table A3.35, the cereal budget share is the sum of the shares for white sorghum,
red sorghum, millet and maize), who also deals with both monetary and non-
monetary expenses. If the budget shares from Roth are converted in monetary
expenses using the figures given by the INSD survey (using the percentage cereal
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expenses and percentage monetary revenues given in Table A3.31), the difference
between the Roth and INSD study is not that large.
Table 9.3 Estimates of the share of annual supernumerary income on cereal
purchases for rural and for urban households per CRPA for an average
rainfall year.















Centre 0.15 0.95 0.14 0.08 0.7 0.06
Centre Nord 0.14 0.95 0.13 0.09 0.75 0.07
Centre Ouest 0.15 0.95 0.14 0.09 0.75 0.07
Centre Sud 0.15 0.95 0.14 0.09 0.75 0.07
Sahel 0.16 0.95 0.16 0.09 0.75 0.07
Mouhoun 0.09 0.95 0.09 0.09 0.75 0.07
Est 0.14 0.95 0.13 0.09 0.75 0.07
Centre Est 0.15 0.95 0.14 0.09 0.75 0.07
Nord 0.14 0.95 0.13 0.09 0.75 0.07
Sud Ouest 0.14 0.95 0.13 0.09 0.75 0.07
Hauts Bassins 0.09 0.95 0.09 0.08 0.7 0.06
Comoe 0.09 0.95 0.09 0.09 0.75 0.07
Notes: (a) and (c) based on table Table A3.31, see above. (b) and  (d) given in Table 9.2.
c) Minimally required cereal purchases, γ h .
Above it has been supposed that each urban consumer has to purchase at least a
minimum amount of cereals. Since there are no data on which to found this estimate,
it will be a rough estimate. If we consider a necessary cereal consumption to remain
healthy of approximately 190 kg of cereals per person per year, of which an
increasing part consists of rice, the minimum level of cereal purchases (of red
sorghum, white sorghum, millet and maize) will not be very high. Certainly for
consumers in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, who consume relatively more rice
than consumers in other cities, the minimum requirements will be moderate. In
Section 8.1.4 it has been discussed that rice consumption of urban households ranged
between 19% and 32% of total cereal consumption in Ouagadougou in the early ‘80s.
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The data in Table A3.17 show that rice consumption per person (divide the sum of
rice production and imports by the urban population which is reported in Table 8.1)
maybe even exceeds this percentage. Suppose now that urban consumers in
Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso consume each year about 90 kg of rice, and other
urban consumers 70 kg. The remainder of the required consumption of 190 kg will
consist of cereals. Suppose now that half of this remainder has to be purchased as the
minimally required purchases. The exact estimate of γ h
 
is not very important, since
its influence on the total purchased quantity is small23. So, the parameter γ r  is:
(9.11) For urban consumers in Ouagadougou or Bobo-Dioulasso: γ u  = 50 kg.
For urban consumers in other cities: γ u  = 60 kg.
For rural consumers it has been supposed that they produce the minimum requirement
themselves. They do not have to purchase a minimum amount of cereals on the
market. So,
(9.12) For rural consumers: γ r  = 0.
d) Supernumerary income, Ih  -  ξh .
To estimate the supernumerary income per person, Ih  -  ξ h , we suppose that all other
goods of the commodity set K are aggregated in one commodity, k. It follows that, if
h
kγ  are the minimum requirements of commodity k for household h and pi k  the
                                                              
23
 For example, if the minimally required purchases increase from γ h  = 50 to 60, then the change of
consumption is:
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. The price difference
between pi(γ h  = 50) and pi(γ h  = 60) will probably be small, because of which the second term in the
numerator will be negligable. Consequently, the change of consumption will approximately be 1/5 kg.
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consumer price of commodity k, then: ξ h = pi k ⋅ hkγ . We have no information available
on which to found estimates of ξ h . We therefore make a rough estimate, of which the
importance will later be analysed by doing a sensitivity analysis. For the commodity k
we suppose that for each consumer (rural and urban) the minimum requirement hkγ  is
half the total purchases of commodity k ( hkγ  = ½⋅ hkC ). Considering consumption
function (9.2) for commodity k it follows that:

























pi γ piγ ξ pi γ piγ2 7 2 7
Since it is supposed that the entire income Ih  is spent on cereals and commodity k
( 1=+ hhk bb ), the value of hkb  can be determined from Table 9.3. Income levels Ih  are
given in Table 9.1, average cereal consumer price levels pi are given in Table 8.3, and
the value of γ h  is given in (9.11) and (9.12). Estimates of the supernumerary income
Ih  - ξh  are given in Table 9.4.
It is recognized that the estimates made under a) to f) in Table 9.4 are rather
unreliable. To analyse the impact of parameter changes, results will be analysed
carefully by making use of a sensitivity analysis.
9.1.3 Cereal demand functions per period
The estimates made in the previous section result in cereal demand functions for an
entire year. In order to come to quarterly demand functions some suppositions have to
be made concerning the timing of purchases for rural and urban consumers. This will
be discussed below.




















I u  -  ξ u
(d) - (h)
Centre 24500 0.14 11322 13178 262500 0.06 50 134 124001 138499
Centre Nord 25375 0.13 11794 13581 152250 0.07 60 126 69810 82440
Centre Ouest 24500 0.14 11322 13178 152250 0.07 60 125 69847 82403
Centre Sud 24500 0.14 11322 13178 152250 0.07 60 128 69753 82497
Sahel 38500 0.16 17627 20873 152250 0.07 60 139 69437 82813
Mouhoun 52500 0.09 25033 27467 152250 0.07 60 108 70335 81915
Est 24500 0.13 11388 13112 152250 0.07 60 120 69979 82271
Centre Est 24500 0.14 11322 13178 152250 0.07 60 127 69776 82474
Nord 25375 0.13 11794 13581 152250 0.07 60 119 70010 82240
Sud Ouest 52500 0.13 24382 28118 152250 0.07 60 125 69858 82392
Hauts Bassins 52500 0.09 25033 27467 262500 0.06 50 113 124518 137982
Comoe 52500 0.09 25033 27467 152250 0.07 60 129 69720 82530
Note: Income (a) and (d) in Table 9.1; share parameters (b) and (e) in Table 9.3; minimum consumption level (f) in (9.11) and (9.12); consumer
cereal price (g) in Table 8.3; minimum expenditures on commodity k, (c) and (h), see (9.13).
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Expressions (9.5) and (9.6) give the annual cereal demand functions for urban and
rural consumers, respectively. To define quarterly demand functions we slightly adapt
the variables and parameters introduced. Define the set of time periods (see also
figure 8.1):
T = {1, 2, 3, 4}
and introduce for t 0 T:
yt




tI ξ− supernumerary income level of a consumer of type h in
period t
(9.14) htγ minimally required cereal purchase level of a consumer of
type h in period t
h
tb share of supernumerary income spent on cereals in period t
pi t cereal consumer price in period t
The quarterly demand function for urban and rural consumers can now be written as
- see (9.5) and (9.6):









= + − −γ
pi
ξ pi γ3 8
in which rtγ  = 0 for rural consumers. For the minimum cereal demand level utγ  for
urban consumers, we suppose that they have to purchase in each period at least a
quarter of the annual level γ u . So, - see (9.11):
(9.16) For urban consumers in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso: utγ  = 12.5
For urban consumers in other cities: utγ  = 15.
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Average quarterly cereal price levels pi t , are presented in Table 8.3. No data are
available on income per period, but we suppose that each consumer, urban and rural,
is able to spread his income equally over the year. So, we define:
(9.17) hthtI ξ− = ¼(Ih  -  ξh )  ,
with the value of Ih  -  ξh  given in Table 9.4 - see Table 9.5 and Table 9.6. Although
income levels are supposed to be the same in each period, expenses on cereal
purchases differ per period. Consequently, also the share of income spent on cereals,
h
tb , differs per period.
For rural consumers the distribution of expenses on cereal purchases over the year
may be different for each CRPA. The data of Table A3.23, Table A3.24, and Table
A3.25 suggest that purchase patterns differ between the South-Western and the other
CRPA. They show that households in the CRPA Mouhoun, Hauts-Bassins, ComoJ
and Sud-Ouest purchase on average approximately 15% of their cereals in the first
period from October to December, 20% in the second period from January to March,
30% in the third period from April to June, and 35% in the fourth period from July to
September. The other CRPA purchase on the average approximately 17.5% of their
cereals during the first period, 17.5% during the second period, 25% during the third
period, and 40% during the fourth period. These approximations are used to
determine values of htb  for rural consumers.
To estimate the level of rtb , we can not apply the same method as in Section 9.1.2
(see (9.10)), for we have no data on elasticities or share parameter sh  per period. We
therefore use the average annual demand level of a rural consumer yr , which can be
calculated with equation (9.6) and the estimates of pi and I r  -  ξ r  given in Table 8.3
and Table 9.4, respectively - see Table 9.5. If the average quarterly cereal purchases
as a percentage of the total purchased quantity is δ t ,  then the average cereal demand
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in period t is yt
r
 = yr⋅δ t.Values of δ t  are given in the text above. It follows from


























Estimates of rtb  for rural consumers are presented in Table 9.5.24
Estimating the budget share utb  for urban consumers is done in a similar way as for
rural consumers. For urban consumers it has been supposed that they purchase their
entire consumption on the market, and that their cereal consumption is the same in
each period. So, they purchase in each period a quarter of the yearly consumption. For
we supposed in (9.17) that income for urban consumers is constant in each quarter,
the share of total budget spent on cereal purchases has to increase during the year
when cereal prices increase. To estimate the budget share utb , we first calculate an
average annual level of cereal demand for an urban consumer, yu . This can be
calculated using equation (9.5) and the estimates of γ u ,  b u , pi and Iu  -  ξ u  given in
(9.11), Table 9.3, Table 8.3 and Table 9.4, respectively - see Table 9.6. The average
level of cereal demand per quarter is: yt
u






































Estimates of utb  for urban consumers are presented in Table 9.6.
                                                              
24
 Note that to estimate rtb , we need estimates of the parameter b
r
.  b r  is used to estimate the value of ξ h
and of ξ th .
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Centre 3294 14 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.24
Centre Nord 3395 14 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.23
Centre Ouest 3294 15 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.24
Centre Sud 3294 14 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.22
Sahel 5218 23 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.27
Mouhoun 6867 23 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.14
Est 3278 14 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.23
Centre Est 3294 15 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.24
Nord 3395 15 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.23
Sud Ouest 7030 30 0.07 0.10 0.17 0.20
Hauts Bassins 6867 22 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.13
Comoe 6867 19 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.13
Note: (a) supernumerary income per period is defined in (9.17); (b) annual cereal demand is defined
using (9.6), Table 8.3, Table 9.3 and Table 9.4; (c) - (f) budget shares are defined in (9.18), quarterly
cereal prices per CRPA, pit, are given in Table 8.3.


















Centre 34625 108 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Centre Nord 20610 100 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
Centre Ouest 20601 100 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07
Centre Sud 20624 99 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07
Sahel 20703 96 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
Mouhoun 20479 107 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08
Est 20568 102 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08
Centre Est 20619 100 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07
Nord 20560 102 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
Sud Ouest 20598 101 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
Hauts Bassins 34496 119 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Comoe 20633 99 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
Note: (a) supernumerary income per period is defined in (9.17); (b) annual cereal demand is defined
using (9.5), Table 8.3, Table 9.3 and Table 9.4; (c) - (f) budget shares are defined in (9.19), quarterly
cereal prices per CRPA, pit, are given in Table 8.3.
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Using the above discussion on cereal demand functions for rural and urban
consumers, we can now estimate the regional demand functions per CRPA. Introduce
a set with all the twelve CRPA, I, and call for i ∈ I:
yit
u the cereal demand function for period t of an urban consumer in
CRPA i
yit
r the cereal demand function for period t of a rural consumer in CRPA i
 y it the regional cereal demand function for CRPA i for period t
The demand functions for rural and urban consumers is given in (9.15). Redefine the
parameters in (9.14) with an index i, to indicate the CRPA concerned: γ pi ξith it ith ithI, , −
and bit
h
. The parameter values γ pi ξith it ith ithI, , −  and bith  are given in (9.12), (9.16),
Table 8.3, Table 9.5 and Table 9.6. Define also:
Popi
u
 the size of the urban population in CRPA i
Popi
r the size of the rural population in CRPA i
Population size for each CRPA is given in Table 8.1. Now, total cereal demand in
period t in CRPA i, i ∈ I, is given by:
(9.20) y Pop y Pop yit iu itu ir itr= + .
Note that the demand function is in fact a simple demand function of the form
(9.21) y it = α it + β it /pi it ,
with
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     α γit iu itu ituPop b= −13 8  and
      β ξ ξit iu itu itu itu ir itr itr itrPop b I Pop b I= − + −3 8 3 8
see (9.20) and (9.15).
9.2 Cereal supply functions
Estimating supply functions is a more complicated task than estimating demand
functions. Supply differences between households are larger, and less is known about
the influence of prices on supply. What is needed for our analysis are functions
which, given cereal production levels, determine the distribution of cereal sales over
the periods as a function of cereal prices, taken into account on-farm consumption of
self produced cereals. In Chapter 7 it was argued that cereal supply in a period t
depends on the (given) stock level at the beginning of the period, on the cereal
producer price in period t, p t , and on the uncertain prices in the future periods. In
Section 9.2.1 and Appendix A2.1 the approach discussed in Section 7.1 is extended.
Now, producers have to supply in each period at least a certain quantity, to satisfy
cash needs. In Section 9.2.2 the parameters are estimated and the form of the resulting
supply functions are discussed.
9.2.1 Cereal supply model
Each producer knows after the harvest, at the beginning of period 1, the level of his
cereal production and how much he can sell during that year, w 0. As in the previous
section we skip the region index i from the variables and parameters. So, for the
annual supply of a producer in region i we write w 0 instead of w i0 - see (7.2). As in
Section 7.1, the producer takes a decision on his cereal sales x t  in period t, when he
knows the available stock level wt-1 remaining from the previous period, and the
current price p t . Future prices for the periods t+1, t+2,..,4 are random variables, of
which the simultaneous probability distributions are assumed to be known by the
producers – see (7.4). Call the random future producer prices Pt+1,  Pt+2,…, P4 – see
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(7.3) and (7.4). In each period t the producer optimizes his revenues for that period,
pt ⋅xt , minus the costs made to sell x t, called c t (x t ) – see (7.8), plus the discounted,
expected net revenues for future periods – see (7.12) and (7.13). Define σ the discount
rate, which indicates the importance the producer attaches to future revenues. If σ is
low, the producer puts a low value to future revenues. If σ > 1, the producer puts a
higher value on future revenues than on current revenues. The discounted, expected,
future revenues can also be interpreted as the present value of future revenues. In that
case σ = 1/(1+r), with r the interest rate. The value of σ will be discussed in Section
9.2.2.
Important in this problem are the costs which have been made to sell x t : c t (x t ). In
Chapter 7 a linear cost function was adopted, see (7.8). This differs from standard
producer theory, in which it is usually supposed that: ′c xt t( )  > 0 and ′′c xt t( )  > 0, see
Chapter 4. However, not enough evidence is available to justify a cost function for
Burkinabè farmers, for which the first and second derivatives are positive. It is,
however, plausible to adopt a cost function which is linear in the quantity supplied. In
that case, ′c xt t( )  > 0 but ′′c xt t( )  = 0. If in period t a quantity x t  is sold, then the
following costs are made:
1. Costs for supplying x t  on the market, i.e. the transaction costs (transport costs,
negotiaton costs), assumed to be an amount α FCFA per kg of cereals sold during
period t.
2. Financial storage costs are ρ FCFA per kg per period. Physical storage losses of
keeping the quantity xt in stock until period t are supposed to be a fraction (1-δ)
per period, due to insects, rats and diseases. It is recalled that the periods t =
1,2,3,4 have all the same length of three months. To sell x t , a producer stores at
the beginning of the year a quantity x t /δ t - 1 . Despite the fact that the stock
decreases in each period due to storage losses, we suppose that the producer has
to pay in all the t-1 periods in which he stores approximately ρx t /δ t - 1  FCFA per
kg stored. So, if a producer sells at the beginning of each period, the storage costs
which have been made to sell x t  are approximately:
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3. Production costs per unit of cereals produced, amount β FCFA per kg. If one kg
is sold in period t, then a quantity 1/δ t -1 must be reserved from the quantity
produced – see 2) above.
The values of the parameters α, β, δ and ρ are discussed in Section 9.2.2. Write the
cost function: c x c xt t t t( ) = ⋅ , with c t the costs per kg supplied, defined as:25








The sales in each period have to satisfy sales restrictions. First, as in Section 7.1, the
producer can not sell more then what remains from previous periods. In each period a
fraction 1-δ  of the stock is lost. So, if we define w t  as the level of the stock at the end
of period t, then w t  = (wt - 1  -  xt) ⋅δ . The initial stock is w 0 .  It follows, that – see
also (7.6):
(9.24) 
w w x w w x x x
w w x x w w x x x x
1 0 1 3 0 1 2 3
2 0 1 2 4 0 1 2 3 4
= − = − − −
= − − = − − − −
1 6 1 62 73 8
1 62 7 1 62 73 84 9
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ δ
Secondly, different from Section 7.1, based on observed practice in Burkina Faso, it is
supposed that each producer sells in each period t, at least a minimum quantity, xt
−
.
                                                              
25
 Note that the cost function does not reflect the costs which have been made in period t. For example,
you include the costs which have been made in the previous periods to store x t , but you do not include
the costs which have to be made in period t to store the remainder. This approach is correct, if it is
assumed that sales in period t take place in the beginning of the period and approxiamelty correct if the
sales take place somewhere in period t.
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In principle, these minimum sales are based on urgent cash requirements. If a
producer needs an amount of capital, he sells a certain part of his stock. This would
mean that his minimum sales depend on prices; if the price is high, his sales will be
lower, than if prices are low – see Section 8.1.3. We do not take into account this
price dependence of minimum sales. It would complicate the analysis considerably,




(9.25) x t ≥ xt−
The values of xt
−
 will be discussed in Section 9.2.2.
We come back now to the producer’s choice of x t . He chooses x t  in such a way that
the expected net revenues will be maximal. We first deal with the last period, t = 4. In
period 4 the producer knows w 3 and p4 . The producer maximizes his net revenues for
that period subject to the minimum sales x4− , and the available stock level, w 3. This
problem may be written as - see also (7.10):
(9.26) z w p Max p c x x x w
x
4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3
4
;1 6 1 6> C= − ≤ ≤−
This model results in the optimal supply for a producer for period 4. In period 3, the
values of w 2  and p3  are known. The value of the price in period 4 is uncertain, i.e. a
random variable P4 , of which the probability distribution is assumed to be known.
Supplies in period 3 should not be less than the minimum sales x3
−
, and not exceed
the available stock minus the quantity which has to be reserved for future sales w 2 −
x4
− /δ. Maximization of the net revenues in period 3, plus the expected revenues for
the rest of the reference year, corresponds to the maximization problem – see (3.48)
in Section 3.5 and (7.12):
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(9.27) 
























Ez4 (w3 ;P4 )  refers to the expectation of z 4  with regard to the random price P4 . It will
be discussed below how it can be calculated. Model (9.27) results in the optimal
supply for the producer in period 3 and in the quantity which is expected to be
optimal for period 4. The optimal supply in period 4, calculated by (9.26) may differ
from this expected supply, if prices turn out to be different than expected. In analogy
with (9.27), for the periods 1 and 2 the following maximization problems have to be
solved:
(9.28) 





2 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 3
2 2 1
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δ δ δ δ
Model (9.28) results in optimal supply levels for period 2, x2, and in supplies for the
periods, 3 and 4, which are expected to be optimal. Analogously, model (9.29) gives
optimal supply levels for period 1, x1, and supplies for the periods 2, 3 and 4, which
are expected to be optimal. In models (9.27) - (9.29) Ez t+1( ⋅ )  refers to the expectation
of z t+1(⋅ ) with regard to all uncertain prices Pt+1,…,P4 – see (3.49) in Section 3.5.
The models (9.27) - (9.29) are typical examples of dynamic programming problems.
In order to estimate Ez t ( ⋅ ) , t = 4,3,2, in (9.27) - (9.29) we assume producers know the
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probability distributions of random prices Pt, for the periods t = 2,3,4. For the model
for period t, we assume that stochastic prices for the future periods t+1,…,4, are
independent of p t. We have made this assumption to simplify the computations.26
However, stochastic prices for the period τ, for τ ∈ {t+2,…,4}, are assumed to
depend on the stochastic price for the period τ−1. In Section 8.1.6 and Appendix
A3.6, it has been discussed that producer prices show a clear seasonal pattern every
year: they are low after the harvest between October and December, then gradually
increase, to reach their maximum between July and September. Define pt , the
average ‘96-’99 producer price in quarter t, see Table 8.3. We suppose that cereal
producers (and traders) expect prices to follow more or less the same pattern every
year. They expect the price in quarter t to be pt − pt −1
 
above the price in period t-1.
Period 3:
In model (9.27) for period 3, expected prices for period 4 are independent of p 3. We
assume they are equal to a parameter $p3 , plus the expected increase p p4 3− :27
(9.30) EP p p p4 3 4 3= + −$ 1 6
We suppose that the random producer price is equal to the expected producer price
plus a random disturbance. Define the discrete, random disturbance in period t, Θ t,
with EΘ t = 0, t = 2,3,4. Assume that the random disturbances for the periods t = 2,3,4
are mutually independent, and have a discrete empirical distribution with possible
realisations θ tk , for k = 1,…,K, and with
                                                              
26
 If the probability distribution of the stochastic prices would depend on p t, then the equilibrium models
presented in Section 7.2 would be much more complicated and very difficult to handle. Moreover, in that
case, the results of the equilibrium models would change, since p t is a variable in these models. In that
case the results of the equilibrium models would not correspond to the optimal strategies of the
individual agents.
27
 How the parameter 
$p3  is estimated, is discussed in the next section.
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(9.31) Pr Θ t tk tkf= =θ3 8
with f tk  satisfying 0 ≤ f tk  ≤ 1 and f t kk
K
=
∑ 1  = 1. We can write in the model for
period 3, the stochastic price for period 4 as:
(9.32) P p p p4 3 4 3 4= + − +$ 1 6 Θ
Write the possible price realisations in period 4, pk4 , as:
(9.33) p p p pk k4 3 4 3 4= + − +$ 1 6 θ
and define – see (9.30) - (9.33):
(9.34) Pr P p fk k4 4 4= =3 8
Estimation of the probability distributions is discussed in Section 9.2.2. Define xk4  as
the supply in period 4, if the price in this period is pk4 , k = 1,…,K.  Model (9.27) may
be written as – see (3.49):
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In model (9.28) for period 2, expected prices for period 3 and 4 are independent of p 2.
We assume that expected prices for period 3 are equal to a parameter $p2 , plus the
expected increase p p3 2− . Furthermore, the expected price for period 4 depends on




P p p p
P P p p p p
3 2 3 2
4 3 3 3 4 3
= + -




1 6 1 6
Assume again that the random producer price is equal to the expected producer price
plus a random disturbance Θ t − see (9.31). Define for k,l = 1,…,k:
pk3  the possible price realisations for period 3,
pkl4  the possible price realisations in period 4 if the price in period 3 is p
k
3 .
They are written as:
(9.37) 
p p p p
p p p p p p p
k k
kl k l k l
3 2 3 2 3
4 3 4 3 4 2 4 2 3 4
= + - +









P p p p P P p p3 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 3 4= + − + = + − +$ 1 6 1 6Θ Θand






P p P p f
k k k
kl k l k l l
3 3 3 3 3
4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4
= = = =
= = = = = = = =
3 8 3 8





We can rewrite the model for the period t = 2 – see (9.28). Define xk3  and xkl4  as the
supply in the periods 3 and 4, if prices in these periods are pk3  and p
kl
4 , respectively,
for k,l = 1,…,K – see (3.53).
(9.39) 
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Period 1:





P p p p
P P p p p p
P P p p p p
2 1 2 1
3 2 2 2 3 2
4 3 3 3 4 3
= + −
= = + −





1 6 1 6
1 6 1 6
Assume again that the random producer price is equal to the expected producer price
plus a random disturbance Θ t − see (9.31). Define for k,l,m = 1,…,k:
pk2  the possible price realisations for period 2
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pkl3  the possible price realisation in period 3 if the price in period 2 is p
k
2
pklm4 the possible price realisation in period 4 if the price in period 2 is p
k
2
and the price in period 3 is pkl3
Write them as:
pk2  = $p p p
k
1 2 1 2+ − +1 6 θ
(9.41) pkl3  = p p pk l2 3 2 3+ − +1 6 θ  = $p p p k l1 3 1 2 3+ − + +1 6 θ θ .
pklm4  = p p p
kl m
3 4 3 4+ − +1 6 θ  = $p p p k l m1 4 1 2 3 4+ − + + +1 6 θ θ θ .
We define:
P p p p
P P p p
P P p p
2 1 2 1 2
3 2 3 2 3
4 3 4 3 4
= + − +
= + − +











Pr , Pr ,
Pr
P p f
P p P p f
P p P p P p
f
k k k
kl k l k l l
klm k kl m k kl
m m
2 2 2 2 2
3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 3
4 4 2 2 3 3 4 4 2 2 3 3
4 4 4
= = = =
= = = = = = = =
= = = = = = = =
= = =
2 7 2 7
4 9 4 9 2 7










Define xk2 , x
kl
3 , and x
klm
4  as the supply in the periods 2, 3 and 4, if prices in these
periods are pk2 , p
kl
3 , and p
klm




z w p Max p c x f p c x




x x x x x x k l m K












k kl klm1 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1
3 3 3 3
1






3 0 1 1
2 2 3 3 4 4




, , , , , ,...,
, , ,
1 6 1 6 2 7
2 7 2 7
= - + - +
%&’






+ + +  











What can we learn from the above models:
• Solving model (9.43) results in optimal supply x 1 (w 0 , p 1) for period 1 as a
function of the producer price in period 1, p 1.
• Solving model (9.39) gives the optimal supply x 2 (w 1 ,p 2 ) in period 2, as a
function of the available stock w1 and the producer price for period 2, p 2.
• Solving model (9.35) gives the optimal supply x 3 (w 2 ,p 3 ) for period 3, as a
function of the available stock w 2 and the producer price in the period 3, p 3.
• Solving model (9.26) gives the optimal supply x 4 (w 3 ,p 4 ) for period 4, as a
function of the available stock w 3 and the producer price in the period 4, p 4.
In Appendix A2, the supply functions resulting from these models are derived. The
supply functions are as follows:
Optimal supply in period 4:
(9.44) 
x w p x p c
x x w p x p c
x w p x w x x x p c
4 3 4 4 4 4
4 4 3 4 4 4 4
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Optimal supply in period 3:
(9.45) 
x w p x p c
x x w p x p c
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1 6 1 6
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∑σδ f p ck k
k
K
3 8  − see (A2.8) and (9.33), with a + = max(a ;0).
Optimal supply in period 2:
(9.46) 
x w p x p c
x x w p x p c
x w p x w x
x x
p c
2 1 2 2 2 2 3
2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3
2 1 2 2 0 1
3 4
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∑ 3 8  − see (A2.13) and (9.37).
Optimal supply in period 1:
(9.47) 
x w p x p c
x x w p x p c
x w p x w
x x x
p c
1 0 1 1 1 1 2
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 2
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∑ ∑σδ  and








∑ 3 8  − see (A2.18) and (9.41).
These functions show that optimal supply in each period has the following form:
• Supply in period t is the minimum quantity xt- , if the price is below the border
price, p t < c t + Ψ t+1.
• Supply in period t is the maximum possible quantity, taken into account
minimum sales in the other periods, if the price is above the border price, p t > c t
+ Ψ t+1.
• Supply in period t may take any value between the minimum and maximum
supply levels, if the price is exactly equal to the border price, p t = c t + Ψ t+1.
9.2.2 Estimating cereal supply functions for Burkina Faso
Before the supply functions (9.44) - (9.47) can be determined, first the values of the
parameters w 0, xt
−
, α, δ, ρ and σ have to be estimated. The estimates will be
discussed below one by one.
a) Annual supply, w 0
For the determination of the level of annual cereal supply w 0, use is made of cereal
production levels. Cereal production per producer is supposed to be the forecasted
mean production level for the year 2000 as presented in column (h) in Table 8.2. It is
recalled that on the basis of evidence discussed in section 8.1.3 we assumed that
annual supply w 0 does not depend on prices. Therefore, w 0 appears as a parameter in
the models  (9.43), (9.39), (9.35), and (9.26). Given production, it can be explored on
the basis of the sales data presented in Appendix A3.3 which part of production can
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reasonably be sold (which means that not too much is sold that hardly anything
remains to feed the own family, or that too little is sold so that stores are still full at
the end of the year). The observations on sales and sales as a percentage of production
give too little evidence to estimate per CRPA annual sales, w 0. Therefore, three
different groups of CRPA are distinguished, with more or less the same sales and
production characteristics. For the first group, the CRPA Sahel, Nord and Centre
Nord, it is supposed that households sell on average 10% of their annual production.
Households in the second group, the CRPA Centre, Centre Ouest, Centre Sud, Est,
Centre Est, and Sud Ouest, sell on average 20%. Households in the third group, in the
CRPA Mouhoun, Hauts Bassins, and ComoJ, sell on average 35%. Using these
estimates and the forecasted cereal production for the planning period 2000-2001,
annual sales per person, w 0, can be calculated (see Table 9.8).
b) Minimally required supplies, xt− .
Minimally required supplies in each period are also estimated for the three different
groups of CRPA. To estimate minimally required supplies, first, estimates are made
of the average percentage of production sold in each quarter. Comparing the different
surveys evaluated in Appendix A3.3 shows that the first group of CRPA sell on
average approximately 26% of their cereals in period 1 from October to December,
30% in period 2 from January to March, 25% in period 3 from April to June, and 19%
in period 4 from July to September – see Table 9.7. Producers from the second group
of CRPA sell on average approximately 27%, 39%, 12% and 23% in period 1, 2, 3
and 4, respectively. Finally, producers from the third group of CRPA sell on average
approximately 19%, 25%, 30% and 27% of their annual sales in period 1, 2, 3 and 4,
respectively.
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Table 9.7 Evaluation of sales per season as % of annual sales for some different
studies.
Author Province Year Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-June July-Sept
Yonli sanmatenga 38% 48% 11% 4%
Reardon Soum 81-82 35% 29% 18% 18%
CRPA
group 1
83-84 10% 45% 35% 10%
Passoré 81-82 25% 25% 25% 25%
82-83 21% 13% 46% 21%
83-84 24% 24% 12% 40%
Average 26% 30% 25% 19%
Pardy Oubritenga 83-84 22% 40% 18% 21%
Zoundweogo 83-84 48% 24% 10% 19%
CRPA
group 2
Gourma 83-84 11% 53% 9% 28%
Average 27% 39% 12% 23%
Reardon Mouhoun 81-82 19% 19% 44% 19%
82-83 21% 21% 29% 29%
CRPA
group 3
Pardy Kossi 16% 34% 17% 33%
Average 19% 25% 30% 27%
Notes: See Appendix A3.3 for the details of the studies of Yonli (1997), Pardy (1987), and Reardon et al.
(1987). Of these studies the years and provinces have been included of which most data were available.
Multiplying the average sales percentages given in Table 9.7 with the annual sales in
Table 9.8 gives estimates of average supplies from cereal sales per period. Minimally
required supplies from cereal sales to satisfy cash needs are now estimated as 60% of
these average quarterly supplies for the first period and second period, and 40% for
the third and fourth period – see Table 9.8. Minimally required supplies for the third
and fourth period are assumed to be lower than for the other two periods, for it is
supposed that non-cropping income is higher during these periods.
c) Discount rate: σ; Transaction costs: α; Production costs: β, Storage costs: ρ;
Storage losses, δ.
Reliable estimates of α, β, δ, ρ and σ are difficult to obtain, due to lack of
information on storage costs and transaction costs for the producers. The following
values have been adopted for all periods and all CRPA. The storage costs, which
include construction costs and time to build the stores, are ρ = 2.5 FCFA per kg per
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period. Transaction costs, which include transport towards the market, costs to obtain
information on traders’ demand and time invested in the sales activities, are estimated
at α = 1 FCFA per kg per period. No data are available on production costs. We take
a value equal to 75% of the average ‘96-’99 producer price, presented in Table 8.3.
Storage losses are estimated to be 10% per year, so δ = 2.5% per period (see Section
8.4). For the discount rate, we suppose that it is equal to σ = 1/(1+r), with r the
interest rate. For r often the interest rate for lending money is chosen. These interest
rates may differ a lot. Private money lenders charge much higher interest rates than
official banks. Here an interest rate of 16% per year, so 4% per period is chosen (see
DJjou (1987) Bassolet 2000), see also Appendix A4.2). Therefore: σ = 0.96 per
period. The influence of these parameter values on the solution has to be analysed
using a sensitivity analysis.
Table 9.8 Sales per person, minimum supplies per quarter and maximum sales in
period 4.




















Centre 26 16% 23% 5% 9%
Centre Nord 16 15% 18% 10% 8%
Centre Ouest 41 16% 23% 5% 9%
Centre Sud 51 16% 23% 5% 9%
Sahel 15 15% 18% 10% 8%
Mouhoun 99 11% 15% 12% 11%
Est 43 16% 23% 5% 9%
Centre Est 36 16% 23% 5% 9%
Nord 14 15% 18% 10% 8%
Sud Ouest 55 16% 23% 5% 9%
Hauts Bassins 100 11% 15% 12% 11%
Comoe 92 11% 15% 12% 11%
Notes: 1) Annual sales are the average production per rural inhabitant (column (h) in Table 8.2)
multiplied with the estimates of sales as percentage of production (see a) above); 2) Minimally required
revenues per period are calculated as the annual sales multiplied with the estimated sales per period as %
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of annual sales (see Table 9.7), and the minimum requirements per period (60% of average revenues in
the first period and second period and 40% in the third and fourth period).
d) Random prices and probability distribution functions
In Chapter 7, it is argued that expected future revenues in the stochastic, multi-period
equilibrium model can be estimated using the probability distribution of future
producer prices. The discussion on cereal prices in Section 8.1.6 and Appendix A3.6,
however, shows that estimating the probability that the price in one of the quarters
reaches a certain level on the basis of the ‘92 – ‘99 price data, is not very accurate.
Before the devaluation a cereal consumer price of 50 FCFA per kg was not very
uncommon. After the devaluation in 1994 it is very rare. For that reason we do not
estimate the probability distribution of prices directly, but via a detour.
Define again the time periods t = 1,…,4, with t = 1 the post-harvest period from
October to December, t = 2 the period from January to March, t = 3 the period from
April to June, and t = 4 the hunger period from July to September, and define the
years Y = 1992,…,1999. Between 1992 and 1999 the average cereal prices per quarter
changed a lot, see Table A3.36, but the distribution of the differences between
observed and average prices remained more or less the same.28 It is possible to
estimate a discrete probability distribution function which gives the probability that
the observed price deviates from the average price with a certain value. For that
reason, we determine for each CRPA, each quarter and each year the average prices,
and the deviations of the price observations from the averages. 29 Using this, we
estimate the probability that the deviation from the average is within a certain
interval. Define pit
Y
, the observed price in quarter t = 1,2,3,4, in CRPA i ∈ I, in year
                                                              
28
 To analyse the dispersion of prices, for each year the standard deviation has been calculated of the
relative difference between observed prices and the average price, P p pitY itY itY−3 8 , with PitY  a price
observation and pitY  the average price for quarter t in CRPA i in year Y, t = 1,...,4, Y = ‘92-’99. These
standard deviations did not change significantly between 1992 and 1999. Furthermore, an analysis of the
first, second, and third quartile distances and of the minimum and maximum relative difference between
prices and average prices did not clearly show changes in time.
29
 Define the set of CRPA I = {Centre, Centre Nord, Centre Ouest, Centre Sud, Sahel, Mouhoun, Est,
Centre Est, Nord, Sud Ouest, Hauts Bassins, Comoe}.
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Y ∈ {’92,…,’99}, pitY  the average price in CRPA i in quarter t in year Y, and
introduce the nine intervals:
(9.48) ∆1 = (-∞;-21] ∆2 = (-21;-15] ∆3 = (-15;-9] ∆4 = (-9;-3] ∆5 = (-3;3]
∆6 = (3;9] ∆7 = (9;15] ∆8 = (15;21] ∆9 = (21;∞].
For each of the quarters t = 2,3,4, we count the number of observations for which the




, was within the
interval ∆ k, for k = 1,...,9. 30 The probability that the deviation from the average price
in a certain quarter is within the interval ∆ k, is equal to the number of observations in
the interval divided by the total number of observations in the quarter. For some of
the CRPA, the number of observations was very small. For example, for the CRPA
Nord, only 2 observations were available for the period July – September.
Furthermore, the distributions did not differ a lot between the CRPA. For that reason
we estimate for each quarter one probability distribution on the basis of price data for
all CRPA, and suppose that it is the same for all regions. Define:
(9.49) Pr P p fitY itY k tk− ∈ =∆ ∆3 8
for t = 2,3,4, k = 1,…,9, i ∈ I, Y ∈ {’92,…,’99}, with 0 ≤ ftk∆  ≤ 1 and f t kk
∆∑  = 1.
The probability distributions are given in Table 9.9.
In Section 9.2.1, random producer prices Pit
 
have been introduced for each CRPA for
the quarters t = 2, 3 and 4, to determine optimal revenues.31 Expectations for future
periods, change in each period. In period 1, a different price is expected for period 4,
than in period 2. In Section 9.2.1, we assumed that in the decision model for period t,
random prices for period t+1 do not depend on p t, whereas random prices for the
                                                              
30
 Note that we only need the probability distribution for the periods t = 2,3,4, see Section 9.2.1.
31
 In Section 9.2.1 the index i was skipped from the definition of the random price in quarter t.
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period τ ∈ {t+2,...,4}, depend on the price in the previous period, P τ −1. Possible
realisations are supposed to depend on the expected price change between period t
and t-1, pit − pi t, −1 , and a discrete random disturbance, Θ t, with EΘ t = 0. Random
disturbances Θ t, whose probability distributions are defined in (9.31), are mutually
independent. Random prices and probability distributions are defined for k,l,m =
1,...,9, as follows – see (9.32), (9.34), (9.36), (9.38), (9.40), and (9.42):
For the model for period 1, (9.29):
(9.50) 
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For the model for period 2, (9.28):
(9.51) 
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For the model for period 3, (9.27):
(9.52) P p p pi i i i4 3 4 3 4= + - +$ 1 6 Θ Pr P p fi ik k4 4 4= =2 7
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with p i1 and p i2 the optimal equilibrium prices for the periods 1 and 2 – see Section
7.2. Assume that the random disturbance has for each period nine possible
realisations, θ tk , for which we adopt the following values corresponding to the nine
intervals introduced in (9.48):
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(9.54) θ 1 = -24, θ 2 = -18, θ 3 = -12, θ 4 = -6, θ 5 = 0, θ 6 = 6, θ 7 = 12, θ 8 = 18, θ 9 = 24
Suppose that the probability distribution of Θ t is the same as the probability
distribution of ∆ t, ftk∆ , in (9.49). Define for k = 1,…,9, i ∈ I, t = 2,3,4, see Table 9.9:
(9.55) Pr Θ ∆t k tk tkf f= = =θ3 8
with 0 ≤ ftk  ≤ 1 and f t kk∑  = 1.
Table 9.9 Probability distribution functions of deviations from average producer
prices – see (9.49) and of the disturbances – see (9.55), for the quarters t =
2, 3 and 4.1






∆1 = (-∞ ; -21] θ 1 = -24 0.018 0.027 0.026
∆2 = (-21 ; -15] θ 2 = -18 0.028 0.034 0.047
∆3 = (-15 ; -9] θ 3 = -12 0.079 0.071 0.096
∆4 = (-9 ; -3] θ 4 = -6 0.228 0.230 0.192
∆5 = (-3 ; 3] θ 5 = 0 0.300 0.307 0.259
∆6 = (3 ; 9] θ 6 = 6 0.205 0.182 0.207
∆7 = (9 ; 15] θ 7 = 12 0.099 0.086 0.113
∆8 = (15 ; 21] θ 8 = 18 0.026 0.040 0.032
∆9 = (21 ; ∞) θ 9 = 24 0.017 0.023 0.028
Note: 1 The numbers denote the probability the deviation from the average price is within one of the




 ∈ ∆k) or the probability that the price in period t has the value
p p pi t it i t
k
, ,− −
+ − +1 11 6 θ . The probability density function for quarter t = 1 is not used in the analysis,
and therefore not shown in the table. Source: Price data from SIM/SONAGESS.
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9.3 Review of the stochastic, multi-period, spatial equilibrium model
In Section 7.2 we argued, that we can analyse market functioning and market price
formation by solving the stochastic, multi-period, spatial equilibrium model (7.46). In
the previous sections we estimated consumer demand functions, discussed producer
supply behaviour, and estimated the other parameters necessary to solve model
(7.46). Before discussing the results of this model in the next chapter, in this section
we shortly reconsider this model.
Some extra parameters for the trader’s strategies
To simplify notation, in model (7.46) we only considered transport and storage costs.
However, in Section 8.2.2 and 9.2 it has been argued that also storage losses and
trading costs have to be taken into account, and that expected future profits have to be
discounted to their present value. Trading costs are the costs a trader has to make for
each unit of cereals transacted. They include costs for bags, personnel and taxes. We
calculate total trading costs as the unit costs multiplied with the quantity sold to the
consumers. In Section 9.2 storage losses and discount rates were already introduced
for the producers. For traders we introduce the following parameters:
1- $δ fraction of stock lost by the trader in each period due to insects, rats,
diseases, etc, see Table 8.5 - 2.
(9.56) $σ discount factor for the traders, to calculate the present value of future
profits, see Table 8.5 - 3.
$α trading costs per unit of cereals transacted, see Table 8.5 - 4, 5, and 6.
These parameters may have different values than storage losses, δ , and discount rate,
σ , for the producers, introduced in Section 9.2.2.
Depending on the number of periods, regions, and possible price realisations taken
into account, the equilibrium model (7.64) can become very large. For example if 4
periods, 12 regions, and 9 possible combinations of price realisations in each period
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(i.e. K = 9) are considered, the number of variables in the equilibrium model for
period 1 is almost 150,000, while we are only interested in the optimal values of 204
of them (the variables for the period 1). For that reason we are using a simplification
of model (7.64) to analyse cereal price formation in Burkina Faso. In the model for
period t, we assume the number of possible price realisations for period t+1 to be
equal to K = 9. For the other periods t+2,…,T we assume that producers and traders
consider only one possible price realisation, which is the expected price for that
period, given the price realisation in the previous period. So, for the possible producer
and consumer price realisations, taken into account by the traders and producers, we
assume, like we did in Section 9.2, that traders and producers expect prices in each
period t+1 to T, to increase with a fixed amount, and that the price in period t+1 may
also increase with a random disturbance. We assume that traders expect the prices in
the different regions to be linked, i.e. the disturbance on the expected price is the
same for each region. This is a rough simplification of the model, but is necessary to
avoid an unmanageable model. The possible prices taken into account by the traders
and producers are – see (9.50) - (9.52):
For the model for period 1:
(9.57) 
p p
p p p p
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For the model for period 2:
(9.58) p p p p
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θ pi pi pi pi θ










3 1 3 1 3
4 3 4 3




For the model for period 3:
(9.59) p p p pik i i i k4 2 4 2 4= + − +1 6 θ pi pi pi pi θik i i i k4 2 4 2 4= + − +1 6
The average producer and consumer prices pit  and pi it  are given in Table 8.3. For the
probability distributions of the random disturbances, we suppose that producers and
traders have the same probability distribution – see (9.55):
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(9.60) Pr Θ t k itk tkf g= = =θ3 8
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Parameters and variables:
Besides the parameters introduced in (9.56), the parameters used in the equilibrium
models are, for regions i = 1,…,12, periods t = 1,…,4, household types h = rural,
urban, price realisations k = 1,…,9:
Popi





− ξ supernumerary income level of a consumer of type h, in
region i, in period t, in FCFA – see (9.14), Table 9.5, and
Table 9.6.
bit
h share of supernumerary income spent on cereals, for a
consumer of type h, in region i, in period t – see  (9.14),
Table 9.5, and Table 9.6.
γ ith minimally required cereal purchase level for a consumer of
type h, in region i, in period t, in kg – see (9.12), (9.14), and
(9.16).
δ 1 – storage losses for a producer – see page 187.
σ discount factor for a producer – see page 187.
c it producer costs of cereals supplied, in FCFA/kg – see (9.23)
and page 186.




− minimally required cereal supplies in period t for a producer
in region i, in kg – see Table 9.8.
τ ijt costs to transport one kg in period t from region i to region j,
in FCFA/kg – see (6.7) and Table 8.4.
k it storage costs in region i in period t, in FCFA/kg – see (6.7)
and Table 8.5–1,3.





, upper bounds on trader sales and purchases, in kg – see
(9.62), (9.63) below.
fitk probability distribution of producer prices in region i in
period t – see (9.61) and Table 9.9.
gt
k trader probability distribution of producer and consumer




k possible producer and consumer price realisations in region i
in period t, in FCFA/kg – see (9.57) - (9.59), (9.53), (9.54),
and Table 8.3.
The variables in the equilibrium models are, for i = 1,…,12, t = 1,…,4, τ = t+1,…,4, k
= 1,…,9:
x it Producer supply in region i in period t, in kg.
y it Consumer demand in region i in period t, in kg.
x ijt Trader’s transported quantity from region i to j in period t, in kg.
s it Trader’s stored quantity in region i in period t, for t = 1,2,3, in kg.
p it Producer price in region i in period t, in FCFA/kg.
pi it Consumer price in region i in period t, in FCFA/kg.
xi
k
τ Producer supply in region i in period τ, if future prices are pi
k
τ , in kg.
qi
k

















τ Trader’s transported quantity from region i to region j in period τ, if
the future prices are pi
k
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y Pop b
1 6 3 8 3 83 8=
− + −
− −1
Note that future consumer strategies can be skipped from the model presentation,
because it are constants.





, . In the equilibrium model for period t, possible future trader sales
and purchases, ri
k
τ  and qi
k
τ , are bounded from above by the consumer demand and
producer supply. We can estimate the upperbound on traders’ sales as follows, for τ =
t+1,…,4 – see (9.20):
(9.62) y y p Pop b
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The upperbounds on trader purchases are estimated as the optimal producer supplies


























































The equilibrium models for the periods 1, 2, 3 and 4 can be written as:
For period 1: Determine the optimal values of the following variables: y i1, x i1, x ij1,








τ τ τ τ, , , , vi
k
τ  for τ = 2,3,4, k = 1,…,K, i = 1,…,n:
(9.64) 
z s w d c x x k s y
f p c x p c x p c x
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r y q x r y q x r y q x
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For period 2: Determine the optimal values of the following variables: y i2, x i2, x ij2,








τ τ τ τ, , , , vi
k
3  for τ = 3,4, k = 1,…,K, i = 1,…,n, with w i1 = (w i0 – x i1)⋅δ, and
with s i1 and x i1 the optimal storage and producer supply for period 1:
(9.65) 
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For period 3: Determine the optimal values of the following variables: y i3, x i3, x ij3,








4 4 4 4, , ,  and vi
k
4  for k = 1,…,K, i = 1,…,n, with w i2 = (w i1 – x i2)⋅δ, and with
s i2 and x i2 the optimal storage and producer supply for period 2:
(9.66) 
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For period 4: Determine the optimal values of the following variables: y i4, x i4, x ij4, for
i = 1,…,n, with w i3 = (w i2 – x i3)⋅δ, and with s i3 and x i3 the optimal storage and
producer supply for period 3:
(9.67) z s w d c x x k s yi i i
y







4 3 3 4
0















pi ξ ξ τ α
subject to
200

















-˚ ˚$ ; ; , ,δ
The theorem 7.1 and 7.2 also hold for these models. The optimal producer price in
period t is defined as:
p it = λ it
with λ it the optimal value of the Lagrange multiplier of the equilibrium constraint for
period t in the model for period t. The results of these models will almost be the same
as the Equilibrium properties 7.1 to 7.4 in Section 7.2. Equilibrium property 7.2
remains the same. The other properties change in:
Equilibrium property 9.1:  For region i and period t we can derive that:
a) In the optimal solution pi it(y it) ≤ p it(x it) + $α .
b) If in the solution pi it(y it) < p it(x it) + $α , then y it = 0.
c) If in the optimal solution, supply and demand are both positive, x it > 0 and y it > 0,
then the prices satisfy necessarily pi it(y it) = p it(x it) + $α .
Equilibrium property 9.2: In the solution, let x ijt > 0, with i,j = 1,…,n, j ≠ i, t = 1,…,n,
then:
a) xsit = 0, for s = 1,…,n, s ≠ i. c) x it > 0 or s i,t-1 > 0.
b) x jst = 0, for s = 1,…,n, s ≠ j. d) y jt > 0 or sjt > 0
Equilibrium property 9.3:
a) In the optimal solution pi jt(y jt) ≤ p it(x it) + $α  + τ ijt.
b) If in the solution pi jt(y jt) < p it(x it) + $α  + τ ijt, then x ijt = 0 or y jt = 0.
c) If in the optimal solution supplies in region i, transport between region i and j, and
demand in region j are positive, x it > 0, x ijt > 0, and y jt > 0, then the optimal prices
satsify necessarily pi jt(y jt) = p it(x it) + $α  + τ ijt.
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Equilibrium property 9.4:
a) If in the optimal solution $ $ $
,
δσ αE i tΠ + −11 6  < p it(x it) + k it, then s it = 0 or ri tk, +1  = 0.
b) If in the optimal solution $ $ $
,
δσ αE i tΠ + −11 6  ≥ p it(x it) + k it, storage in period t, and
planned sales in period t+1 are positive, s it > 0 or ri t
k
, +1  > 0 for all k ∈ {1,…,K}, then
an optimal solution exists satisfying q it = x it or ri t
k
, +1  = y i,t+1 for at least one k ∈
{1,…,K}. For $ $ $
,
δσ αE i tΠ + −11 6  = p it(x it) + k it, an optimal solution is not unique.
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10 Discussion of model results
Solving model (9.1), (9.2), (9.13), with demand functions given in (8.14) Section 8.1.3,
and supply functions determined by model (8.36) in Section 8.2.1, gives us results which
roughly reflect reality in Burkina Faso. We shortly discuss some of the main results.
Prices determined by the model are generally in line with the observed cereal prices given
in Table 8.3. The values of the consumer and producer prices do have more or less the
correct order and reflect seasonality - see Table 10.1. Price volatility is somewhat higher
than the average observed in Table 8.3. This was expected as we deal with a specific year
instead of the average for a number of years. The results show that prices are lowest in
the high production areas, from which many cereals are transported, and highest in the
low production and shortage areas.
Estimated transport flows are in line with the flows observed in reality. Most goods are
transported from the largest surplus zone Mouhoun towards the region Centre with the
capital Ouagadougou (see Figure 10.1). Also the shortage regions Sahel and Nord receive
a large part of the surplus from the regions Mouhoun and Est. Transport towards these
regions is highest during the lean period, from July to September, when farmers’ stocks
get depleted. In the period October – December the region Hauts Bassins has a relatively
low price and a large surplus that is transferred to Ouagadougou, where the prices are
relatively high. However, from april onwards, Hauts Bassins becomes a deficit region
that imports from the Mouhoun and the Centre-Ouest. It should be noted that many
cereals from the region Mouhoun, Sud Ouest and Comoe are transferred to the north and
center via traders based in Bobo Dioulasso, which is one of the most important
redistribution markets of the country. About 1/3 of the marketable surplus (see Table 8.1
and 9.8) is transported towards other regions.
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About 10% of the annual sales are stored by traders for at least one period. These cereals
are generally stored in the surplus zones. Traders are not involved in intertemporal
storage in the third and fourth period, since farmers prefer to execute this function
themselves. In the supply model producers expect to receive the highest prices by selling
during the lean season, and therefore preserve a large part of their annual sales for the last
period. This result, corresponds to observations made by Bassolet (2000) in Burkina
Faso, Lutz (1996) in Benin, and Armah (1989) in Ghana, that most goods are stored by
the producers and that only a few traders store cereals for a longer period.
Table 10.1: Results of the multi-period, spatial equilibrium model.
a. Consumer price levels and supply per person.
Consumer price level (FCFA/kg) Supply per person (kg per person)
Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sept Average Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sept Total
Centre 103 108 115 119 111 4.2 17.5 1.3 2.3 26.0
Centre Nord 107 110 116 123 114 2.6 4.5 5.8 2.5 16.0
Centre Ouest 102 102 108 121 108 6.6 9.4 16.3 7.1 41.0
Centre Sud 100 102 109 113 106 8.2 11.7 2.6 26.0 50.9
Sahel 109 110 123 131 118 6.0 6.0 1.5 1.2 15.0
Mouhoun 92 98 104 108 101 10.9 14.9 11.9 56.0 99.0
Est 100 99 106 119 106 6.9 9.9 20.7 3.9 43.0
Centre Est 106 104 111 114 109 5.8 8.3 1.8 18.4 36.0
Nord 101 106 113 118 109 2.2 5.8 4.4 1.1 14.0
Sud Ouest 100 98 101 134 108 8.8 12.7 20.8 10.5 55.0
Hauts Bassins 92 107 111 123 108 61.2 15.0 12.0 10.0 100.0
Comoe 97 102 114 118 108 10.1 13.8 13.9 15.1 55.2
Average price 101 104 111 120 109
Av. supply 11.1 10.8 9.4 12.8 44.1
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b. Cereal demand and consumption per rural and urban consumer


















Centre 3.2 2.9 4.1 6.5 122 31.4 29.7 29.9 29.7 121
Centre Nord 2.8 2.7 3.9 6.3 163 26.2 26.0 26.2 26.3 105
Centre Ouest 2.9 3.1 4.5 6.6 179 26.4 27.1 27.5 26.4 107
Centre Sud 3.1 3.1 4.6 6.4 238 27.2 27.4 27.9 26.1 109
Sahel 4.9 4.9 6.9 10.6 162 26.0 26.1 25.8 25.4 103
Mouhoun 3.5 4.8 7.4 8.7 208 27.4 27.5 27.9 28.3 111
Est 2.7 2.8 4.2 6.4 188 26.4 27.1 27.7 26.8 108
Centre Est 2.9 3.1 4.3 6.8 163 26.4 27.2 26.9 26.8 107
Nord 2.9 2.8 4.1 6.5 143 26.7 26.5 26.8 26.6 107
Sud Ouest 5.2 7.3 11.5 10.5 253 27.0 27.5 28.2 25.2 108
Hauts Bassins 3.8 4.4 6.8 7.3 206 32.9 29.8 30.7 29.2 123
Comoe 3.6 4.4 6.6 7.8 231 27.6 26.6 26.6 26.9 108
Average 3.5 3.9 5.8 7.5 182 27.6 27.4 27.7 27.0 110
Note: 1) Annual consumption equals production per rural inhabitant (Table 8.1) + annual demand – annual supply per
person (Table 9.8).
c. Transported and stored quantities.
Quantity transported (in 1000 tonnes) Quantity stored (in 1000 tonnes)
From To Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sept Total Oct-Dec Jan-Mar
Centre Ouest Centre 0 0 10.8 0 10.8 Centre 0 0
Centre Ouest Sud Ouest 0 0 0 0.46 0.46 Centre Nord 0 0
Centre Sud Centre 0 3.43 0.74 3.95 8.12 Centre Ouest 0.32 3.11
Centre Sud Centre Nord 0 0 0 5.33 5.33 Centre Sud 2.04 2.35
Mouhoun Centre 0 0.35 10.01 23.31 33.67 Sahel 0 0
Mouhoun Centre Ouest 0 0 0 3.08 3.08 Mouhoun 2.28 10.55
Mouhoun Sahel 0 0 0 7.93 7.93 Est 2.06 0
Mouhoun Nord 3.35 0 2.52 7.82 13.69 Centre Est 0 1
Mouhoun Hauts Bassins 0 0 0 8.83 8.83 Nord 0 0
Est Centre 0 7.48 6.28 0 13.76 Sud Ouest 1.36 3.35
Est Sahel 0 0 4.89 0 4.89 Hauts Bassins 2.41 0
Est Centre Est 0.61 0 3.66 0 4.26 Comoe 0 0
Centre Est Centre 0 0 0 1.73 1.73 Total 10.48 20.36




Sud Ouest Hauts Bassins 0 0.24 7.58 0 7.82
Hauts Bassins Centre 25.48 0 0 0 25.48
Hauts Bassins Centre Nord 1.96 0 0 0 1.96
Hauts Bassins Comoe 0.29 0 0 0 0.29
Comoe Hauts Bassins 0 0.62 0 0 0.62
Total 31.68 12.12 46.48 66.44 156.72
.
pi ≤ 106


















Figuur 10.1: Consumer prices and transport flows in Burkina Faso
Transport costs
The main objective of this paper was to analyse the direct impact of transport costs on
cereal trade. We recall that the total annual supply is given (see Chapter 9), however, the
distribution of supply over the year changes. The model shows that if transport costs
decrease, quarterly cereal prices in surplus regions increase, while cereal prices in deficit
regions decrease – see Table 10.2. The changes are, however, small. Halving the transport
costs causes average prices in the Sahel to decrease by 3.9% - see Table 10.2. This causes
an increased demand of 4.3% and an increased cereal consumption of only 0.7%.32
                                                      
32
 The impact on total consumption is smaller than the impact on market demand, as only a minor part of total
consumption is purchased on the market (see Table 10.1.b).
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Likewise, average prices in the region Centre, with the capital Ouagadougou, decrease
with 1.7%. As a consequence, urban consumption increases with 1.1%, and rural
consumption with only 0.2% (rural demand increases with 1.4%). A drawback from
decreased prices in a region, is that producers earn less from their supplies (since the
margin between producer and consumer prices is assumed to be fixed). Total transported
quantities increase with 7.8% if transport costs decrease with 50%. Stored quantities
decrease with 19%.
Looking at prices, it can be concluded that on average the price increase in the periods 2
and 3 is somewhat lower, whereas, the price increase in the last period is sharper than in
the situation with high transport costs. Consumers in the main deficit area Sahel and
producers in the main surplus area Mouhoun profit most from the reduction in transport
costs. For producers and consumers in other markets, the effects are less striking. These
results show that despite the large (50%) decrease in transport costs, the direct effects on
prices and consumption are small. This result contradicts popular claims that transport
costs are a major barrier for a more equal distribution of cereal production over the
country. The model indicates that the bad income position of the Sahelian population is
more likely to be responsible for the low demand. We note that the income position may
increase in the long run as a result of infrastructural improvements. It is, however, not our
intention to analyse the spin-off effects of infrastructural improvements on other sectors
in the economy. Our partial economic approach is not suitable to analyse these indirect
effects. We simply questioned the popular claim that high transport costs are a major
barrier for cereal marketing. The research results show that this claim needs to be
nuanced.
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Table 10.2 Percentage change with base results if transport costs decrease with 50%.
a. Changes in consumer price levels and quantity stored.
Changes in consumer price (%) Quantity stored (in 1000 tonnes)
Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sept average Oct-Dec Jan-Mar
Centre -1.8% -2.7% -3.2% 0.5% -1.7% Centre 0 0
Centre Nord -3.5% -2.9% -2.6% -1.1% -2.5% Centre Nord 0 0
Centre Ouest -1.9% -1.4% -1.0% -0.1% -1.1% Centre Ouest 0.24 2.97
Centre Sud -2.7% -0.8% 2.2% 2.4% 0.4% Centre Sud 1.94 0
Sahel -2.4% -2.6% -6.2% -4.2% -3.9% Sahel 0 0
Mouhoun 4.0% 4.0% 0.5% 4.9% 3.3% Mouhoun 0 8.95
Est 0.0% 0.6% -0.2% 0.5% 0.2% Est 2.66 0
Centre Est -2.9% -1.9% -1.8% 2.0% -1.1% Centre Est 0 0.6
Nord 0.2% 0.2% -2.6% 1.1% -0.3% Nord 0 0
Sud Ouest -0.8% -0.8% 0.8% -4.5% -1.6% Sud Ouest 1.34 1.7
Hauts Bassins 2.9% -4.2% -2.6% -0.9% -1.3% Hauts Bassins 1.28 0
Comoe 1.0% -2.8% -3.7% 0.0% -1.4% Comoe 0 0
average price -0.8% -1.3% -1.8% -0.1% -1.0% Total stored quantity 7.46 14.22
b. Change in cereal demand per rural and urban consumer
Change in demand per rural consumer (%) Change in demand per urban consumer (%)
Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sept total Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sept total
Centre 1.6% 2.8% 3.4% -0.5% 1.4% 1.1% 1.6% 2.0% -0.3% 1.1%
Centre Nord 3.6% 3.0% 2.8% 1.1% 2.3% 1.7% 1.4% 1.3% 0.5% 1.2%
Centre Ouest 2.1% 1.3% 1.1% 0.2% 0.9% 0.9% 0.7% 0.5% 0.0% 0.5%
Centre Sud 2.6% 1.0% -2.2% -2.3% -0.8% 1.4% 0.4% -1.1% -1.1% -0.1%
Sahel 2.5% 2.6% 6.6% 4.4% 4.3% 1.1% 1.2% 3.0% 2.0% 1.8%
Mouhoun -4.0% -4.0% -0.5% -4.6% -3.1% -1.9% -1.9% -0.3% -2.4% -1.6%
Est 0.0% -0.4% 0.2% -0.5% -0.2% 0.0% -0.3% 0.1% -0.2% -0.1%
Centre Est 3.1% 1.9% 1.9% -1.9% 0.5% 1.4% 1.0% 0.9% -1.0% 0.6%
Nord 0.0% -0.4% 2.7% -1.1% 0.2% -0.1% -0.1% 1.3% -0.5% 0.1%
Sud Ouest 0.8% 0.8% -0.8% 4.7% 1.4% 0.4% 0.4% -0.4% 2.1% 0.6%
Hauts Bassins -2.9% 4.4% 2.8% 1.0% 1.5% -1.8% 2.7% 1.7% 0.5% 0.7%
Comoe -1.1% 3.0% 3.9% 0.0% 1.5% -0.5% 1.3% 1.8% 0.0% 0.7%
Average demand 0.6% 1.0% 1.7% 0.3% 0.9% 0.3% 0.7% 0.9% 0.0% 0.5%
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c. Transported quantities.


















Cen.Ouest Centre 13.91 13.91 Cen. Est Centre 0.32 2.01 2.34
Cen. Sud Centre 5.67 6.33 12 Cen. Est Est 3.82 3.82
Cen. Sud Cen. Nord 1.65 1.65 Sud Ouest Centre 0.2 0.2
Cen. Sud Cen. Est 0.05 0.05 Sud Ouest H. Bass 1.83 7.91 9.74
Mouhoun Centre 8.37 20.55 28.92 Sud Ouest Comoe 0.91 0.91
Mouhoun Cen.Ouest 5.85 5.85 H. Bass Centre 25.83 25.83
Mouhoun Sahel 2.5 8.3 10.8 H. Bass Cen.Nord 2.08 2.08
Mouhoun Nord 3.34 2.65 7.74 13.73 H. Bass Sahel 0.32 0.32
Mouhoun Sud Ouest 0.14 0.14 H. Bass Cen. Est 0.65 0.65
Mouhoun H. Bassins 8.93 8.93 H. Bass Comoe 0.27 0.27
Est Centre 8.09 3.7 11.79 Comoe S. Ouest 3.51 3.51
Est Cen. Nord 4.08 4.08 Comoe H. Bass 0.55 0.55
Est Sahel 2.78 2.78 Total 35.04 16.47 48.65 68.83 168.99




1% < ∆pi < 2%
-1% < ∆pi <1%


















Figure 10.2: Changes in cereal prices if transport costs decrease with 50%.
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Storage costs
The influence of storage costs on prices, supply, and demand is also weak. If storage
costs decrease with 50%, prices increase on average with 2.2% (see Table 10.3). Prices in
the first three periods increase on average, whereas prices in the fourth period remain the
same in most regions, but decrease sharply in the regions Centre Ouest and Sud Ouest.
This price increase is mainly due to changes in the producers’ supply schedule. The
general price increase is caused by the ‘fixed’ price expectations. Price expectations for
period t+1 do not depend on prices in period t. So, if storage costs decrease but price
expectations remain the same, traders expect to make higher profits from storage.
Consequently, their demand increases, causing producer prices (and consequently also
consumer prices) to increase. Stored quantities in the first and second period increase
sharply (respectively with 63% and 29%). Even when storage costs decrease with 50%,
traders do not store in the third and fourth period. Storage is expected not to be profitable
for traders, while farmers expect to earn high profits if they sell in the lean season.
Consumer demand and transported quantities decrease in this case due to the increased
prices.
If consumer price expectations for the next period do depend on the current producer
price, it is not clear whether consumer and producer prices will increase or decrease. But
it can be expected that average changes will be smaller than in the current situation.
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Table 10.3 Percentage change with base results if storage costs decrease with 50%.
a. Changes in consumer price levels and quantity stored.
Changes in consumer price (%) Quantity stored (in 1000 tonnes)
Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sept average Oct-Dec Jan-Mar
Centre 3.4% 5.8% 4.0% 0.0% 3.2% Centre 0 0
Centre Nord 1.5% 1.3% 6.1% 0.0% 2.2% Centre Nord 0 0
Centre Ouest 3.7% 5.4% 4.3% -7.6% 1.1% Centre Ouest 0.47 3.48
Centre Sud 5.9% 6.1% 4.3% 0.0% 4.0% Centre Sud 2.14 2.39
Sahel 1.5% 3.2% 3.8% 0.0% 2.1% Sahel 2.64 0.17
Mouhoun 3.7% 6.4% 4.4% 0.0% 3.5% Mouhoun 2.6 9.87
Est 4.0% 6.3% 4.4% 0.0% 3.5% Est 2.79 5.08
Centre Est 3.7% 5.2% 4.2% 0.0% 3.2% Centre Est 0 0.8
Nord 3.4% 2.9% 4.1% 0.0% 2.5% Nord 0 0
Sud Ouest 3.5% 6.3% 4.7% -13.0% -0.7% Sud Ouest 1.47 3.93
Hauts Bassins 3.8% -3.7% 4.3% 0.0% 1.0% Hauts Bassins 4.97 0
Comoe 3.6% -1.9% -0.3% 0.0% 0.3% Comoe 0 0.57
average price 3.4% 3.5% 4.0% -1.8% 2.2% Total stored quantity 17.09 26.3
b. Change in cereal demand per rural and urban consumer
Change in demand per rural consumer (%) Change in demand per urban consumer (%)
Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sept total Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sept total
Centre -3.5% -5.2% -3.7% 0.0% -2.5% -2.0% -3.3% -2.3% 0.0% -1.9%
Centre Nord -1.4% -1.1% -5.9% 0.0% -1.9% -0.7% -0.6% -2.7% 0.0% -1.0%
Centre Ouest -3.4% -5.2% -4.2% 8.4% 0.6% -1.6% -2.5% -2.0% 3.9% -0.6%
Centre Sud -5.8% -5.8% -4.1% 0.0% -3.1% -2.7% -2.8% -2.0% 0.0% -1.9%
Sahel -1.4% -3.0% -3.6% 0.0% -1.8% -0.7% -1.4% -1.7% 0.0% -1.0%
Mouhoun -3.7% -6.1% -4.2% 0.0% -3.0% -1.7% -3.0% -2.1% 0.0% -1.7%
Est -4.0% -6.0% -4.0% 0.0% -2.8% -1.8% -2.9% -2.1% 0.0% -1.7%
Centre Est -3.5% -5.2% -3.9% 0.0% -2.5% -1.6% -2.4% -1.9% 0.0% -1.5%
Nord -3.2% -2.8% -3.9% 0.0% -2.0% -1.5% -1.3% -1.9% 0.0% -1.2%
Sud Ouest -3.5% -6.0% -4.4% 14.9% 1.2% -1.6% -2.9% -2.2% 6.6% -0.2%
Hauts Bassins -3.7% 3.7% -4.1% 0.0% -1.1% -2.3% 2.3% -2.6% 0.0% -0.7%
Comoe -3.6% 2.1% 0.3% 0.0% -0.1% -1.7% 0.9% 0.1% 0.0% -0.2%
Average demand -3.5% -3.4% -3.8% 2.4% -1.4% -1.7% -1.6% -2.0% 0.9% -1.1%
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c. Transported quantities.


















Cen.Ouest Centre 4.65 0.87 5.52 Est Sahel 4.52 4.52
Cen.Ouest Cen. Nord 2.46 2.46 Est Cen. Est 3.67 3.67
Cen. Sud Centre 3.6 0.88 4.48 Cen. Est Centre 0.37 1.73 2.1
Cen. Sud Cen. Nord 4.05 4.05 Cen. Est Est 3.98 3.98
Mouhoun Centre 1.75 10.08 26.4 38.23 Sud Ouest H. Bass 7.08 7.08
Mouhoun Sahel 7.93 7.93 H. Bass Centre 24.85 1.24 26.09
Mouhoun Nord 3.22 2.21 7.82 13.25 H. Bass Cen. Est 0.49 0.49
Mouhoun H.Bassins 8.83 8.83 H. Bass Comoe 0.22 0.22
Est Centre 3.33 11.48 14.8 Total 28.77 10.29 44.86 64.06 147.99
Est Cen. Nord 0.3 0.3 %decrease 9.2% 15.1% 3.5% 3.6% 5.6%
Sensitivity analysis
A brief sensitivity analysis shows that price expectations, total production, and consumer
income are the parameters having the largest influence on the solutions. Changes in their
values have large consequences. The other model parameters have only a marginal
influence on the model results.
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11 Final discussion
In this report we pursued three objectives. The first was to develop a model to analyse
cereal arbitrage in space and time. The second was to to analyse the interaction between
the various actors on the cereal market in Burkina Faso. The third was to apply this model
to analyse the direct impact of transport and storage costs on the distribution of cereals
and on cereal prices in different regions of Burkina Faso. Much emphasis was put on
adapting standard micro-economic equilibrium theory to the specific situation of cereal
trade in West Africa. The two most challenging issues of the approach were 1) to model
behaviour of burkinabP farmers and traders, and 2) to take into account the uncertain
character of cereal prices.
What have we learned from this modelling approach? Firstly, by developing step by step
the equilibrium models we identified the limits and possibilities of spatial equilibrium
theory. By simply adopting the properties of a Spatial Price Equilibrium as discussed in
the introduction of Chapter 5, the existence of price uncertainty is neglected, as well as
other market situations deviating from a ‘perfect market’. By introducing explicitly trader
behaviour, the influence of stochastic future prices can be analysed. The model elaborated
in Chapter 5 to 7, is also useful to analyse other market imperfections. For example, a
lack of credit facilities, and the existence of oligopolistic market power.
Secondly, in the Chapters 5 to 7, we discussed the strategies of the market actors involved
in cereal trade, and developed a stochastic, multi-period, spatial equilibrium model. We
recall that we proved that the welfare optimizing results of the equilibrium model are in
line with the optimal strategies of the actors operating on the cereal market: producers,
traders and consumers. We have shown that prices on a market are formed by the joint
action of the market actors, who follow each their individual optimal strategy. This means
that actors do not trade if they lose money (or expect to lose, in the case of storage). As
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long as each actor follows this principle (and market entry of new actors are free and
capital availability is not constraining), equilibrium prices will be realized satisfying the
equilibrium conditions discussed above. This explanation is more comprehensible and
satisfactory, then the often cited ‘invisible hand’, directing the market towards a price
level for which supply and demand are in equilibrium. The inclusion of trader behaviour
in the model makes the functioning of the ‘invisible hand’ explicit.
Thirdly, as for the practical results of the models, the results demonstrated that the
influence of transport and storage costs on cereal trade are limited. The direct effects of
lower transport costs on the food situation of the poorer, rural regions are small.
Furthermore, it was confirmed that long term storage is more often a task for producers
than for traders. It can not be said whether producers or consumers do profit the most
from decreasing transport or storage costs. The deficit regions do profit from decreased
transport costs, however, the influence on cereal consumption is only marginal.
Consumer income, total annual production, and price expectations are the factors which
determine the equilibrium prices and the timing of supplies and demand. The results of
the model provide useful elements for the discussions on improving the functioning of the
cereal market in Burkina Faso.
Although the use of the model can be criticised because of unrealistic assumptions,
unreliable estimates, and incomplete treatment of actors’ strategies, it is still a useful tool
to simulate the effects of market liberalization policies and agricultural development. The
subject of market functioning is very complex, as many factors are interrelated: price
formation results from the joint action of all market actors. With a descriptive or
statistical analysis these factors can not be analysed in their coherence. Furthermore, the
modelling approach forces the researcher to structure the descriptive analysis. For
example, the choice of a cereal demand function of a certain type, indicates which
parameters have to be estimated, and accordingly the elements which have to analysed. A
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descriptive analysis on its turn identifies the factors which are important to include in the
model. A descriptive analysis of traders’ strategies in Burkina Faso, for example,
revealed that information on present and future prices are factors constraining traders’
strategies. Therefore, we introduced stochastic prices in our equilibrium models. Another
example concerns the timing of cereal sales and purchases within a year, which is
important for poor households’ survival strategies. A review of many surveys on farmers’
strategies revealed that a widespread belief, that most farmers sell their largest quantity in
the months following the harvest, had to be nuanced. This stressed once more the
importance of including the timing of sales and purchases in the equilibrium models.
Summarizing, a modelling approach ‘can structure the discussions and the understanding
of the issues considerably’ (Schweigman, 1994).
The model results nuanced a widespread belief that transport costs are a major barrier for
cereal trade. We do not want to claim that transport costs are not important for the
development of the agricultural sector, but the direct impact of lower transport costs, as
the direct impact of other price measures, are likely to be small. The reasons are clear.
Cereal demand elasticities are low, and annual cereal supply is unlikely to change a lot if
cereal prices change. Probably, a changed price will not rigourously alter the demand and
supply behaviour of consumers and producers. Whether demand is price inelastic because
other food commodities are hardly available on the market, or whether other food
commodities are not available because cereal demand is inelastic, is another question,
which is not addressed in this research. Similarly, whether annual cereal supply is price
inelastic because producers do not sell their produce on the market because producer
prices are considered to be too low, or because farmers are not able to produce more with
the limited resources available, is a question which is not addressed here. The results
subscribe to the more and more common view that improving single market constraining
elements (like e.g. transport prices) is fruitless if not more complementary measures, or
comprehensive packages of policy measures, are implemented to relax constraining
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elements of food markets and food production (deJanvry et al., 1997; Thorbecke, 2000).
For example, the impact of an improved infrastructure will be larger, if this policy is
complemented by proper agricultural research and extension services. The models set up





• Bassolet, B., 1999. “Le marchJ de cJrJales au Burkina Faso”. Paper presented at
the SOM/CDS Seminar on food  markets in Burkina Faso, April 16, 1999.
University of Groningen.
• Bassolet, B., 2000. “LibJralisation du marchJ cJrJalier au Burkina Faso: une
analyse NJo-institutionelle de son organisation et de son efficacitJ temporelle et
spatiale”. Ph.D. Thesis. Centre for Development Studies, University of
Groningen, the Netherlands.
• Bazaraa, M.S., Sherali, H.D., Shetty C.M., 1993. “Nonlinear Programming;
Theory and Algorithms”. sec.ed., Wiley.
• Broekhuyse, J.T., 1983. “Rural Mossi Economie, Deel I”. KIT, Amsterdam, the
Netherlands
• Broekhuyse, J.T., 1988. “De la survivance B la suffisance; Jtude des problPmes et
des perspectives du dJveloppement aboutissant B une idJologie paysanne au
Plateau Nord des Mossi”. Projet CEDRES/AGRISK, UniversitJ de
Ouagadougou, University of Groningen, the Netherlands.
• Broekhuyse, J.T., 1998. “Monografie van de Mossi: Noordelijk Plateau –
Sanmatenga, Burkina Faso”. KIT, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
• Danida, 1999. “Burkina Faso: Plan d’actions sur les cJrJales (mil, sorgho, maVs)
2000-2010”. MinistPre des Affaires EtrangPres du Danemark, Danemark.
• Deaton, A., Muellbauer, J., 1980. “An Almost Ideal Demand System”. American
Economic Review, No.70:3: p. 312-326.
• Dreze, J., Sen, A., 1989. “Hunger and Public Action”. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Egg, J., Gabas, J.J., Ki-Zerbo, B., Ancey, V., 1997. “La hausse des prix des
cJrJales au Burkina Faso dans le contexte regional: ampleur et analyse” (version
provisoire). Club du Sahel/CILSS, RJunion du RJseau de PrJvention des Crises
Alimentaires au Sahel, 27-28 Nov. 1997. OCDE, Paris.
• Ellis, F., 1992. “Agricultureal Policies in Developing Countries”. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
218
• Ellis, F., 1993. “Peasant economics: farm households and agrarian development”.
Wye Studies in Agricultural and rural development. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
• Ellsworth, L, Shapiro, K., 1989. “Seasonality in Burkina Faso grain marketing:
Farmer strategies and government policy”. In: Sahn, E. (Ed.). “Seasonal
variability in Third World Agriculture: the consequences for food security”.
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, USA.
• Florian, M., Los, M., 1982. “A new look at spatial price equilibrium models”.
Regional Science and Urban Economics, No. 12, p. 579-597.
• Güvenen, O., Labys, W., Lesourd, J.B. (Eds.), 1990. “International commodity
market models : advances in methodology and applications”. International studies
in economic modelling, No. 7. Chapman and Hall, London, UK.
• Heijman, W.J.M., Hiel, R.T.R., Kroes, E.P., Van den Noort, P.C., Silvis, H.J.,
Slangen, L.H.G., 1991. “Leerboek algmene agrarische economie”. Stenfert
Kroese, Leiden, The Netherlands.
• Hoftijzer, M., 1998. “Seizoensbewegingen van de graanprijzen in Burkina Faso”.
M.Sc. Thesis University of Groningen, the Netherlands.
• INSD, 1995a. “Analyse des resultats de l’enquete dJmographique 1991”.
Direction de la DJmographie, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
• INSD, 1995b. “Annuaire statistique du Burkina Faso: 1994”. Direction des
Statistiques Generales, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
• INSD, 1996a. “Le profil de pauvretJ au Burkina Faso; premiPre Jdition; Etude
Statistique Nationale”. Programme “Dimensions Sociales de l’Ajustement”,
MinistPre de l’Economie des Finances et du Plan, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
• INSD, 1996b. “Analyse des rJsultats de l’enquLte prioritaire sur les conditions de
vie des mJnages”. MinistPre de l’Economie des Finances et du Plan, Direction
des Statistiques Generales, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
• INSD, 1998. “Population rJsidente des dJpartements, communes,
arrondissements et provinces. RJcensement gJneral de la population et de
l'habitation du Burkina Faso (du 10 au 20 DJcembre 1996). RJsultats Definitifs”.
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
219
• Janvry, A. de, Fafchamps, M., Sadoulet, E., 1991. “Peasant Household Behaviour
with Missing Markets: some paradoxes explained”. The Economic Journal, Vol
101, pp 1400-1417.
• Judge, G.G. Takayama, T., 1973. “Studies in economic planning over space and
time”. Contributions to Economic Analysis, No. 82, North-Holland Publishing
Company, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
• Labys, W.C., Takayama, T., Uri, N.D. (Eds.), 1989. “Quantitative methods for
market-oriented economic analysis over space and time”. Aldershot, Avebury,
UK.
• LaclavPre, G., 1993. “Atlas du Burkina Faso”. Les Jditions j.a., Paris, France.
• Lang, M.G., 1985. “Crop and livestock marketing patterns in Burkina Faso”.
• Lang, M.G., Cantrell, Cantrell, R.P., Sanders, J.H., 1983. “Identifying farm level
constraints and evaluating new technology in Uper Volta”. Paper presented at the
Farming Systems Research symposium, Kansas State University,
SAFGRAD/FSU, Kansas, USA.
• Lutz, C., Bassolet, B., 1999. franse artikel
• Maatman, A., Schweigman, C., Ruijs, A., 1996. “A study of farming systems on
the Central Plateau in Burkina Faso: application of linear programming; Volume
2”. RJseau SADAOC. University of Groningen, University of Ouagadougou,
INERA. Groningen, the Netherlands.
• Maatman, A., 2000. “Si le fleuve se tord, que le crocodille se torde; une analyse
des systPmes agraires de la rJgion Nord-Ouest du Burkina Faso  B l’aide des
modPles de programmation linJaire”. Ph.D. Thesis, Centre for Development
Studies, University of Groningen, the Netherlands.
• Martin, L.J., 1981. “Quadratic single and multi-commodity models of spatial
equilibrium: a simplified exposition”. Canadian Journal of Agricultural
Economics, Vol. 29, No. 1, p. 21 – 48.
• McCorkle, C.M., 1987. “FiertJ, prJfJrence et pratique: dJcisions des cultivateurs
concernant l’Jcoulement des cJrJales dans une communautJ BurkinabJ”. La
Dynamique de la Commercialisation des CJrJales au Burkina Faso, Tome III,
220
Document de travail no. 1. CRED, University of Michigan, IAP, University of
Wisconsin.
• Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources, 1984-1996. “Resultats de
l’enquPte permanente agricole”, Annee 1984; Annee 1985; Annee 1986; Annee
1987; Annee 1988; Annee 1989; Campagne 1990-1991; Campagne 1991-1992;
Campagne 1992-1993; Campagne 1993-1994; Campagne 1994-1995; Campagne
1995-1996. Direction des Statistiques Agro-Pastorales, Burkina Faso.
• Nicholson, W., 1995. “Microeconomic theory: basic principles and extensions”.
Sixth edition. The Dryden Press, Fort Worth.
• Pardy, C.R., 1987. “Comportement relatif aux ventes de cJrJales dans les familles
d’exploitations de quatre villages du Burkina Faso”. La Dynamique de la
Commercialisation des cJrJales au Burkina Faso. Tome III, Doc. de travail 4.
CRED, University of Michigan, IAP, University of Wisconsin.
• Pieroni, O., 1990. “Le paysan, le sorgho et l’argent”. CILSS, Assistence
Technique, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
• Ravallion, M., 1987. “Markets and Famines”. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Reardon, T., Delgado, C., Matlon P., 1987. “Farmer marketing behaviour and the
composition of cereals consumption in Burkina Faso”. Paper presented for the
IFPRI/ISRA conference: “Dynamics of cereals consumption and production
patterns in West Africa”. Dakar, Senegal.
• Reardon, T., Matlon, P., Delgado, C., 1988a. “Coping with household level food
insecurity in drought-affected areas of Burkina Faso”. World Development, vol.
16, no. 9, p. 1065-1074.
• Reardon, T., Thiombiano, T., Delgado, C., 1988b. “La substitution des cJrJales
locales par les cJrJales importJes: la consommation alimentaire des mJnages B
Ouagadougou Burkina Faso”. CEDRES-Etudes, No 2, Juin 1988. UniversitJ de
Ouagadougou, IFPRI, CEDRES, Burkina Faso.
• Reardon, T., Matlon, P., 1989. “Seasonal food insecurity and vulnerability in
drought- affected regions of Burkina Faso”. In: Sahn D.E. (ed.), “Seasonal
variability in Third World agriculture: the consequences for food security”. The
Johns Hopkins University Press.
221
• Reardon, T., Delgado, C., Matlon, P., 1992. “Determinants and Effects of Income
Diversification Amongst Farm Households in Burkina Faso”. Journal of
Development Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, pp 264-296.
• Roehner, B.M., 1995. “Theory of markets; Trade and space-time patterns of price
fluctuations. A study in analytical economics”. Springer-Verlag, Berlin,
Germany.
• Roth, M., 1986. “Economic evaluation of agricultural policy in Burkina Faso: a
sectoral modelling approach”. Ph.D. Thesis, Purdue University, USA.
• Sadoulet, E., De Janvry, A., 1995. “Quantitative development policy analysis”.
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
• Sahn, D.E., Dorosh, P., Younger, S., 1997. ‘Structural Adjustment Reconsidered:
Economic policy and poverty in Africa”. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
and New York.
• Samuelson, P.A., 1952. “Spatial price Equilibrium and Linear Programming”,
American Economic Review, 42; 283-303.
• Saul, M., 1987. “La dynamique de la commercialisation des cJrJales au Burkina
Faso”. University of Michigan and University of Wisconsin, USA.
• Schweigman, C., 1994. “Mathematical modelling and development related
research”. In; Harts-Broekhuis, A., Verkoren, O.. “No easy way out: essays on
third world development in honour of Jan Hinderink”. Nederlandse Geografische
Studies, No. 186, p. 114-119.
• Sedes Cedrat SA et Gopa (1990). “Plan cJrJalier du Burkina Faso, tome 1:
SynthPse”. MinistPre de l’Jlevage et de l’agriculture, CILLS, Ouagadougou,
Burkina Faso.
• Sherman, J.R., Shapiro, K.H., Gilbert, E., 1987. “An economic analysis of grain
marketing”. The Dynamics of Grain Marketing in Burkina Faso, Volume I.
CRED, University of Michigan, IAP, University of Wisconsin.
• SirpJ, G., 2000. “Transport routier et Jcoulement des produits agricoles: une
analyse Jconomique de l’influence des transports sur les mouvements
interrJgionaux de cJrJales au Burkina Faso”. FacultJ des Sciences Economiques,
UniversitJ de Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
222
• Stiglitz, J.E., 1994. “Whither socialism?”. MIT Press, Massachusetts, USA.
• Szarleta, E.J., 1987. “ExcJdents commerciaux au Burkina Faso: une Jtude des
schJmas d’Jcoulement des cJrJales”. La Dynamique de la Commercialisation des
CJrJales au Burkina Faso, Tome III, Document de travail no. 3. CRED,
University of Michigan, IAP, University of Wisconsin.
• Takayama, A., 1974. “Mathematical Economics”, Dryden.
• Takayama, T., Judge, G.G., 1971. “Spatial and Temporal Price and Allocation
Models”. Contributions to Economic Analysis, No. 73. North-Holland Publishing
Company, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
• Theil, H., 1980. ‘The system-wide approach to microeconomics’. University of
Chicago Press.
• Thiombiano, T., Soulama, S., Wetta, C., 19??. “SystPmes alimentaires en zones
rurales B dJficits cJrJaliers: le cas des provinces du Bam, du Sanmatenga et du
Yatenga. Phase III”. CEDRES, UNRISD.
• Thiombiano, T., Soulama, S., Wetta, C., 1988. “SystPmes alimentaires du
Burkina Faso”. CEDRES-Etudes, No. 1, RJsultats de Recherche CEDRES,
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
• Thorbecke,  E., 2000. “Agricultural markets beyond liberalization: the role of the
state”. In Tilburg, A. van, H.A.J. Moll, A. Kuyvenhoven. “Agricultural markets
beyond liberalization”. Kluwer Academic Press.
• Union EuropJenne, 1999. “Les flux cJrJaliers, les stocks commerHants et la
stratJgie des commerHants de cJrJales au Burkina Faso”. DJlJgation de la
Commision EuropJenne au Burkina Faso, MinistPre de l’Economie et des
Finances, MinstPre de l’Agriculture. 7 ACP BK 054.
• Van den Bergh, J.C.J.M., Nijkamp, P., Rietveld, P. (Eds.), 1995. “Recent
advances in spatial equilibrium modelling: methodology and applications”.
Springer, Berlin, Germany.
• Van den Bergh, J.C.J.M., Nijkamp, P, Rietveld, P., 1995b. Spatial Equilibrium
models: A survey with special emphasis on transportation”. In: Van den Bergh,
J.C.J.M., Nijkamp, P., Rietveld, P. (Eds.), 1995. Chapter 2.
223
• Varian, H.R., 1992. “Microeconomic analysis”. Third edition.W.W. Norton &
Company, New York..
• Vogelzang, J., 1996. “Transports et Jchanges cJrJaliers entre rJgions dJficitaires
et rJgions excJdentaires du Burkina Faso: application de la programmation
linJaire”. M.Sc. thesis, University of Groningen, the Netherlands.
• Yonli, E.P., 1997. “StratJgies paysannes en matiPre de sJcuritJ alimentaire et de
commercialisation cJrJaliPre: le r^le des banques de cJrJales dans le Nord du
Plateau Central du Burkina Faso”. Ph.D. Thesis, Centre for Development Studies,
University of Groningen, the Netherlands.
• Zeller, M, Schrieder, G., Braun, J. von, Heidhuess, F., 1997. ”Rural Finance for
Food Security for the Poor. Implications for research and policy”. Food Policy
Review No. 4, IFPRI, Washington.
224
225
Appendix 1: Proofs of Properties and Theorems in the Chapters 5, 6 and 7
• Properties of Section 5.1:
Trader property 5.1:  For each region i ∈ {1,...,n}:
a) If pi i < p i, then any optimal solution of (5.12) satisfies: q i = 0 or r i = 0.
b) If pi i ≥ p i, then an optimal solution of (5.12) exists which satisfies the condition q i
= x i or r i = y i. Nota bene: for pi i > p i, any optimal solution of (5.12) has to satisfy this
condition; for pi i = p i, other optimal solutions may exist not satisfying this condition.
Proof:
a) Let pi i < p i. If in the optimal solution of (5.12) r i > 0 and q i > 0, then necessarily,
see (5.13), pi i ≥ λ i and λ i ≥ p i, which contradicts pi i < p i. So necessarily r i = 0 or q i =
0.
b) An optimal solution of the linear programming model (5.12) exists, since its
feasible region is bounded. We make a distinction between pi i > p i and pi i = p i.
* Let pi i > p i. If in the optimal solution q i < x i and r i < y i, then necessarily, see (5.13),
p i ≥ λ i and λ i ≥ pi i, which contradicts pi i > p i. So necessarily, q i = x i or r i = y i.
* Let pi i = p i. Consider an optimal solution q s, r s, q sj, s ≠ j, s,j = 1,…,n, in which
optimal purchases, sales and transports in region i, satisfy q i < x i and r i < y i. Call ∆ i =
min(x i-q i; yi-r i). The solution ′ ′ ′q r qs s sj, , , defined by ′qi = q i + ∆ i, ′ri = r i + ∆ i, ′qij = q ij,
′qs = q s, ′rs = r s, and ′qsj = q sj, for s≠j, is optimal as well, as can be seen easily by
inspecting (5.12). Moreover, ′qi = x i or ′ri = y i.
Trader property 5.2: Let q i, r j, q ij, j ≠ i, i,j = 1,…,n, be an optimal solution of (5.12).
Let a trader transport from a region i to a region  j, so q ij > 0, for i,j ∈ (1,…,n}, i ≠ j,
then:
a) no goods are transported from a region s = 1,…,n, s ≠ i, to region i, q si = 0
b) no goods are transported from region j to a region s = 1,…,n, s ≠ j, q js = 0.
c) purchases in region i are positive, q i > 0
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d) sales in region j are positive, r j > 0.
Proof:
a) Let q ij > 0. Suppose that q si > 0. In that case, see (5.13), λ j = λ i + τ ij and λ i = λ s +
τ si. This implies that λ j = λ s + τ si + τ ij. Due to (5.13) we know that λ j ≤ λ s + τ sj. It
would follow that τ sj ≥ λ j - λ s = τ si + τ ij. This is in contradiction with the analogue of
property (5.11), which says that τ sj < τ si + τ ij. So, necessarily q si = 0.
b) The proof of the second property is similar to the proof under a).
c) If q ij > 0, then making use of a), the equilibrium condition (5.7) leads to a
contradiction if q i = 0. Consequently, q i > 0.
d) In a similar way it can be shown that necessarily r j > 0, if q ij > 0.
Trader property 5.3: For the regions i and j, i,j ∈ {1,...,n}, i ≠ j:
a) If pi j < p i + τ ij, then any optimal solution of (5.12) satisfies q ij = 0.
b) If pi j ≥ p i + τ ij and q ij > 0, then an optimal solution of (5.12) exists satisfying q i = x i
or r j = y j; for pi j = p i + τ ij and q ij > 0 an optimal solution of (5.12) is not necessarily
unique.
Proof:
a) Let pi j < p i + τ ij. If q ij > 0, then necessarily, see Trader property 5.2, q i > 0 and r j >
0. As a consequence, see (5.13), pi j ≥ λ j, λ j = λ i + τ ij, and λ i ≥ p i, which contradicts pi j
< p i + τ ij. So necessarily, q ij = 0.
b) An optimal solution of the linear programming model (5.12) exists, since its
feasible region is bounded. We make a distinction between pi j > p i + τ ij and pi j = p i +
τ ij:
* Let pi j > p i + τ ij and q ij > 0. According to (5.13) λ j = λ i + τ ij. If q i < x i and r j < y j,
then necessarily, see (5.13), pi j ≤ λ j  and λ i ≤ p i, which contradicts pi j > p i + τ ij. So
necessarily, q i = x i or r j = y j.
* Let pi j = p i + τ ij and q ij > 0. Consider the optimal solution q s, r s, q sv, s,v = 1,…,n, s ≠
v, and assume that for region i and j: q i < x i and r j < y j. Call ∆ ij = min(x i-q i; y j-r j).
227
The solution ′ ′ ′q r qs s sv, ,  defined by ′qi = q i + ∆ ij, rj = r j + ∆ ij, ′qij = q ij + ∆ ij, ′qs = q s,
′rv = r v, ′qsv = q sv, for s≠i, v≠j, is optimal as well, as can be seen easily by inspecting
(5.12). Moreover, ′qi = x i or rj = y j.
• Properties and Theorem of Section 5.2:
Equilibrium property 5.1:  For region i ∈ {1,…,n}:
a) In the optimal solution of (5.19), pi i ( y i ) ≤ p i (xi ) .
b) If in the optimal solution of (5.19), pi i(y i) < p i(x i), then x i = 0 or y i = 0.
c) If in the optimal solution of (5.19), supply and demand in region i are both positive,
so x i > 0 and y i > 0, then necessarily p i(x i) = pi i(y i).
Proof:
a) Since the solution of (5.19) has to satisfy pi i(y i) ≤ λ i and λ i ≤ p i(x i), see (5.21) –
(5.24), it is only possible that pi i(y i) ≤ p i(x i).
b) Using (5.21) and (5.23), the proof is similar to the proof of Trader property 5.1 a).
c) This follows from a) and b).
Equilibrium property 5.2: In the optimal solution of (5.19), let transport take place
from market i to market j, i.e. x ij > 0, with i, j ∈ {1,2, ...,n}, j ≠ i,, then:
a) no cereals are transferred from other regions into market i, i.e. xsi = 0, for all s ≠ i
b) no cereals are transported from market j to other regions, i.e. x js = 0, for all s ≠ j
c) the producer supply x i in region i satisfies x i > 0,
d) the consumer demand y j in region j satisfies y j > 0,
Proof:
The proof is similar to the proof of Trader property 5.2.
Equilibrium property 5.3: For region i and j, i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j:
a) In the optimal solution of (5.19), pi j(y j) ≤ p i(x i) + τ ij.
b) If in the optimal solution of (5.19), pi j(y j) < p i(x i) + τ ij, then x ij = 0.
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c) If in the optimal solution of (5.19), transport between region i and j is positive, x ij >
0, then the optimal prices satisfy necessarily pi j(y j) = p i(x i) + τ ij.
Proof:
a) Since the solution of (5.19) always has to satisfy pi j(y j) ≤ λ j, λ j ≤ λ i + τ ij and λ i ≤
p i(x i), see (5.21) – (5.26), it is only possible that pi j(y j) ≤ p i(x i) + τ ij.
b) Using (5.21), (5.23) and (5.25), the proof is similar to the proof of Trader property
5.3 a).
c)  This follows from a) and b).
Theorem 5.1:
Let x i, y i, x ij, i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, be an optimal solution of the equilibrium model
(5.19). Let pi i = pi i(y i) , p i = p i(x i). The solution:
(5.27) q i = x i ;  r i = y i  ;  q ij = x ij for i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j
is an optimal solution of trader decision problem (5.12). The value of the objective
function is equal to 0, meaning that the trader makes no profits or losses.
Proof:
The proof will consist of three parts: a) (5.27) is a feasible solution of (5.12), b) the
solution (5.27) results in a value of the objective function of (5.12) which is equal to
0; c) the solution (5.27) is an optimal solution of (5.12).
a) See (5.27), (5.16), (5.7), and (5.12).
b) Due to (5.21) – (5.26), pi i ⋅yi  = λ i ⋅yi , p i ⋅x i  = λ i ⋅x i , and τ ij⋅x ij =  (λ j  -  λ i )⋅x ij,
with λ i the optimal value of the Lagrange multiplier of the equilibrium condition
in model (5.16) – (5.21). So,  for the solution (5.27) the objective function of
model (5.12) can be written as follows:
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due to the equilibrium condition (5.7).
c) Consider any feasible solution q i, r i, q ij of (5.12), and market prices pi i = pi i(y i)
and pi = p i(x i), with y i and x i the optimal demanded and supplied quantities of
equilibrium model (5.19), (5.16), and (5.17). Due to Equilibrium properties 5.1 –
5.3 pi i ≤ λ i ≤ p i and pi j ≤ λ j ≤ λ i + τ ij ≤ p i + τ ij, for all i,j = 1,…,n, i≠ j, with λ i the
Lagrange multiplier of the equilibrium condition in model (5.19), (5.16), and
(5.17). The objective function of model (5.12) can be written as:
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So, for market prices pi i = pi i(y i) and p i = p i(x i), the objective function always has a
value ≤ 0. The objective function of model (5.12) reaches a maximum for the solution
(5.27). Consequently, (5.27) is an optimal solution of (5.12).
• Properties of Section 6.1:
Trader property 6.1:  For region i ∈ {1,…,n}, and period t ∈ {1,…,T}:
a) If pi it < p it, then any optimal solution of (6.11) satisfies q it = 0 or r it = 0
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b) If pi it ≥ p it, then an optimal solution of (6.11) exists satisfying the condition q it = x it
or r it = y it; for pi it = p it, other optimal solutions of (6.11) may exist, not satisfying this
condition.
Proof: Using (6.11), the proof is similar to the proof of Trader property 5.1 in Section
5.1.
Trader property 6.2: Let q it, r jt, q ijt, v it, j ≠ i, i,j = 1,…,n, t = 1,…,T, be an optimal
solution of (6.11). Let a trader transport in a period t from a region i to a region j, so
q ijt > 0, for i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, j ≠ i, t ∈ {1,…,T}, then:
a) in period t, no goods are transported from a region s = 1,…,n, s ≠ i, to region i, q sit
= 0
b) in period t, no goods are transported from region j to a region s = 1,…,n, s ≠ j, q jst
= 0.
c) in period t, purchases in region i are positive, q it > 0, or the stock remaining from
the previous period is positive, v i,t-1 > 0.
d) in period t, sales in region j are positive, r jt > 0, or the stock at the end of period t
in region j is positive, vjt > 0.
Proof: Using (6.9) and  (6.11), the proof is similar to the proof of Trader property 5.2
in Section 5.1.
Trader property 6.3: For region i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, j ≠ i, and period t ∈ {1,…,T}:
a) If pi jt < p it + τ ijt, then any optimal solution of (6.11) has to satisfy q it = 0 or q ijt = 0
or r jt = 0.
b) If pi jt ≥ p it + τ ijt, and q it > 0, q ijt > 0 and r jt > 0, then an optimal solution of (6.11)




a) Let pi jt < p it + τ ijt. If q it > 0, q ijt > 0 and r jt > 0, then, see (6.11), λ it ≥ p it, λ jt = λ it +
τ ijt and λ jt ≤ pi jt, which contradicts pi jt < p it + τ ijt. So necessarily, q it = 0, q ijt = 0 or r jt =
0.
b) An optimal solution of problem (6.11) exists, since its feasible region is bounded.
We make a distinction between pi jt > p it + τ ijt and pi jt = p it + τ ijt:
* Let pi jt > p it + τ ijt and q it > 0, q ijt > 0 and r jt > 0. If the optimal solution satisfies q it <
x it and r jt < y jt, then, see (6.11), λ it = p it, λ jt = λ it + τ ijt and λ jt = pi jt. It would follow
that pi jt = p it + τ ijt, which is in contradiction with pi jt > p it + τ ijt. So necessarily, q it = x it
or r jt = y jt.
* Let pi jt = p it + τ ijt. Consider the optimal solution q sτ, q svτ, r vτ, for s,v = 1,…,n, and τ
= 1,…,T, in which purchases, transports and sales for the regions i and j, and for the
period t satisfy 0 < q it < x it, q ijt > 0 and 0 < r jt < y jt. Call ∆ ijt = min(x it-q it; y jt-r jt). The
solution ′ ′ ′q r qs v svτ τ τ, ,  defined by ′qit = q it + ∆ ijt, ′rjt = r jt + ∆ ijt, ′qijt = q ijt + ∆ ijt, ′qsτ = q sτ,
′rvτ = r vτ, ′qsvτ = q svτ, for s≠i, v≠j and τ≠t, is optimal as well, as can be seen easily by
inspecting (6.10). Moreover, ′qit = x it or ′rjt = y jt.
Trader property 6.4: For region i ∈ {1,…,n}, j ≠ i, period t ∈ {1,…,T-1}:
a) If pi i,t+1 < p it + k it, then any optimal solution of (6.11) has to satisfy q it = 0 or v it = 0
or r i,t+1 = 0.
b) Analogously for τ ∈ {t+1,…,T}: if pi iτ < p it + κ itτ, then any optimal solution of
(6.11) has to satisfy q it = 0 or v it = 0, or …, or v i,τ − 1  = 0, or r iτ = 0.
c) If pi i,t+1 ≥ p it + k it, and q it > 0, v it > 0 and r i,t+1 > 0, then an optimal solution of (6.11)
exists which satisfies the condition q it = x it or r i,t+1 = y i,t+1. Nota bene: for pi i,t+1 > p it +
k it, any optimal solution of (6.11) has to satisfy this condition; for pi i,t+1 = p it + k it, an
optimal solution is not unique.
d) Analogously for τ ∈ {t+1,…,T}: if pi iτ ≥ p it + κ itτ, and q it > 0, v it > 0,…, v i,τ−1 > 0
and r iτ > 0, then an optimal solution of (6.11) exists satisfying the condition q it = x it
or r iτ = y iτ. For pi iτ = p it + κ itτ, an optimal solution of (6.11) is not unique.
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Proof:
a) Let pi i,t+1 < p it + k it. If q it > 0, v it > 0 and r i,t+1 > 0, then, see (6.11), λ it ≥ p it, λ i,t+1 =
λ it + k it and λ i,t+1 ≤ pi i,t+1, which contradicts pi i,t+1 < p it + k it. So necessarily, q it = 0, v it
= 0 or r i,t+1 = 0.
b) Let pi iτ < p it + κ itτ for τ ∈ {t+1,…,T}. If q it > 0, v it > 0,…, v i,τ−1 > 0 and r iτ > 0,
then, see (6.11), λ it ≥ p it, λ i,t+1 = λ it + k it, …, λ iτ = λ i,τ-1 + k i,τ−1 and λ iτ ≤ pi iτ, which
contradicts pi iτ < p it + κ itτ - see (6.12). So necessarily, q it = 0 or v it = 0,… or v i,τ-1 = 0
or r iτ = 0.
c) An optimal solution of problem (6.11) exists, since its feasible region is bounded.
For this proof we make a distinction between pi i,t+1 > p it + k it and pi i,t+1 = p it + k it:
* Let pi i,t+1 > p it + k it and q it > 0, v it > 0 and r i,t+1 > 0. If the optimal solution satisfies
q it < x it and r i,t+1 < y i,t+1, then, see (6.11), λ it = p it, λ i,t+1 = λ it + k it and λ i,t+1 = pi i,t+1. It
would follow that pi i,t+1 = p it + k it, which is in contradiction with pi i,t+1 > p it + k it. So
necessarily, q it = x it or r i,t+1 = y i,t+1.
* Let pi i,t+1 = p it + k it. Consider the optimal solution q sτ, vsτ, r sτ for s = 1,…,n and τ =
1,…,T, for which in region i and period t and t+1: 0 < q it < x it, v it > 0 and 0 < r i,t+1 <
y i,t+1. Call ∆ it = min(x it-q it; y i,t+1-r i,t+1). The solution ′ ′ ′q r vs s sτ τ τ, ,  defined by ′qit = q it +
∆ it, ′ +ri t, 1 = r i,t+1 + ∆ it, ′vit = v it + ∆ it, ′qsτ = q sτ, ′rsζ = r sζ, ′vsτ = vsτ, for s≠i, τ≠t, and
ζ≠t+1, is optimal as well, as can be seen easily by inspecting (6.10). Moreover, ′qit =
x it or ′ +ri t, 1 = y i,t+1.
d) The proof of this property is similar to the proof under c). The main difference is
that, due to v it > 0,…, v i,τ - 1  > 0, λ iτ  = λ it + κ itτ , see (6.11) and (6.12).
• Properties and Theorem of Section 6.2:
Equilibrium property 6.1:  For region i ∈ {1,…,n}, and period t ∈ {1,…,T}:
a) In the optimal solution of (6.14) – (6.16) pi it( y it) ≤ p it(xit) .
b) If in the optimal solution of (6.14) – (6.16) pi it(y it) < p it(x it), then x it = 0 or y it = 0.
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c) If in the optimal solution of (6.14) – (6.16), supply and demand are both positive,
x it > 0 and y it > 0, then the prices necessarily satisfy p it(x it)  = pi it(y it).
Proof:
Using (6.17) – (6.24), the proof is similar to the proof of Equilibrium property 5.1 in
Section 5.2.
Equilibrium property 6.2: Let in the optimal solution of (6.14) – (6.16) transport in
period t take place from a market i to a market j, so x ijt > 0, with i,j ∈ {1,2, ...,n}, j ≠ i,
t ∈ {1,…,T}, then:
a) in period t, no cereals are transferred from other regions into market i, i.e. xsit = 0,
for all s ≠ i
b) in period t, no cereals are transported from market j to other regions, i.e. x jst = 0,
for all s ≠ j
c) in period t, the producer supply in region i in period t satisfies, x it > 0, or the stock
remaining from the previous period is positive, s i,t-1 > 0.
d) in period t, the consumer demand in region j in period t satisfies y jt > 0, or the
quantity put in stock in region j is positive, sjt > 0.
Proof:
The proof is similar to the proof of Equilibrium property 5.2 in Section 5.2.
Equilibrium property 6.3: For region i and j, i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, and period t ∈
{1,…,T}:
a) In the solution of (6.14) – (6.16) pi jt(y jt) ≤ p it(x it) + τ ijt.
b) If in the optimal solution of (6.14) – (6.16) pi jt(y jt) < p it(x it) + τ ijt, then x it = 0 or x ijt
= 0 or y jt = 0.
c) If in the optimal solution of (6.14) – (6.16) supplies in region i, transport between
region i and j, and demand in region j are positive, x it > 0 and x ijt > 0 and y jt > 0, then
the optimal prices necessarily satisfy pi jt(y jt) = p it(x it) + τ ijt.
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Proof:
Using (6.17) – (6.2), the proof is similar to the proof of Equilibrium property 5.3 in
Section 5.2.
Equilibrium property 6.4: For region i ∈ {1,…,n}, and period t ∈ {1,…,T-1}:
a) In the optimal solution of (6.14) – (6.16) pi i,t+1(y i,t+1) ≤ p it(x it) + k it. Analogously, for
τ ∈ {t+1,…,T}: pi iτ(y iτ) ≤ p it(x it) + κ itτ.
b) If in the optimal solution of (6.14) – (6.16) pi i,t+1(y i,t+1) < p it(x it) + k it, then x it = 0 or
s it = 0 or y i,t+1 = 0. Analogously, for τ ∈ {t+1,…,T} – see also (6.12): if pi iτ < p it + κ itτ,
then any optimal solution of (6.14) – (6.16) has to satisfy x it = 0 or s it = 0 or s i,t+1 = 0
… or s i,τ-1 = 0 or y iτ = 0.
c) If in the optimal solution of (6.14) – (6.16) supplies in period t, stock levels at the
end of period t, and demand in period t+1 are positive, x it > 0 and s it > 0 and y i,t+1 > 0,
then the optimal prices necessarily satisfy pi i,t+1(y i,t+1) = p it(x it) + k it.
d) If in the optimal solution of (6.14) – (6.16), supplies in period t, storage from
period t to the end of period τ-1, and demand in period τ are positive, x it > 0, s it > 0,
s i,t+1 > 0,…, s i,τ-1 > 0 and y iτ > 0, then the optimal prices satisfy pi iτ(y iτ) = p it(x it) + κ itτ,
for τ ∈ {t+1,…,T}.
Proof:
a) Since the solution always has to satisfy pi i,t+1(y i,t+1) ≤ λ i,t+1, λ i,t+1 ≤ λ it + k it, and λ it ≤
p it(x it) – see (6.17) – (6.24), pi i,t+1(y i,t+1) ≤ p it(x it) + k it. Analogously, for τ ∈
{t+1,…,T}, the solution has to satisfy pi iτ(y iτ) ≤ λ iτ, λ iτ ≤ λ i,τ−1 + k iτ,…, λ i,t+1 ≤ λ it +
k it, and λ it ≤ p it(x it). Consequently, pi iτ ≤ p it + κ itτ
b) Using (6.17), (6.19) and (6.23), the proof is similar to the proof of Trader property
6.4 a) and b) in Section 6.1.
c) This follows from a) and b).
d) This follows from a) and b) for τ ∈ {t+1,…,T}.
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Theorem 6.1:
Let x it, y it, x ijt, s it, i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, t ∈ {1,…,T}, be an optimal solution of the
equilibrium model (6.14) – (6.16). Let pi it = pi it(y it) , p it = p it(x it). The solution:
q it = x it ;  r it = y it  ;  q ijt = x ijt  ;  v it = s it for i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, t ∈ {1,…,T}
is an optimal solution of trader decision problem (6.10). The value of the objective
function is equal to 0, meaning that the trader makes no profits or losses.
Proof:
The proof will consist of three parts: a) (6.25) is a feasible solution of (6.10), b) the
solution (6.25) results in a value of the objective function of (6.10) which is equal to
0; c) the solution (6.25) is an optimal solution of (6.10).
a) See (6.25), (6.15), (6.10), and (6.9).
b) Due to (6.17) - (6.24), the objective function of model (6.10) for the solution
(6.25) can be written as follows, with λ it the optimal value of the Lagrange
multiplier of model (6.14) – (6.16):
λ λ λ λ λ λ
λ






















y x x s
y x x x s s
− − − − −

!









































due to the equilibrium condition (6.15).
c) Consider any feasible solution q it, r it, q ijt, s it of (6.10), and market prices pi it =
pi it(y it) and pit = p it(x it), with y it and x it the optimal demanded and supplied
quantities of equilibrium model (6.14) – (6.16). Due to Equilibrium property 6.1
– 6.4 and (6.17) – (6.24) pi it ≤ λ it ≤ p it and pi jt ≤ λ jt ≤ λ it + τ ijt ≤ p it + τ ijt and pi i,t+1
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≤ λ i , t+1 ≤ λ it + k it ≤ p it + k it, for all i = 1,…,n, i ≠ j, t = 1,…,T, with λ it the
Lagrange multiplier of model (6.14) – (6.16). The objective function of model
(6.10) can be written as:
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So, the objective function is always ≤ 0 for market prices pi it = pi it(y it) and p it = p it(x it).
The objective function of model (6.10) reaches a maximum for the solution (6.25),
see b). Consequently, (6.25) is an optimal solution of (6.10).
• Properties of Section 7.1:
Trader property 7.1:  For region i ∈ {1,…,n}, and period t ∈ {1,…,T}:
a) If pi it < p it, then any optimal solution of (7.27) satisfies q it = 0 or r it = 0.
b) If pi it ≥ p it, then an optimal solution of (7.27) exists, satisfying the condition q it = x it
or r it = y it. For pi it = p it, other optimal solutions of (7.27) may exist, not satisfying this
condition.
Proof: Using (7.29) and (7.30), the proof is similar to the proof of Trader property 5.1
in Section 5.1 and Trader property 6.1 in Section 6.1.
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Trader property 7.2: Let q it, r jt, q ijt, v it, j ≠ i, i,j = 1,…,n, t = 1,…,T, be an optimal
solution of (7.27). Let a trader transport in a period t from region i to j, so q ijt > 0, i,j
∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, t ∈ {1,…,T}, then:
a) no goods are transported from a region s = 1,…,n,s ≠ i,  to region i, q sit = 0
b) no goods are transported from region j to a region s = 1,…,n, ,s ≠ j, q jst = 0.
c) purchases in region i are positive, q it > 0, or the stock remaining from the previous
period is positive, v i,t-1 > 0.
d) sales in region j are positive, r jt > 0, or the quantity put in stock in region j is
positive, vjt > 0.
Proof: Using (7.29) - (7.31), the proof is similar to the proof of Trader property 5.2 in
Section 5.1 and Trader property 6.2 in Section 6.1.
Trader property 7.3: For region i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, and period t ∈ {1,…,T}:
a) If pi jt < p it + τ ijt, then any optimal solution of (7.27) has to satisfy q it = 0 or q ijt = 0
or r jt = 0.
b) If pi jt ≥ p it + τ ijt, and q it > 0, q ijt > 0 and r jt > 0, then an optimal solution of (7.27)
exists satisfying q it = x it or r jt = y it. For pi jt = p it + τ ijt, an optimal solution of (7.27) is
not unique.
Proof: Using (7.29) - (7.31), the proof is similar to the proof of Trader property 6.3 in
Section 6.1.
Trader property 7.4: For region i ∈ {1,…,n}, and period t ∈ {1,…,T-1}:
a) If Epi i,t+1 < p it + k it, then any optimal solution of (7.27) has to satisfy q it = 0 or v it =
0 or ri t
k
, +1  = 0 for at least one k ∈ {1,...,K}.
b) Analogously, if Epi i,t+2 < p it + κ it,t+2, see also (6.12), then any optimal solution of
(7.27) has to satisfy q it = 0 or v it = 0 or vi tk, +1 = 0 or ri tk l, ,+2  = 0 for at least one k, l ∈
{1,...,K}. Analogous properties can be derived for storage until the periods τ =
t+3,...,T if Epi iτ < p it + κ itτ.
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c) If Epi i,t+1 ≥ p it + k it and q it > 0 and s it > 0 and ri tk, +1  > 0 for all k = 1,…,K, then an
optimal solution of (7.27) exists satisfying q it = x it or ri tk, +1 = yi tk, +1  for at least one k ∈
{1,...,K}. For Epi i,t+1 = p it + k it, an optimal solution of (7.27) is not unique.
d) Analogously: if Epi i,t+2 ≥ p it + κ it,t+2 and q it > 0 and v it > 0, vi tk, +1 > 0 and ri tk l, ,+2  > 0,





+2 , for at least one k, l ∈ {1,...,K}, is an optimal solution. For Epi i,t+2 = p it + κ it,t+2,
an optimal solution of (7.27) is not unique. Analogous properties can be derived for
storage until the periods τ = t+3,...,T if Epi iτ ≥ p it + κ itτ.
Proof:
a) Let Epi i,t+1 < p it + k it. If q it > 0, v it > 0 and ri tk, +1  > 0 for all k ∈ {1,...,K}, then, see




∑ 11 = λ it + k it and λ i tk, +1  ≤ gtk i tk+ +1 1pi , , which
contradicts, see (7.25), Epi i,t+1 < p it + k it. So necessarily, q it = 0, v it = 0 or ri tk, +1  = 0, for
at least one k ∈ {1,...,K}.
b) Let Epi i,t+2 < p it + κ it,t+2. If q it > 0, v it > 0, vi tk, +1 > 0 and ri tk l, ,+2  > 0 for all k , l  ∈











λ i tk tk i tg k, ,+ + ++1 1 1  and λ i tk l,, +2  ≤ g gtk tl i tl+ + +1 2 2pi , , which contradicts, see (7.25), Epi i,t+2 < p it
+ κ i,t,t+2. So necessarily, q it = 0, v it = 0, vi t
k




+2  = 0 for at least one k , l  ∈
{1,...,K}.
c) An optimal solution of problem (7.27) exists, since its feasible region is bounded.
For this proof we make a distinction between Epi i,t+1 > p it + k it and Epi i,t+1 = p it + k it:
* Let Epi i,t+1 > p it + k it and qit > 0, v it > 0 and ri t
k
, +1  > 0 for all k ∈ {1,…,K}. If the
optimal solution satisfies q it < x it and ri t
k
, +1  < yi t
k
, +1  for all k ∈ {1,…,K}, then, see




∑ 11  = λ it + k it and λ i tk, +1  = gtk i tk+ +1 1pi , . It
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would follow that Epi i,t+1 = p it + k it, which is in contradiction with Epi i,t+1 > p it + k it. So
necessarily, q it = x it or ri t
k
, +1  = yi t
k
, +1  for at least one k ∈ {1,…,K}.
* Let Epi i,t+1 = p it + k it. Consider the optimal solution q st, vst, rs t
k
, +1 , s = 1,…,n, with
purchases, sales and storage for region i satisfying 0 < q it < x it, v it > 0 and 0 < ri t
k
, +1  <
yi t
k
, +1 , k = 1,…,K. Call ∆ it = min(x it-q it; yi t, +11 - ri t, +11 ;…; yi tK, +1 - ri tK, +1 ). The solution
′ ′ ′+q r vst s t
k
st, ,, 1  defined by ′qit = q it + ∆ it, ′ +ri t
k
, 1 = ri t
k





, +1 , ′vst = vst, for s≠i, is optimal as well, as can be seen easily by inspecting (7.27)
and (7.28). Moreover, ′qit = x it or ′ +ri tk, 1 = yi tk, +1  for at least one k ∈ {1,…,K}.
d) The proof of this property is analogous to the proof under c).
• Properties and Theorem of Section 7.2:
Optimal equilibrium prices and quantities for period T – see model (7.44)
Theorem 7.1a:
Let in the optimal solution of the equilibrium model (7.44) for period T, $xiT  be the
optimal supply level and λ iT be the corresponding optimal value of the Lagrange
multiplier, for i = 1,…,n. If the producer price in period T in region i is equal to:
(7.48) p iT = λ iT
then x iT = $xiT  is an optimal solution of model (7.10), the producer supply model for
period T. In other words, the optimal equilibrium supply level is a supply level which
gives the producers optimal profits in period T. Since the value of λ iT, depends on the
value of the equilibrium supply level, we write p iT(x iT) = λ iT.
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Proof:
It is trivial that $xiT  is a feasible solution of (7.10) for p iT( $xiT ) = λ iT. After all, it
follows from (7.44) that 0 ≤ $xiT  ≤ w i,T-1. To prove that $xiT  is an optimal solution of
(7.10), consider the following cases:
• if $xiT  = 0, then p iT( $xiT ) ≤ c iT, see (7.45) and (7.46). For p iT ≤ c iT the producer
supply level x iT = 0 is an optimal solution of model (7.10) – see (7.11).
• if 0 < $xiT  < w i,T-1, then p iT( $xiT ) = c iT, see (7.45) and (7.46). For p iT = c iT the
optimal producer supply level determined by model (7.10) is not unique. Also
supplying a level x iT = $xiT  will be optimal for the producer – see (7.11).
if $xiT  = w i,T-1, then piT( $xiT ) ≥ c iT, see (7.45) and (7.46). For p iT ≥ c iT the producer
supply level x iT = w i,T-1 is an optimal solution of model (7.10) – see (7.11).
Theorem 7.2a:
Let x iT, y iT, x ijT, i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, be an optimal solution of equilibrium model
(7.44) for period T. Let pi iT = pi iT(y iT) , p iT = p iT(x iT) = λ iT. The solution:
(7.49) q iT = xiT  ;  r iT = y iT  ;  q ijT = x ijT for i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j
is an optimal solution of the trader decision problem (7.27) for period T.
Proof:
The proof will consist of three parts: a) (7.49) is a feasible solution of (7.27), b)
solution (7.49) results in a certain value of the objective function of (7.27); c) the
solution (7.49) is an optimal solution of (7.27), because any feasible solution of (7.27)
has an objective value less than the objective value for solution (7.49).
a) See (7.49), (7.44), and (7.27).
b) Due to (7.45) - (7.47) and (7.48), the objective function of model (7.27) for the
solution (7.49) can be written as, with λ iT the optimal value of the Lagrange
multiplier of model (7.44):
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due to the equilibrium condition of (7.44).
c) Consider any feasible solution q iT, r iT, q ijT of (7.27), and market prices pi iT =
pi iT(y iT) and p iT = p iT(x iT), with y iT and x iT the optimal demanded and supplied
quantities of equilibrium model (7.44). Due to (7.45) - (7.47) and (7.48) pi iT ≤ λ iT
= p iT and λ jT ≤ λ iT + τ ijT, for all i = 1,…,n, i ≠ j, with λ iT the optimal value of the
Lagrange multiplier of model (7.44). The objective function of model (7.27) can
be written as:
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due to the equilibrium condition of (7.27). So, (7.49) is an optimal solution of
model (7.27).
Optimal equilibrium prices and quantities for period T-1 – see model (7.50)
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions of model (7.50) result in the following expressions – see
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Using these conditions, the following theorem can be derived.
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Theorem 7.1b:
Let in the optimal solution of the equilibrium model (7.50), $
,
xi T −1  and $xiT
k
 be the
optimal supply levels for period T-1 and T, respectively, and let λ i,T-1, λ iTk  and γ ik  be
the corresponding optimal values of the Lagrange multipliers, for i = 1,…,n and k =
1,…,K. If the producer price in period T-1 in region i is equal to:
(7.52) p i,T-1 = λ i,T-1




= $   are optimal solutions of model (7.14), the producer
supply model for period T-1. In other words, the optimal equilibrium supply levels
give the producers optimal profits in period T-1. Since the value of λ i,T-1, depends on
the value of the equilibrium supply level, we write p i,T-1(x i,T-1) = λ i,T-1.
Proof:
It is trivial that the solution $
,
xi T −1 , $xiT
k
 is a feasible solution of (7.14) for p i,T-1( $ ,xi T −1 )
= λ i,T-1. After all, it follows from (7.50) that 0 ≤ $ ,xi T −1 + $xiTk  ≤ w i,T-2. To prove that
$
,
xi T −1  and $xiT
k
 are optimal solutions of (7.14), first determine the value of the
objective function of (7.14) for the solution $
,
xi T −1  and $xiT
k
, and then show that this
value is optimal:
• Due to (A1.1), (A1.5), (A1.9) and (7.52), the objective function of (7.14) can be
written as:
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• Consider any feasible solution of model (7.14), x i,T-1, xiTk  for k = 1,…,K,
satisfying x i,T-1 + xiT
k
 ≤ w i,T-2. Consider the optimal equilibrium market price p i,T-1





∑ 1 ≤ 0, and f p ciTk iTk iT ik− −3 8 γ ≤ 0 for k = 1,…,K – see (A1.1) and (A1.5).
The objective function of (7.14) can be written as:


























2 7 3 8 3 8γ γ
So, $
,
xi T −1 , $xiT
k
 is an optimal solution of model (7.14) if the producer price
satisfies (7.52).
Theorem 7.2b:




, and $qijTk , i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, be an optimal
solution of equilibrium model (7.50). Let pi i,T-1 = pi i,T-1(y i,T-1) , p i,T-1 = p i,T-1(x i,T-1) = λ i,T-
1. The solution:













for k ∈ {1,…,K}, i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, is an optimal solution of the trader decision
problem (7.27) for period T-1.
Proof:
The proof will consist of three parts: a) (7.53) is a feasible solution of (7.27), b)
solution (7.53) results in a certain value of the objective function of (7.27); c) (7.53)
is an optimal solution of (7.27), because any feasible solution of (7.27) has an
objective value less than the objective value for (7.53).
a) See (7.53), (7.50), and (7.27).
b) Due to (A1.1) – (A1.9) and (7.52), the objective function of model (7.27) for the
solution (7.53) can be written as:
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due to the equilibrium conditions of (7.50) and (A1.9).
c) Consider any feasible solution q i,T-1, r i,T-1, q ij,T-1, v i,T-1, riTk , qiTk , qijTk  of (7.27), and
market prices pi i,T-1 = pi i,T-1(y i,T-1) and p i,T-1 = p i,T-1(x i,T-1), with y i,T-1 and x i,T-1 the
optimal demanded and supplied quantities of equilibrium model (7.50). Due to
(A1.1) – (A1.9) and (7.52):
 pi i,T-1 ≤ λ i,T-1 = p i,T-1  ; λ j,T-1 ≤ λ i,T-1 + τ ij,T-1; - k i,T-1 -λ i,T-1 + λ iTkk
K
=

















-  0 ; µ ϑiTk iTk, ≥ 0
for all i = 1,…,n, i ≠ j, with λ i,T-1, λ µ ϑiTk iTk iTk, ,  the optimal values of the Lagrange
multipliers of model (7.50). Analogous to b), for the objective function of model
(7.27) follows:
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due to the equilibrium condition of (7.27). So, (7.53) is an optimal solution of
model (7.27).
Optimal equilibrium prices and quantities for period t ∈ {1,…,T-2} – see model
(7.54):
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Let in the optimal solution of the equilibrium model (7.54) for period t, t = 1,…,T-2,
$ , $ , $ ,








k kT t1 −
 be the optimal supply level and λ it be the corresponding
optimal value of the Lagrange multiplier of the equilibrium condition for period t, for
i = 1,…,n, k1,…,kT-t = 1,…,K. If the producer price in period t in region i is equal to:
(7.55) p it = λ it












1 1 1 1
$ ,..., $
,..., ,...,
, for k 1,…,kT-t = 1,…,K, is an optimal
solution of supply model (7.14), the producer supply model for the periods 1 to T-2.
In other words, the optimal equilibrium supply levels give the producers optimal
profits. Since the value of λ it, depends on the value of the equilibrium supply level,
we write p it(x it) = λ it.
Proof:
Consider the optimal solution of model (7.54) for period t: $ , $ , $ ,..., $, ,...,x x x xt tk tk k Tk kT t+ + −1 21 1 2 1










, for k 1,…,kT-t =
1,…,K. Is this solution an optimal solution of producer supply problem (7.14) for
period t? It is trivial that the solution is a feasible solution of  model (7.14). To prove
that the solution is also optimal, first determine the value of the objective function of
(7.14), and then show that this value is optimal:
• Due to (A1.10), (A1.14), (A1.19), and (7.55), the objective function of (7.14) can
be written as:
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• Consider any feasible solution of model (7.14): x x x xt tk tk k Tk kT t, , ,...,, ,...,+ + −1 21 1 2 1  for the










, for k 1,…,kT-t =
1,…,K. Suppose that prices satisfy the following properties – see (A1.10),
(A1.14), (A1.19), and (7.55):
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The value of the objective function of  (7.14) for the feasible solution satisfies:
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1 1 2 1
 is an optimal solution of (7.14), if the producer price
satisfies (7.55).
Theorem 7.2c:
Let $ , $ , $ , $ , $ , $ , $ , $ , $ , $ , $ , $
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, τ = 2,…,T-t, i,j
∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, be an optimal solution of equilibrium model (7.54). Let pi it = pi it( $yit )
, p it = p it( $xit ) = λ it. The solution:
(7.56)
q x r y q x v s
q q r r q q v v
q q r r q
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for i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, i ≠ j, is an optimal solution of the trader decision problem (7.27).
Proof:
The proof will consist of three parts: a) (7.56) is a feasible solution of (7.27), b)
solution (7.56) results in a certain value of the objective function of (7.27); c) (7.56)
is an optimal solution of (7.27), because any feasible solution of (7.27) has an
objective value less than the objective value for (7.56).
a) See (7.56), (7.54), and (7.27).
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b) Due to (A1.10) – (A1.19) and (7.55), the objective function of model (7.27) for
the solution (7.56) can be written as:
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1 1 1 1
due to the equilibrium conditions of (7.54) and (A1.19).
c) Consider any feasible solution q it, r it, q ijt, v it, r q q vi tk i tk ij tk i tk, , , ,, , , ,+ + + +1 1 1 11 1 1 1
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 of model (7.27), and market prices pi it = pi it( $yit ) , p it
= p it( $xit ) = λ it. Due to (A1.10) – (A1.19) and (7.55):
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for all τ = 2,…,T-t, i = 1,…,n, i ≠ j, with λ it, λ λ µτ τi tk i tk k i tk, ,,..., ,, ,+ + +1 11 1 1 ,
µ ϑ ϑτ ττ τi tk k i tk i tk k, ,..., , , ,...,, ,+ + +1 1 11  the optimal values of the Lagrange multipliers of model
(7.54). Analogous to b), for the objective function of model (7.27) follows:
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due to the equilibrium condition of (7.29). So, (7.76) is an optimal solution of model
(7.29).
Some equilibrium properties:
Equilibrium property 7.1:  For region i ∈ {1,…,n}, and period t ∈ {1,…,T}:
a) In the optimal solution of (7.44) pi it(y it) ≤ p it(x it).
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b) If in the optimal solution of (7.44) pi it(y it) < p it(x it), then y it = 0.
c) If in the optimal solution of (7.44), supply and demand are both positive, x it > 0
and y it > 0, then the prices satisfy necessarily pi it(y it) = p it(x it).
Proof:
a) Since the solution always has to satisfy pi it(y it) ≤ λ it = p it(x it), see for example
(A1.2) and (7.52), pi it(y it) ≤ p it(x it).
b) Let  pi it(y it) < p it(x it). If in the optimal solution y it > 0, then necessarily, see for
example (A1.2) and (7.52), pi it(y it) = λ it = p it(x it), which contradicts pi it(y it) < p it(x it).
So, necessarily, y it = 0.
c) This follows from a) and b).
Equilibrium property 7.2: In the optimal solution of (7.44), let transport take place
from market i to market j in period t, i.e. x ijt > 0, with i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, j ≠ i, t ∈
{1,…,n}, then:
a) no goods are transported from a region s = 1,…,n, to region i, x sit = 0, for s ≠ i.
b) no goods are transported from region j to a region s = 1,…,n, x jst = 0, for s ≠ j.
c) the producer supply in region i satisfies, x it > 0, or the stock remaining from the
previous period is positive, s i,t-1 > 0.
d) the consumer demand in region j satisfies, y jt > 0, or the quantity in stock at the end
of period t in region j is positive, sjt > 0 (this is equal to the statement that the quantity
in stock at the end of period t, to be sold in period τ, is positive for at least one period
τ, &s jtτ > 0 , τ ∈ {t+1,…,T}).
Proof: Using for example (A1.3), the proof is similar to the proof of Equilibrium
property 5.2.
Equilibrium property 7.3: For region i and j,  i,j ∈ {1,…,n}, j ≠ i, and period t ∈
{1,…,n}:
a) In the optimal solution of (7.44) pi jt(y jt) ≤ p it(x it) + τ ijt.
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b) If in the optimal solution of (7.44) pi jt(y jt) < p it(x it) + τ ijt, then x ijt = 0 or y jt = 0
c) If in the optimal solution of (7.44) supplies in region i, transport between region i
and j, and demand in region j are positive, x it > 0, x ijt > 0 and y jt > 0, then the optimal
prices satisfy necessarily pi it(y it) = p it(x it) + τ ijt.
Proof:
a) Since the solution always has to satisfy pi jt(y jt) ≤ λ jt ≤ λ it + τ ijt = p it(x it) + τ ijt, see
for example (A1.2), (A1.3) and (7.52), pi jt(y jt) ≤ p it(x it) + τ ijt.
b) Let  pi it(y it) < p it(x it) + τ ijt. If in the optimal solution x ijt > 0 and y it > 0, then
necessarily, see for example (A1.2), (A1.3) and (7.52), pi jt(y jt) = λ jt = λ it + τ ijt  =
p it(x it) + τ ijt, which contradicts pi it(y it) < p it(x it) + τ ijt. So, necessarily, x ijt = 0 or y it = 0.
c) This follows from a) and b).
Equilibrium property 7.4: For region i ∈ {1,…,n}, and period t ∈ {1,…,n}, we can
derive that:
a) If in the optimal solution of (7.44) EΠ i,t+1 < p it(x it) + k it, then s it = 0 or ri tk, +1  = 0 for
at least one k ∈ {1,…,K}.
b) If in the optimal solution of (7.44) Epi i,t+1 ≥ p it + k it, storage in period t, and




 > 0 for all k 1 ∈ {1,…,K},
then an optimal solution exists satisfying q it = x it or ri t
k
, +1 = yi t
k
, +1  for at least one k ∈
{1,...,K}. For Epi i,t+1 = p it + k it, an optimal solution is not unique.
Proof:
a) Let EΠ i,t+1 < p it(x it) + k it. Suppose that s it > 0 and ri tk, +11  = 0 for all k 1 = 1,…,K.
Then, see for example (A1.2), (A1.4) and (7.52): EΠ i,t+1 ≥ λ it + k it = p it(x it) + k it,
which is in contradiction with EΠ i,t+1 < p it(x it) + k it.
b) The proof is similar to the proof of Trader property 7.4 in Section 7.1.
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Appendix 2: The stochastic supply model
In Section 9.2, the cereal supply decision problems of cereal producers in Burkina
Faso have been discussed for all periods t = 1,…,4. In this appendix we derive the
optimal solutions of these models for each period. In Section 9.2, it has been
supposed that when producers decide on their optimal supplies for period t, they
know the stock level at the end of the previous period w t-1, and the producer price
level in period t, p t. For the stochastic future prices, Pt+1,…,P4, we assumed that the
stochastic price for period t+1 is independent of the price in period t, p t. The
stochastic prices for the other periods τ = t+2,…,4, P τ, however, depend on the
stochastic price in the previous period, P τ −1. In the model for period t, for t = 1,2,3,
future prices for the periods t+1 to 4 were written as – see (9.32), (9.37), and (9.41):
(A2.1) Pt+1 = $p p pt t t+ -+11 6  + Θ t+1; P τ  = P τ−1 + p pτ τ- -11 6 + Θτ 
for τ = t+2,…,4,
with $pt  and pτ  constants, and EΘυ = 0, for υ = t+1,…,4. Θ t+1 are random
disturbances from the expected price in period t+1: E(Pt+1); Θτ are random
disturbances from the expected price in period τ, given the price in period τ-1: E(P τ
|P τ−1=p τ−1) for τ = t+2,…,4. We assume that the random disturbances Θυ, for υ =
t+1,…,4, are independent, and have a discrete, empirical distribution with possible
realisations θ k, for k = 1,…,K, and:
(A2.2) Pr(Θυ = θ k) = f kυ for υ = t+1,…,4, and k = 1,…,K




∑ 1 = 1. In the models for the periods 1, 2, and 3, possible
prices and probability distributions are defined, for k,l,m = 1,...,K, as follows – see
(9.33), (9.34), (9.38), (9.39), (9.42), and (9.43):
For the model for period 1, (9.29):
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(A2.3) 
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For the model for period 2, (9.28):
(A2.4) 
p p p p
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For the model for period 3, (9.27):
(A2.5) p p p pk l4 3 4 3 4= + - +$ 1 6 θ Pr P p fk k4 4 4= =2 7
We start with the decision problem for period 4.
Optimal supply in period 4
When the producer decides on his supplies for period 4, he knows the quantities in
stock at the end of the previous period, w 3, and the price in period 4, p 4. He solves the
following problem – see (9.26):
(A2.6) z w p Max p c x x x w
x
4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3
4
;1 6 1 6> C= − ≤ ≤−
From this it follows directly that the producer will earn negative profits if p 4 < c 4. In
that case, he will sell the smallest quantity possible, i.e. the minimum quantity x4
−
. If
p 4 ≥ c 4, the producer will earn positive profits if he supplies a positive quantity. In
that case it is optimal for him to sell the largest quantity possible, i.e his stock w 3. If
p 4 = c 4, the solution is not unique. In that case the producer will make neither losses





if any solution  between  and  is optimal
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Optimal supply in period 3
Consider period 3. At the moment when the producer decides on his supplies, he
knows the stock at the end of period 2, w 2, and the producer price for period 3, p 3.
The distribution of the stochastic price for period 4 has been defined in (A2.1), (A2.2)
and (A2.5). Possible prices and the probability distribution have been defined in
(A2.5), see also (9.33) and (9.34). The decision problem for period 3 is – see (9.36):
(A2.8) 
z w p Max p c x f p c x
x
x
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 = k K p ck= <1 4 4,...,> C ; K42  = k K p ck= ≥1 4 4,...,> C
 For k ∈ K41 , optimal supply in period 4 is x k4  = x4
− ; for k ∈ K42 , optimal supply may
be written as x k4  = w 3 = (w 2 – x 3)⋅δ. For the k for which p ck4 4= , optimal supply is
not unique. We can rewrite the objective of (A2.8) as – see (A2.7):
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(A2.9) 
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with A3 and B3 constants. The first term is the expected surplus value of selling the
quantity x 3 now in stead of in period 4. It is the difference between revenues from
selling in period 3 and expected positive revenues from selling in period 4 or not
selling at all. Expected revenues for period 4 are multiplied with the time preference
indicator σ. This gives the discounted value of expected revenues in period 4. Define:
(A2.10) Ψ 4 the expected revenues of selling one unit of cereals in period 4, or not
selling at all
(A2.11) Ψ4 4 4 4
1
4 3 4 3 4 4
1











3 8 1 63 8$
with a + = max(a ;0). From (A2.9) and (A2.11), it follows that it is more profitable to
sell in period 3, if p 3 − c 3 – Ψ4 < 0. In that case the producer will supply the
minimally required quantity x 3  = x3
−
, in period 3. If p 3 − c 3 – Ψ 4 > 0, it is expected to
be more profitable to sell now in stead of in the next period. It will be optimal to sell
in this period a quantity as large as possible, and in the next period only the minimally
required quantity, x4- . The maximum possible quantity, taken into account the
minimum supplies in period 4 are: x 3  = w 2 - x4- /δ . If p 3 - c 3 – Ψ 4 = 0, the optimal
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Optimal supply in period 2
Consider period 2. When the producer decides on his optimal supplies for period 2, he
knows the stock level at the end of the previous period, w 1 , and the price in period 2,
p 2. Possible price realisations for period 3 and 4, and the probability distribution of
the stochastic prices have been defined in (A2.1), (A2.2), and (A2.4) – see also (9.38)
and (9.39). The decision problem for period 2 can be written as – see (9.40):
(A2.13) 
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Supplies in period 3, x k3 , if the price in period 3 is pk3 , satisfy (A2.12). Supplies in
period 4, x kl4 , if the prices in period 3 and period 4 are pk3  and pkl4 , respectively,
satisfy (A2.7). Change definition (A2.11) in the following way:33
(A2.14) Ψ4 3 4 4 4
1
p f p ck l kl
l
K
3 8 3 8= − +
=
∑σ δ
Introduce the following sets:
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 = k K p c pk k= < +1 3 3 4 3,..., Ψ 3 8J L ; L k41  = l K p ckl= <1 4 4,...,> C
K3
2
 = k K p c pk k= ≥ +1 3 3 4 3,..., Ψ 3 8J L ; L k42  = l K p ckl= ≥1 4 4,...,> C
for k ∈ {1,...K}
For k ∈ K31 , optimal supply in period 3 is x k3  = x3- , and for k ∈ K32 , optimal supply
may be written as x k3  = (w 1 − x 2)δ − x4− /δ . For the k for which p c pk k3 3 4 3= +Ψ 3 8 ,
optimal supply is not unique. For l ∈ L k41 , optimal supply in period 4 is x4
−
, and for l
∈ L k4
2
, optimal supply may be written as x kl4  = ((w 1 − x 2)δ − x k3 )δ. Note that for k ∈
K3
2
, supply in period 4 is equal to x kl4  = x4
−
 for all l = 1,...,K. In that case it is
expected in period 3, that it is more profitable to sell in period 3 a large quantity, and
in period 4 only the minimally required quantity. We can write the objective function
of (A2.13) as follows:
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(A2.15) 
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with A2  and B2 constants. The first term is the expected surplus value from selling in
period 2 the quantity x 2, in stead of in period 3 or 4. It is the difference between
revenues from selling in period 2 and expected revenues from selling in period 3 or 4,
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Now (A2.15) can be written as: x 2  (p2 −c 2 −Ψ 3 )  + A2 + B2w 1. From this it follows
again, that the producer will only sell the minimally required quantity, if p 2 −c 2 −Ψ 3
< 0 : x 2 = x2- . If p 2 −c2 −Ψ3  > 0, it turns out to be optimal to sell in period 2 in stead
of in one of the later periods. The producer will sell the maximum quantity possible,
i.e. the stock remaining from the first period, minus the quantities which have to be
saved for future periods: x 2 = w 1  – x3
− /δ  – x4− /δ 2 .  If p 2 −c 2 −Ψ 3  = 0, the optimal
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Optimal supply in period 1:
Analogously, we can derive the supply function for period 1. When the producer
decides on his optimal supplies for period 1, he knows the initial stock level, w 0 , and
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the price in period 1, p 1. The possible price realisations, and probability distributions
of the stochastic prices for the periods 2, 3 and 4 have been defined in (A2.1) - (A2.3)
– see also (9.42) and (9.43). Consider the supply problem for period 1 – see (9.44):
(A2.18) 
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For producer price pk2 , supply in period 2, x
k
2 , satisfies (A2.17). For producer prices
pk2  and p
kl
3 , supply in period 3, xkl3 , satisfies (A2.12). For producer prices pk2 , pkl3 ,
and pklm4 , supply in period 4, xklm4 , satisfies (A2.7). Change the definitions of (A2.14)
and (A2.16) into:
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Introduce the following sets:
K2
1
= k K p c pk k= < +1 2 2 3 2,..., Ψ 3 8J L
K2
2
= k K p c pk k= ≥ +1 2 2 3 2,..., Ψ 3 8J L




= l K p c p pkl kl k= ≥ +1 3 3 4 3 2,..., ,Ψ 3 8J L
M kl4
1
= m K p cklm= <1 4 4,...,> C
M kl4
2
= m K p cklm= ≥1 4 4,...,> C  for k,l ∈ {1,...,K}
Optimal supply in period 4 may be written as  xklm4  = w 3  =
w x x xk kl0 1 2 3− − −1 63 84 9δ δ δ , for m ∈ M kl42 , see (A2.7). For l ∈ L k32 , optimal supply in
period 3 may be written as xkl3  = w 2  − x4
− /δ  = w x xk0 1 2− −1 63 8δ δ  −  x4− /δ , see
(A2.12). For k ∈ K22 , the optimal supply in period 2 may be written as xk2  =





 even for l ∈ L k32  and m ∈ M kl42 . Using (A2.7),
(A2.12), (A2.17) and (A2.19), we can rewrite the objective of model (A2.18) as
follows – see also (A2.15):
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with A1 and B1 constants. The term between brackets is the expected surplus value
from selling now in stead of in one of the periods 2, 3 or 4. It is the difference
between revenues from selling in period 1 and expected revenues from selling in
period 2, 3 or 4, or not selling at all. Define:
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(A2.20) can be written as x 1 (p1–c1–Ψ 2)  + A1 + B1w 0. If p 1 –c 1 –Ψ 2 > 0, it is more
profitable to sell now, then to store the goods and sell in one of the future periods. In
that case the producer supplies the maximum quantity possible, i.e. the available
supply w 0, minus the minimum quantities which have to sold in the future periods: x 1
= w 0 –  x2
− /δ  –  x3− /δ 2  – x4− /δ 3 . If p 1–c1–Ψ 2 < 0 , it is more profitable to sell in
this period only the minimally required quantity x1
−
, and to sell the remainder in the
future periods. If p 1–c1 –Ψ2 = 0 , the optimal solution is not unique. Optimal supply




if any solution  between  and  is optimal
p c x x
p c x w
x x x
p c x x w
1 1 2 1 1





1 1 2 1 1 0
< + =














We have shown that in each period t = 1,...,4, the optimal cereal supply, xt, is:
• the minimally required quantity x t =xt- , if the price is below a border level, p t < c t
+Ψ t+1
• the available stock minus quantities to be saved for minimally required future
sales − see (A2.7), (A2.12), (A2.17) and (A2.22), if the price is above the border
















• any solution between the minimum and maximum quantities is optimal, if the
price is equal to the border level, p t = c t +Ψ t+1.
Ψ 2 is defined in (A2.21), Ψ 3 is defined in (A2.16), Ψ 4 is given in (A2.11), and Ψ 5 =
0. The supply functions are presented schematically in Figure A2.1.
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Figure A2.1: Schematic representation of the optimal supply for the periods 1, 2, 3
and 4.








Appendix 3:   Parameter estimation
In Section 8.1 a survey is given of empirical evidence of cereal supply and demand,
both in terms of quantities and timing. This survey is based on a review of a number
of studies on cereal trade, supply and demand, which have been performed in Burkina
Faso in the past. The most important results of these studies will be discussed in this
Appendix. A comparison of the different studies is not given in this Appendix, but in
Section 8.1. Results of the studies are used in Section 9.1 and 9.2 to estimate the
parameters of cereal demand functions and of producer supply behaviour.
A3.1   Urban and rural population
In Section 8.1.1 the size of the urban and rural population is estimated for the year
2000. These estimates are used in Section 9.1 and 9.2 to estimate aggregate regional
demand and supply. Estimates of the urban and rural population are based on the
1985 and 1996 census (1995a,b, 1998). Based on these data, expected growth rates of
the urban and rural population can be calculated (see Table A3.1).
A remarkable observation is the annual growth of the urban population in Mouhoun
of 18.78%. The reason for this is that the demographic surveys define an area as
‘urban’ if it has a certain minimal socio-economic and administrative infrastructure
(administration services, schools, electricity, water), and if it houses more than 10,000
people (INSD, 1995a). In two of the three provinces in the CRPA Mouhoun
(Mouhoun and Kossi) no areas were characterised as ‘urban’ in 1985, which had
changed in 1996. Therefore, the urban population in these two provinces increased
from zero in 1985 to 68,394 in 1996, resulting in a yearly increase of 18.78% for the
entire CRPA. The same applies for the CRPA Centre Est, where the urban population
in the province of Kouritenga increases from zero in 1985 to 53,339 in 1996. Since it
is not realistic to assume that the yearly urbanisation rate continues to be that high,
these rates for the CRPA Mouhoun and Centre Est are supposed to be the same as the
Table A3.1 Urban and rural population in 1985 and 1996, and population growht rates.
Population1 Population 1996 Population 1985 annual growth 1985-19962
CRPA Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural
Centre 1514048 709736 804312 959743 441514 518229 4.23% 4.41% 4.08%
Centre Nord 928321 51851 876470 729189 25814 703375 2.22% 6.55% 2.02%
Centre Ouest 989766 95024 894742 827419 51926 775493 1.64% 5.65% 1.31%
Centre Sud 530696 17146 513550 565227 14242 550985 -0.57% 1.70% -0.64%
Sahel 708332 23768 684564 521911 10956 510955 2.82% 7.29% 2.69%
Mouhoun 1146689 83612 1063077 889803 12588 877215 2.33% 18.78% 1.76%
Est 934275 42920 891355 682246 20857 661389 2.90% 6.78% 2.75%
Centre Est 772530 84805 687725 600722 23331 577391 2.31% 12.45% 1.60%
Nord 955420 86982 868438 760408 53057 707351 2.10% 4.60% 1.88%
Sud Ouest 518343 16424 501919 456375 10657 445718 1.16% 4.01% 1.09%
Hauts Bassins 988988 326352 662636 721695 228668 493027 2.91% 3.29% 2.72%
Comoe 325201 62548 262653 249967 35319 214648 2.42% 5.33% 1.85%
Total 10312609 1601168 8711441 7964705 928929 7035776 2.38% 5.07% 1.96%
1) INSD, 1995a,b, 1998, 2) Annual  population growth (in %) = ((pop.1996/pop.1985)1/11-1)*100%
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national average: 5.07%. For the other CRPA’s the growth rates are not exceptionally
high. For all CRPA’s it is supposed that the expected rural and urban growth rates
after 1996 remain the same as presented in Table A3.1. The expected urban, rural and
total population can now be estimated for the year 2000, see Table 8.1 in Section
8.1.1. These population figures are estimated as:
expected urban population 2000 = urban population 1996 * (1 + urban growth rate)4
expected rural population 2000 = rural population 1996 * (1 + rural growth rate)4
expected total population 2000 = urban population 2000 + rural population 2000.
A3.2   Cereal production
The annual cereal production per producer, is an important determinant of annual
cereal supplies. Annual cereal supply, estimated in Section 9.2, is based on forecasted
mean cereal production per producer. Production forecasts discussed in Section 8.1.2,
are based on production, cultivated area and yield data for all produced crops, which
are published each year by the ‘Direction des Statistiques Agro-Pastorales’ of the
Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources. Aggregating the production data of
millet, red sorghum, white sorghum and maize gives the total cereal production per
year, and the average cereal production for the period 1984-1998 (see Table A3.2).
The data presented in Table A3.2 to Table A3.5 and Figures A3.1 to A3.3 enable us
to make the following observations:
1. Production, cultivated area and yield levels show a clear trend. Regression
analysis shows that national production, cultivated area and yield levels increase
significantly with a linear trend  (at the 99% significance level). Production
increases a bit faster than cultivated area, since this increase is caused by both
area expansion and yield improvement.
2. Production increases per CRPA between 1984 and 1998 were also significant at
the 95% level for most CRPA (except for Centre (significant at 80% level),
Centre Ouest (significant al 90% level), Centre Sud (significant at 80% level),
and ComoJ (significant at 70% level)).
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3. Area increases were significant at the 95% significance level for the CRPA Sahel,
Centre Ouest, Mouhoun, Est, and Comoe, and at the 80% significance level for
the CRPA Nord and Hauts Bassins. Some of the area increases were rather
striking – see Table A3.3. Area increases in the CRPA Mouhoun may be logical
because of land reclamation programmes along the Volta Noire river. It is,
however, uncertain whether area increases as reported for the CRPA Sahel are
lasting. This region is not very suitable for agriculture, and it is therefore, risky to
suppose that the cultivated area continuous to increase as predicted by
extrapolation of the trend line. Also differences between years are large. In some
years acreage increases explosively, in other years, acreage decreases.
4. In 1991 average yields show a sharp increase (see Figure A3.1). Table A3.4
shows that compared to the period 1984-1990, the average cultivated area
between 1991-1998 was 15% higher, average yield was 28% higher and average
production even 48%. Although the pattern is the same for most CRPA, some
CRPA show on average a decreased cultivated area during the last seven years.
On the other hand, for example the CRPA Sahel shows an increased yield of 55%
and an increased production of even 100%. It is not realistic to assume that such
increases proceed for the years following this period. These high increases are
probably partly caused by favourable rainfall during those years – see Table A3.5.
Figure A3.1 also shows the trend lines if the period is cut in two: the period 1984-
1990 and the period 1991-1998. Yield levels and production in the second period
show a total different trend from the trend in the first period, they even slightly
decrease. However, because of the few observations, the trend lines are not
significant. Despite this, the figure shows that it is risky to assume that production
increases yearly as presented in the 1984-1998 trend line.
5. Comparing the yearly expansion (decrease) of cultivated area with the rural
population growth presented in Table A3.1 reveals that for some CRPA cultivated
area increases faster than rural population, whereas in most CRPA population
growth exceeds cultivated area growth (see Table A3.3). For the country as a
whole, acreage expansion is lower than rural population growth. This shows that
in total farmers cultivate less land per person every year.
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6. Production, yield and acreage depend for a large part on rainfall. The tables and
figures show that production, yields and area cultivated were lower than average
in 1984, 1987, 1990 and 1997. These lower productions were mainly caused by
low rainfall. Rainfall data of the National Meteorological Institute of Burkina
Faso show that the 1984-’98 average yearly rainfall was 711 mm, while only 531
mm of rain fell in 1984, 601 mm in 1987, 577 mm in 1990, and 663 mm of rain
fell in 1997 (see table Table A3.5; see also figure A3.3). Linear regression
analysis shows that production, yield and acreage depend significantly (at 99%
significance level) on rainfall. This dependence is, however, not clear for all
years. For example for the years 1992 and 1993 rainfall decreases with 13%
compared to 1991, which is not reflected in lower cereal production. Production
even increases slightly in 1992 and 1993. Regression results show that production
forecasts depend for 58% on rainfall (R2 = .58), yield for 47% and the area
cultivated for 51%. Rainfall data per CRPA (aggregates for the rainfall stations in
each CRPA) did not demonstrate the same dependance of production, yield and
acreage on rainfall for all CRPA. Rainfall had a significant influence (90%
significance level) on production in the CRPA Centre Nord, Centre Sud, Sahel,
Mouhoun, Est and Nord, on cultivated area in the CRPA Sahel, Mouhoun, Centre
Est, Est and Nord, and on yield in the CRPA Centre Nord, Centre Ouest, Centre
Sud, Sahel, Est and Nord.
Table A3.2 Area cultivated with cereals (ha/year), cereal production (tonnes/year), and average cereal yields
(kg/ha/year) for each CRPA.
Production 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Centre
Area 197910 171575 186629 109727 196623 258140 197000 189000 196300 196346 203580 177638 181580 201529 216342
production 64227 113791 126353 46576 134871 170745 110700 163300 158900 156542 120157 146922 128927 83912 160239
average yield1 325 663 677 424 686 661 562 864 809 797 590 827 710 416 741
Centre Nord
Area 241556 247012 293209 250032 303680 317519 217000 201000 235600 293113 319035 250013 249264 268876 279946
production 88709 122436 158125 81666 216879 135118 107000 164900 205000 186034 201992 180514 168645 109013 231723
average yield 367 496 539 327 714 426 493 820 870 635 633 722 677 405 828
Centre Ouest
Area 184065 236443 274106 289740 298990 302641 320800 297600 293100 332888 365908 287705 286859 286501 303941
production 102276 165127 176629 161211 229037 211612 165000 218400 131400 289408 269952 208404 228080 171668 208200
average yield 556 698 644 556 766 699 514 734 448 869 738 724 795 599 685
Centre Sud
Area 168363 177319 199505 199758 193088 93791 179200 212500 207000 187150 201275 172568 162901 175038 195904
production 91075 136229 150079 112041 122314 71166 88000 203100 196100 169555 124066 145579 157873 137504 166518
average yield 541 768 752 561 633 759 491 956 947 906 616 844 969 786 850
Sahel
Area 132367 200741 201440 145095 221519 298341 252000 268100 279200 286515 335981 252926 236564 236357 248207
production 56084 62621 63830 46251 113210 109522 94100 182700 195200 155680 213183 119872 105453 93309 184133
average yield 424 312 317 319 511 367 373 681 699 543 635 474 446 395 742
Cont. Table A3.2
Production 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Mouhoun
Area 221322 270455 301380 327242 382496 388122 401000 478600 461500 480789 478129 419625 436827 502234 493242
production 172066 216453 253977 200907 297373 304094 244000 424600 456300 449722 379118 357454 464081 332820 393798
average yield 777 800 843 614 777 784 608 887 989 935 793 852 1062 663 798
Est
Area 112047 194010 287390 267065 258562 257720 234000 276300 290700 311383 297152 312205 301974 301368 321799
production 77122 156138 226559 190170 198380 205413 149000 185200 216700 291796 263146 309639 285466 227489 318286
average yield 688 805 788 712 767 797 637 670 745 937 886 992 945 755 989
Centre Est
area 143249 186338 190902 173044 218308 196549 62400 158800 168000 191673 197216 171353 188411 196424 183742
production 82965 126763 110108 114303 124823 153761 26300 119800 145300 188715 158743 202476 200341 141676 167278
Average yield 579 680 577 661 572 782 421 754 865 985 805 1182 1063 721 910
Nord
area 139253 216939 156830 246040 275414 249011 214000 261700 271500 248850 243104 194625 227721 209791 268843
Production 72333 109694 90073 101005 190761 118703 63300 195500 160200 146924 169412 108319 176608 99046 230854
Average yield 519 506 574 411 693 477 296 747 590 590 697 557 776 472 859
Sud Ouest
area 154069 150350 158814 195417 185626 188983 208000 192000 231000 173517 182467 175146 145803 160009 168165
Production 90083 109100 115504 114633 93696 112213 166000 173000 219000 160377 171893 156814 148596 162058 174906
Average yield 585 726 727 587 505 594 798 901 948 924 942 895 1019 1013 1040
Cont. Table A3.2
Hauts Bassins
area 132437 141810 162370 178081 204413 227631 143000 156700 141800 202248 197391 187528 179121 190709 187208
Production 129248 143151 161915 172411 216960 235090 178000 254000 255800 203166 255428 218029 223040 275159 244848
Average yield 976 1009 997 968 1061 1033 1245 1621 1804 1005 1294 1163 1245 1443 1308
Comoe
area 69205 67812 66295 74266 75007 81863 58000 65000 82400 62271 57810 49500 49058 52851 56119
Production 67183 72821 64021 67661 74356 69960 66000 94000 77000 82536 87080 58331 72049 79630 72550
Average yield 971 1074 966 911 991 855 1138 1446 934 1325 1506 1178 1469 1507 1293
Total
Area 1895843 2260804 2478870 2455507 2813726 2860311 2486400 2757300 2858100 2966743 3079048 2650832 2646083 2781687 2923458
Production 1093371 1534324 1697173 1408835 2012660 1897397 1457400 2378500 2416900 2480455 2414170 2212353 2359159 1913284 2553333
Average yield 577 679 685 574 715 663 586 863 846 836 784 835 892 688 873
Notes: 1) Average yield levels are estimated by dividing total cereal production by total cultivated area. The ministry of agriculture estimates
regional production by multiplying estimated yield (the average of a sample of measured yield levels) by estimated acreage for each crop.
However, we consider here aggregate cereal production and acreage. These are estimated by adding up the production levels and cultivated
areas of the different crops and provinces in a CRPA. Consequently, average ‘cereals’ yield levels can not be estimated on the basis of reported
yield levels for each crop, but have to be based on total cereal production and total cultivated acreage.
Source: MinistPre de l’agriculture et de l’Jlevage, 1984-1999.
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Table A3.3 Average yearly growth of cultivated area between 1984 and 1998 and











Centre 0.79% 4.08% Centre Est 0.68% 1.60%
Centre Nord 0.25% 2.02% Nord 1.44% 1.88%
Centre Ouest 1.66% 1.31% Sud Ouest -0.01% 1.09%
Centre Sud 0.23% -0.64% Hauts Bassins 1.39% 2.72%
Sahel 2.83% 2.69% Comoe -2.23% 1.85%
Mouhoun 4.25% 1.76% Total 1.69% 1.96%
Est 3.41% 2.75%
Notes: 1) Based on a regression of yearly cultivated area as a function of time, see Table A3.2 for data
on cultivated area per CRPA. Growth of cultivated area = (predicted surface 1998/predicted surface
1984)1/15 - 1; 2) Presented in Table A3.1.
Table A3.4 Average cultivated area (ha), production (tonnes) and yield (kg/ha) for














Area 188229 195289 3.75% Area 167256 181952 8.79%
production 109609 139862 27.60% production 105575 165541 56.80%
average yield 582 716 22.99% average yield 631 910 44.13%
Centre Nord Nord
Area 267144 262106 -1.89% Area 213927 240767 12.55%
production 129990 180978 39.22% production 106553 160858 50.97%
average yield 487 690 41.90% average yield 498 668 34.14%
Centre Ouest Sud Ouest 0 0 0.00%
Area 272398 306813 12.63% Area 177323 178513 0.67%
production 172985 215689 24.69% production 114461 170830 49.25%
average yield 635 703 10.70% average yield 645 957 48.25%
Centre Sud Hauts Bassins
Area 173003 189292 9.42% Area 169963 180338 6.10%
production 110129 162537 47.59% production 176682 241184 36.51%
average yield 637 859 34.89% average yield 1040 1337 28.65%
Sahel Comoe
Area 207358 267981 29.24% Area 70350 59376 -15.60%
Production 77945 156191 100.39% production 68857 77897 13.13%
average yield 376 583 55.05% average yield 979 1312 34.04%
Mouhoun Total
Area 327431 468868 43.20% Area 2464494 2832906 14.95%
production 241267 407237 68.79% production 1585880 2341019 47.62%
average yield 737 869 17.87% average yield 643 826 28.42%
Est 0 0 0.00%
Area 230113 301610 31.07%
production 171826 262215 52.61%
average yield 747 869 16.43%
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Table A3.5 Average yearly rainfall (in mm) and national cereal production (in
1000 tonnes) from 1984 to 1998.




















Year (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
1984 511 473 602 622 301 676 522 532 443 789 531 1093
1985 617 437 764 764 345 782 534 628 501 1167 624 1534
1986 732 565 1021 1029 297 826 623 750 557 871 685 1697
1987 664 529 725 874 278 725 580 709 447 778 601 1409
1988 713 740 705 764 399 751 746 853 651 1060 713 2013
1989 658 579 772 1061 429 686 607 891 713 809 698 1897
1990 639 508 656 658 359 626 603 615 423 819 577 1457
1991 658 745 1037 1120 574 908 685 822 807 947 859 2379
1992 615 581 643 826 407 726 622 768 685 1028 697 2417
1993 715 587 776 962 266 823 658 592 548 793 668 2480
1994 718 588 760 826 543 1131 648 721 592 897 992 2414
1995 700 695 756 924 396 716 764 717 660 1278 779 2212
1996 677 558 826 1153 333 872 702 753 708 901 772 2359
1997 588 527 633 864 414 913 595 659 371 853 663 1913
1998 668 710 722 1068 594 990 830 803 782 1123 809 2553
Aver.2 658 588 760 901 396 810 648 721 592 941 711 1989
Notes: 1) Data are missing for the CRPA Sud Ouest and Comoe; 2) Average rainfall (column (a) – (k))
and average production (column (l)) for the period 1984 - 1998. a) – j) Averages of annual rainfall data
for the following stations: a) Ouagadougou; b) Bam, Kaya; c) Koudougou, Leo; d) Po; e) Djibo, Dori,
Arabinda; f) Boromo, Dedougou; g) Bogande, Diapaga, Fada N’Gourma, Kantchari; h)Tenkodogo,
Zabre, Koupela; i) Ouahigouya, Yako; j) Hounde, Bobo Dioulasso. k) Average rainfall for Burkina Faso
is the average over all stations. l) Annual cereal production is given in Table A3.2.
Source: MJtJo: National Meteorological Institute of Burkina Faso.
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Surface Surface (estimated) Surface ’84-’90/’91-’98
Source: Production, yield and surface data by DSAP of the Ministry of Agriculture.
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Nord Sud Ouest Hauts Bassins "Comoe"
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Figure A3.2b: Cereal production levels per CRPA
























































Nord Sud Ouest Hauts Bassins Comoe
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Figure A3.2c: Cultivated area per CRPA











































Nord Sud Ouest Hauts Bassins Comoe
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Figure A3.3: Production, yield and acreage as a function of rainfall

















































yield Yield (linear trend) Yield (Polynomal trend)
Source: Rainfall data by MJtJo, meteorological institute of Burkina Faso. Production,
surface and yield data by DSAP of the Minstry of Agriculture and Animal Resources.
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A3.3   Sales
In Section 8.1.3 factors influencing annual cereal sales and distribution of cereal sales
over the year have been discussed. This discussion is based on a number of surveys
performed in the past in Burkina Faso on cereal sales behaviour of households, which
will be discussed below. The data presented are used in Section 9.2 to analyse
producer supply behaviour.
Surveys by the Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin
The Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin executed in the unfavourable rainfall
season 1983-‘84 a survey on the dynamics of grain marketing in Burkina Faso. Part of
this survey concentrated on producer behaviour. In five villages across three
ecological zones (the first five villages in Table A3.6) 224 households were sampled.
Results of a study by SAFGRAD and Purdue University in the same year among 102
households in four villages were also used. Szarleta (1987) and Sherman et al. (1987)
report on cereal sales in these nine villages (see Table A3.6). The difference between
deficit and surplus villages is clear. In general, households in surplus villages sell a
larger quantity of cereals and a larger part of their cereal harvest. Also the number of
households selling cereals is larger in surplus villages than in deficit villages. Figures
would be different in a normal rainfall year, but the pattern would probably remain
similar.
ICRISAT surveys
ICRISAT carried out extensive farming systems studies in six villages in Burkina
Faso from 1981 to 1985. They weekly surveyed 150 households from two villages in
the province of Soum (WourJ and Silgey; average household size 10.2 people) in the
north of Burkina Faso, two villages in the centre in the province of PassorJ (Ouonon
and Kolbila; average household size 12.2 persons) and two villages in the south-west
in the province of Mouhoun (Sayero and Koho; average household size 12 people).
Based on food production they classified households as surplus or shortage
household. Shortage households were those which had a food production with a calo-
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Table A3.6 Average cereal sales per household in different regions in the season




















































































Notes: 1) S = village with a surplus during the survey period, D = village in deficit during the survey
period, S/D = village with a production which is more or less equal to the cereal consumption
requirements of the village; 2) The total number of sample households between brackets; 3) Data for the
first 5 villages are given in Consumer Equivalents (CE), and in Adult Equivalents (AE) for the last 4
villages. CE and AE are used to convert the lower consumption requirements and labour productivity of
women and children in male consumption requirements and labour productivity units; (b) = total sample
sales / total sample harvest; (c) = total sample sales / (a); (d) = total sample sales / total sample
households; (e) = (d) / average household size in AE.
Source: Szarleta (1987), Sherman et al. (1987), Pardy (1987).
ric value below 80% of the WHO average yearly caloric requirement (requirements
are 2,850 Kcal per adult equivalent; Reardon et al., 1988a). Reardon et al (1987)
report on cereal sales per adult equivalent. These data do not exhibit a clear pattern
between the regions. Sales by surplus households surpass sales of deficient
households, though this difference is small in the province of PassorJ. It has to be
noted that the survey period comprised a period of severe drought with lower than
usual production. This may cause the low production in the province of Mouhoun,
and the abnormal feature that production in Soum exceeds production in the other,
more fertile provinces. The sales pattern may not be representative for an average
rainfall year.
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Table A3.7 Cereals sales and production per adult equivalent between 1981-1985,




















Sales (kg) 3.27 15.2 6.8 8.6 6.7 19.0
Production (kg) 109 303 85 216 112 272
Sales (as % of
 production)
3% 5% 8% 4% 6% 7%
Source: Reardon et al. (1987)
Survey by J.T.Broekhuyse
Broekhuyse (1983, 1988, 1998) reports for 20 households in two villages in the
province of Sanmatenga (Koalma and BasberikP) the sales by households applying
manual labour (ML) or households using animal traction (AT) between 1979 and
1985. The average household size was 7.3 for ML housholds, and 10.2 people for AT
households. He observes that on average ML households sell only 25.2 kg of cereals
(3.8% of cereal production), and that AT households sell 58,5 kg of cereals (3.3% of
cereal production).
Survey by O. Pieroni
Pieroni (1990) executed, under the authority of CILSS, a study of the behaviour of
cereal producers. They interviewed between august 1986 and october 1987 114
households in 15 villages in the provinces of Houet (2 villages), ComoJ (3 villages),
KJnJdougou (1 village), Kossi (3 villages), Sissili (3 villages) and Boulgou (3
villages). Rainfall in the 1986-’87 production season had been normal (see Table
A3.5). He reports that in these villages 56.6% of the households sell more than 300
kg. He clearly observes a positive relation between production and the degree of
market participation (see Table A3.8 and Table A3.9). In the survey year, the villages
in ComoJ have a shortage, and the villages in Sissili are either just in equilibrium or
have a shortage. These villages lodge only a few households selling large quantities
of cereals. In Sissili, households selling more than 1000 kg are absent. On the other
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hand, the villages in Houet, KJnJdougou and Boulgou have a surplus and most
households sell large quantities on the market. Hardly any household sells less than
100 kg. The province of Kossi holds an intermediate position, with two surplus
villages and one shortage village. In both the shortage and surplus villages in this
province, the number of households selling large quantities almost equals the
households selling little (see Table A3.9).
The provinces of Houet, KJnJdougou and Kossi are the cotton areas of the country,
where the use of modern agricultural techniques is widespread. Despite the fact that
much land and labour is allocated to cotton production, also cereal production is
generally higher than in the other regions of the country. In ComoJ sugar cane is
produced on plantations using the most fertile soil and employing many of the young
labourers. Cultivation of cereals is often not the main source of income, and is for a
large part done by women and older farmers, without the use of modern techniques.
In the provinces of Sissili and Boulgou modern agricultural techniques are not
widespread, but soil fertility and rainfall are suitable. Trade conditions are also pretty
favourable because of the presence of the Ghanian border. Pieroni clearly shows that
sales are highly correlated with production. Although it does not apply for all
households, it can be said that the more cereals a household produces, the more it
sells. Those households are most of the time the larger households cultivating more
land with more people. Other factors influencing household sales are capital needs,
social relations (household composition and ethnic lineage) and the regional
importance of the market (whether it is only a small local market or whether it is a
larger market on which more products are traded).
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ZabrJ (S) 8 22.0 6.10 6340 2598 118.1 41.0%
Hono-bissa (S/D) 8 12.9 4.03 2488 1036 80.5 41.6%
Yoroko (S) 8 7.8 4.96 2660 1078 139.1 40.5%
Boulgou 24 14.2 5.03 3829 1571 110.6 41.0%
Fara Sissili (D) 8 15.8 3.42 2470 138 8.7 5.6%
Nabou (S/D) 8 15.3 4.87 2752 221 14.5 8.0%
Ton (S/D) 8 10.5 4.14 2060 232 22.1 11.3%
Sissili 24 13.8 4.14 2427 197 14.2 8.1%
Solenzo (S) 8 11.4 4.09 3139 1118 98.3 35.6%
KiJ (D) 7 12.4 2.82 1936 541 43.5 28.0%
LJkoro (S) 6 10.8 7.56 3846 626 57.8 16.3%
Kossi 21 11.6 4.66 2940 785 67.9 26.7%
DandJ (S) 8 20.0 11.17 5148 1606 80.3 31.2%
Fara KJnJdougou (S) 8 10.9 5.69 2994 1358 124.9 45.4%
KouJrJdJni (S) 7 10.7 6.53 4443 2548 237.8 57.3%
Houet/KJnJdougou 23 14.0 7.85 4184 1806 129.0 43.2%
SiniJna (D) 8 8.4 1.89 1127 155 18.5 13.7%
Diarabakoko (D) 7 13.6 3.88 1263 131 9.6 10.4%
Tangora (D) 7 13.0 2.71 1386 481 37.0 34.7%
ComoJ 22 11.5 2.78 1253 251 21.8 20.0%
Note: 1) S = village in surplus during the survey period, D = village in deficit during the survey period,
S/D = village with a production which is more or less equal to the cereal consumption requirements of
the village; 2) The number of sample households in the sample villages; 3) Average number of
household members. (e) = (d)/(a), (f) = (d)/(c)*100%. Source: Pieroni (1990).
Survey by E.P. Yonli
Yonli (1997) executed a survey from October 1991 to June 1993 in 4 villages in
Yatenga (24 households; on average 14.6 people per household) and 4 villages in
Sanmatenga (21 households; on average 11.1 people per household), see Table A3.10.
In the 1991 agricultural season, rainfall was far above the 1970-’93 average in both
provinces.34 Production in the CRPA in which the villages are situated was above
                                                              
34
 Yatenga: average rainfall: 550 mm, 1991 rainfall: 680 mm; Sanmatenga: average rainfall: 617 mm,
1991 rainfall: 821 mm. Data from National Meteorological Institute of Burkina Faso.
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Table A3.9 Number of households (in %) selling less than 100 kg, between 100 kg
and 1000 kg, or more than 1000 kg of cereals, for some villages in
1986-87, by Pieroni (1990).
Villages/Provinces1) N2) < 100 kg 100-1000 kg > 1000 kg
Zabre (S) 8 12.5% 25.0% 62.5%
Hono-bissa (S/D) 8 0.0% 50.0% 50.0%
Yoroko (S) 8 0.0% 62.5% 37.5%
Boulgou 24 4.2% 45.8% 50.0%
Fara Sissili (D) 8 62.5% 37.5% 0.0%
Nabou (S/D) 7 42.9% 57.1% 0.0%
Ton (S/D) 8 37.5% 62.5% 0.0%
Sissili 23 47.8% 52.2% 0.0%
Solenzo (S) 8 50.0% 25.0% 25.0%
Kie (D) 7 28.6% 42.9% 28.6%
Lekoro (S) 6 33.3% 33.3% 33.3%
Kossi 21 38.1% 33.3% 28.6%
Dande (S) 8 0.0% 50.0% 50.0%
Fara Kenedougou (S) 8 0.0% 50.0% 50.0%
Koueredeni (S) 7 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Houet/Kenedougou 23 0.0% 34.8% 65.2%
Siniena (D) 8 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
Diarabakoko (D) 7 71.4% 28.6% 0.0%
Tangora (D) 7 57.1% 14.3% 28.6%
Comoe 22 59.1% 31.8% 9.1%
Total 29.2% 39.8% 31.0%
Note: 1) See not 1 in Table A3.8; 2) Number of households in the sample. Source: Pieroni (1990).
average in both the ‘91-’92 and ‘92-’93 season, but nevertheless, both regions knew a
shortage production, or were almost in equilibrium (see Table A3.2). For the sample
villages, only the village of Noungou had a surplus production. It is remarkable to see
that this is also the village with the smallest average household size. Both provinces
produced mainly sorghum (Yatenga 61.7% and Sanmatenga 89.2% sorghum as
percentage of cereal production). In the village of Noungou even 94.8% of cereal
production consisted of sorghum. The data clearly show that, although a very small
part of production was sold, sales were higher in the higher production province. The
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data per village show the same pattern. The differences between the villages are large,
but even within a village differences are considerable. The standard deviation of the
sold quantity was for most villages larger than the average sales.
Table A3.10 Cereal sales in some villages in Yatenga and Sanmatenga from

















    Ramsa 3 14.3 5.0 0.35 128.9
    SJguJnJga 7 14.7 0.0 0.00 131
    Kalsaka 7 15.6 0.0 0.00 111.0
    Kossouka 7 13.4 3.2 0.24 132.4
Yatenga 24 14.6 1.6 0.11 125.3
    Nessemtenga 1 12.0 0.0 0.00 n.a.2
    Soubeira 5 14.2 26.8 1.89 172.6
    Noungou 8 8.8 79.2 9.00 234.6
    SinguJ 7 11.3 46.2 4.09 132.1
Sanmatenga 21 11.1 57.6 5.24 179.7
Notes: 1) The first four villages are in Yatenga, the last four villages are in Sanmatenga. (c) = (b)/(a). 2)
n.a.: not available. Source: Yonli (1997)
Seasonal sales pattern
Some authors also report on the sales per season. Most authors observe, what has
become a general characteristic of African agriculture, that farmers sell in the post-
harvest, low-price season and buy in the pre-harvest, high-price season.
Surveys by Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin
The seasonal sales pattern is also observed by Sherman et al. (1987). Table A3.11
“reveals that the postharvest quarter is indeed the heaviest sales period for the largest
number of households” (Ellsworth and Shapiro, 1989). On the other hand, the sales
volume is more evenly distributed than is often thought. This indicates that many
households have to sell small quantities immediately following the harvest. A smaller
number of farmers can sell larger quantities later in the year. The sales pattern per
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village shows that especially in BarJ, where by far the largest volume is sold (see
Table A3.6), most households sell in the two post-harvest quarters from October to
March. It has to be noted that cereal sales are only a part of the total amount of cereals
that leave the farm. The quantity of cereals given to others via non-market transfers
may be more than the amount sold. These gifts are often payments for agricultural
work, and therefore a veiled form of sales (Ellsworth and Shapiro, 1989).
Table A3.11 Total cereal sales per quarter for five Burkina Faso villages in 1984, by
Sherman et al. (1987).
 Periods Jan-Mar Apr-June July-Oct 10 Oct 11-Dec Total number of
selling
households3
Sales (kg)1 9,520 (33%) 4,885 (17%) 6,347 (22%) 7,811 (27%)
Number of households2
MenJ (Yatenga) 2 0 3 0 5 (46)
BougourJ (PassorJ) 0 0 0 1 1 (42)
Tissi (Sourou) 1 1 1 9 12 (40)
Dankui (Mouhoun) 2 0 0 1 3 (42)
BarJ (Houet) 16 4 4 23 47 (50)
Total 21 5 8 34 68 (220)
Notes: 1) Percent of annual total between brackets; 2) The data give the number of households in five
villages with their largest volume of sales in a certain quarter. Only those households are considered who
sold more than 25 kg; 3) Number of sample households between brackets. Source: Sherman et al (1987)
Pardy (1987) confirms the phenomenon of post-harvest sales, based on an analysis of
the seasonal sales for the four surplus villages surveyed by SAFGRAD (see page
A.284). He divides the year in four seasons: the harvest season from October to
December, the dry season from January to March, the hot season from April to June
and the rainy season from July to September. His data show that for three of the four
villages sales were largest and most households were selling during the dry season
(see Table A3.12). However, for two villages the largest sales per household are made
during the rainy season when the prices are more favourable. Only in the village of
PoJdogo most cereals are sold during the harvest season. The large sales volume
during the dry season in Dissankuy, which is in a cotton producing area, is striking.
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These sales may be due to late payments of cotton sales, which compels households
to earn money from other sources, for example cereal sales.
Table A3.12 Cereal sales per trimester for four villages from October 1983 to
September 1984.


























































































Notes: 1) Number of households selling during that period; 2) total sales in kg; 3) percentage of yearly
total; 4) sales per selling household in kg. Source: Pardy (1987).
Pardy also looks at sales differences between households of different wealth (see
Table A3.13). He identifies very poor, poor, average and wealthy households on the
basis of the total value of their livestock in December 1983 and their agricultural
equipment in 1984. These posessions indicate the possibility to use other sources to
face cash needs. The majority of households sells during the dry season. The number
of households selling during the harvest season is also very large for all types of
households, except the weatlhy. From those households which profit from the higher
prices during the July – September period, most have an average wealth. They also
have the largest sales per household. Of all households selling between April and
June, the wealthy households sell the largest quantity. For all wealth groups, except
the very poor, at least 30% of the households which sell during the year, also sell
during the rainy season between July and September. Pardy notes that the richer
households sell in less periods. 56% of the poor households sells in three periods,
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compared to 46% of the average and 38% of the wealthy households. This strategy
corresponds to the need to sell cereals to satisfy capital requirements for the poor
households.
Table A3.13 Cereal sales per trimester four different different types of households,
for four villages from October 1983 to September 1984.













































































Notes: 1) Number of households selling during that period; 2) total sales in kg; 3) percentage of yearly
total; 4) sales per selling household in kg. Source: Pardy (1987).
ICRISAT surveys
Reardon et al (1987) also report on seasonal sales patterns for the period harvest 1981
to rainy season 1985 (see Table A3.14). Their data do not exhibit evidence of ‘forced
sales’. It does not show up that deficient households sell in the post-harvest period,
and surplus households sell whenever prices are higher. It only follows, which was
already reported in Table A3.7, that surplus households sell more than deficient
households. The data in this table do not demonstrate a clear relation between
production and sales. It has to be noted, however, that sales patterns during the survey
years may have been different from normal because of the bad rainfall during these
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years, which were in almost all cases below average, and in some cases even
dramaticaly low.35
Table A3.14 Seasonal sales in kg. per adult equivalent by region for the main cereal
sold.
‘81-‘82 ‘82-‘83 ‘83-‘84 ‘84-‘85
Seasons1 hr cl ht rn Hr cl ht Rn hr cl ht rn hr cl ht rn
Soum,  deficient2: millet 5 9 2 2 1 1 2
             surplus2: millet 6 5 3 3 1 14 2 9 7 2 15
PassorJ, deficient: w.sorghum 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 7 1
             surplus: w.sorghum 2 1 2 1 3 2 9 4 5 5 1 3 2 1 1
Mouhoun,deficient: w.sorghum
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Notes: 1) Seasons: harvest (hr = sept-nov), cold (cl = dec-feb), hot (ht = mar-may), rainy (rn = june-aug);
2) Deficient refers to shortage households, surplus to the surplus households. Source: Reardon et al.
(1987)
Survey by E.P. Yonli
Yonli (1997) gives monthly sales for some villages in Yatenga and Sanmatenga
between October 1991 and June 1993. Monthly sales are, especially in Yatenga, very
small, but data clearly show that sales are larger during the post-harvest season (from
October till March). This is even more clearly seen from quarterly sales. For the
survey villages in Yatenga, sales during the lean season are totally absent. The survey
villages in Sanmatenga did sell during the second and third quarters, but less than in
the other quarters, although sales during the second quarter of 1993 were larger than
during the preceding harvest season. A reason for the higher sales during the first and
second quarter of 1993 compared to the same quarters in 1992, may be caused by the
average cereal production which was for the villages in Sanmatenga much larger in
1992 than in 1991 (179.7 kg per person in 1991 and 237.3 kg per person in 1992).
                                                              
35
 For example, rainfall in Djibo in the CRPA Soum was in 1984 about one third lower than the 1970-
1993 average rainfall. Rainfall in DJdougou in the CRPA Mouhoun was in 1981 25% below the 1970-
1993 average rainfall.
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Table A3.15 Montly sales in kg per person between October 1991 and June 1993,
by Yonli (1997).
Month/Year Yatenga Sanmatenga Month/Year Yatenga Sanmatenga
10-91 0 0 9-92 0 0
11-91 0.03 1.07 3d quarter 92 0 0.21
12-91 0.02 1.11 10-92 0 0.08
4th quarter 91 0.05 2.18 11-92 0.16 0.30
1-92 0 1.13 12-92 0.04 0.62
2-92 0.06 1.33 4th quarter 92 0.20 1.00
3-92 0 0.25 1-93 0.02 1.36
1st quarter 92 0.06 2.71 2-93 0 2.15
4-92 0 0.20 3-93 0 1.42
5-92 0 0.25 1st quarter 93 0.02 4.93
6-92 0 0.15 4-93 0 0.60
2nd quarter 92 0 0.60 5-93 0 1.46
7-92 0 0.11 6-93 0 0.91
8-92 0 0.10 2nd quarter 93 0 2.97
Note: In Yatenga 24 households and in Sanmatenga 21 households were surveyed. Source: Yonli (1997).
Survey by O. Pieroni
Finally, Pieroni (1990) observes that cereals are sold during the entire year.
Nevertheless, in general a negative relation exists between sales volume and cereal
price. Most cereals are sold during the post-harvest season. He points at a difference
between richer and poorer households. Richer household have the opportunity to
delay a part of their sales until prices are more favourable. For example in the
province of Kossi almost 60% of cereal sales is done between July and November,
wheras in Boulgou only 25% is sold in this period. In Boulgou, the largest part is sold
between December and May. Differences between villages and households within a
province are, however, considerable.
To summarize the above review, the different surveys indicate that only a small part
of cereal production is sold on the market. Cereal production levels are the most
important determinant of annual cereal sales, cereal prices are less important. Since
cereal production levels differ considerably between years (see Appendix A3.2), sales
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levels will also fluctuate between the years. In good rainfall years, when cereal
production is good, sales will be higher than in bad rainfall years. In general, surplus
households sell larger quantities than shortage households. Differences between
provinces but also within provinces are large. Cereal sales depend, however, also on
many other factors. Seasonal studies show that most cereals are sold in the post
harvest season. Data suggest, however, that wealthier households prefer to sell later in
the year, when prices are higher. On the other hand poorer households are often
obliged to sell earlier in the year, at low prices, in order to repay debts. The data
presented in this section are used in Section 7.3 to estimate cereal supply functions.
A3.4   Purchases
Cereal purchase behaviour of BurkinabP consumers is discussed in Section 8.1.4. This
discussion is based on a number of surveys performed in the past in Burkina Faso
which are discussed below. To analyse cereal purchases, a distinction is made
between rural and urban consumers. Urban consumers purchase all cereals on the
market, wheras rural consumers purchase only a part of their cereals consumption on
the market. A large part of their consumption comes from own production. In this
appendix also the timing of cereal purchases and estimates of price and income
elasticities of cereal demand are discussed. The data presented in this appendix are
used in Section 9.1 to estimate cereal demand as a function of cereal prices. Before
analysing purchase patterns of rural households, first the studies concentrating on
urban cereal demand will be reviewed.
Urban studies
Reardon et al. (1988b) surveyed between October ’84 and September ’85 118
households in Ouagadougou. Their aim was to analyse the substition of traditional
cereals (millet, sorghum and maize) by non-traditional cereals (rice and flour). Based
on household revenues, they classified the households in three groups of equal size,
called poor households (average income 5036 FCFA per adult equivalent (AE) per
month), average households (average income 9082 FCFA/AE/month) and rich
households (average income 15449 FCFA/AE/month). For each household they
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analysed the cereal consumption pattern. As expected, poor households spend a larger
share of their expenses on cereals. The poor spend 31% of their expenses on cereals,
the average households 23%, and the rich households only 16%. Daily purchases for
the different strata were given for four seasons in grams per person per day. In Table
A3.16 cereal purchases are given in percentages, since converting the daily purchases
into yearly purchases resulted in absurd quantities per person.36 They observed that all
households consumed large quantities of rice, though in total more traditional cereals
were used. As expected, the share of non-traditional cereals in daily meals is larger
for richer households than for poor households. Differences between the quarters are
not very large. Consumption of rice is almost the same in all periods. They also
looked at prices. It appeared that poor households paid, in general a higher price for
their cereals than richer households37. The main reason was that richer household had
the opportunity to purchase in larger quantities and to purchase from the
governmental cereal board OFNACER which mainly sold in 100 kg sacs.
The observations that rice consumption increases, is confirmed by the rice production
and import data (see Table A3.17). This table shows that rice production and imports
increase fast. These figures even seem to be very high if the rice consumption per
person is calculated. If the total rice availability (production + imports) in 1996/97 is
divided by the rural population (see Table 8.1), who consume much more rice than
urban households, it is seen that the average rice consumption per urban consumer
would be 100 kg. So, half their consumption would consist of rice. It is not realistic to
assume that all rice is consumed by urban households, but even if rural households
consume a part of the available rice, or if the data in the table are too high, the table
shows that rice consumption increases fast.
                                                              
36
  The rich should purchase 1682 kg of cereals per person per year. This is an absurd quantity, if you
know that required consumption is approximately 190 kg per person.
37
 This difference were significant for rice and maize, but not for sorghum and millet.
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Table A3.16 Cereal purchases  per stratum per quarter in Ouagadougou between
October 1984 and September 1985, Reardon et al. (1988b).
Purchases differences between non-traditional and traditional cereals:
Household Cereal type1 Oct-dec jan-march apr-june july-sept Total
Poor Non-traditional 20% 18% 20% 20% 19%
Traditional 80% 82% 80% 80% 81%
Average Non-traditional 17% 20% 17% 19% 18%
Traditional 83% 80% 83% 81% 82%
Rich Non-traditional 38% 32% 28% 30% 32%
Traditional 62% 68% 72% 70% 68%
Notes: 1) Non-traditional cereals comprise rice and flour; traditional cereals are millet,
sorghum and maize.
Source: Reardon et al. (1988b).
Table A3.17 Local rice production and rice imports in tonnes.
1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98
Local production 53809 61009 84026 111807 89516
Imports 87087 40093 63060 97377 n.a.
Notes: n.a. = not available. Source: MinistPre de l’Agriculture et CGP.
Rural Studies
Surveys by the Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin
Szarleta (1987) reports on the purchase behaviour of the five survey villages
mentioned on page 284. Almost all sample household purchased cereals on the
market. Differences between the villages were, however, large, as well as differences
between households within a village. Table A3.18 shows that purchases in BarJ, in
the surplus zone, are smallest, whereas purchases in MenJ, in the shortage zone, are
largest. Millet and white sorghum are purchased by most households. Also red
sorghum is purchased by many households in Tissi, Dankuie and BarJ, a large part of
which is used for dolo brewing. The data show that 92% of the households in BarJ
sold red sorghum, whereas 58% of them purchased it (on average less was purchased
than sold). So, most purchasing households rebought a part of the red sorghum they
sold. Furthermore, 39 of the 42 sample households in BougourJ and 30 of the 40
households in Tissi purchased white sorghum, whereas 5 households in BougourJ and
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13 in Tissi sold it. So, at least some households rebought a part of their sold cereals.
Unfortunately, for the other cereals it can not be retrieved whether households bought
the same type of cereals as they had sold. It can, however, be expected that many
households which sold cereals early in the season had to rebuy during the lean season.
This phenomenon of rebuying the same type of cereals can partly be explained by the
different roles and responsiblities of a chief and his wife (wives) and the division of
tasks within a household. For example, if one wife of the household sells a part of the
harvest from her personal fields, it is possible that another wife of the household has
to purchase these cereals to feed her children. Except for BarJ, household purchases
are much larger than household sales (see Table A3.6). In 1983-84 BarJ was the only
surplus village in the sample. The other four villages were in shortage or just in
equilibrium. Many households also received and offered cereals to other households
as a gift. Szarleta (1987) observes large differences between the five villages. In Tissi,
almost a third of total consumption was received from gifts (on average 294 kg per
household). Households in this village also gave large quantities of cereals to others
(on average 416 kg per household). For the other villages these gifts were much lower
(on average 61 kg given and 70 kg received per household for the other four villages;
BarJ did not report any cereals given to others). Szarleta explains the importance of
gifts in Tissi by the large muslim population in this village.
Table A3.18 Average cereal purchases per household in different regions in 1983-


































Note: 1) Number of sample households between brackets; 2) S = village in surplus during the survey
period, D = village in deficit during the survey period, S/D = village with a production which is more or
less equal to the cereal consumption requirements of the village. Source: Szarleta (1987).
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Although this paper only considers the aggregate ‘cereals’, and not the individual
crops, it is interesting to look for a moment at differences between the different crops.
Table A3.19 displays production, sales, purchases and consumption disaggregated per
crop for the five survey villages. Data are presented for all households of the sample
villages. Data per household are not representative because an individual household
does not produce or sell necessarily all types of crops. Another reason is that the
number of households producing, selling or purchasing presented in Szarleta (1987)
do not match. The number of selling households may be larger than the number of
producing households, which is rather odd. Aggregate data probably show a more
complete picture than individual data. The data also exhibit other odd patterns. First
of all, sold quantities sometimes exceed production. This might be true if these crops
were still in stock from the previous harvest. It is, however, unlikely that the shortage
village of MenJ has 700 kg of last years’ maize in stock. Secondly, consumption does
not match with produced, sold and purchased quantities. These differences are
influenced by the quantity of gifts received and offered, which Szarleta does not
present per crop. What is striking is the large volume of red sorghum purchases and
consumption in the last three villages. Probably a large part of this is consumed as
dolo. Furthermore, in the northern village of MenJ millet is consumed the most,
wheras the other villages prefer white sorghum. In BarJ, the richest and most fertile
of the five villages, also large quantities of maize are consumed. The data reveal that
in the south-western villages Tissi and BarJ red sorghum is sold in large quantities. It
can, however, not be concluded that it is sold to purchase other types of cereals with
it, as is sometimes suggested. For the villages of MenJ and BarJ, maize also serves as
an income generating crop, although the data for MenJ can be questioned.
ICRISAT surveys
Reardon et al. (1987) showed that purchases were much larger than sales. They
observed a clear difference between deficient and surplus households. The first group,
naturally, purchased more per adult equivalent. The difference between the three
provinces is less clear. They also looked at gifts received and offered, and concluded
that on average households offered more gifts than they received, though the
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quantities were much smaller than those reported by Szarleta (1987), probably
because of the bad harvest. Table A3.20 shows that the importance of purchases in
total consumption is limited for surplus households, but more important for deficient
households.
Survey by E.P. Yonli
Yonli (1997) observes that between October 1991 and September 1992, cereal
purchases by far surpass cereal sales for the 8 survey villages in Yatenga and
Sanmatenga (see Table A3.10). Purchases in Yatenga exceed purchases in the higher
production province Sanmatenga. Purchases are in all villages a substantial part of
total cereal consumption. This is even the case in the village of Noungou, for which
production exceeds consumption, and for which sales are much smaller than the
difference between production and consumption. Part of the excess production is
stored.
Table A3.19 Production, sales and purchases for five survey villages in 1983-94,
reported by Szarleta (1987).
Province Village1 Crop Production (kg) Sales (kg) Purchases (kg) Consumption (kg)

















































































































Notes: 1) S = village in surplus during the survey period, D = village in deficit during the survey period,
S/D = village with a production which is more or less equal to the cereal consumption requirements of
the village. Source: Szarleta (1987).
Table A3.20 Cereal purchases per adult equivalent, by Reardon et al. (1987)
Soum PassorJ MouhounProvince
Deficient Surplus Deficient Surplus Deficient Surplus
Purchases (kg) 35 16 28 5 21 11
Purchases (as % of consumption) 18% 4% 20% 2% 14% 3%
Source: Reardon et al. (1987).
Table A3.21 Cereal purchases in some villages in Yatenga and  Sanmatenga















Purchases as % of
consumption
(d)
    Ramsa 3 14.3 798 55.8 28.1%
    SJguJnJga 7 14.7 307 20.9 11.1%
    Kalsaka 7 15.6 713 45.7 20.9%
    Kossouka 7 13.4 525 39.2 20.1%
Yatenga 24 14.6 552 37.8 18.9%
    Nessemtenga 1 12.0 358 29.8 34.6%
    Soubeira 5 14.2 382 26.9 13.2%
    Noungou 8 8.8 304 34.6 18.4%
    SinguJ 7 11.3 384 34.0 16.0%
Sanmatenga 21 11.1 355 32.3 16.8%
Notes: 1) The first four villages are in Yatenga, the last four villages are in Sanmatenga. (c) = (b)/(a)
Source: Yonli (1997).
Survey by Broekhuyse
Broekhuyse (1983, 1998) observes that in the province of Sanmatenga, the ‘modern’
households using animal traction (AT) purchase more cereals than households
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applying manual labour (ML). AT households purchase on average 554 kg (average
household size 10.2 members), and ML households 322 kg (average household size
7.3 members). This is inconsistent with expectations. AT households produce more,
and accordingly need to purchase less. The data show that AT household purchase
large quantities of red sorghum for brewing dolo. If red sorghum purchases are
distracted from the figures, AT households still purchase more cereals (331 kg for AT
and 276 kg for ML households), but purchases per person are less (32 kg for AT and
38 kg for ML households).
If the different studies are compared it can be seen that preferences differ per
province. Households in the northern provinces (Yatenga and Soum) prefer to
purchase millet, whereas households in the other provinces (PassorJ, Sanmatenga,
Mouhoun, Houet, Kossi) purchase much more white sorghum. In the northern
provinces maize purchases per household were also reported much higher than in the
other provinces. Reardon et al. (1987) attribute this to the maize prices which were
low in these regions because they were sold by official, government sellers. In those
days the government sold cereals at fixed, predetermined prices.
Seasonal purchase pattern
CEDRES survey
Some studies also collected data on seasonal purchase patterns. Despite high prices,
many households purchase most cereals during the lean period, when stores are
almost empty. Researchers from CEDRES (Thiombiano et al. (1988) ) surveyed 104
households in the provinces of Yatenga (Thiou, Nomo, Gourcy and Rom), Bam
(Kongoussi and Loagha) and Sanmatenga (Barsalogho and Tamassogo). They looked,
among other things, to production, consumption, sales and purchases, but presented
results only in monetary terms. Consequently, sold and purchased quantities are
difficult to derive. Table A3.22 shows the distribution of cereal purchases for a period
of 7 months (as a % of total purchase expenditures over this period). The last period is
for households normally the most difficult period of the year. Stores are almost
empty, and people have to work hard on the fields. The province of Sanmatenga
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shows the expected purchase pattern, that more cereals are purchased the closer one
approaches the new harvests (from sept-nov). In Bam, the last period is the period in
which most cereals are purchased, but the first period also shows a large percentage.
The only exception is the province of Yatenga, which shows the opposite pattern.
This is, for an important part, caused by the village of Thiou with exceptionally high
purchases in the first period. These purchases are so high (75% of total) that this
might be a data error. If the village of Thiou is skipped from the data, the pattern is
clearer (28% in feb-mar, 20% in apr-may and 52% in july-aug).
Table A3.22 Distribution of cereal purchases as % of total cereal sales in the period
february to august, by Thiombiano et al. (1988).
Province Febr-Mar Apr-May July-Aug
Yatenga 49% 17% 33%
Sanmatenga 25% 29% 46%
Bam 38% 16% 46%
Source: Thiombiano et al. (1988)
ICRISAT surveys
Reardon et al. (1987) only report on seasonal purchases for deficient households (see
Table A3.23). High purchases in the season 1984-‘85 can be explained by bad
production in both ’83 and ’84. High purchases in ‘82-’83 can however not be
explained by low production, since production in ’81 and ’82 were reasonable. It
must, however, be noted that the table only reports on shortage households. Because
differences within villages and provinces are very large, it is well possible that many
households have a low production, even if total regional production is high. The table
clearly shows the pattern that purchases in the lean period (the hot and rainy season)
were highest. In most years, purchases were highest in the northern province.
Purchases in the province of Mouhoun were also rather high.
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Table A3.23 Seasonal purchases of deficient households between 1981-84 per adult
equivalent by region, reported by Reardon et al. (1987).
‘81-‘82 ‘82-‘83 ‘83-‘84 ‘84-‘85
Season1 hr cl ht rn hr cl ht rn hr cl ht rn hr cl ht rn
Soum: deficient 7 1 5 19 9 19 48 42 6 3 1 11 11 19 27 50
PassorJ: deficient 2 4 3 8 2 3 7 6 4 4 6 7 3 4 16 14
Mouhoun: deficient 5 5 8 2 16 14 21 5 7 13 16 3 4 7 4
Note: 1) Seasons: harvest (hr = sept-nov), cold (cl = dec-feb), hot (ht = mar-may), rainy (rn = june-aug).
Source: Reardon et al. (1987)
Surveys from the Universities from Michigan and Wisconsin
Ellsworth and Shapiro (1989) also give data on seasonal cereal purchases, but only
aggregated for the five sample villages of the surveys from the University of
Michigan. These data clearly show that the largest volume is purchased during the
quarter July-October, the lean season. Also the number of households with their
largest volume of cereal purchases, is higher in this quarter than in the other quarters.
This corresponds with the expected purchase pattern for the country. Dissaggregation
by village reveals that nearly half of the households in BarJ, a relatively wealthy,
surplus village, made their largest purchases between January and March, when prices
were still low. In the other four villages, which had a chronically or occasional cereals
deficit, most households purchased their largest quantity of cereals during the other
two, higher priced, quarters.
Table A3.24 Cereal purchases in 1984, by Ellsworth and Shapiro (1989).
Jan-Mar Apr-June July-Oct. 10 Oct. 11- Dec
Purchases1 25,366 35,846 57,158 12,085
Number of households2 45 61 64 7
Notes: 1) Sorghum, millet, maize, rice, food aid, miscellaneous foods. 2) Number of households with
their largest volume of purchases in a certain quarter. Source: Ellsworth and Shapiro (1989).
Survey by E.P. Yonli
Yonli (1997) presents the monthly purchases aggregated for his survey villages in
Yatenga and Sanmatenga between October 1991 and June 1993.  Table A3.25 clearly
shows that purchases are highest during the lean season (the second and third
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quarter). For Yatenga monthly purchases always exceed montly sales (see also Table
A3.15). In Sanmatenga, sales exceed purchases in some months. The low purchases
in Sanmatenga during the second quarter of 1993 seem logical, considering the
relatively high sales during that period. The data indicate for Sanmatenga, though not
very clearly, that purchases decrease if production increases (production in ’92 was
much higher than production in ’91). For Yatenga, however, this can not be observed
(’91 production was higher than ’92 production).
Table A3.25 Monthly purchases (in kg per person) between October 1991 and June






10-91 0.75 4.11 9-92 0.27 2.06
11-91 1.30 0.82 3d quarter 92 11.26 16.59
12-91 2.83 0.50 10-92 1.73 0.04
4th quarter 91 4.88 5.43 11-92 2.36 0.47
1-92 1.03 1.52 12-92 0.35 0.15
2-92 2.78 0.08 4th quarter 92 4.44 0.66
3-92 4.34 1.23 1-93 3.47 2.27
1st quarter 92 8.15 2.83 2-93 2.38 0.31
4-92 2.63 0.94 3-93 3.46 0.31
5-92 6.70 2.08 1st quarter 93 9.31 2.89
6-92 4.46 4.05 4-93 3.40 0.23
2nd quarter 92 13.79 7.07 5-93 3.77 0.47
7-92 4.68 10.67 6-93 4.31 1.88
8-92 6.31 3.86 2nd quarter 93 11.48 2.58
Note: In Yatenga 24 households and in Sanmatenga 21 households were surveyed. Source: Yonli (1997).
Price and income elasticities of cereal demand




Reardon et al. (1988b) analysed the sensitivity of cereal consumption to cereal price
changes. Rice, maize and millet/white sorghum consumption were regressed at the
prices of these cereals, monthly household expenses, household size, and the number
of children. Elasticities are estimated, which indicate the percentage increase in
consumption, resulting from a percentage increase in the price of one of the cereals or
in the household expenses. The calculated R2 of the regressions were in most cases
low, which indicates that the purchases were only for a small part explained by the
independent variables. R2 only had reasonable values for rice purchases by poor
households (62%), and rice and millet/sorghum purchases by average households
(30% and 44%, respectively). For the other purchases, R2 was between 13% and 22%.
A remarkable result was that neither the rice price, nor the prices of the other cereals,
did have a significant influence on rice consumption. The income elasticity of rice
consumption (% increase of rice consumption relative to a 1% increase of household
revenues which are supposed to be equal to total household expenses) was for all
households between 0.72 and 1.01 (see Table A3.26). This indicates that rice is not a
luxury good (see Section 4.2). The same holds for maize and for millet/sorghum
consumption. The analysis also shows that households with less children consume
more rice (they consume more often rice purchased from prepared food sellers). On
the other hand maize cultivation turns out to be dependent on its own price (for the
average households) and the millet/sorghum price (for the poor and average
households). If the maize price increases, average households will consume much less
maize, and will substitute it partly with millet/sorghum. Finally, millet/sorghum
consumption did respond weakly and not significantly on cereal price changes.
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      Total household expenses 0.79 0.72 1.01
Maize purchases
      Maize price -7.00
      Millet/sorghum price 3.11 3.80
      Total household expenses 1.11 1.03 1.28
Millet/sorghum purchases
      Total household expenses 0.87 0.91
Notes: Only elasticities with a significance level of at least 90% are shown. Source: Reardon et al.
(1988b).
Survey by Roth
Roth (1986) estimated income and demand elasticities for five rural and two urban
regions in Burkina Faso. For his estimates he used some empirical estimates from
other studies in different countries (see Table A3.27) and observations on rural-urban
consumption patterns (e.g. more rice consumption in cities, the position of maize in
daily consumption). His estimates of own-price, cross-price, and income-price
elasticities are presented in Table A3.28. In this table income compensated own-price
and cross-price elasticities are presented, which shows that changes in demand are not
only caused by a substitution effect, but also by an income effect. After all, if prices
increase also the purchasing power of households decreases. His estimates show
inelastic and negative own-price elasticities of demand, and very inelastic but positive
cross-price elasticities. Elasticities for the staple cereals millet and sorghum are on the
countryside more elastic than rice, maize and groundnuts. In the cities, sorghum
demand is not influenced by prices of the other goods. Urban households mainly
demand red sorghum for brewing dolo. Rice and white sorghum demand are more
elastic than millet. Millet is more a crop for the poor. Maize turns out to be very
inelastic for all households. The relatively elastic own-price elasticities for staple
crops is caused by the high proportion of income spent on them. If the price of these
goods increases, the purchasing power decreases, and cheaper substitutes will be
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sought after. For commodities on which a smaller part of income is spent, price also
plays a minor role.  Income elasticities for millet and sorghum are in rural areas
relatively elastic, compared to urban elasticities of these commodities. For rice, the
reverse is observed. Maize and groundnuts are less elastic in rural areas, but a little
more elastic in Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso.
Table A3.27 Estimates of own-price and income elasticities, reported in Roth
(1986).
Own-price elasticity Income elasticity



































































Notes: 1) So = sorghum, Mi = millet, Mz = maize, Rc = rice, Wt = wheat, Oth = others; 2) A distinction
has been made between low, middle and high income groups. Source: Roth (1986).
Table A3.28 Own-price, cross-price and income elasticities for Burkina Faso, by
Roth (1986).
Price elasticityRegions1 Income












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Notes: 1) Central region = CRPA Centre, Centre Ouest, Centre Est, Centre Sud and the province of
PassorJ; North region = CRPA Centre Nord, Sahel and the province of Yatenga; East region = CRPA
Est; Western region = CRPA Mouhoun; Southwest region = CRPA Hauts Bassins, Sud Ouest and
ComoJ; 2) Ws = white sorghum, Rs = Red sorghum, Mi = millet, Mz = maize, Rc = rice, Gn =
Groundnuts, Oth = other.
Source: Roth (1986).
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Study by Colman and Young
Colman and Young (1989) also present some FAO estimates of income elasticities of
demand for some agricultural products (see Table A3.29). These estimates are much
lower than the estimates presented by Roth (1986). The most important reason for this
is that Colman and Young give aggregated estimates for all cereals. These are
normally lower than disaggregated elasticities for the different cereals. After all, if the
price of white sorghum increases, another cereal can substitute this demand, whereas
another type of commodity (not a cereal type) has to substitute for cereals, if the
‘cereal’ price increases.
Table A3.29 Income elasticities of demand for some agricultural products, by
Colman and Young (1989).
Egypt ‘74/75 India (‘73/74) Java (’78)




Cereals 0.15 0.61 0.21 0.48 0.15 0.23 0.58 -0.16
Total food 0.75 1.28 0.79 0.82 0.74 0.72 0.64 0.09
Source: Colman and Young (1989).
We retain the following conclusions from the above review. Rice consumption of
urban households increases. Rice consumption is higher for wealthier households, and
poorer households spent a larger share of their income on cereal purchases. Almost all
rural households purchase cereals on the market. The quantity of cereals purchased is
for many households larger than the quantity sold. Cereal purchases are a
considerable part of total consumption, certainly for shortage households.
Furthermore, in general most purchases take place during the lean season, when
stocks are depleted, before the new harvest. Income and price elasticities of cereal
demand differ a lot between the different regions. Roth has estimated in his study
income elasticities of supply which we will also use in our study. We feel that his
estimates are more reliable than the other elasticities presented above, because he
estimated them on the basis of elasticities reported in other studies and on emprical
evidence from Burkina Faso.
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A3.5   Revenues and expenditures
Non-cropping income is an important determinant of cereal purchases and sales. It is
one of the major elements of the cereal demand functions discussed in Section 9.1. In
Section 8.1.5 it has been showed that collecting data on these issues is a difficult task.
In this appendix some surveys performed in the past are reviewed.
INSD survey
In 1994 the national statistical institute of Burkina Faso, INSD, executed a large
survey on household living conditions among more than 8000 households scattered
over the country (INSD, 1996a,b). This was one of the first large surveys on living
conditions by the institute. Based on their surveys they divided the country in 5
representative rural regions and two urban regions. These regions are not the same as
the CRPA which are applied in this study. Table A3.30 shows which provinces lie in
which INSD survey region and CRPA. Assuming that revenues and expenditures are
the same in all provinces of the 5 regions, it is possible to estimate revenues and
expenditures per CRPA. In their reports, INSD admits that they encountered many
problems, and that therefore some of the results are not as reliable as required.
Table A3.31 shows for each region total and cereal expenses and revenues per
household. INSD measures total revenues and expenses as the sum of monetary and
non-monetary expenses and revenues. Monetary expenses are for example purchases
of cereals on the market. Non-monetary expenses comprises for example
consumption of self produced cereals. Consumption of self-produced crops has been
valued against the going market price to determine non-monetary expenses. An
average household in Burkina Faso consists on of 7.8 people (INSD, 1996a). Because
of difficulties measuring directly household revenues, only the distribution of
revenues over the different sources is presented. In INSD (1996b) it has been
supposed that total revenues equal total expenses.
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Table A3.30 Subdivision of INSD regions and CRPA’s in provinces
Province INSD region CRPA Province INSD region CRPA
Soum Nord Sahel Yatenga Centre-Nord Nord
Oudalan Nord Sahel PassorJ Centre-Nord Nord
Seno Nord Sahel Bam Centre-Nord Centre-Nord
Poni Sud and Sud-Est Sud-Ouest Sanmatenga Centre-Nord Centre-Nord
Bougouriba Sud and Sud-Est Sud-Ouest Namatenga Centre-Nord Centre-Nord
Sissili Sud and Sud-Est Centre-Ouest Gngagna Centre-Nord Est
Nahouri Sud and Sud-Est Centre-Sud SanguiJ Centre-Sud Centre-Ouest
Gourma Sud and Sud-Est Est BoulkiemdJ Centre-Sud Centre-Ouest
Tapoa Sud and Sud-Est Est Kadiogo Centre-Sud Centre
Comoe Ouest Comoe Oubritenga Centre-Sud Centre
Houet Ouest Hauts-Bassins Ganzourgou Centre-Sud Centre
Kenedougou Ouest Hauts-Bassins BazJga Centre-Sud Centre-Sud
Mouhoun Ouest Mouhoun Zoundweogo Centre-Sud Centre-Sud
Kossi Ouest Mouhoun Boulgou Centre-Sud Centre-Est
Sourou Centre-Nord Mouhoun Kouritenga Centre-Sud Centre-Est
Inhabitants of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso have expenses which are three
times higher than expenses from rural households. Also food expenditures are much
higher. It seems peculiar that the level of cereal purchases (monetary plus non-
monetary) is lower in Ouagadougou than on the country side. The main reason for
this is the consumption pattern of urban households, which differs from the rural
consumption pattern. Citizens consume much more rice and other food products,
which is reflected by their higher food expenditures. Total expenses and food
expenses may differ considerably between the regions. Expenses may differ up to
20%. The part of consumption of self-produced cereals in total consumption is
striking. In the rural areas only 10% to 20% of the cereals is purchased. The
remainder originates from own production. It is logical that this is the reverse in the
cities. The data confirm that revenues of urban households are for the largest part
monetary, originating mainly from non-agricultural sources. Non-monetary income
for rural households is substantial, certainly in the region ‘Centre-Sud’. The table also
shows that revenues from cereal sales are very limited. Income earned by selling
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cotton in the western regions, and by selling livestock in the other regions often
exceeds cereal income. This confirms that households prefer not to sell cereals.
Table A3.31 Annual revenues and expenses per household in FCFA in 1994.
Ouest Sud et Centre- Centre- Nord Ouaga/ Other
Expenses Sud-Est Nord Sud Bobo cities
(a) Total expenses (FCFA)1 441,360 419,741 364,301 386,998 374,982 1,141,725 940,182
(b) Food expenses 232,841 230,438 191,844 198,547 239,610 372,388 363,323
(c)      (as % of total expenses) 52,8% 54,9% 52,7% 51,3% 63,9% 32,6% 38,6%
(d) Cereal expenses 111,764 97,475 89,016 80,610 119,086 98,310 115,537
(e)      (as % of food expenses) 48,0% 42,3% 46,4% 40,6% 49,7% 26,4% 31,8%
Suppositions:2
(f)  Cereal expenses non-monetary (%) 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 21% 49%
(g)  Cereal expenses monetary (%) 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 79% 51%
(h) Cereal expenses non-mon. (FCFA) 89,411 77,980 71,212 64,488 95,269 20,645 56,613
(i) Cereal expenses monetary (FCFA) 22,353 19,495 17,803 16,122 23,817 77,665 58,924
Revenues3
Monetary revenues (%) 54,3% 33,2% 35,3% 28,1% 38,8% 80,6% 69,6%
Non-monetary revenues (%) 45,7% 66,8% 64,7% 71,9% 61,2% 19,4% 30,4%
Structure of monetary revenues
         *agriculture4: 71,2% 40,4% 46,3% 35,2% 43,5% 1,8% 5,8%
            -cereals, groundnuts4 26,9% 15,9% 14,6% 13,3% 2,6% 0,5% 2,2%
            -cotton4 33,4% 8,3% 0,9% 1,6% 0,1% 0,0% 0,1%
            -livestock4 6,4% 10,7% 27,1% 13,1% 38,5% 0,5% 1,6%
Average household size 7.8 7.6 9.0 8.0 6.7 6.1 7.5
Notes: (c) = (b)/(a)*100%, (e) = (d)/(b)*100%, (h) = (f)*(d), (i) = (g)*(d) .1) Total expenses include
monetary and non-monetary expenses. Non-monetary expenses are calculated by multiplying
consumption of self-produced crops with the observed market price; 2) On-farm consumption of self-
produced base cereals millet and sorghum is estimated at 80% of total cereal expenses for the rural areas,
against 49% for average cities and only 21% for Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso (INSD, 1996b: p.
226); 3) It has been supposed that total revenues equal total expenses, which are given in (a). 4) As % of
total monetary revenues.
Source: data based on INSD (1996a,b)
Survey by Broekhuyse
Broekhuyse (1988) reports the revenues and expenditures for households using
animal traction (AT) and using manual labour (ML) in two villages in the province of
Sanmatenga, see Table A3.32. The average household size was 7.3 for ML housholds,
and 10.2 people for AT households. AT households had much larger revenues and
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expenditures than ML households. The largest differences in revenues are in the sales
of cash crops, processing agricultural produce, extra agricultural activities and credits
obtained. AT households can obtain more credit to purchase their traction equipment.
Using this equipment they produce more cash crops. Because these households are
larger, more household members do extra-agricultural activities. It is striking that
cereal purchases are higher for AT households than for ML households. Furthermore,
because of credit repayments and maintenance of traction equipment, debts and
production costs are higher for AT households.
Table A3.32 Household income and revenues between 1979 and 1985 reported by
Broekhuyse (1988) in Sanmatenga.
Households using manual labour Households using animal tractionRevenues
in FCFA/household as % of total in FCFA/household as % of total
Sales of cereals1
Sales of other crops2
Livestock
































































Notes: 1) Cereals comprise millet, red sorghum, white sorghum and maize; 2) Other crops comprise rice,
groundnuts, cowpea, cotton, manioc, aubergine, gombo, etc. Source: Broekhuyse (1988).
The monetary value of gifts received and paid in kind were also a substantial part of
total revenues and expenditures. Broekhuyse estimated that gifts received in kind
were on average 4,310 F CFA for ML and 4,395 F CFA for TA households. Gifts
paid in kind could take a value of 4,845 F CFA for ML and 12,038 F CFA for AT
households, so 11% and 16% of total expenditures, respectively. A part of these gifts
were payments for labour services provided.
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ICRISAT survey
Reardon et al. (1988a) analysed household strategies to cope with food insecurity.
Using income and consumption survey panel data collected by ICRISAT and IFPRI
in the 1984-85 cropping season they estimated the level of household income. Data
were used of one village in the Soum province in the Sahelian rainfall zone, and one
village in the province of PassorJ in the Sudanian rainfall zone. Households in the
Sahelian zone were more food secure than those in the Sudanian zone. Average
household size was 10 in Soum and 11 in PassorJ. Table A3.33 gives some results of
these studies.
Table A3.33 Household income in two rainfall zones by Reardon et al. (1988a).







Livestock husbandry 8,370 1,930
Local non-farm income2 9,580 4,250
Non-local non-farm income3 8,760 5,200
Transfers4 3,020 2,360
Total 38,820 30,870
Notes: 1) Wages received for work on other households’ plots in the immediate region. 2) Non-
migratory income earned in occupations other than cropping and livestock husbandry. 3) Migratory
income earned by members of the household. 4) Food aid, gifts and remittances. Source: Reardon et al.
(1988a).
CEDRES survey
Thiombiano et al. (1988) also reported on household revenues and expenditure in the
north of the Central Plateau in 1984 (see Table A3.34).
Survey by Roth
Finally, Roth (1986) estimated the share of budget spent on cereals (see Table A3.35).
The results do not differ much from INSD (1996) data. The budget share spent on
cereals is for most rural areas higher than for the larger cities, and varies between
20% and 30% of total expenditures. Table A3.35 clearly shows the difference
between the countryside and the city. In Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, much
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more rice is consumed than in rural areas. Furthermore, in the north, and to a lesser
extent also in the central region, millet is prefered, whereas white sorghum is prefered
in the other regions. It can be questioned whether the consumption of red sorghum in
the cities is indeed neglible. It is true that dolo consumption, for which much of the
red sorghum is used, is less important in larger cities, where bottled beer is consumed
more often. However, dolo consumption is certainly not zero in these areas.
Table A3.34 Household revenues and expenditure patterns for eight villages in the
north of the Central Plateau in 1984, in FCFA per household.










0 9692 346 0 12063 0 109742 8435 17535
Livestock 111934 11635 108444 33173 15469 7123 28815 32627 43653
Handicraft 91192 769 14923 9515 0 169 18300 20905 19472
Small trade 0 6346 19423 5278 2431 2980 2653 3731 5355
Retirements,
pensions
131692 0 26692 0 43077 0 0 0 25183
Other revenues 3846 34038 0 0 10576 846 13846 17308 10058
Total (FCFA) 338664 62480 169828 47966 83616 11118 173356 833006 215004
Source: Thiombiano et al. (1988)
Table A3.35 Average share of budget spent on different cereals; by Roth (1986).
Ws2 Rs Mi Mz Rc Gn Oth
Centre1 0.081 0.044 0.111 0.013 0.025 0.024 0.703
North 0.100 0.003 0.199 0.021 0.023 0.028 0.627
East 0.107 0.010 0.077 0.013 0.013 0.021 0.760
West 0.088 0.032 0.062 0.012 0.009 0.020 0.777
South-west 0.065 0.012 0.026 0.038 0.015 0.014 0.832
Ouagadougou 0.062 0 0.017 0.003 0.057 0.035 0.826
Bobo-Dioulasso 0.062 0 0.011 0.031 0.053 0.039 0.805
Notes: 1) Central region = CRPA Centre, Centre Ouest, Centre Est, Centre Sud and the province of
PassorJ; North region = CRPA Centre Nord, Sahel and the province of Yatenga; East region = CRPA
Est; Western region = CRPA Mouhoun; Southwest region = CRPA Hauts Bassins, Sud Ouest and
ComoJ; 2) Ws = white sorghum, Rs = Red sorghum, Mi = millet, Mz = maize, Rc = rice, Gn =
Groundnuts, Oth = other.
Source: Roth (1986).
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The above rewiew shows that income and expenditure levels reported by the different
surveys differ considerably. This is caused by the unreliability of the data, but on the
other hand differences between households, between regions, and also between years
are known to differ a lot. In Section 9.1 we estimate income levels per person mainly
on the basis of the INSD survey (1996a,b). Despite unexplained data errors in the
INSD reports, it is the most recent and largest survey available.
A3.6   Agricultural prices
To estimate the different parameters of the cereal demand functions in Section 9.1,
estimates are used of average cereal consumer prices per quarter. To determine cereal
supply functions in Section 9.2, the probability distribution of cereal producer prices
per quarter is used. In this appendix and Section 8.1.6 the price data used for these
purposes are discussed. Price data in Burkina Faso are gathered weekly by
SIM/SONAGESS on 37 markets in Burkina Faso for the cereals millet, red sorghum,
white sorghum, yellow maize and white maize. A distinction is made between
producer and consumer prices. Producer prices ensue from transactions between
producers and traders, consumer prices ensue from transactions between consumers
and traders or between consumers and producers. Before discussing these data for the
period 1992-199938, we first briefly discuss the analyses of Bassolet (2000) and
Hoftijzer (1998), who used the same data, but for the period 1992-1996.
In the study of Bassolet (2000) an analysis is made of: 1)  changes in the cereal
market structure and the behavior of actors after market liberalization in Burkina
Faso, and of: 2) the economic efficiency of market transactions. He showed that the
grain policies of the government constrained the functioning of the market in the past.
Liberalization policies had some favorable effects on competition, mainly due to the
result of the increased number of traders and the market information system (SIM)
                                                              
38
 Data obtained from STATISTIKA, the statistical department from SIM/SONAGESS and from
internet: www.statistika.net.
318
which contributed to the transparency of the market. In the meanwhile, limited access
to credit, high taxes, bad infrastructure and the irregular dissemination of prices by
the market information system, still constrain competition.
Bassolet also showed that the new policies also changed farmer behaviour, in
particular in surplus regions. They changed their passive commercial strategies in
more active behavior. Nowadays, sales are planned in a way that the farmer profits
from seasonal price fluctuations, and surpluses are only sold to the highest bid. Also
traders profit from the increased transparency. They are better informed about supply
and demand conditions (prices) on local surplus markets and therefore they are able to
purchase the grain more efficiently. Remarkably, (semi-)wholesalers did not change
their storage strategies. Most of them sell their stocks within one month. Three
explanations are given for this behaviour: 1) traders are constrained by a limited
availability of working capital; 2) it is costly to conserve grain for a longer period; 3)
the grain board SONAGESS, responsible for the management of the national food
security grain stock, revolves the stock gradually and sells during the hungry season
(June - August). As a consequence, seasonal price increases in the grain market are
reduced, making investments in storage less attractive for traders.
Bassolet showed that producer prices increased after liberalization. He derived a
seasonal price index which is relatively stable for the consumer price series, but
instable for the producer price series. The collected price data show some evidence
for the conclusion that the seasonal price increase is lower than the costs of storage.
This result clearly explains why traders play only a minor role in the long term
storage activity. Finally, Bassolet showed that price differences between markets
decreased after liberalization. Net margins for traders are low, indicating that market
integration improved after liberalization. The results of tests for cointegration
(Johansen procedure) are in line with these observations and show that the number of
cointegrated markets increased. Bassolet concludes that this can be interpreted as a
positive effect of liberalization policies and, in particular, the upshot of the market
information system and the removal of regional trade barriers in the country.
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An analysis of the weekly SIM prices for the period 1992-1996 for 16 villages by
Hoftijzer (1998) demonstrated that no evidence could be found for a seasonal pattern
with regular price increases and decreases. On most markets prices decreased after the
harvest and increased during the lean season. For some markets, however, this pattern
could not be observed. Furthermore, the timing of price increases and decreases as
well as the amplitude of seasonal changes differed per year. However, these
conclusions are based on data for only 4 harvest years. Differences between years and
between villages are large. A closer look to the white sorghum producer prices in
Banfora show that the price difference between the first and third quarter in 1993 is
only 8%, while it is 103% in 1996. Furthermore average ‘92-’96 millet consumer
prices in N’dorola are reported to have increased 130% between the first and the
second quarter, whereas prices in Niangoloko increased only 8%. Some of these
differences may be caused by data weakness (only few observations are available for
some markets), but volatility of prices is on the other hand a well known phenomenon
in African agriculture.
To estimate average prices and the distribution of cereal prices, we used cereal prices
for the period 1992 –1999. For the period 1992-1996 weekly price data were
available. For the period 1997-1999, however, we obtained only monthly data.
Therefore, we estimated for the period 1992-1996 for each crop type the average
monthly prices from the available weekly prices. Many of the data were missing39. A
reason for the large number of missing data is that some of the crops are not traded on
each market day on some of the markets. The thinness of the markets causes that
some of the weekly prices are based on only a few observations. Due to the large
number of missing data on red sorghum and yellow maize, not much value can be
adressed to these data. Red sorghum is most often used to brew dolo, and is not
                                                              
39
 From the 3552 possible observations (37 markets, 8 years, 12 months per year) for each crop, 44% of
the millet producer prices were missing, 43% of the white sorghum data, 67% of the white maize data,
90% of the red sorghum data and 97% of the yellow maize data. For the consumer prices, the share of
missing data was 8% for millet, 6% for white sorghum, 31% for white maize, 76% for red sorghum and
90% for yellow maize.
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regularly traded on the market. Therefore, average monthly cereal prices are based on
the cereals millet, white sorghum and white maize, only.
Using these monthly cereal prices, average cereal prices per quarter can be estimated
for each CRPA40. In Table A3.36 these average quarterly prices are shown for each
year and for the entire period ‘92-‘99. We can make the following observations from
the price data:
1. The ‘92-‘99 cereal price averages (see Table A3.36 and Table A3.37) reveal that
the CRPA Mouhoun, Hauts Bassins, Sud Ouest and Nord have on average the
lowest producer prices, whereas the CRPA Centre Sud, Centre Est, Centre Ouest
and Est have the highest producer prices. The CRPA Hauts Bassins, Mouhoun
and Est have the lowest consumer prices, and the highest consumer prices can be
observed in the CRPA Centre, Sahel and Sud Ouest. It is logical that producer
prices in Mouhoun and Hauts Bassins are low, since these regions are the high
production regions of the country. Consumer prices in these regions are also low,
because costs to transport produce from the producers to the consumers are low.
The high consumer prices in the regions Centre, with the capital Ouagadougou,
and Sahel, correspond to the expectations. Prices in the Sahel are affected by high
transport costs, whereas prices in Ouagadougou are affected by high demand
levels from the urban consumers and from traders from the rest of the country. It
is striking that price differences between the region Sahel and the northern
regions Nord and Centre Nord are that large. This is partly caused by data
weakness. Price from the CRPA Nord are only based on prices for the city of
Ouahigouya. This market is a regional transit market, from which many cereals
are transported towards the sahelian regions. Prices in the other parts of the region
Nord may be substantially higher. The high producer prices in the regions Centre
                                                              
40
 The 37 markets on which SIM/SONAGESS collects price data are located in the following CRPA:
Centre: Gounghin, Paglayiri, SankaryarJ; Centre Nord: Kaya, Kongoussi, Tougouri; Centre Ouest: Fara,
HamJlJ, Koudougou, LJo; Centre Sud: Guelwongo, Manga; Sahel: Djibo, Dori, Gorom-Gorom;
Mouhoun: DJdougou, Djibasso, Solenzo, Tougan; Est: Bitou, Bogande, Botou, Diapaga, Fada N’gourma,
Namounou; Centre Est: Pouytenga, Tenkodogo, ZabrJ; Nord: Ouahigouya; Sud Ouest: DiJbougou,
Gaoua; Hauts Bassins: Bobo Dioulasso, Dande, Faramana, N’dorola; ComoJ: Banfora, Niangoloko.
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Sud, Centre Est, Centre Ouest and Est, and high consumer prices in the regions
Centre Sud and Centre Est, are probably caused by cross-border trade. Traders
from the neighbouring countries Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo and Benin purchase
cereals on markets close to the border, selling it in their own country. No
conclusions can be drawn from the prices for the region Sud Ouest and Nord,
because averages are based on only a few observations.
2. The data in Table A3.36 clearly show that average cereal prices increased a lot
between 1994 and 1996 (see also Figure A3.4 and A3.5).
• The price increase between 1994 and 1996 can not only be caused by cereal
production. In almost all years prices increase if production decreases, and
vice versa. However, production decreases do not explain for the large price
increase between October 1994 and June 1996. In Table A3.38 cereal
production between 1992 and 1998 are compared with average cereal prices
for each agricultural year from October till September. The price increase is
more clearly seen by looking at the indexes in Table A3.38. Between the
years 94/95 and 95/96, the production index decreases from 100 to 92, and
the consumer price index increases from 126 to 178, an increase of 41%. On
the other hand, between the years 92/93 and 93/94, the production index
increased from 100 to 103, and the consumer price index decreased from 100
to 92, a decrease of only 8%.
• Prices seem to have stabilized after 1996. Between 1996 and 1998 price
changes due to production fluctuations seem not to be excessive, and are
similar to price changes in the period 1992–1994. However, the price series is
too short to draw final conclusions on this issue.
• Price increases between 1994 and 1996 are presumably caused by the
devalution of the Franc CFA in January 1994, which started to have effects
on cereal prices in 1995. As a result, the average Oct ’96 – Sept ’99 producer
and consumer prices increased with 91% and 99%, respectively, compared to
the average Jan ’92 – Sept ’94 cereal prices, see Table A3.39.
• According to Egg et al. (1997), the devaluation caused a price increase of
imported consumption goods and fertilizers, an increased export of cereals to
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neighbouring countries, and changes in producer behaviour, due to an
increased purchasing power of the producers and an increased competition
between traders.
• Furthermore, due to the cotton sector reorganisation in 1994, cotton farmers
received payments for their production earlier (Egg et al., 1997). Therefore,
from 1994 onwards, distress sales to repay debts were less important,
resulting in lower cereal supplies in the period following the harvest. This is
confirmed by the cereal price data in Table A3.39, which show that cereal
prices in the cotton producing areas have increased more between the periods
‘92-’94 and ‘96-’99, than in the non-cotton producing regions.
3. Table A3.39 shows that the average ‘96-’99 average producer and consumer
prices are almost the double of the ‘92-’94 average producer prices. For the
region Centre, with the capital Ouagadougou, the increase is less, and for  the
high production areas (Mouhoun, Hauts Bassins, and Comoe), the increase is
more than the double. For the region Sud Ouest the increase is small, but this is
probably caused by data weakness.
4. Looking at the commercial margins (the difference between consumer and
producer price) in Table A3.39, we have to conclude that the commercial margins
have increased after the devaluation. Both the margin in FCFA per kg and the
margin as a percentage of the producer price increased significantly. In most
regions, margins almost doubled or more than doubled. High margins for the
regions Sud Ouest, Centre Nord, and Sahel have to be treated with care, because
they may be caused by data weakness. This differs from the observations of Egg
et al. (1997), who concluded on the basis of the ‘92-’97 price data that margins
did not change significantly. It is not strange that commercial margins double, if
prices double. The increase is among other things caused by inflation and
increasing transport costs. The margin increased from an average of 8 FCFA per
kg between January 1992 and September 1994 to an average of 20 FCFA per kg
between October 1996 and September 1999. This indicates that traders make
larger profits. On the other hand, looking at the difference between the consumer
price in one region and the producer price in another region, we have to conclude
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that margins for transport towards Ouagadougou did increase less than transport
towards the other regions. This indicates that competition on the wholesale
market of Ouagadougou has become more fierce, whereas this is less the case in
the other regions. A more detailed investigation of the market situation is needed
to confirm this.
5. In most cases prices increase during the lean season (from April to September).
Looking at the monthly cereal price average for Burkina Faso (see Figure A3.5),
it follows that in most years producer and consumer prices reach their maximum
in July and August. Looking at the production year from one harvest to the other
(from October to September), it follows that minimum price levels are in most
cases attained in November or December. However, for the production years
‘94/’95 and ‘97/’98 producer prices reach their minimum already in October. In
these years cereal production was lower than in other years, see also Table A3.38.
Furthermore, in the years ‘92/’93 and ‘93/’94 the average consumer price reaches
its minimum in December and January. In these years cereal production was
good. On average the minimum is attained in November, and the maximum in
August.
Table A3.36 Average seasonal cereal producer and consumer prices for each CRPA
for the period 1992-‘99 in FCFA per kg.
Producer prices Average Quarterly Producer Price for  the period 1992 - 1999
Period 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Average
‘92-‘99
jan-mar 56 54 55 66 94 106 127 93 76
apr-jun 56 60 60 74 105 103 144 99 80
jul-sept 68 64 64 76 138 119 114 76
Centre
Nord
oct-dec 54 51 51 74 102 108 93 76 73
jan-mar 64 59 42 63 92 110 124 113 79
apr-jun 75 58 49 76 112 114 149 116 88
jul-sept 75 59 51 81 140 112 173 114 92
Centre
Ouest
oct-dec 61 40 51 78 91 104 115 88 77
jan-mar 68 64 56 80 86 127 129 108 88
apr-jun 71 71 60 92 138 159 109 91
jul-sept 67 67 64 99 128 118 203 109 92
Centre
Sud
oct-dec 63 54 65 68 122 113 113 82 88
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Cont.Table A3.36
jan-mar 61 65 66 65 110 107 118 92 76
apr-jun 59 71 84 77 119 128 95 82
jul-sept 73 75 79 90 83 96 82
Sahel
oct-dec 63 56 60 79 101 102 86 94 73
jan-mar 51 38 36 51 82 80 101 99 67
apr-jun 54 43 46 60 96 86 127 88 76
jul-sept 61 48 45 68 128 81 137 87 83
Mouhoun
oct-dec 42 36 42 68 78 83 88 70 65
jan-mar 65 53 45 61 75 98 119 102 75
apr-jun 73 52 53 67 88 102 134 102 81
jul-sept 69 55 52 79 121 110 157 93 88
Est
oct-dec 51 42 51 64 94 101 112 69 72
jan-mar 69 57 49 78 90 114 118 106 79
apr-jun 69 61 57 89 107 104 139 102 84
jul-sept 74 63 60 94 133 118 161 103 93
Centre
Est
oct-dec 59 52 63 81 114 113 123 79 81
jan-mar 62 54 46 68 123 63
apr-jun 65 59 61
jul-sept 63 63
Nord
oct-dec 61 55 49 83 99 65
jan-mar 68 69 57 72 89 78 88 70
apr-jun 70 59 65
jul-sept 72 68 89 83 73
Sud
Ouest
oct-dec 64 58 64 75 63
jan-mar 46 39 33 51 79 83 93 82 62
apr-jun 52 37 41 63 90 86 107 75 66
jul-sept 53 48 40 70 114 86 121 85 73
Hauts
Bassins
oct-dec 42 32 46 71 84 88 84 69 62
jan-mar 60 48 41 63 82 104 96 111 74
apr-jun 66 49 49 75 97 117 119 113 79
jul-sept 67 55 53 87 142 112 137 104 84
Comoe
oct-dec 49 43 53 81 113 95 168 85 75
jan-mar 61 53 47 63 85 99 112 97 74
apr-jun 64 55 52 72 98 103 131 97 79
jul-sept 66 58 54 79 128 101 146 94 84
Burkina
Faso
oct-dec 54 45 52 72 95 99 103 76 72
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Consumer prices Average Quarterly Consumer Price for the year 1992 - 1999
Period 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Average
‘92-‘99
jan-mar 83 82 68 85 112 130 137 117 102
apr-jun 87 76 70 98 127 127 156 125 108
jul-sept 92 80 76 100 159 131 171 122 116
Centre
oct-dec 84 74 78 104 145 122 132 115 107
jan-mar 61 59 60 73 100 116 139 105 89
apr-jun 62 65 67 80 118 123 158 106 97
jul-sept 73 67 66 87 166 129 173 109 108
Centre
Nord
oct-dec 59 56 62 78 124 119 113 92 88
jan-mar 67 64 47 74 103 112 130 121 90
apr-jun 75 65 55 86 119 117 152 124 99
jul-sept 77 68 55 89 150 113 168 120 106
Centre
Ouest
oct-dec 64 51 56 88 103 108 129 100 89
jan-mar 71 66 57 87 96 125 138 114 94
apr-jun 79 74 65 105 104 139 158 119 105
jul-sept 72 68 69 109 128 122 151 104 102
Centre
Sud
oct-dec 66 56 71 83 123 123 122 85 92
jan-mar 73 67 68 78 115 131 146 121 99
apr-jun 78 69 78 85 131 131 174 126 109
jul-sept 87 73 77 92 174 133 189 125 119
Sahel
oct-dec 69 63 69 88 133 129 129 112 99
jan-mar 54 42 41 58 90 93 117 99 75
apr-jun 61 46 52 65 105 99 140 103 84
jul-sept 69 53 53 74 142 99 154 103 94
Mouhoun
oct-dec 48 41 49 76 91 98 101 84 75
jan-mar 69 57 47 66 78 106 129 103 79
apr-jun 74 59 54 73 93 115 155 111 89
jul-sept 77 63 58 86 124 116 175 106 99
Est
oct-dec 58 45 56 70 96 112 116 76 78
jan-mar 73 61 51 81 95 126 140 110 92
apr-jun 80 65 60 97 113 126 156 115 101
jul-sept 76 66 62 97 136 130 161 109 104
Centre
Est
oct-dec 62 53 65 89 113 126 117 89 90
jan-mar 66 58 58 76 108 106 129 108 89
apr-jun 66 62 66 83 119 111 154 109 96
jul-sept 77 66 66 94 161 111 163 110 106
Nord
oct-dec 64 56 65 94 106 112 114 102 89
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Cont. Table A3.36
jan-mar 70 70 56 74 98 127 141 133 97
apr-jun 74 70 61 85 115 137 152 138 103
jul-sept 80 74 64 94 147 134 186 135 115
Sud
Ouest
oct-dec 69 62 60 90 124 117 148 113 101
jan-mar 51 46 41 57 86 102 110 108 75
apr-jun 57 42 48 68 98 106 136 105 82
jul-sept 61 50 47 74 129 95 151 108 90
Hauts
Bassins
oct-dec 46 41 48 80 104 96 123 93 80
jan-mar 68 54 49 69 92 118 113 127 86
apr-jun 73 55 56 81 105 136 133 133 97
jul-sept 77 67 61 95 135 137 159 125 107
Comoe
oct-dec 64 55 61 95 109 116 139 109 93
jan-mar 66 59 52 72 96 115 130 112 88
apr-jun 72 61 60 82 111 120 152 116 96
jul-sept 76 65 61 89 144 119 167 114 104
Burkina
Faso
oct-dec 61 53 62 84 113 113 122 95 88
Notes: Cereal prices are the averages for the cereals millet, white sorghum and white maize. Averages
are based on 1992-1996 weekly prices and 1997-1999 monthly prices collected by SIM/SONAGESS on
37 markets
Table A3.37 Ranking of average 1992 –1999 cereal prices, from lowest to highest
cereal price per quarter for each crpa.


















1 HB N N HB N HB HB HB M HB
2 N SO SO SO HB M M M E M
3 M HB HB M SO E E E HB E
4 SO M CN N M COM N CS CN N
5 COM COM S E CN CN COM CE CO COM
6 E CN M S S N CN CO N CN
7 S E COM CN COM CO CO N CE CO
8 CN S E COM E CE CE COM CS CE
9 CE CE CO CO CO CS SO CN COM CS
10 CO CO CS CE CE SO CS SO S SO
11 CS CS CE CS CS S C C SO S
12 C S S C C
Notes: 1) No producer prices are available for the CRPA Centre. 2) Centre = C; Centre Nord = CN;
Centre Ouest = CO; Centre Sud = CS; Sahel = S; Mouhoun = M; Est = E; Centre Est = CE; Nord = N;
Sud Ouest = SO; Hauts Bassins = HB; Comoe = COM. Source: SIM/SONAGESS price data, see Table
A3.36.
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Table A3.38 Average annual producer and consumer prices (in FCFA/kg), cereal
production (in 1000 tonnes), and indexes for prices and production

























Producer price 63 55 49 67 94 99 117 98
Consumer price 71 62 57 77 109 117 140 116
Production1) 2378 2417 2480 2414 2212 2359 1913 2553
Index Producer price2) 115 100 90 122 171 181 213 179
Index Consumer price2) 116 100 92 126 178 190 228 189
Index Production2) 98 100 103 100 92 98 79 106
Notes: 1) Prices for the period Oct year t / Sept year t+1 are compared with production from the harvest
from October – November from year t. Production is given in Table A3.2. 2) Index Producer price year t
= Producer price year t / Producer price Oct ’92 / Sept ‘93, similar for Consumer price and Production.
Table A3.39 Average cereal prices for the periods January ’92 to September’94 and
October ’96 to September ’99 for each CRPA (in FCFA/kg).























Centre 79 134 69%
Centre Nord 58 103 78% 63 126 100% 5 23
Centre Ouest 57 115 103% 63 125 99% 6 10
Centre Sud 63 123 94% 68 128 90% 4 5
Sahel3) 66 100 50% 73 139 91% 7 39
Mouhoun 45 94 109% 51 108 113% 6 15
Est 54 109 100% 60 120 99% 6 11
Centre Est 61 117 92% 64 127 98% 3 10
Nord3) 58 111 92% 64 119 86% 6 8
Sud Ouest3) 65 83 28% 68 139 104% 4 56
Hauts Bassins 42 89 112% 48 113 133% 7 24
Comoe 52 113 117% 62 129 110% 10 17
Burkina Faso 55 104 91% 62 125 99% 8 20
Notes: 1) % Increase = ((average ‘92-’94 / average ‘96-’99) – 1)*100%. 2) Margin = Consumer price –
Producer price. 3) The data for these regions have to be treated with care, since many data are missing
for the period ‘96-’99. Source: SIM/SONAGESS price data, see Table A3.36.
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1992 59 61 62 63 63 67 73 67 59 55 54 53
1993 53 54 54 53 55 57 62 58 55 48 45 42
1994 43 46 51 52 52 53 55 55 52 50 52 57
1995 59 63 67 71 72 72 76 81 81 76 71 69
1996 82 85 88 93 96 105 121 134 128 111 84 89
1997 97 101 100 103 104 101 107 104 92 93 97 105
1998 108 112 117 127 131 136 147 159 131 125 101 89
1999 93 100 101 99 97 95 101 96 86 77 75 76






















1992 64 66 69 70 71 74 80 77 70 64 60 59
1993 59 59 60 59 60 64 68 66 61 57 53 49
1994 48 52 57 59 60 61 61 62 61 59 60 69
1995 69 70 76 82 82 84 87 90 90 86 83 83
1996 92 96 99 104 109 119 137 150 143 129 104 105
1997 114 113 118 119 121 121 122 122 113 111 112 117
1998 124 129 136 145 153 156 163 175 163 142 118 106
1999 108 113 116 118 117 114 119 115 108 99 94 92
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
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Appendix 4:   Trading costs
In Section 8.2 estimates are made of costs made by cereal traders in Burkina Faso.
Not many authors reported on the strategies of cereal traders and their trading costs.
In this appendix in particular recent surveys executed by Bassolet (2000) and SirpJ
(2000) and a large survey by the Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin (Sherman et
al.,1987; and DJjou, 1987) are evaluated in order to be able to estimate the trading
costs which are necessary for our modelling approach. Bassolet conducted a survey
among 357 cereal traders at 16 markets scattered over Burkina Faso. The main
objective of his inquiry was to get a picture of how cereal trade is organised and how
it has been changed since the market and price liberalisation in 1992. SirpJ analysed
the transport sector of Burkina Faso, with the accent on cereal transport. He
interviewed in 1995 354 carriers, in order to obtain a picture of their strategies, costs
and revenues. DJjou (1987) analysed the strategies of cereal traders, within the
framework of a large research project on the dynamics of cereal trade in Burkina
Faso, executed by the University of Michigan and the University of Wisconsin (see
also Sherman et al., 1987). Between February 1984 and February 1985 a large team
of BurkinabJ and American researchers conducted a survey among numerous cereal
traders, farmers and consumers scattered over the entire country.
A4.1   Transport costs
In Section 8.2 estimates are made of the cost of transporting a bag of cereals between
a number of markets. To determine the average costs to transport cereals between the
different markets, the organisation and functioning of the transport sector is of
importance. Transport costs depend much on the distance travelled. If cereals are
transported between two rural markets within one region, other types of trucks may
be used than for transport towards an urban or a redistribution centre, and
consequently prices will differ.
331
Survey by SirpJ
SirpJ (2000) distinguishes between three levels of transport. First, the local or
regional level, where goods are transported in small quantities between rural markets,
or between the rural markets and provincial towns. Roads are often not well
developed, and transport takes place using pick-ups or vans. Carriers are often traders
having their own means of transport. Secondly, the national level concerns
principally transport between provincial towns or between the two main centres
Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. Distances usually do not exceed 400 km, and
most often small trucks with a carrying capacity of 10 tonnes are used. Carriers are
often traders. The third level concerns the international level, with transports between
Burkina Faso (most often Ouagadougou or Bobo-Dioulasso) and the harbours of the
neighbouring countries (Abidjan, LomJ, Cotonou), and to a lesser extent to the
capitals of Mali and Niger. These international connections are served by large trucks
with an average capacity of 32 tonnes which travel over 1000 km per journey. At this
international level many goods are transported. However, cereals are less important at
this level, and it is therefore not considered in our study. 41
A survey among 354 carriers showed that 60% of them owned only one truck. Only
2% owned more than 10 trucks. Those who are also trader, use their truck to transport
their own merchandise, and if possible, also from other traders. They usually do not
keep any records on the costs and benefits from transport. Carriers who are not also
trader, most of the times hold ties with only a few clients. They are more or less
specialized in transporting only a limited number of products, although also other
products may be transported occasionally. Among these carriers, the number of
enterprises which go bankrupt, is considerable. The number of new enterprises which
failed between 1986 and 1991 ranged between 26% and 51% (SirpJ, 2000). A reason
for this is that the prices charged for their services may cover the personnel and fuel
costs, but do often not cover for maintenance and depreciation. So, many
                                                              
41
 The cereals imported in Burkina Faso, often arrive in smaller quantities by traders who operate close
to the border. Rice, however, is imported in large quantities, and is transported with large trucks. Price
formation of rice is not analysed in this paper.
332
entrepreneurs enter the free transport market if they can gather the starting capital to
pay for the truck, the taxes and the insurance, but many of them do not earn enough to
keep their business running. Competition, especially on the local segment, may be too
fierce, which drives down prices below costs. This may not draw the attention of the
carrier if he does not keep books of his business, or it is not a big problem if the
carrier is also a trader owning his own means of transport.
A distinction is to be made between costs of transport (for the transport agent) and the
prices of transport which have to be paid by the trader paying for the transport
services. Evaluating all costs made by carriers, and the prices charged by them, SirpJ
concludes that for pick-ups and vans the transport costs made, on average, do just not
cover for the prices charged per ton per kilometer (Transport price = 178 FCFA per
tonne per kilometer; Transport costs = 179 FCFA per tonne per kilometer). For 10-
tonnes trucks, he concludes that the margin between the costs and the price charged is
large (Transport price = 112 FCFA per tonne per kilometer; Transport costs = 60
FCFA per tonne per kilometer; Margin = 47%), while large trucks (32 tonnes) just
cover the costs made (Transport price = 42 FCFA per tonne per kilometer; Transport
costs = 40 FCFA per tonne per kilometer). These conclusions must, however, be
treated with care, since price differences are caused by many factors, the differences
between the carriers are large and since the small and medium size carriers do often
not know all their costs. The transport costs are influenced considerably by the road
conditions. Not only maintenance costs increase, but also the costs for fuel, lubricants
and tires increases. SirpJ makes a distinction between three road types: asphalted
roads, unpaved roads, and dirt roads (bad unpaved roads). He discussed how much
transport costs should increase according to the ‘Direction des Transports’ of Burkina
Faso, if merchandise was transported over unpaved roads (see Table A4.1). This
shows that certainly maintenance costs should increase considerably for transports
between rural markets.
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Table A4.1 Increase of transport costs if unpaved roads or dirt roads are crossed.
Increase of transport costs










Source: SirpJ (2000), obtained from the ‘Direction des Transports’ of Burkina Faso.
Surveys of the Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin
DJjou (1987) also reports on cereal transport in Burkina Faso. Unlike SirpJ who
analysed the transport sector from the viewpoint of the carrier, DJjou looks at the
price a trader has to pay if he hires the services from a carrier or a trader owning a
truck. In Table A4.2 it is shown which price a trader has to pay to transport a cereal
bag of 100 kg between two markets. The difference between the price presented by
DJjou (1987) and SirpJ (2000) is remarkable. If it is considered that 10-tonne trucks
are used for inter-regional transport, than the estimated transport price of 11 FCFA
per 100 kg bag per km observed by SirpJ, is extremely high compared to the transport
costs born by the traders, which are presented in Table A4.2. In this table a distinction
has been made between the dry and the rainy season. Transport during the rainy
season may be more difficult, causing for more time and fuel and maintenance costs.
Table A4.2 Transport costs per 100 kg bag of cereals, reported by DJjou (1987).
Transport costs
Dry season Rainy season













Bare Houet Ouagadougou Kadiogo 3701 600 1.6 600 1.6 0%
Bobo-Dioulasso Houet " " 3711 500 1.4 500 1.4 0%
Dano Bougouriba " " 2742 1,000 3.7 1,200 4.4 19%
Dedougou Mouhoun " " 2252 1,000 4.4 1,200 5.3 20%
Djibasso Kossi " " 3372 1,250 3.7 1,500 4.5 22%
Guelwongo Nahouri " " 2302 750 3.3 800 3.5 6%
Koudougou Boulkiemde " " 971 500 5.2 500 5.2 0%
Koupela Kouritenga " " 1371 350 2.6 350 2.6 0%
Leo Sissili " " 2053 750 3.7 1000 4.9 32%
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Cont. Table A4.2
Nouna Kossi " " 2812 1,000 3.6 1,000 3.6 0%
Po Nahouri " " 1441 500 3.5 500 3.5 0%
Pouytenga Kouritenga " " 1401 350 2.5 350 2.5 0%
Solenzo Kossi " " 3122 1,250 4 1,250 4 0%
Tenkodogo Boulgou " " 1831 350 1.9 350 1.9 0%
Tougan Sourou " " 1282 1,250 9.8 1,500 11.7 19%
Zabre Boulgou " " 1812 800 4.4 900 5 14%
Ouagadougou Kadiogo Aribinda Soum 3803 1,250 3.3 2,000 5.3 61%
" " Boulsa Namentenga 1762 800 4.6 1,200 6.8 48%
" " Djibo Soum 2903 600 2.1 750 2.6 24%
" " Dori Seno 2652 1,000 3.8 1,500 5.7 50%
" " Gorom-Gorom Oudalan 3212 2,000 6.2 3,000 9.4 52%
" " Kaya Sanmatenga 981 350 3.6 600 6.1 69%
" " Kongoussi Bam 1153 400 3.5 400 3.5 0%
" " Markoye Oudalan 3582 2,000 5.6 3,000 8.4 50%
" " Ouahigouya Yatenga 1811 500 2.8 500 2.8 0%
" " Pissila Sanmatenga 1202 500 4.2 750 6.3 50%
" " Diebougou Bougouriba 3082 1,000 3.3 1,200 3.9 18%
" " Gaoua Poni 3812 1,000 2.6 1,200 3.2 23%
" " Kombissiri Bazega 401 350 8.8 400 10 14%
" " Fada N’Gourma Gourma 2251 500 2.2 500 2.2 0%
Bare Poni Bobo-Dioulasso Houet 303 500 16.7 500 16.7 0%
Dano Bougouriba " " 1753 750 4.3 800 4.6 7%
Dedougou Mouhoun " " 1793 1,000 5.6 1,000 5.6 0%
Djibasso Kossi " " 2903 700 2.4 700 2.4 0%
N’Dorola Kenedougou " " 952 500 5.3 700 7.4 40%
Nouna Kossi " " 2353 1,000 4.3 1,000 4.3 0%
Solenzo Kossi " " 1472 800 5.4 800 5.4 0%
Tougan Sourou " " 2773 1,250 4.5 1,250 4.5 0%
Bobo-Dioulasso Houet Kaya Sanmatenga 4541 1,000 2.2 1,000 2.2 0%
" " Koudougou Boulkiemde 2881 400 1.4 400 1.4 0%
" " Ouahigouya Yatenga 3713 1,250 3.4 1,275 3.4 0%
Bobo-Dioulasso Houet Diebougou Bougouriba 1383 1,000 7.3 1,000 7.3 0%
" " Gaoua Poni 2113 1,250 5.9 1,375 6.5 10%
Diebougou Bougouriba Gaoua Poni 733 600 8.2 700 9.6 17%
Dedougou Mouhoun Ouahigouya Yatenga 1923 1,000 5.2 1,000 5.2 0%
Djibasso Kossi " " 2543 1,000 3.9 1,000 3.9 0%
Solenzo Kossi " " 2793 1,250 4.5 1,250 4.5 0%
Tougan Sourou " " 943 700 7.5 800 8.5 13%
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Ouahigouya Yatenga Aribinda Soum 1993 1,000 5.0 1,000 5.0 0%
" " Djibo Soum 1093 500 4.6 500 4.6 0%
Nouna Kossi Koudougou Boulkiemde 1843 800 4.4 800 4.4 0%
Djibasso Kossi " " 2403 1,000 4.2 1,000 4.2 0%
Tougan Sourou " " 1313 1,000 7.6 1,000 7.6 0%
Leo Sissili " " 1373 1,500 11 1,750 12.8 16%
Dori Seno Gorom-Gorom Oudalan 563 1,500 26.8 2,000 35.7 33%
Pissila Sanmatenga Dori Seno 1373 700 5.1 1,000 7.3 43%
Djibasso Kossi Dedougou Mouhoun 1123 600 5.4 700 6.3 17%
Nouna Kossi " " 563 400 7.1 600 10.7 51%
Solenzo Kossi " " 873 700 8.1 800 9.2 14%
Tougan Sourou " " 983 700 7.1 700 7.1 0%
Dedougou Mouhoun Kaya Sanmatenga 3232 1,500 4.6 1,750 5.4 17%
Koudougou Boulkiemde " " 1951 1,000 5.1 1,000 5.1 0%
Solenzo Kossi " " 4102 1,500 3.7 1,750 4.3 16%
Notes: 1) transport over asphalted road, 2) transport over both asphalted and unpaved roads, 3) transport
over unpaved and dirt roads. (c) = (b)/(a), (e) = (d)/(a), (f) = ((d)/(b)-1)*100%. Source: DJjou (1987)
A closer look at Table A4.2 shows that the transport costs of the dry and the rainy
season differ more if the villages are not connected by an asphalted road.
Furthermore, transport costs are much lower for asphalted roads than for unpaved
roads. For example, transporting from Ouagadougou to Fada N’Gourma is much
cheaper than transporting from DJdougou to Ouagadougou, while the distances are
more or less the same. The first route passes via an asphalted road, the second route is
partly via a mediocre unpaved road. Some of the differences reported in the table are
no longer valid today. Nowadays, the price between Ouagadougou and Kaya will no
longer be much higher during the rainy season, since this road has been asphalted.
The difference between dry season and rainy season transport to the Sahelian villages
is large. Road conditions in the Sahel are not very favourable. Even the road to Dori
and Gorom-Gorom is of a mediocre quality. Some strange observations made from
the table is that transporting directly from Bobo-Dioulasso to Kaya is during the dry
season more expensive than transporting from Bobo-Dioulasso to Ouagadougou and
later transporting from Ouagadougou to Kaya. This is not very realistic. It is
furthermore strange that transport costs from Bobo-Dioulasso to Ouagadougou are the
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same as transport costs from Koudougou to Ouagadougou. Going from Bobo-
Dioulasso to Ouagadougou you pass by Koudougou, so you would expect transport
costs to differ.
Green (1987), like DJjou (1987) also working in the research project of the
Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin but concentrating on trade in the Volta Noire
region (CRPA Hauts Bassins and Mouhoun), also noted the differences in transport
costs between short and long distances. She concluded that for distances shorter than
15 km, transport costs per kilometer were approximately 17 FCFA for a 100 kg bag
(ranging between 14 and 25 FCFA). For distances between 25 and 80 kilometers
transport costs are on average 12 FCFA per bag per kilometer (between 8 and 17
FCFA). Transport costs for distances exceeding 80 kilometers amounted on average 5
FCFA per bag per kilometer (ranging between 4 and 6 FCFA).
Survey by Bassolet
Also Bassolet (2000) estimated transport prices, based on his survey among cereal
traders in 1997. Table A4.3 shows that on average transport costs per kilomer are
higher for transport over short distances than for transport over larger distances
(compare for example transport from Solenzo to Bobo-Dioulasso or to DJdougou, or
transport to Pouytenga from Fada N’Gourma, Bogande or Bobo-Dioulasso).
Furthermore, transport over asphalted roads is generally cheaper than transport over
unpaved roads. Differences between dry and rainy season do not show the same
pattern as in Table A4.2. In general transport is more expensive during the rainy
season, but the difference between asphalted and unpaved roads is less clear as in
Table A4.2. For example, transport from MannJ to Gorom-Gorom over an unpaved
road has the same price during both seasons. On the other hand transport from
Ouagadougou to Gorom-Gorom, which is partly over an asphalted road, is 1/3 more
expensive during the rainy season than during the dry season. Furthermore, for the
asphalted road between Bobo-Dioulasso and Ouagadougou and between Fada
N’Gourma and KoupJla transport costs are the same in both seasons, but for the
asphalted road LJo – Ouagadougou transport costs are twice as expensive during the
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rainy season. Transport costs also depend upon the possibility for the carrier to have a
truck load on the return journey. If he is certain to have a return load, the price will be
lower. For that reason transport costs between the large urban centres are lower, than
between secondary markets. Compare for example transport costs between Pouytenga
and Bobo-Dioulasso (2.1 FCFA per km) and Pouytenga and BogandJ (8.2 FCFA per
km). The costs presented in this table reflect the costs paid by a trader if he hires the
services of a carrier. The traders interviewed who owned their own means of transport
were not asked properly to indicate the costs they made for transport and maintenance
of their vehicles.
Table A4.3 Transport costs per 100 kg bag, reported by Bassolet (2000).













Kouka Kossi Ouahigouya Yatenga 3153 1250 4,0 1575 5,0 26%
Solenzo Kossi " " 2793 1400 5,0 1675 6,0 20%
Ouahigouya Yatenga Djibo Soum 1093 550 5,0 650 6,0 18%
Manne Sanmatenga Gorom-Gorom Oudalan 2423 725 3,0 725 3,0 0%
Ouagadougou Kadiogo " " 3212 950 3,0 1300 4,0 37%
Bobo-Dioulasso Houet Pissila Sanmatenga 4672 925 2,0 1400 3,0 51%
Ouagadougou Kadiogo " " 1202 475 4,0 600 5,0 26%
Bobo-Dioulasso Houet Kaya Sanmatenga 4541 900 2,0 1350 3,0 50%
Ouagadougou Kadiogo " " 981 500 5,1 500 5,1 0%
Solenzo Kossi Ouagadougou Kadiogo 3122 625 2,0 625 2,0 0%
Leo Sissili " " 2053 500 2,4 1000 4,9 100%
Bobo-Dioulasso Houet " " 3711 700 1,9 700 1,9 0%
Pouytenga Kouritenga " " 1401 150 1,1 350 2,5 133%
Ouagadougou Kadiogo Dori Seno 2852 1000 3,5 1250 4,4 25%
Fada N’Gourma Gourma Koupela Kouritenga 881 600 6,8 600 6,8 0%
Fada N’Gourma Gourma Pouytenga Kouritenga 1201 750 6,3 1200 10,0 60%
Bogande Gnagna " " 923 750 8,2 750 8,2 0%
Bobo-Dioulasso Houet " " 5131 1075 2,1 1075 2,1 0%
Orodara Kenedougou N’Doroloa Kenedougou 973 500 5,2 850 8,8 70%
Koloko Kenedougou " " 1223 800 6,6
Koundougou Houet Dande Houet 172 250 14,7 350 20,6 40%
Kouka Kossi Bobo-Dioulasso Houet 1032 600 5,8 800 7,8 33%
Banwale Houet " " 752 600 8,0 800 10,7 33%
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Cont. Table A4.3
Solenzo Kossi " " 1472 700 4,8 700 4,8 0%
Solenzo Kossi Dedougou Mouhoun 873 700 8,0 700 8,0 0%
Notes: 1) Connected by asphalted roads; 2) Transport over both asphalted and unpaved roads; 3)
Connected by unpaved roads. (c) = (b)/(a), (e) = (d)/(a), (f) = ((d)/(b)-1)*100%.  Source: Inquiry 1997 by
Bassolet (2000).
Distances
In Section 8.2 the transport costs between the main centres in the different CRPA are
estimated. The costs per kilometer are based on the above evaluation of transport
surveys. The distances between the centres, as well as the distance over asphalted
roads, unpaved roads and dirt roads are estimated on the basis of the road map of
Burkina Faso – see Table A4.4.
A4.2   Storage costs
Storage costs determine to a certain extent the price difference between two periods.
The storage costs estimated in Section 8.2 include physical and financial storage
costs. Physical costs include, according to Bassolet (2000) the costs for the
storehouses (rent, depreciation, maintenance), costs for conservation (insecticides,
shelves), and surveillance costs. Also storage losses must be taken into account.
Financial costs include, according to Bassolet, opportunity costs, which indicate the
benefits the trader could earn by investing in other activities. For many costs it is
difficult to estimate the costs per 100 kg bag. Rent or maintenance of a storehouse
must be paid, even if it is not totally full. A storehouse will not be totally filled during
the entire year. Surveillance costs must be paid, even if only one bag is stored.
Storehouses
DJjou (1987) reports that it is difficult to obtain detailed data concerning storage
houses and storage costs. For producers storage costs are low. They can easily and
cheaply build new cereal sheds. Storage costs for small traders are also low. They
store the few bags they trade at home. On the other hand, larger traders on the semi-
urban and urban markets have to rent storehouses. DJjou (1987) reports that the large
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storehouses may cost up to 15,000 FCFA per month. She does, however, not mention
how many bags can be stored in such a storehouse. On the urban markets traders
often have to rent small hangars on the market place, to store the merchandise they
sell during the market day. These hangars, which are often rented with two or three
traders, cost 750 to 1000 FCFA monthly during the mid 80’s. Bassolet (2000) gives
monthly costs to rent storehouses on market places, subdivided by type of trader
(wholesaler or semi-wholesaler; see Table A4.5). Rents depend on the storage
capacity of the storehouses and the availability on the market. Bassolet, however,
does not mention the capacity of the storehouses.
Surveillance
For the larger store houses, also surveillance costs must be paid. According to DJjou
(1987), the former cereal board OFNACER charged a daily tariff of 200 FCFA for a
guard. Bassolet (2000) gives totally different surveillance costs. He mentions costs
which differ between 10,000 and 50,000 FCFA per month.





























Centre Ouagadougou 0 98 97 165 97 265 203 225 218 225 137 181 308 356 441
Centre Nord Kaya 98 0 195 263 195 167 146 323 258 229 141 164 406 454 539
Centre Ouest Koudougou 97 195 0 137 197 362 300 128 131 322 234 165 240 288 373
Centre Ouest Leo 165 263 137 0 223 430 368 264 268 390 302 346 133 269 354
Centre Sud Manga 97 195 194 223 0 362 300 322 315 218 130 278 356 453 538
Sahel Dori 265 167 362 430 362 0 188 490 392 261 273 297 573 621 706
Sahel Djibo 203 146 300 368 300 188 0 301 203 428 340 109 511 559 644
Mouhoun Dedougou 225 323 128 264 322 490 301 0 98 450 362 192 317 179 264
Mouhoun Tougan 218 258 131 268 315 391 203 98 0 453 365 94 415 277 362
Est Fada N’Gourma 225 229 322 390 218 261 428 450 453 0 88 396 533 581 666
Centre Est Koupela 137 141 234 302 130 273 340 362 365 88 0 305 445 493 578
Nord Ouahigouya 181 164 165 346 278 297 109 192 94 396 305 0 489 371 456
Sud Ouest Diebougou 308 406 240 133 356 573 511 317 415 533 445 489 0 138 223
Hauts Bassins Bobo-Dioulasso 356 454 288 269 453 621 559 179 277 581 493 371 138 0 85
Comoe Banfora 441 539 373 354 538 706 644 264 362 666 578 456 223 85 0





























Centre Ouagadougou 0 98 97 0 97 98 0 97 97 225 137 181 224 356 441
Centre Nord Kaya 98 0 195 98 170 0 0 195 0 133 45 0 322 454 539
Centre Ouest Koudougou 97 195 0 0 172 195 97 0 0 322 234 74 132 267 352
Centre Ouest Leo 0 98 0 0 70 98 0 0 0 225 137 181 0 0 85
Centre Sud Manga 97 170 169 70 0 170 72 169 169 133 45 253 70 428 513
Sahel Dori 98 0 195 98 170 0 0 195 0 0 8 0 322 454 539
Sahel Djibo 0 0 97 0 72 0 0 0 0 225 137 0 224 356 441
Mouhoun Dedougou 97 195 0 0 169 195 0 0 0 322 234 0 0 0 85
Mouhoun Tougan 97 0 0 0 169 0 0 0 0 322 234 0 277 277 362
Est Fada
N’Gourma
225 133 322 225 133 0 225 322 322 0 88 396 449 581 666
Centre Est Koupela 137 45 234 137 45 8 137 234 234 88 0 305 361 493 578
Nord Ouahigouya 181 0 74 181 253 0 0 0 0 396 305 0 405 371 456





356 454 267 0 428 454 356 0 277 581 493 371 0 0 85
Comoe Banfora 441 539 352 85 513 539 441 85 362 666 578 456 85 85 0





























Centre Ouagadougou 0 0 0 165 0 167 203 128 121 0 0 0 0 0 0
Centre Nord Kaya 0 0 0 165 25 167 91 128 145 0 0 0 0 0 0
Centre Ouest Koudougou 0 0 0 137 25 167 203 128 131 0 0 0 0 0 0
Centre Ouest Leo 165 165 137 0 58 332 368 264 268 165 165 165 81 81 81
Centre Sud Manga 0 25 25 58 0 192 228 153 146 85 85 25 139 25 25
Sahel Dori 167 167 167 332 192 0 188 295 283 261 195 188 167 167 167
Sahel Djibo 203 91 203 368 228 188 0 192 94 203 203 0 203 203 203
Mouhoun Dedougou 128 128 128 264 153 295 192 0 98 128 128 192 179 179 179
Mouhoun Tougan 121 145 131 268 146 282 94 98 0 131 131 94 0 0 0
Est Fada
N’Gourma
0 0 0 165 85 261 203 128 131 0 0 0 0 0 0
Centre Est Koupela 0 0 0 165 85 195 203 128 131 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nord Ouahigouya 0 0 0 165 25 188 0 192 94 0 0 0 0 0 0





0 0 0 81 25 167 203 179 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Comoe Banfora 0 0 0 81 25 167 203 179 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





























Centre Ouagadougou 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 84 0 0
Centre Nord Kaya 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 0 113 96 96 164 84 0 0
Centre Ouest Koudougou 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 91 108 21 21
Centre Ouest Leo 0 0 0 0 95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 52 188 188
Centre Sud Manga 0 0 0 95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 147 0 0
Sahel Dori 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 109 0 70 109 84 0 0
Sahel Djibo 0 55 0 0 0 0 0 109 109 0 0 109 84 0 0
Mouhoun Dedougou 0 0 0 0 0 0 109 0 0 0 0 0 138 0 0
Mouhoun Tougan 0 113 0 0 0 109 109 0 0 0 0 0 138 0 0
Est Fada
N’Gourma
0 96 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 84 0 0
Centre Est Koupela 0 96 0 0 0 70 0 0 0 0 0 0 84 0 0
Nord Ouahigouya 0 164 91 0 0 109 109 0 0 0 0 0 84 0 0





0 0 21 188 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 138 0 0
Comoe Banfora 0 0 21 188 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 138 0 0
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Table A4.5 Monthly rents for storehouses (FCFA), reported by Bassolet (2000).
Monthly rentMarket Province
Merchant1 Average trader1
Bobo-Dioulasso Houet 4,000 to 6,000 1,300 to 2,000
DandJ Houet 1,500
DJdougou Mouhoun 15,000 5,000 to 10,000
Djibo Soum 4,500 1,000 to 2,500
Dori Seno 15,000 7,000
Gorom-Gorom Oudalan 10,000 to 20,000 1,000 to 8,000
Guelwongo Nahouri 5,000 1,500 to 3,000
Kaya Sanmatenga 10,000 1,000 to 5,000
KoupJla Kouritenga 3,500 500 to 2,500
Manga Zoundweogo 4,000 500
N’Dorola Kenedougou 1,000
Ouagadougou Kadiogo 50,000 to 100,000 1,000 to 25,000
Ouahigouya Yatenga 10,000 1,000 to 5,000
Pissila Sanmatenga 7,500 1,000 to 5,000
Pouytenga Kouritenga 3,000 to 6,000 500 to 2,750
Solenzo Kossi 7,500 to 10,000 5,000
Note: 1) unfortunately Bassolet did not mention the business size in kg traded for merchants
and average traders. As a consequence we can not present the rents per bag.
Source: Inquiry 1997 by Bassolet (2000)
Storage losses
Storage losses depend on the place and the way of storing. Sherman et al. (1987)
report storage losses to be approximately 10% per year if the cereals are stored on the
producers’ farms, and 15 to 20% per year if they are stored in storehouses. DJjou
(1987), however, believes that this is a little overestimated, and furthermore, this
figure is less important since most traders no not stock for such a long time. Sedes et
al. (1990) observed storage losses of 8% among traders in Bobo-Dioulasso, for a




DJjou (1987) also emphasizes the risk associated with borrowing money. Prices may
suddenly fall, or the price increase may be lower than the credit costs. These credit
costs may be considerable for many traders. Although official bank loans have
interest rates of approximately 11 to 15% (DJjou, 1987), only the large traders do
have the necessary collateral to obtain such loans (Bassolet (2000) reports that only
0.7% of the surveyed traders receive official bank loans). Other traders may obtain
short term loans (for 1 to 6 months) from family members, large traders, decentralised
financial institutions or other money lenders. Common interest rates for these money
lenders, observed by DJjou (1987), may be up to 2 to 4% per month. Other financial
institutions charge, according to Bassolet (2000) 20% per year (the cooperative
savings and credit organisation COPEC) or 13% per year (the national agency for
agricultural credit CNCA). Bassolet (2000) applies the interest rate of the CNCA
since most surveyed traders obtain loans from this organisation. Next to these interest
costs due to money borrowed, traders may have considerable costs due to loans that
are not reimbursed by their customers or by intermediaries working on the account of
the trader. DJjou (1987) reports that these costs appear to be significative. However,
no data are available on these losses.
A4.3   Other trading costs
Other costs which have to be made by traders include personnel costs, cereal bags,
and taxes. Finally, also opportunity costs must be considered. Estimates made in
Section 8.2 are based on the data discussed below.
Personnel costs
Personnel costs are difficult to estimate per 100 kg bag. Personnel costs differ a lot
between the different types of traders. Many traders operate alone, others have an
extensive network of buying and selling agents. Some pay salaries to their
middlemen, others pay them a commission per bag. Furthermore, as DJjou (1987) has
shown, the profit margin which remains after all costs have been subtracted from the
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consumer price differs a lot between the different seasons and between the different
markets. The trader’s salary is not a fixed proportion of the price, and may even be
negative during some market days, if the trader made some speculation errors. DJjou
(1987) reports salaries of 15,000 to 20,000 FCFA per month for intermediaries with
lower responsabilities up to 60,000 FCFA per month for regional coordinators. She
does, however, not report how many bags are collected by these intermediaries.
Intermediaries may also obtain a commission per 100 kg bag collected, which may be
between 100 and 250 FCFA. Relatives sometimes only obtain an allowance for daily
expenses and some ‘gifts’ (DJjou, 1987). Furthermore, local personnel who load and
unload trucks receive 50 FCFA for each bag carried. Bassolet (2000) found other
personnel costs. He observed payments to assistents of 500 FCFA per market day,
and salaries of employees of 25,000 FCFA per month. Loading and unloading costs
were reported to be 250 FCFA per bag on average.
Cereal bags
Next to personnel costs, also the costs for purchasing bags must be considered. DJjou
(1987) reports bag prices which vary between 250 FCFA and 500 FCFA, depending
on the condition of the bags. During periods of scarcity of bags, the prices may
increase. Bassolet (2000) mentions prices between 275 and 300 FCFA.
Taxes
To sell on the market, traders must also pay taxes. Business taxes, which are
proportional to the quantity traded, must be paid on a yearly basis. Many traders do
not pay these taxes, but they pretend to work for a merchant whenever they are
inspected. Many other traders often pay less than required. For importing and
exporting merchants with sales exceeding 200 million FCFA annually, these taxes are
approximately 10%, for smaller im/exporters it is approximately 15-20% of annual
sales. Nationally operating traders pay a fixed fee and a part which is proportional to
their sales. The amount of the fixed fee for the mid ‘80s is shown in Table A4.6. The
fee proportional to their sales is between 8% and 12% (DJjou, 1987). Daily market
taxes are collected from all traders who want to sell on a market by the market
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coordinators. These taxes may be 25 FCFA for small women retailers (vendeuses) but
vary according to the quantity sold (DJjou, 1987).
Table A4.6 Fixed annual trade taxes (in FCFA), reported by DJjou (1987).
Fixed annual trade tax Amount of annual transactions (FCFA)






































Source: MinistPre du Commerce, taken from DJjou (1987).
Bassolet (2000) distinguishes between three categories of taxes: trade taxes, market
taxes and rent for stores and shops on the market places. These last are no real taxes,
and have already been treated in the section on storage costs. According to him, the
trade tax is an annual tax which is proportional to the business size, which is
estimated by the treasury. Trade taxes mentioned by the traders on a number of
markets are presented in Table A4.7. The data in this table do not show the taxes
classified by the amount of transactions, like in Table A4.6. For that reason, the
maximum trade tax for wholesalers may differ. Bassolet notes that taxes on the ‘more
dynamic’ markets (like Pouytenga and Gorom-Gorom), and on the secondary markets
(like Ouahigouya and Dori) are higher than on the large urban centres (Ouagadougou
and Bobo-Dioulasso). This contradicts the trade taxes presented by DJjou (1987).
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Table A4.7 Annual trade taxes, reported by Bassolet (2000).
Annual trade taxMarket Province
Wholesaler Retailer
Bobo-Dioulasso Houet 20,000 to 45,000 2,000 to 15,000
Dande Houet 25,000 7,500 to 15,000
Dedougou Mouhoun 45,000 15,000 to 19,000
Djibo Soum 45,000 7,000 to 40,000
Dori Seno 35,000 to 75,000 15,000 to 30,000
Gorom-Gorom Oudalan 50,000 to 75,000 20,000 to 25,000
Guelwongo Nahouri 25,000 to 50,000 10,000
Kaya Sanmatenga 50,000 8,000 to 40,000
Koupela Kouritenga 30,000 8,000 to 20,000
Manga Zoundweogo 25,000 15,000
N’Dorola Kenedougou 28,000 to 50,000 8,000 to 25,000
Ouagadougou Kadiogo 20,000 to 25,000 5,000 to 18,000
Ouahigouya Yatenga 37,500 to 200,000 18,000 to 35,000
Pissila Sanmatenga 30,000 4,000 to 20,000
Pouytenga Kouritenga 30,000 to 100,000 13,000 to 24,000
Solenzo Kossi 30,000 to 50,000 15,000 to 25,000
Source: Inquiry 1997 by Bassolet (2000).
Market taxes are paid daily by all traders, to pay for using the market infrastructure.
Wholesalers who rent a storehouse or shop on the market pay monthly, other traders
pay on a daily basis. The tax is proportional to the quality of the infrastructure. For
example, market taxes on non-furnished, rural market places are 25 FCFA per day,
while traders in Ouagadougou have to pay 50 FCFA per day and traders in
Ouahigouya and Djibo even have to pay 100 FCFA daily. In Table A4.8 these market
taxes are reported for a number of markets.
A4.4   Marketing margins
As becomes clear from the above discussion, it is difficult to indicate for all expenses
the costs per 100 kg bag. Many costs are fixed, and are independent on the level of
transactions. It is therefore complicated to estimate the marketing margins of cereal
traders. The estimates of trading costs discussed in Section 8.2, must however be
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given in FCFA per bag of 100 kg. The surveys discussed below estimated the trading
costs discussed in the Appendices A2.1 to A2.4 per bag of 100 kg of cereals.
Studies by Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin
Sherman et al. (1987) made estimates of the market margins for some well described
trade routes. They argue that estimating margins is always a ‘best guess’ situation
even with excellent data, since the variability of costs and prices between traders and
between months is large. They estimated for four trade routes the costs made and the
margins earned by the traders, see Table A4.9. Each of the routes presented is
representative of comparable routes within the same region. For example, the costs
made by a trader to purchase white sorghum in Djibasso and sell it in Ouagadougou
are similar to the costs if the white sorghum would be purchased in other villages in
the CRPA Mouhoun.








Bobo-Dioulasso1 Houet 1000 750 25
Dande3 Houet 1000 1000 25
Dedougou3 Mouhoun 7500 625
Djibo3 Soum 1500 400 100
Dori3 Seno 400 200 100
Gorom-Gorom3 Oudalan 400 200 100
Guelwongo2 Nahouri 1000 1000 100
Kaya1 Sanmatenga 1000 500 25
Koupela2 Kouritenga 15
Manga2 Zoundweogo 1000 200 50
N’Dorola3 Kenedougou 100 25
Ouagadougou1 Kadiogo 1000 600 50
Ouahigouya1 Yatenga 1000 750 100
Pissila2 Sanmatenga 1000 500 25
Pouytenga2 Kouritenga 15
Notes: 1) Daily market; 2) Market every three days; 3) Weekly market. In some cities, smaller markets
are held every day, but some days are more important according to the regional schedule (once a week or
once every three days).
Source: Inquiry 1997 by Bassolet (2000).
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Table A4.9 Rough estimates of net margins per 100 kg bag of white sorghum for
large traders, by Sherman et al., 1987.
a)  Nouna (Kossi) to Ouahigouya (Yatenga)

























































































































































b) Djibasso (Kossi) to Ouagadougou (Kadiogo)


























































































































































c) Nouna (Kossi) to Bobo-Dioulasso (Houet)

























































































































































d) Ouagadougou (Kadiogo) to Dori (Seno)

























































































































































Notes: (a) Commision to village buyers and coordinators; (b) Personnel costs are discussed in the text below; (c)
Sundry costs include taxes, licence fees, bribes, warehousing, etc; (d) the costs of a bag is 200 FCFA, loading and
unloading a bag from a truck is 100 FCFA each; (e) Capital costs are estimated as the return the trader could have
made on his money if he had invested it in other activities, which are evaluated at 1% to 4% of the invested capital per
month; (f) total storage and other trading costs = (a) + (b) + (c) + (d) + (e); (g) The net margin is the sales price minus
all the other costs.  Source: Sherman et al., 1987.
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To estimate the personnel costs in Table A4.9 it is supposed that wholesale traders
employ two apprentices and a warehouseman. The salaries of the employees are
supposed to be the same as for low-level civil servants, i.e. 20,000 FCFA/month. The
salary of the trader is evaluated at that of a high-level civil servant, which is supposed
to compensate for his expertise and managerial capabilities. To estimate the personnel
costs per bag, the salaries are divided by the number of bags traded. Since the number
of bags traded differs per season, personnel costs are not the same in all periods. The
warehousing costs are estimated for an estimated average storage time of one month.
Estimates of storage costs are not given seperately, but are included in the sundry
costs, which include taxes and license fees. Capital costs are interpreted as the returns
the trader could have made on his money if he would have invested it in other
activities. Sherman et al. (1987) evaluate them to be at least the commercial rate of
interest, which was 12% per year.
The last column in Table A4.9 shows the estimated net margins on cereal trade. These
turn out to be negative in most months. Reasons for this may be that the trader’s
salary is estimated too high, or that the purchase and sales prices for a 100 kg bag are
not correct. The prices given in the table are the observed market prices for a bag.
However, bags are normally heavier when purchased from producers then when sold
to consumers. A large part of the margins will be earned from this practice, which is
not taken into account in the data presented above.  Another reason is that trade flows
are not occuring in all months. For example, not many cereals will be transported
from Ouagadougou to Dori in Februari. Traders will transport more to Dori later in
the year, when local stocks are depleted.
Study by B. Bassolet
Bassolet (2000) executed some case studies to be able to calculate for some traders
and for some well specified situations the total trading costs per bag. Using these
estimates it is possible to get an idea of the marketing margins of these traders.
Bassolet collected for a few traders detailed information on the costs they made, their
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strategies, the quantity they trade, and the prices they paid and received per bag. On
the basis of this he calculated the costs per 100 kg bag. He measured the following
elements:
1. Transport costs: the costs per bag to transport a bag from the purchase to the sales
market.
2. Storage costs: renting costs, surveillance, insecticides if the traders store for at
least four months. The total costs are divided by the number of bags purchased by
the trader.
3. Bags: cost per bag to store cereals.
4. Annual taxes: Annual taxes are divided by the quantity traded to obtain taxes per
bag.
5. Daily market taxes: It is supposed that only one bag is traded per market day. So,
costs per bag are equal to the daily market tax.
6. Travel costs of the trader to travel to the markets, including costs for food, drinks,
etc.
7. Personnel costs: agents working on a commission basis receive a fixed amount
per bag. The personnel costs per bag for montly paid personnel is calculated as
their salary divided by the number of bags traded.
8. Loading costs: costs to load and unload the trucks.
9. Gifts, etc.
10. Opportunity costs: foregone profits during the storage period.
For three different types of transactions Bassolet (2000) estimated for five different
traders their trading costs. The first type of transaction considers intra-regional cereal
trade by a merchant in Solenzo in the province of Kossi, who purchases in
neighbouring villages, and who stores his merchandise for one month, before selling
it in Solenzo. He sells approximately 600 bags per month, and he sells in retail to
consumers and in bulk to merchants from the central and Sahelian regions of the
country. The second type of transaction considers interregional trade with a storage
period not exceeding one month. Two cases are distinguished here: a semi-merchant
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and a merchant from Ouagadougou. The semi-merchant, who sells approximately 200
bags per month, purchases in the south-western regions of the country. His average
storage length is 15 days, and he sells to retailers and consumers. The merchant sells
approximately 1200 bags per month which are stored for an average length of one
month before selling it to the merchants of Dori and Ouahigouya. The third type of
transaction considers interregional cereal trade with a storage length of four months.
The costs of a merchant in Dori and one in Ouahigouya are evaluated. The merchant
in Dori purchases on average approximately 700 bags per month from traders in
Ouagadougou, MannJ and Bobo-Dioulasso. The merchant from Ouahigouya
purchases in Bobo-Dioulasso, Solenzo and Mali. He sells approximately 750 bags per
month to consumers and to other traders. He stocks for about 4 months before selling.
The trading costs of these traders are presented in Table A4.10 and Table A4.11.





















































Purchase price 8250 11938 11993
Sales price 9300 12417 12528
Net margin1 657 -844 -705
Note: 1) Net margin = Sales price – Purchase price – Total costs
Source: Bassolet (2000).
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Table A4.11 Trading costs in FCFA per 100 kg bag for a storage time of
approximately four months.



































Purchase price 9975 8950
Sales price 13333 11278
Net margin1 2058 718
Note: 1) Net margin = Sales price – Purchase price – Total costs
Source: Bassolet (2000).
Some of the costs reported by Bassolet seem very low. For example, no personnel
costs are reported for three of the 5 traders interviewed. This is strange if you
consider the quantity traded, which can impossibly be handled by the merchant alone.
Salaries and commissions paid to personnel which are reported by DJjou (1987) and
Bassolet himself, amount at least 250 FCFA per bag (see Appendix A2.3).
Differences between storage costs are also large. It may be well possible that the
traders interviewed forgot some of the costs they have to make, either because it are
sunk costs or because activities are carried out by relatives who are paid in kind. The
opportunity costs are non-negligible. Bassolet estimates them on the basis of the
annual interest rate charged by the CNCA, which is 13% per year. The net margins
which can be calculated on the basis of the results of the two tables show large
differences. For two traders the net margins turn out to be negative, for the other three
they are positive and large. Unlike Sherman et al. (1987) above, Bassolet does not
include the salaries of the traders in the traders’ costs. This is one of the reason why
the estimated margins are high for some of the trade routes. Although it is normal to
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exclude the traders’ salary if the traders’ margins are calculated, we have to include
them in our study. After all, the trade costs considered in our approach have to
account for the entire difference between consumer and producer prices. This
difference includes the margins earned by the traders (i.e. his salary).
The storage and trade costs estimated by Sherman et al. (1987) are considerably
higher than those estimated by Bassolet (2000). Reasons are that Bassolet neglected
some of the costs (e.g. salary of the trader himself), and that some of his estimates are
rather unreliable. We therefore apply in Section 8.2 above all the study of Sherman et
al. (1987) to estimate the storage and other trading costs.
